Affected: pnpm

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.2 and 11.5.3, the generic peer-suffix normalizer also stripped parenthesized text from git, URL, tarball, file, and other opaque locators. Approval for one source string could therefore authorize a different attacker-controlled source whose locator normalized to the same value. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.2 and 11.5.3.

Affected: npm: pnpm

## Summary

Keep build approval for opaque dependency sources byte-exact for GHSA-5wx6-mg75-v57r / CAND-PNPM-123.

Merged upstream commit `bf1b731ee6` fixed the original name-only approval bypass by making build policy consume the resolved dependency identity. One collision remained: the generic peer-suffix normalizer also stripped parenthesized text from git, URL, tarball, file, and other opaque locators. Approval for one source string could therefore authorize a different attacker-controlled source whose locator normalized to the same value.

## Security boundary

- Registry dependency identities still normalize legitimate peer suffixes and retain patch hashes. - Git, URL, tarball, file, directory, and otherwise opaque identities must match the complete resolved locator byte for byte. - Explicit denials use the same normalization as approvals. - Ignored-build output preserves the exact opaque identity, so the key pnpm asks a user to approve is the key policy later checks. - TypeScript pnpm and pacquet implement the same distinction between registry and opaque identities.

## Exploit replay

- With `allowBuilds` approving `foo@https://host/pkg.tgz`, the upstream implementation also accepted `foo@https://host/pkg.tgz(evil)` because both passed through peer-suffix removal. - An independent review found a second Rust-only form: `foo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(good)` and `foo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(evil)` collided because the parser selected the final `@` and misclassified the opaq…