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  <updated>2026-09-29T12:07:07.145636+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90199</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-90199 — fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:07:07.878809+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr()</p>
<p>In mi_enum_attr(), the start/end VCN validation for non-resident
attributes is:</p>
<p>if (svcn &gt; evcn + 1) goto out;</p>
<p>When evcn is U64_MAX the "evcn + 1" expression wraps to 0 and any svcn
passes the check. For evcn values close to U64_MAX (but not equal to it)
the right-hand side is still a meaningless near-wrap upper bound, so a
malformed on-disk attribute with svcn == 0 and evcn near U64_MAX can pass
mi_enum_attr() unrejected.</p>
<p>VCN (virtual cluster number) is a cluster index, so any valid evcn is
bounded by the volume's total cluster count, which ntfs3 holds in
sbi-&gt;used.bitmap.nbits (set up in ntfs_init_from_boot() before any caller
of mi_enum_attr() runs). Reject evcn values that fall outside this range.</p>
<p>However, an empty non-resident attribute (no allocated clusters) is
legitimately encoded with svcn == 0 and evcn == -1 (U64_MAX), e.g. via
attr-&gt;nres.evcn = cpu_to_le64((u64)vcn - 1) with vcn == 0. That sentinel
must keep passing, so exclude evcn == U64_MAX from the range check. The
existing "svcn &gt; evcn + 1" test still tolerates the sentinel ("0 &gt; 0" is
false) and continues to require svcn == 0 for it, while the range check
rejects every other out-of-range evcn and thereby also defuses the
"evcn + 1" wraparound.</p>
<p>svcn does not need its own bound: once evcn &lt; nbits, "svcn &gt; evcn + 1"
implies svcn &lt;= nbits.</p>
<p>[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fi…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90199"/>
  </entry>
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