Affected: Kludex python-multipart, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6, Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3, Red Hat Satellite 6.17, Red Hat Satellite 6.18, Red Hat Lightspeed Core, Red Hat OpenShift Lightspeed, Red Hat AI Inference Server and 4 more

Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to version 0.0.22, a Path Traversal vulnerability exists when using non-default configuration options `UPLOAD_DIR` and `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME=True`. An attacker can write uploaded files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by crafting a malicious filename. Users should upgrade to version 0.0.22 to receive a patch or, as a workaround, avoid using `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME=True` in project configurations.

Affected: PyPI: python-multipart

### Summary

A Path Traversal vulnerability exists when using non-default configuration options `UPLOAD_DIR` and `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME=True`. An attacker can write uploaded files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by crafting a malicious filename.

### Details

When `UPLOAD_DIR` is set and `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME` is `True`, the library constructs the file path using `os.path.join(file_dir, fname)`. Due to the behavior of `os.path.join()`, if the filename begins with a `/`, all preceding path components are discarded:

```py os.path.join("/upload/dir", "/etc/malicious") == "/etc/malicious" ``` This allows an attacker to bypass the intended upload directory and write files to arbitrary paths. #### Affected Configuration Projects are only affected if all of the following are true: - `UPLOAD_DIR` is set - `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME` is set to True - The uploaded file exceeds `MAX_MEMORY_FILE_SIZE` (triggering a flush to disk)

The def…

Affected: PyPI: python-multipart

### Summary

A Path Traversal vulnerability exists when using non-default configuration options `UPLOAD_DIR` and `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME=True`. An attacker can write uploaded files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by crafting a malicious filename.

### Details

When `UPLOAD_DIR` is set and `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME` is `True`, the library constructs the file path using `os.path.join(file_dir, fname)`. Due to the behavior of `os.path.join()`, if the filename begins with a `/`, all preceding path components are discarded:

```py os.path.join("/upload/dir", "/etc/malicious") == "/etc/malicious" ``` This allows an attacker to bypass the intended upload directory and write files to arbitrary paths. #### Affected Configuration Projects are only affected if all of the following are true: - `UPLOAD_DIR` is set - `UPLOAD_KEEP_FILENAME` is set to True - The uploaded file exceeds `MAX_MEMORY_FILE_SIZE` (triggering a flush to disk)

The def…