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  <updated>2026-09-29T21:29:05.641907+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43334</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-43334 — Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:29:05.664361+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response</p>
<p>smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the
initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH
requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can
also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.</p>
<p>tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may
select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing
policy the responder already enforces.</p>
<p>When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can
be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the
response in both rsp.auth_req and auth. This keeps the responder auth bits
and later method selection aligned.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43334"/>
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