Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the pairing-store access control for direct message pairing policy that allows attackers to reuse pairing approvals across multiple accounts. An attacker approved as a sender in one account can be automatically accepted in another account in multi-account deployments without explicit approval, bypassing authorization boundaries.

Affected: npm: openclaw

### Summary OpenClaw had account-scope gaps in pairing-store access for DM pairing policy, which could let a pairing approval from one account authorize the same sender on another account in multi-account setups.

### Impact This is an authorization-boundary weakness in multi-account channel deployments. A sender approved in one account could be accepted in another account before explicit approval there.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version affected: `2026.2.25` - Vulnerable range: `<= 2026.2.25` - Patched version (planned next release): `>= 2026.2.26`

### Fix OpenClaw now enforces account-scoped pairing reads/writes consistently across core and extension message channels, with stricter runtime/SDK helpers and shared policy wiring to prevent cross-account pairing bleed.

### Fix Commit(s) - `a0c5e28f3bf0cc0cd9311f9e9ec2ca0352550dcf` - `bce643a0bd145d3e9cb55400af33bd1b85baeb02`

### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.