Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Versions prior to 2.4.0 store password-reset, email-confirmation, and account-deletion tokens in the `user_tokens` table in plaintext. If an attacker gains read access to the database through a backup leak, misconfigured storage, or SQL-level exposure, they can immediately use pending tokens to take over user accounts without knowing passwords. Version 2.4.0 fixes the issue.

Affected: Go: code.vikunja.io/api

### Summary

Vikunja stores password-reset, email-confirmation, and account-deletion tokens in the `user_tokens` table in **plaintext**. If an attacker gains read access to the database through a backup leak, misconfigured storage, or SQL-level exposure, they can immediately use pending tokens to take over user accounts without knowing passwords.

### Details

`pkg/user/token.go` — `genToken()` stores the raw random string directly: ```go func genToken(u *User, kind TokenKind) (*Token, error) { tokenStr, err := utils.CryptoRandomString(tokenSize) ... return &Token{ UserID: u.ID, Kind: kind, Token: tokenStr, // stored as-is, no hashing }, nil } ```

Lookup also uses plaintext equality: ```go func getToken(s *xorm.Session, token string, kind TokenKind) (t *Token, err error) { has, err := s.Where("kind = ? AND token = ?", kind, token).Get(t) } ```

Affected token types: - `TokenPasswordReset` (`pkg/user/user_password_reset.go:120`) - `TokenEmailConfirm` (`pkg/user/user_create.go:101`, `pkg/user/update_email.go:88`) - `TokenAccountDeletion` (`pkg/user/delete.go:102`)

Note: CalDAV tokens correctly use `generateHashedToken` with bcrypt — the same protection is absent for the above types.

### PoC

```sql -- Attacker with DB read dumps all pending password-reset tokens: SELECT u.email, t.token FROM user_tokens t JOIN users u ON u.id = t.user_id WHERE t.kind = 1;

-- Then takes over any account: curl -X POST https://vikunja.example.co…