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  <updated>2026-09-29T06:26:26.279453+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74339</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-74339 — ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T06:26:26.293330+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read</p>
<p>snd_seq_read() copies a queued variable-length event header to userspace
before expanding the payload. Queued variable-length events use
SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_CHAINED internally, and data.ext.ptr points at the first
extension cell.</p>
<p>The read side strips SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_* bits from data.ext.len before the
copy, but it leaves data.ext.ptr untouched. A userspace sequencer client
can therefore write a direct variable event to itself and read back the
extension-cell kernel address from the returned header.</p>
<p>Clear the temporary header pointer before copy_to_user(). The original
queued event remains unchanged and is still passed to
snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so payload expansion keeps using the
internal chain.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74339"/>
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