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  <updated>2026-09-30T21:46:01.860589+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50560</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-50560 — Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:46:01.862814+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> netty</p>
<p>Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50560"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm</id>
    <title>GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm — Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:46:01.862919+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http2</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. According to[ the RFC](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-defined-settings): “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”</p>
<p>When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:</p>
<p>- Read the request
- Proxy the request to the origin
- Attempt to produce a response
- Create an exception while writing the headers for the response</p>
<p>Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.</p>
<p>## Remediation</p>
<p>When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it.  It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.</p>
<p>## Credit
Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)</p>
<p>## Contact
Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-563q-j3cm-6jxm"/>
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