Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

**Title** Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement

**CWE** CWE-862 Missing Authorization

**CVSS v3.1** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Base score: **6.5 (Medium)**

**Severity Assessment** Medium. This is a real authorization flaw in OpenClaw’s internal control plane. The issue does not require host access, trusted local state tampering, or multi-tenant assumptions, but exploitation does require an already authenticated internal Gateway caller with `operator.write`.

**Impact** An authenticated internal Gateway caller limited to `operator.write` can perform state-changing `/allowlist` actions without `operator.admin`, even though comparable mutating internal chat commands already require `operator.admin`. The reachable effects are persistent changes to config-backed `allowFrom` entries and pairing-store-backed allowlist entries.

This is not a semantic-modeling complaint and not a generic “trusted operator can do things” claim. It is a missing authorization check inside OpenClaw’s own internal scope model, where peer mutating command surfaces already distinguish `operator.write` from `operator.admin`.

**Affected Component** Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`.

Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: - `src/auto-reply/reply/co…