<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-01T12:35:20.113202+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84371</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-84371</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T12:35:20.116034+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. From version 1.9.0 until version 2.17.7, packages/sanitize-html/index.js validates an animation value attribute as one flat URL and does not recognize that attributeName selecting href or xlink:href gives the sibling values, from, to, or by attribute SVG SMIL URL semantics. In configurations that allow the animate, animateColor, animateMotion, animateTransform, or set elements, a values list can begin with a safe fragment and contain a later executable destination that survives allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes checking. When the sanitized SVG is rendered, the browser can copy that later destination into the live link, and a victim who activates the link can execute script in the application's origin. This issue is fixed in version 2.17.7.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84371"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8qq-57p8-ggw5</id>
    <title>GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5 — ApostropheCMS: Stored XSS via SVG SMIL URI-list scheme-policy bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T12:35:20.116160+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sanitize-html</p>
<p>### Summary
When SVG animation is allowed, `attributeName="href"` makes `values` a list of URL destinations. `sanitize-html` accepts a list that starts with a safe fragment even when `values` is explicitly scheme-checked, allowing a later `javascript:` destination to execute when the sanitized link is activated.</p>
<p>### Details
`index.js:371-383` validates each attribute as one flat URL. It does not recognize that `attributeName="href"` gives the sibling `values` attribute SMIL URI-list semantics. For `values="#safe;javascript:..."`, the leading fragment passes the flat check and the complete list is retained.</p>
<p>### PoC
This was reproduced with `sanitize-html@2.17.6` and Chromium 150.0.7871.124. The configuration adds SVG animation to the defaults and applies the existing scheme policy to `values`; it does not allow `javascript:`. Save this as `poc.js`:</p>
<p>```js
const sanitize = require('sanitize-html');</p>
<p>const input = `&lt;svg&gt;&lt;a&gt;&lt;animate attributeName="href" values="#safe;javascript:alert('XSS')" dur=".01s" fill="freeze"&gt;&lt;/animate&gt;&lt;text y="30"&gt;Click me&lt;/text&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/svg&gt;`;
const output = sanitize(input, {
  allowedTags: sanitize.defaults.allowedTags.concat(['svg', 'animate', 'text']),
  allowedAttributes: {
    ...sanitize.defaults.allowedAttributes,
    animate: ['attributename', 'values', 'dur', 'fill'],
    text: ['y']
  },
  allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes:
    sanitize.defaults.allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes.concat(['values'])
});
console.log(output);
```</p>
<p>Install and run i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8qq-57p8-ggw5"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
