ID CVE-2018-10470
Summary Little Snitch versions 4.0 to 4.0.6 use the SecStaticCodeCheckValidityWithErrors() function without the kSecCSCheckAllArchitectures flag and therefore do not validate all architectures stored in a fat binary. An attacker can maliciously craft a fat binary containing multiple architectures that may cause a situation where Little Snitch treats the running process as having no code signature at all while erroneously indicating that the binary on disk does have a valid code signature. This could lead to users being confused about whether or not the code signature is valid.
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • Apple Mac OS
    cpe:2.3:o:apple:mac_os
CVSS
Base: 5.0
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-347
CAPEC
  • Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
    An attacker is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an attacker is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an attacker is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key. Any cryptosystem can be vulnerable to padding oracle attacks if the encrypted messages are not authenticated to ensure their validity prior to decryption, and then the information about padding error is leaked to the attacker. This attack technique may be used, for instance, to break CAPTCHA systems or decrypt/modify state information stored in client side objects (e.g., hidden fields or cookies). This attack technique is a side-channel attack on the cryptosystem that uses a data leak from an improperly implemented decryption routine to completely subvert the cryptosystem. The one bit of information that tells the attacker whether a padding error during decryption has occurred, in whatever form it comes, is sufficient for the attacker to break the cryptosystem. That bit of information can come in a form of an explicit error message about a padding error, a returned blank page, or even the server taking longer to respond (a timing attack). This attack can be launched cross domain where an attacker is able to use cross-domain information leaks to get the bits of information from the padding oracle from a target system / service with which the victim is communicating. To do so an attacker sends a request containing ciphertext to the target system. Due to the browser's same origin policy, the attacker is not able to see the response directly, but can use cross-domain information leak techniques to still get the information needed (i.e., information on whether or not a padding error has occurred). For instance, this can be done using "img" tag plus the onerror()/onload() events. The attacker's JavaScript can make web browsers to load an image on the target site, and know if the image is loaded or not. This is 1-bit information needed for the padding oracle attack to work: if the image is loaded, then it is valid padding, otherwise it is not.
refmap via4
confirm https://obdev.at/cve/2018-10470-8FRWkW4oH8.html
misc https://www.okta.com/security-blog/2018/06/issues-around-third-party-apple-code-signing-checks/
the hacker news via4
id THN:EAF6F042171A19B82AF7D46D233208C1
last seen 2018-06-12
modified 2018-06-12
published 2018-06-12
reporter Swati Khandelwal
source https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/apple-mac-code-signing.html
title Signature Validation Bug Let Malware Bypass Several Mac Security Products
Last major update 12-06-2018 - 13:29
Published 12-06-2018 - 13:29
Last modified 08-08-2018 - 14:28
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