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  <updated>2026-10-10T19:40:53.263496+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107807</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107807</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T19:40:53.265802+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, Nginx UI accepts the Node.Secret master credential through the node_secret query parameter in HTTP and WebSocket authentication paths instead of requiring the X-Node-Secret header. The credential can consequently appear in access logs, proxy logs, browser history, Referer headers, configuration URLs, and deployment environment data. A party that obtains the secret can bypass normal password, JWT, session, and second-factor checks and obtain persistent administrative API access, including access to configuration and secret material. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107807"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pvgv-gcp7-v38g</id>
    <title>GHSA-pvgv-gcp7-v38g — Nginx UI: Node Secret Credential Exposure via URL Query Parameter</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T19:40:53.265895+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p>
<p>## 1. Vulnerability Summary</p>
<p>nginx-ui's `Node.Secret` is a master credential that bypasses all JWT/password authentication for the entire API. The application accepts this credential via a **URL query parameter** (`?node_secret=`), causing it to be recorded in plaintext in HTTP access logs, reverse proxy logs, browser history, and HTTP `Referer` headers. Additionally, the official cluster configuration format embeds node secrets directly into URL query strings stored in `app.ini` and environment variables, creating a systemic credential exposure pattern across the entire cluster deployment model.</p>
<p>An attacker who gains read access to any log aggregation system, proxy log, or configuration file can extract the node secret and obtain full, persistent, unauthenticated administrative access to the nginx-ui API — including reading TLS private keys, modifying nginx configurations, and (when chained with Bug #1) achieving OS-level code execution.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>## 2. Root Cause Analysis</p>
<p>### 2.1 Node Secret Accepted as URL Query Parameter</p>
<p>The `getNodeSecret` function reads the credential from the URL query string as a fallback when the `X-Node-Secret` header is absent: [1](#3-0)</p>
<p>This function is called in both `AuthRequired()` and `AuthRequiredWS()` middleware, meaning the query parameter bypass works for **all authenticated HTTP and WebSocket endpoints**: [2](#3-1) [3](#3-2)</p>
<p>The same pattern is repeated in the WebSocket origin checker, which also reads `node_secret` from the URL: [4](…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pvgv-gcp7-v38g"/>
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