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  <updated>2026-10-07T18:25:33.962095+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-mcp-atlassian-ghsa-489g-7rxv-6c8q</id>
    <title>BREW-mcp-atlassian-GHSA-489g-7rxv-6c8q — MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP): DNS-rebinding TOCTOU bypass of the SSRF fix (CVE-2026-27826): unauthen…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T18:25:33.967495+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: mcp-atlassian</p>
<p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). From 0.17.0 until 0.22.0, validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the attacker-controlled X-Atlassian-Jira-Url and X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url header host once at middleware time, but the outbound request is built with the raw hostname and resolves it again at connection time with no IP pinning. An attacker-controlled DNS-rebinding name can return a public IP during validation and 169.254.169.254 or another internal IP during connection, enabling unauthenticated server-side requests to cloud metadata or internal services. The flaw spans src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py, src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py, and src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py; validate_url_for_ssrf returns only a verdict rather than a pinned IP, UserTokenMiddleware processes the attacker-controlled headers before fetcher creation, and the Jira and Confluence fetchers use the raw hostname. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-mcp-atlassian-ghsa-489g-7rxv-6c8q"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73497</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-73497</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T18:25:33.967654+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). From 0.17.0 until 0.22.0, validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the attacker-controlled X-Atlassian-Jira-Url and X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url header host once at middleware time, but the outbound request is built with the raw hostname and resolves it again at connection time with no IP pinning. An attacker-controlled DNS-rebinding name can return a public IP during validation and 169.254.169.254 or another internal IP during connection, enabling unauthenticated server-side requests to cloud metadata or internal services. The flaw spans src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py, src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py, and src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py; validate_url_for_ssrf returns only a verdict rather than a pinned IP, UserTokenMiddleware processes the attacker-controlled headers before fetcher creation, and the Jira and Confluence fetchers use the raw hostname. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73497"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-489g-7rxv-6c8q</id>
    <title>GHSA-489g-7rxv-6c8q — MCP Atlassian: DNS-rebinding TOCTOU bypass of the SSRF fix (CVE-2026-27826)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T18:25:33.967728+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p>
<p>### Summary
GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9's fix added `validate_url_for_ssrf`, which resolves the attacker-controlled `X-Atlassian-{Jira,Confluence}-Url` header host **once at middleware time** and trusts the result. But the outbound request is later built with the **raw hostname** and **re-resolves at connect time with no IP pinning**. An attacker-controlled rebinding DNS name returns a public IP on the guard's lookup (validation passes) and `169.254.169.254` / an internal IP on the request's lookup (the socket connects there) → unauthenticated SSRF to cloud metadata / internal services on the **patched** build.</p>
<p>### Relationship to CVE-2026-27826 / GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9 (incomplete fix — please read first)
This is an **incomplete-fix sibling** of the published `GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9` (the `X-Atlassian-*-Url` header SSRF). That fix (PR #986/#1005) added a single middleware-time resolve + allowlist DNS-skip, but **does not pin the validated IP to the connection** — the fetcher re-resolves the raw hostname at connect time, so the documented SSRF mitigation is incomplete against DNS-rebinding. The other advisory `GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4` (file-write) is unrelated. Verified live (2026-06-27): neither advisory, nor any open PR/issue (`rebind`/`TOCTOU`/`getaddrinfo`/`pin` → 0), covers connect-time re-resolution. Filing as an incomplete-fix of GHSA-7r34 (not a standalone fresh SSRF).</p>
<p>### Affected
`src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py` + `servers/main.py` + `servers/dependencies.py`, HEAD `ba72540` (PyP…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-489g-7rxv-6c8q"/>
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