Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

# PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints

## Summary

PraisonAI's documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.

The current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host="0.0.0.0"` for remote access.

This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI's prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.

This report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.

## Affected Components

- Package: `praisonaiagents` - Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` - Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57` - Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisona…