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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.907018+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90053</id>
    <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90053</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.964047+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90053"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90053</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-90053</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.964145+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops</p>
<p>htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl-&gt;filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.</p>
<p>Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.</p>
<p>The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -&gt; inner -&gt; leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classif…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90053"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f6p9-726c-vrmc</id>
    <title>GHSA-f6p9-726c-vrmc</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.964243+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops</p>
<p>htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl-&gt;filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.</p>
<p>Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.</p>
<p>The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -&gt; inner -&gt; leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classif…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-f6p9-726c-vrmc"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</id>
    <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.964310+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90053</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90053</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:50:04.964749+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching to cl-&gt;filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic from a single packet. Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this qdisc or its parent. The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced: htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal root -&gt; inner -&gt; leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not affect legitimate classificat…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90053"/>
  </entry>
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