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  <updated>2026-09-29T23:04:38.800164+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72400</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-72400 — seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T23:04:39.724996+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields</p>
<p>seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh-&gt;type and
srh-&gt;hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed
struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields.</p>
<p>The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer
and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and
END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the
length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard.  A 2-byte SEG6
encap header can therefore make the validator read srh-&gt;type at offset 2
beyond the caller-supplied buffer.</p>
<p>Reject lengths shorter than the fixed SRH at the top of
seg6_validate_srh(), before any field is read.  This fixes the BPF helper
path and keeps the common validator robust.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72400"/>
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