<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T12:07:07.750768+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72825</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-72825</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:07:08.008513+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The getgrav/grav-plugin-api plugin before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in the POST /reports/twig-content/allowlist endpoint (ReportsController). The endpoint enforces requirePermission('api.config.write') followed by a bare isSuperAdmin() check instead of requireSuper(). Because isSuperAdmin() reads access.api.super directly and never consults api_key_scopes, a least-privilege API key scoped to api.config.write minted on a super account passes the gate, allowing an attacker to append attacker-chosen tokens to the security.twig_sandbox allowlist (persisted to user/config/security.yaml). Widening the allowlist turns any subsequent Twig-in-content render into an SSTI/RCE sink.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72825"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rv98-5gw8-6hf9</id>
    <title>GHSA-rv98-5gw8-6hf9</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:07:08.008625+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The getgrav/grav-plugin-api plugin before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in the POST /reports/twig-content/allowlist endpoint (ReportsController). The endpoint enforces requirePermission('api.config.write') followed by a bare isSuperAdmin() check instead of requireSuper(). Because isSuperAdmin() reads access.api.super directly and never consults api_key_scopes, a least-privilege API key scoped to api.config.write minted on a super account passes the gate, allowing an attacker to append attacker-chosen tokens to the security.twig_sandbox allowlist (persisted to user/config/security.yaml). Widening the allowlist turns any subsequent Twig-in-content render into an SSTI/RCE sink.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rv98-5gw8-6hf9"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
