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  <updated>2026-10-01T21:50:42.400790+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102821</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-102821</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T21:50:42.404465+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.63.2, an authenticated remote peer can send SSH_MSG_KEXINIT without the required SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT and then flood SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages while SessionKexState::InProgress prevents priority_receiver in russh/src/server/session.rs from being drained. The server continues processing network input and enqueues a ChannelOpenReply for each request on an unbounded channel, allowing one connection to grow memory until the process is terminated. This issue is fixed in version 0.63.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102821"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-35g8-35p8-c8fw</id>
    <title>GHSA-35g8-35p8-c8fw — Russh: Unbounded memory exhaustion via CHANNEL_OPEN flood during a client-stalled rekey</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T21:50:42.404555+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: russh</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>A russh **server** can be driven to unbounded heap growth (process OOM / kill) by
a peer that speaks only standard SSH messages, in the **default configuration**.</p>
<p>The peer starts a key re-exchange (sends `SSH_MSG_KEXINIT`) but never sends the
follow-up `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT`, leaving the server's kex state machine in
`SessionKexState::InProgress` **indefinitely**. While a rekey is in progress the
server's three message-drain paths are all gated off (`if !self.kex.active()`),
but the network-read path stays active, so every `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN` the peer
sends is processed inline and appends one reply to an **unbounded** internal
queue (`priority_receiver`, an `UnboundedReceiver`) that is not dequeued until
the rekey completes. Because the peer decides whether the rekey ever completes,
the queue — and the server's memory — grows without bound.</p>
<p>This is reproducible end-to-end against a real russh server over a real
encrypted transport; see "Proof of concept". A one-line negative control (same
flood, no rekey) keeps memory flat, isolating the rekey window as the sole
trigger.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- **Availability / DoS.** Server RSS climbs at roughly 3.3 KB per
  `CHANNEL_OPEN`, driven entirely by the peer, until the process is OOM-killed.
  In the reproduction one connection pushed the server from ~4 MB to **2.57 GB**
  (and past **4.8 GB** against the stock `echoserver` example) and it was still
  climbing when the flood was stopped.
- **Reached with standard messages,…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-35g8-35p8-c8fw"/>
  </entry>
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