An issue was discovered in OpenSSH 7.9. Due to the scp implementation being derived from 1983 rcp, the server chooses which files/directories are sent to the client. However, the scp client only performs cursory validation of the object name returned

In OpenSSH 7.9, due to accepting and displaying arbitrary stderr output from the server, a malicious server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can manipulate the client output, for example to use ANSI control codes to hide additional files being transfe

An issue was discovered in OpenSSH 7.9. Due to missing character encoding in the progress display, a malicious server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can employ crafted object names to manipulate the client output, e.g., by using ANSI control codes t

In OpenSSH 7.9, scp.c in the scp client allows remote SSH servers to bypass intended access restrictions via the filename of . or an empty filename. The impact is modifying the permissions of the target directory on the client side.

In NetKit through 0.17, rcp.c in the rcp client allows remote rsh servers to bypass intended access restrictions via the filename of . or an empty filename. The impact is modifying the permissions of the target directory on the client side. This is s

An issue was discovered in rcp in NetKit through 0.17. For an rcp operation, the server chooses which files/directories are sent to the client. However, the rcp client only performs cursory validation of the object name returned. A malicious rsh serv

In WinSCP before 5.14 beta, due to missing validation, the scp implementation would accept arbitrary files sent by the server, potentially overwriting unrelated files. This affects TSCPFileSystem::SCPSink in core/ScpFileSystem.cpp.