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  <updated>2026-09-29T11:58:44.543037+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72823</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-72823</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:58:44.819813+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in DemoController. Its private requireSuper() method checks isSuperAdmin() and returns early before invoking requirePermission(), so the api_key_scopes cap (enforced only in requirePermission()) is skipped. As a result, any scoped API key minted on a super account can bypass its scope restrictions when calling the baseline() and reset() operations (e.g. POST /api/v1/demo/reset), allowing it to capture the demo baseline or force a demo reset. Impact is bounded to demo-engine control and is conditional on demo mode being configured with writable resources.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72823"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mfhq-ghcj-c36q</id>
    <title>GHSA-mfhq-ghcj-c36q</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:58:44.819913+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in DemoController. Its private requireSuper() method checks isSuperAdmin() and returns early before invoking requirePermission(), so the api_key_scopes cap (enforced only in requirePermission()) is skipped. As a result, any scoped API key minted on a super account can bypass its scope restrictions when calling the baseline() and reset() operations (e.g. POST /api/v1/demo/reset), allowing it to capture the demo baseline or force a demo reset. Impact is bounded to demo-engine control and is conditional on demo mode being configured with writable resources.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mfhq-ghcj-c36q"/>
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