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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T21:52:47.258391+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98166</id>
    <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-98166 — CVE-2026-98166 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:52:47.279640+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
          <strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong>
        </p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98166"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98166</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-98166</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:52:47.279728+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range</p>
<p>ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and
a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns
zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU
walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in
ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()
pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change
for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink()
infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret &gt; 0", which is what
was intended here as well.</p>
<p>Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the
swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's
bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable.
When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move
(ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()),
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its
!ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos-&gt;first /
pos-&gt;last is left pointing at freed memory. The next
ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor
is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(),
"list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL
deref…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98166"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-62xr-3qf5-9qpj</id>
    <title>GHSA-62xr-3qf5-9qpj</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T21:52:47.279836+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range</p>
<p>ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and
a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns
zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU
walk on swapout failure") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in
ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under "if (!ret)", so the
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail()
pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change
for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 ("drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink()
infinite LRU walk on backup failure") tests "lret &gt; 0", which is what
was intended here as well.</p>
<p>Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the
swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's
bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable.
When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move
(ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()),
ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its
!ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos-&gt;first /
pos-&gt;last is left pointing at freed memory. The next
ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor
is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(),
"list_del corruption" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL
deref…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-62xr-3qf5-9qpj"/>
  </entry>
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