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  <updated>2026-09-29T04:43:22.549949+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64324</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-64324 — udf: validate free block extents against the partition length</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T04:43:22.566879+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>udf: validate free block extents against the partition length</p>
<p>udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound.  A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.</p>
<p>A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel.  This is a local availability issue.  On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it.  Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.</p>
<p>No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.</p>
<p>Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check.  Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64324"/>
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