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  <updated>2026-10-06T01:55:17.569681+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65959</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-65959</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:55:17.761223+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Vitess is a database clustering system for horizontal scaling of MySQL. In 24.0.2 and earlier, the /debug/vrlog endpoint registered by addHttpEndpoint() in go/vt/vttablet/tabletmanager/vreplication/vrlog.go invokes vrlogStatsHandler() without acl.CheckAccessHTTP(r, acl.DEBUGGING), unlike comparable debug endpoints. A remote caller who can reach the vttablet debug HTTP port can bypass the configured security policy and stream VrLogStats data produced from NewVrLogStats().Send(), including literal SQL statements and bound application values from MoveTables, Reshard, Materialize, and vitess-strategy Online DDL workflows</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65959"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mhc4-g3wh-cw7m</id>
    <title>GHSA-mhc4-g3wh-cw7m — Vitess: Missing authorization on vttablet /debug/vrlog exposes live VReplication SQL data</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:55:17.761611+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: vitess.io/vitess</p>
<p>## Vulnerability Details</p>
<p>**File**: `go/vt/vttablet/tabletmanager/vreplication/vrlog.go`</p>
<p>### Summary
`vttablet`'s `/debug/vrlog` HTTP endpoint streams live VReplication event data — including the literal SQL DML statements being replicated by MoveTables, Reshard, Materialize, and "vitess"-strategy Online DDL workflows — with no authorization check at all. Every comparable "debugging" HTTP endpoint in vttablet/vtgate (querylogz, queryz, txlogz, livequeryz, schemaz, debugenv, hotrows, tablet_plans, query_stats, query_rules) calls `acl.CheckAccessHTTP(r, acl.DEBUGGING)` before serving data, so that the cluster operator's configured `--security-policy` (e.g. `deny-all`, `read-only`, or a custom plugin) is actually honored. `vrlog.go` is the one exception: it has zero references to the `acl` package.</p>
<p>### Root Cause
`addHttpEndpoint()` registers `/debug/vrlog` via `servenv.HTTPHandleFunc`, and `vrlogStatsHandler()` immediately starts streaming subscribed `VrLogStats` events to the response writer without first calling `acl.CheckAccessHTTP(r, acl.DEBUGGING)`, unlike every sibling handler in the same family (see e.g. `go/vt/vttablet/tabletserver/querylogz.go`'s `querylogzHandler`, which calls the check first).</p>
<p>The data streamed is sensitive: `go/vt/vttablet/tabletmanager/vreplication/vplayer.go` calls `NewVrLogStats(...).Send(sql)` / `.Send(event.Statement)` for every row change and statement event flowing through a VReplication stream (vplayer.go:339, 700, 771, 785) — i.e. the l…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mhc4-g3wh-cw7m"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-65959</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-65959 — Vitess: Missing authorization on vttablet /debug/vrlog exposes live VReplication SQL data</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:55:17.761854+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-65959</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-65959"/>
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