vm2 3.11.6 is vulnerable to a sandbox escape leading to remote code execution in the host Node.js process. The fix for GHSA-m283-3h24-438v is incomplete: the bridge gate at lib/bridge.js:1624 identity-checks only the direct call target when deciding whether to rebuild/sanitise a rejected host Promise value. Registering the rejection handler through Function.prototype.call or .apply indirection (e.g., p.then.call(p, undefined, cb)) makes the intercepted target host Function.prototype.call, so the sanitiser never runs and the raw host error reaches sandbox code with its own properties intact. If an embedder exposes a host-realm Promise to the sandbox (an async host function bridged via the sandbox option, or a NodeVM external module's async method) and that Promise rejects with an Error carrying a non-primitive own property referencing a host object (for example err.detail = process), untrusted code in the sandbox obtains a fully functional proxy to that host object and can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the host process (e.g., e.detail.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync(...)). The direct p.then(undefined, cb), bind, and Reflect.apply forms are correctly sanitised. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: npm: vm2

## Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-647f-g98j-qq25. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

## Original Description vm2 3.11.6 is vulnerable to a sandbox escape leading to remote code execution in the host Node.js process. The fix for GHSA-m283-3h24-438v is incomplete: the bridge gate at lib/bridge.js:1624 identity-checks only the direct call target when deciding whether to rebuild/sanitise a rejected host Promise value. Registering the rejection handler through Function.prototype.call or .apply indirection (e.g., p.then.call(p, undefined, cb)) makes the intercepted target host Function.prototype.call, so the sanitiser never runs and the raw host error reaches sandbox code with its own properties intact. If an embedder exposes a host-realm Promise to the sandbox (an async host function bridged via the sandbox option, or a NodeVM external module's async method) and that Promise rejects with an Error carrying a non-primitive own property referencing a host object (for example err.detail = process), untrusted code in the sandbox obtains a fully functional proxy to that host object and can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the host process (e.g., e.detail.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync(...)). The direct p.then(undefined, cb), bind, and Reflect.apply forms are correctly sanitised. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.

undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol vm2: vm2: Denial of Service due to memory allocation limit bypass vm2: vm2: Missing Error.cause Sanitization Enables VM2 Sandbox Escape to RCE vm2: vm2: Sandbox Breakout Using Dangerous Host Proto Mutators urllib: urllib: Credential leakage via cross-origin redirects fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-Side Request Forgery via repeated hostname percent-decoding fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via skipped IDN canonicalization fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-side request forgery via malformed IPv6 normalization fast-uri: fast-uri: URI parsing flaw enables server-side request forgery and redirects multer: Multer: Denial of Service via file descriptor leak on aborted uploads multer: Multer: Denial of Service via crafted multipart field names jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions multer: Multer: Denial of Service via oversized array index in field names qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper validation in stringify function fast-uri: fast-uri: Authority Injection via Unvalidated Port Serialization js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service vulnerability in YAML parsing fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via unbalanced URI brackets can bypass security policies undici: undici: TLS certificate validation bypass in BalancedPool via dropped connect…