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  <updated>2026-10-03T23:46:22.085832+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46133</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-46133 — RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T23:46:22.526898+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing</p>
<p>Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC
before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet
can still trigger panic.  That patch handled payload_size() underflow only
for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown
opcode.  The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit
and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver.</p>
<p>The check added there reads</p>
<p>pkt-&gt;paylen &lt; header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE</p>
<p>where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt-&gt;opcode].length.  The
rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB
opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so
length == 0 and the check degenerates to</p>
<p>pkt-&gt;paylen &lt; 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE</p>
<p>which does not constrain pkt-&gt;paylen enough.  rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes</p>
<p>rxe_opcode[pkt-&gt;opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES</p>
<p>which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(),
causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload.</p>
<p>Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with
CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after</p>
<p>rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0</p>
<p>A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and
QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers:</p>
<p>BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46133"/>
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