GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.

Affected: Go: github.com/osrg/gobgp/v4

### Summary GoBGP contains a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment.

### Details The issue is in the BGP OPEN capability parser under:

- `pkg/packet/bgp/bgp.go` - `pkg/packet/bgp/validate.go` - The BGP OPEN optional parameter capability format includes a capability code, a capability length field, and a capability value. Each concrete capability decoder should only parse bytes inside the declared capability value boundary. In affected versions, the generic capability parser records the declared `CapLen`, but several concrete capability decoders continue parsing from the full remaining capability buffer after advancing past the two-byte capability header. Conceptually, the vulnerable pattern is: ```go data = data[2:] // decoder reads from data without first limiting it to CapLen

### PoC The following parser-level proof of concept demonstrates the issue without requiring a full BGP session or a running `…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: gobgp, Ubuntu:25.10: gobgp, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: gobgp

GoBGP is an open source Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementation in the Go Programming Language. Versions prior to 4.6.0 contain a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant case is the 4-octet AS capability, where a capability with `CapLen == 0` may cause the parser to read bytes from the following capability as the 4-octet AS value. This parsed value may later affect peer AS validation during BGP session establishment. Version 4.6.0 patches the issue.