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  <updated>2026-09-29T16:39:34.196043+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53267</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53267 — netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T16:39:34.212430+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval</p>
<p>I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].</p>
<p>A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:</p>
<p>table ip t {
        chain pre {
            type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
            ct zone set 1
            ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
        }
    }</p>
<p>The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via
nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -&gt; kzalloc, tuple is all
zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls
nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct
and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this
overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller
dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.</p>
<p>Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),
mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,
bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv-&gt;len
instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple
before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading
bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple-&gt;{src,dst}.u3.all are
well-defined zero. priv-&gt;len is validated at rule load, so the
copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than
by an untrusted field on the conntrack.</p>
<p>[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53267"/>
  </entry>
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