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  <updated>2026-09-29T21:30:58.764698+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50270</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-50270</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:30:58.766664+00:00</updated>
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        <p>dd-trace-java is a Datadog APM client for Java. Prior to 1.62.0, W3C baggage extraction does not enforce DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS, which defaults to 64, or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES, which defaults to 8192, although those limits apply during baggage injection. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send a baggage HTTP header containing many comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value. The extraction path allocates map entries while parsing the attacker-controlled header on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption in an HTTP service where the baggage propagation style is enabled, which is the default for most affected tracers. This can cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.62.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-50270"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-74xj-wh4w-vqxc</id>
    <title>GHSA-74xj-wh4w-vqxc — dd-trace-java: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:30:58.766750+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: com.datadoghq:dd-java-agent</p>
<p>### Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.</p>
<p>### Patches
This is resolved in version 1.62.0 and later of the `dd-trace-java` library.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).</p>
<p>### Resources
Related ups…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-74xj-wh4w-vqxc"/>
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