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CVE-2026-40072 — web3.py affected by SSRF via CCIP Read (EIP-3668) OffchainLookup URL handling

2026-10-06T16:17:29.075870+00:00

Affected: ethereum web3.py

web3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload["urls"]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.

GHSA-5hr4-253g-cpx2 — web3.py: SSRF via CCIP Read (EIP-3668) OffchainLookup URL handling

2026-10-06T16:17:29.075999+00:00

Affected: PyPI: web3

## Summary

web3.py implements CCIP Read / `OffchainLookup` (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in `offchain_lookup_payload["urls"]`. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after `{sender}` / `{data}` template substitution) without any destination validation:

- No restriction to `https://` (and no opt-in gate for `http://`) - No hostname or IP allowlist - No blocking of private/reserved IP ranges (loopback, link-local, RFC1918) - No redirect target validation (both `requests` and `aiohttp` follow redirects by default)

**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.

This results in **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs `eth_call` / `.call()` against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.

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## Why This Is a Vulnerability

The argument is not that CCIP Read itself is invalid or that web3.py should stop supporting EIP-3668. The issue is that, in server-side deployments (backends, indexers, bots, APIs), the current implementation doesn't provide destination policy controls, such as a validation/override hook, private…

PYSEC-2026-3414 — web3.py: SSRF via CCIP Read (EIP-3668) OffchainLookup URL handling

2026-10-06T16:17:29.076169+00:00

Affected: PyPI: web3

## Summary

**CCIP Read is enabled by default** (`global_ccip_read_enabled = True` on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's `.call()` method is exposed without explicit opt-in.

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## Why This Is a Vulnerability