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  <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:15.854547+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102427</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-102427</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:15.856461+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK &lt; 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102427"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v3vp-7jrj-hc66</id>
    <title>GHSA-v3vp-7jrj-hc66</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T19:51:15.856548+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla CCK &lt; 8.3.16 - site/uploader.php is reached through the component’s normal frontend routing (task=getContent), a task with no authentication or ACL check anywhere in the dispatch chain. The handler validates the uploaded file’s content with a real magic-byte MIME check, but the extension allow-list that would otherwise restrict the saved file’s extension was present in the source and commented out. The saved file’s extension was taken directly from the attacker-supplied filename with no validation, and the file was written to a path directly under the Joomla web root that is executed by the PHP handler. An image/PHP polyglot, a file whose header bytes satisfy the MIME check with PHP source appended after, passed the content check while carrying a .php extension of the attacker’s choosing.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v3vp-7jrj-hc66"/>
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