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  <updated>2026-09-28T20:57:48.258153+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100708</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-100708</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T20:57:48.632285+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains' certificates, including Let's Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100708"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wq4p-x9fv-rhvg</id>
    <title>GHSA-wq4p-x9fv-rhvg</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T20:57:48.632514+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains' certificates, including Let's Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wq4p-x9fv-rhvg"/>
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