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  <updated>2026-09-30T21:11:54.678241+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-54059</id>
    <title>BIT-pillow-2026-54059 — Pillow: PcfFontFile._load_bitmaps()`: `Image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protectio…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:11:54.894191+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: pillow</p>
<p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-54059"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54059</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-54059 — Pillow: PcfFontFile._load_bitmaps()`: `Image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protectio…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:11:54.894312+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-pillow Pillow</p>
<p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54059"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8v84-f9pq-wr9x</id>
    <title>GHSA-8v84-f9pq-wr9x — Pillow `PcfFontFile._load_bitmaps()`: `Image.frombytes()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protectio…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:11:54.894373+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pillow</p>
<p>## Description
`PIL/PcfFontFile.py` `_load_bitmaps()` (line 227) reads glyph dimensions from the PCF `METRICS` section and passes them directly to `Image.frombytes()` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. Dimensions originate from unsigned 16-bit values:</p>
<p>```
xsize = right - left          (max: 65535 − 0 = 65535)
ysize = ascent + descent      (max: 65535 + 65535 = 131070)
```</p>
<p>Maximum exploitable pixel count: **65,535 × 131,070 = 8,589,734,450 pixels** — **48× the DecompressionBombError threshold**.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable code (`PIL/PcfFontFile.py` line 224–227):**
```python
for i in range(nbitmaps):
    xsize, ysize = metrics[i][:2]    # from PCF METRICS — attacker-controlled
    b, e = offsets[i : i + 2]
    bitmaps.append(
        Image.frombytes("1", (xsize, ysize), data[b:e], "raw", mode, pad(xsize))
        # ↑ NO _decompression_bomb_check()!
    )
```</p>
<p>`Image.frombytes()` calls `Image.new()` first (allocating the full C-heap buffer), **then** attempts to fill it. This creates two distinct attack paths:</p>
<p>- **Persistent attack**: Provide matching bitmap data → `frombytes()` succeeds → image stored in `font.glyph[ch]` permanently
- **Transient attack**: Provide a 148-byte PCF file with large declared dimensions but no data → `Image.new()` allocates the full buffer → `ValueError` → buffer freed → but the spike occurs before Python can respond</p>
<p>## Steps to reproduce</p>
<p>**Proof of Concept script:**</p>
<p>```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: PcfFontFile bomb bypass — 148-…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8v84-f9pq-wr9x"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2253</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2253</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:11:54.894503+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pillow</p>
<p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2253"/>
  </entry>
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