https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-11T17:32:07.959811+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107399 fkie_cve-2026-107399 2026-10-11T17:32:07.962708+00:00

The Mechanize library is used for automating interaction with websites. Prior to 2.14.1, Mechanize applies no origin trust boundary in Mechanize::HTTP::Agent#response_follow_meta_refresh when Mechanize#follow_meta_refresh is enabled. A page containing a meta refresh to another origin causes headers configured through Mechanize#request_headers= to be reapplied to the refresh request, allowing an attacker who controls content in the crawl to capture bearer tokens or session cookies. The default configuration is not affected because follow_meta_refresh is false, and the exposure is limited to caller-supplied default headers. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.1.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c6rp-p8xm-4q9f GHSA-c6rp-p8xm-4q9f β€” Mechanize sends credential headers to another origin after a meta refresh 2026-10-11T17:32:07.962801+00:00

Affected: RubyGems: mechanize

## Summary

`mechanize` applied no trust boundary to a `meta` refresh, so credentials set through `Mechanize#request_headers=` followed a refresh that pointed at another origin.

## Details

`Mechanize::HTTP::Agent#response_follow_meta_refresh` fetched the refresh target with no notion of a crossed origin, so `@request_headers` were re-applied in full. An attacker who could place a `meta` refresh in a page the agent fetched β€” through stored content, an open redirect, or control of any page in the crawl β€” collected the same credentials as through an HTTP redirect, on a code path that had none of the redirect path's protections.

The refresh fetch passes an empty per-request headers hash, so only headers set through `Mechanize#request_headers=` were exposed.

This requires `Mechanize#follow_meta_refresh = true`. It is `false` by default, so an agent in its default configuration is not affected. Crawlers commonly enable it.

## Impact

An attacker who can place a `meta` refresh in any page the agent fetches captures bearer tokens and session cookies set through `request_headers=`. Disclosure only; no integrity or availability impact.

## Patches

Fixed in `mechanize` v2.14.1. A `meta` refresh that points at another origin is now subject to the same rule as an HTTP redirect: credentials and cookies are withheld from the request that follows it.

## Workarounds

Leave `Mechanize#follow_meta_refresh` at its default of `false`, or avoid `request_headers=` for credentials when it is…