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  <updated>2026-10-10T11:20:20.061540+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xx22-p4ch-683r</id>
    <title>GHSA-xx22-p4ch-683r — LZ4 Java: Native XXHash implementations can crash the JVM when passed invalid byte array ranges</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T11:20:20.705457+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: at.yawk.lz4:lz4-java, Maven: org.lz4:lz4-java</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Insufficient validation of byte array arguments in JNI-based XXHash implementations in lz4-java 1.11.0 and earlier allows callers to crash the JVM by passing an invalid array reference or invalid range to native XXHash methods.</p>
<p>This affects applications where an attacker can influence the byte array object or the `off` / `len` arguments passed to affected XXHash APIs. It does **not** affect the common case where only the contents of a valid byte array are attacker-controlled.</p>
<p>Java-based XXHash implementations are *not* affected.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The JNI-backed XXHash implementations pass caller-provided byte array arguments to native code. The affected APIs are:</p>
<p>- `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash32().hash(byte[] buf, int off, int len, int seed)`
- `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().hash64().hash(byte[] buf, int off, int len, long seed)`
- `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash32(seed).update(byte[] bytes, int off, int len)`
- `XXHashFactory.nativeInstance().newStreamingHash64(seed).update(byte[] bytes, int off, int len)`</p>
<p>Before the fix, the streaming JNI implementations did not validate `bytes`, `off`, or `len` before calling `XXHashJNI.XXH32_update` / `XXHashJNI.XXH64_update`. The non-streaming JNI implementations called `SafeUtils.checkRange`, but `SafeUtils.checkRange(byte[], int, int)` skipped all array access when `len == 0`, so a null byte array with a zero length could still reach JNI.</p>
<p>As a result:</p>
<p>- `hash(null, 0, 0, seed)` and `update(null…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xx22-p4ch-683r"/>
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