{"metadata": {"vulnerability": "CVE-2019-16098", "count": 26, "kinds": {"milestone": 4, "sighting": 13, "kev": 0, "other": 9}, "linked_omitted": 0}, "data": [{"timestamp": "2019-09-08T00:00:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-08T00:00:00.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Reserved", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.dateReserved"}, {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / mitre", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "containers.cna.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T17:15:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T17:15:00Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Nvd published at", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "record": "GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "field": "database_specific.nvd_published_at", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T17:15:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T17:15Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Published Date", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2019-16098", "record": "GSD-2019-16098", "field": "namespaces.nvd.nist.gov.publishedDate", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T17:15:10.713Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T17:15:10.713", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2019-16098", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2019-16098", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2021-07-21T11:39:00Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2021-07-21T11:39Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Last Modified Date", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2019-16098", "record": "GSD-2019-16098", "field": "namespaces.nvd.nist.gov.lastModifiedDate", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-05-24T16:55:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-05-24T16:55:55Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "record": "GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "field": "published", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2022-10-06T17:35:04Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-10-06T17:35:04.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5fe9a99e-39f5-4c23-83d1-81cc30d2385f", "content": "BlackByte \u0432\u0437\u044f\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 Bring Your Own Driver (BYOVD).\n\n\u0412\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438  \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 CVE-2019-16098 \u0432 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 MSI Afterburner RTCore64.sys.\n\n\u0423\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f 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\u0430\u043d\u043d\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f.\n\nSophos \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e BlackByte \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u044d\u0442\u0438\u0445 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u043a \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0447\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0432 \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u0438\u0437 \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e.\n\n\u0412\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0430 BlackByte \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 DLL-\u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 Avast, Sandboxie, \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0439 Windows DbgHelp \u0438 Comodo Internet Security, \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f.\n\n\u0421\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 BlackByte, \u0434\u043e\u0431\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0432 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 MSI \u0432 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a.\n\n\u041a\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435 \u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e, \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043d\u044b \u043e\u0442\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0447\u0430\u0449\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044f\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0445, \u0447\u0442\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043d\u0430\u0439\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e.", "url": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "metric_role": "exploitation", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2023-12-13T01:23:40.807Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2023-12-13T01:23:40.807040Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "gsd \u00b7 GSD-2019-16098", "record": "GSD-2019-16098", "field": "gsd.osvSchema.modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-04-04T01:55:12Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-04-04T01:55:12Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "github \u00b7 GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "record": "GHSA-PGJ3-5W38-PG9M", "field": "modified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2024-05-21T13:04:44Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-05-21T13:04:44.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "MISP/a9eb9e8e-d894-4f36-a6c2-ca8142f72d29", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "0d66f302-6e1e-4162-b605-55254e641b42"}, {"timestamp": "2024-08-05T01:03:32.893Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-08-05T01:03:32.893Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2024-08-05T01:03:32.893Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2024-08-05T01:03:32.893Z", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "cvelistv5 / CVE", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "containers.adp.0.providerMetadata.dateUpdated"}, {"timestamp": "2025-08-31T03:00:54Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2025-08-31T03:00:54.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "MISP/ab0b745f-bbd5-338e-8b92-97dd0c757e9d", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "9d4ca029-fa0b-4bc8-8ba5-bf790b4bb8bc"}, {"timestamp": "2026-02-06T21:11:55Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-02-06T21:11:55.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "MISP/a9eb9e8e-d894-4f36-a6c2-ca8142f72d29", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "9428fc9d-0644-453e-96ff-fd110d46785c"}, {"timestamp": "2026-06-17T02:21:39.840Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-06-17T02:21:39.840", "kind": "other", "label": "Updated", "source": "fkie_nvd \u00b7 FKIE_CVE-2019-16098", "record": "FKIE_CVE-2019-16098", "field": "lastModified", "linked_record": true}, {"timestamp": "2026-07-26T02:02:37.987Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-07-26T02:02:37.987641Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://t.me/EchelonEyes/756", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "e41b72f8-0bf5-4631-8f6f-5114bb783e31", "content": "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0430-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c BlackByte \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 Windows, \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\n\n\u0411\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0438\u0437 Sophos \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0441 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 (bring your own vulnerable driver - BYOVD). \u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u044b-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f BlackByte. \u0423\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0432 Windows \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439, \u043d\u043e \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 Micro-Star MSI Afterburner (RTCore64.sys), \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 (CVE-2019-16098, \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS: 7,8) \u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438.\n\n\u00ab\u0422\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0443\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u043e\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u0437 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u043c 1000 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432, \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b\u00bb, \u2014 \u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b \u0432 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437 Sophos \u0410\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0430\u0441 \u041a\u043b\u043e\u043f\u0448.\n\nBlackByte \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0439 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0439\u0448\u0435\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u043c\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 BYOVD, \u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u044f\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u043e \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 randsom-as-a-service (Raas), \u0442\u043e \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u044e\u0431\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a. \u041a \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0449\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0431\u0435\u0433\u0430\u044e\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0445\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u044b, \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f Slingshot, InvisiMole, APT28 \u0438 Lazarus.\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442 BYOVD-\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0445, \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0445 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c, \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043e\u043d\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u0431\u044b\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u044b.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/10/04/blackbyte-ransomware-returns/ \n\n#BYOVD #BlackByte", "url": "https://t.me/EchelonEyes/756"}, {"timestamp": "2026-07-28T07:00:06.540Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-07-28T07:00:06.540147Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/EchelonEyes/756", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "47ec7fd7-94eb-407a-8d5a-b00350387eec", "content": "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0430-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c BlackByte \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 Windows, \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\n\n\u0411\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0438\u0437 Sophos \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0441 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 (bring your own vulnerable driver - BYOVD). \u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u044b-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f BlackByte. \u0423\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0432 Windows \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439, \u043d\u043e \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 Micro-Star MSI Afterburner (RTCore64.sys), \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 (CVE-2019-16098, \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS: 7,8) \u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438.\n\n\u00ab\u0422\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0443\u043a\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0433\u0440\u043e\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430 \u0438\u0437 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u043c 1000 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432, \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u044b \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b\u00bb, \u2014 \u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b \u0432 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437 Sophos \u0410\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0430\u0441 \u041a\u043b\u043e\u043f\u0448.\n\nBlackByte \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0439 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0439\u0448\u0435\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u043c\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c-\u0432\u044b\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 BYOVD, \u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u044f\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u043e \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 randsom-as-a-service (Raas), \u0442\u043e \u0435\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043b\u044e\u0431\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a. \u041a \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0449\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0431\u0435\u0433\u0430\u044e\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0445\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u044b, \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f Slingshot, InvisiMole, APT28 \u0438 Lazarus.\n\n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442 BYOVD-\u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0445, \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0445 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c, \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043d\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043e\u043d\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u0431\u044b\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u044b.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/10/04/blackbyte-ransomware-returns/ \n\n#BYOVD #BlackByte", "url": "https://t.me/EchelonEyes/756", "metric_role": "exploitation", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2026-08-20T16:51:20.874Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-08-20T16:51:20.874654Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://bsky.app/profile/cyfar.ca/post/3mtjpe5xp2n2n", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "13e796d8-a188-4782-99dc-76a7dfff4bea", "content": "@talosintelligence.com\nChinese-speaking actor UAT-10147 deploys SPECTRE backdoor with Linux rootkit and BYOVD EDR evasion.\n-\nIOCs: CVE-2019-16098, CVE-2021-21551\n-\n#Rootkit #SPECTRE #ThreatIntel", "url": "https://bsky.app/profile/cyfar.ca/post/3mtjpe5xp2n2n"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-01T20:01:43.954Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-01T20:01:43.954918Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50153", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "fdce025f-2163-46bc-8f89-1fc42a533d0b", "content": "KitPloit - PenTest Tools!\nEDRSandblast - Tool That Weaponize A Vulnerable Signed Driver To Bypass EDR Detections And LSASS Protections\n\nhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAMzRHxJsuayYfmlgYJ40ZPtgY0mQX_fJ-1XWkdNeiicxSAw8cPQ3Kig390B1yD2NgyUGLg6nsd-oF0MRo3JVR5j7pBbRbMB_bL7NEOi7hdPfYidDlrP7XFKEh3bkv4dbtgCSY3SSq_EN2IMa_YNmVs785PfHxb69R4MfBvxTSIJHc-WlEy6RC6lxi/w640-h314/EDRSandblast.png EDRSandBlastis a tool written in Cthat weaponize a vulnerable signed  driver to bypass EDR detections (Kernel callbacks and ETW TIprovider) and LSASSprotections. Multiple userland unhooking techniques are also  implemented to evade userland monitoring.\n\nAs of release, combination of userland (--usermode) and Kernel-land  (--kernelmode) techniques were used to dump LSASSmemory under EDR  scrutiny, without being blocked nor generating \"OS Credential Dumping\"-related  events in the product (cloud) console. The tests were performed on 3 distinct  EDR products and were successful in each case. DescriptionEDR bypass through Kernel callbacks removalEDR products use Kernel callbacks on Windows to be notified by the kernel of  system activity, such as process and thread creation and loading of images  (exe / DLL).\n\nThe Kernel callbacks are defined from user-land using a number of documented  APIs (nt!PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, nt!PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine,  etc.). The user-land APIs add driver-supplied callback routines to undocumented  arrays of routines in Kernel-space:\n\n* PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutinefor process creation\n* PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutinefor thread creation\n* PspLoadImageNotifyRoutinefor image loading EDRSandBlastenumerates the routines defined in those arrays and remove any  callback routine linked to a predefined list of EDR drivers (more than 1000  thousands drivers of security products from the allocated filter altitudes).  The enumeration and removal are made possible through the exploitation of an  arbitrary Kernel memory read / write vulnerability of the Micro-Star MSI Afterburnerdriver (CVE-2019-16098). The enumeration and  removal code is largely inspired from br-sn's CheekyBlinder project.\n\nThe offsets of the aforementioned arrays are hardcoded in the NtoskrnlOffsets.csvfile for more than 350 versions of the Windows Kernel ntoskrnl.exe. The choice of going with hardcoded offsets instead of pattern  searches is justified by the fact that the undocumented APIs responsible for  Kernel callbacks addition / removal are subject to change and that any attempt  to write Kernel memory at the wrong address may (and often will) result in a Bug Check(Blue Screen of Death). For more information on how the offsets  were gathered, refer to Offsets section. EDR bypass through deactivation of the ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence providerThe ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligenceprovider log data about the  usages of some Windows API commonly used maliciously. This include the nt!MiReadWriteVirtualMemoryAPI, called by nt!NtReadVirtualMemory(which is  used to dump LSASSmemory) and monitored by the nt!EtwTiLogReadWriteVmfunction.\n\nEDR products can consume the logs produced by the ETW TIprovider through  services or processes running as, respectively, SERVICE_LAUNCH_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHTor PS_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT, and associated with an Early Launch Anti Malware (ELAM)driver.\n\nAs published by slaeryanin a CNO Development Labsblog post,  the ETW TIprovider can be disabled altogether by patching, i[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50153"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-01T20:01:44.173Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-01T20:01:44.173464Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "25a0c01c-f3e4-4576-94e3-312050e4d895", "content": "Detection  From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.  Driver whitelisting  Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even recommended by Microsoft themselves (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (Hypervisor-protected code integrity) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).  Kernel-memory integrity checks  Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.  As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent Kernel Data Protection (KDP) (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.  The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the ProviderEnableInfo, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Threat%20Intelligence) events generation.  User-mode detection  The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a LoadLibrary call, especially ntdll.dll.  In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.  Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for NtCreateProcess syscall, ObRegisterCallbacks for NtOpenProcess syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (kernel32.dll -&gt; ntdll.dll -&gt; syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. program.exe -&gt; direct syscall).  Acknowledgements      Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder      Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable  Micro-Star MSI Afterburner driver:  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/      Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider      Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz      Initial list of EDR drivers names:  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1      Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling Wdigest through LSASS memory  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/      Authors  Thomas DIOT (Qazeer) (https://github.com/Qazeer/)  Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks) (https://github.com/themaks)  Licence  CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922179Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "4748b214-38ce-4dff-8a62-3b5461d5d874", "content": "Detection  From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.  Driver whitelisting  Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even recommended by Microsoft themselves (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (Hypervisor-protected code integrity) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).  Kernel-memory integrity checks  Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.  As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent Kernel Data Protection (KDP) (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.  The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the ProviderEnableInfo, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Threat%20Intelligence) events generation.  User-mode detection  The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a LoadLibrary call, especially ntdll.dll.  In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.  Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for NtCreateProcess syscall, ObRegisterCallbacks for NtOpenProcess syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (kernel32.dll -&gt; ntdll.dll -&gt; syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. program.exe -&gt; direct syscall).  Acknowledgements      Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder      Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable  Micro-Star MSI Afterburner driver:  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/      Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider      Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz      Initial list of EDR drivers names:  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1      Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling Wdigest through LSASS memory  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/      Authors  Thomas DIOT (Qazeer) (https://github.com/Qazeer/)  Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks) (https://github.com/themaks)  Licence  CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:13.193Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-06T00:00:13.193080Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50153", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "10c98711-c357-4899-980c-035a042bcd53", "content": "KitPloit - PenTest Tools!\nEDRSandblast - Tool That Weaponize A Vulnerable Signed Driver To Bypass EDR Detections And LSASS Protections\n\nhttps://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgAMzRHxJsuayYfmlgYJ40ZPtgY0mQX_fJ-1XWkdNeiicxSAw8cPQ3Kig390B1yD2NgyUGLg6nsd-oF0MRo3JVR5j7pBbRbMB_bL7NEOi7hdPfYidDlrP7XFKEh3bkv4dbtgCSY3SSq_EN2IMa_YNmVs785PfHxb69R4MfBvxTSIJHc-WlEy6RC6lxi/w640-h314/EDRSandblast.png EDRSandBlastis a tool written in Cthat weaponize a vulnerable signed  driver to bypass EDR detections (Kernel callbacks and ETW TIprovider) and LSASSprotections. Multiple userland unhooking techniques are also  implemented to evade userland monitoring.\n\nAs of release, combination of userland (--usermode) and Kernel-land  (--kernelmode) techniques were used to dump LSASSmemory under EDR  scrutiny, without being blocked nor generating \"OS Credential Dumping\"-related  events in the product (cloud) console. The tests were performed on 3 distinct  EDR products and were successful in each case. DescriptionEDR bypass through Kernel callbacks removalEDR products use Kernel callbacks on Windows to be notified by the kernel of  system activity, such as process and thread creation and loading of images  (exe / DLL).\n\nThe Kernel callbacks are defined from user-land using a number of documented  APIs (nt!PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, nt!PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine,  etc.). The user-land APIs add driver-supplied callback routines to undocumented  arrays of routines in Kernel-space:\n\n* PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutinefor process creation\n* PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutinefor thread creation\n* PspLoadImageNotifyRoutinefor image loading EDRSandBlastenumerates the routines defined in those arrays and remove any  callback routine linked to a predefined list of EDR drivers (more than 1000  thousands drivers of security products from the allocated filter altitudes).  The enumeration and removal are made possible through the exploitation of an  arbitrary Kernel memory read / write vulnerability of the Micro-Star MSI Afterburnerdriver (CVE-2019-16098). The enumeration and  removal code is largely inspired from br-sn's CheekyBlinder project.\n\nThe offsets of the aforementioned arrays are hardcoded in the NtoskrnlOffsets.csvfile for more than 350 versions of the Windows Kernel ntoskrnl.exe. The choice of going with hardcoded offsets instead of pattern  searches is justified by the fact that the undocumented APIs responsible for  Kernel callbacks addition / removal are subject to change and that any attempt  to write Kernel memory at the wrong address may (and often will) result in a Bug Check(Blue Screen of Death). For more information on how the offsets  were gathered, refer to Offsets section. EDR bypass through deactivation of the ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence providerThe ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligenceprovider log data about the  usages of some Windows API commonly used maliciously. This include the nt!MiReadWriteVirtualMemoryAPI, called by nt!NtReadVirtualMemory(which is  used to dump LSASSmemory) and monitored by the nt!EtwTiLogReadWriteVmfunction.\n\nEDR products can consume the logs produced by the ETW TIprovider through  services or processes running as, respectively, SERVICE_LAUNCH_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHTor PS_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT, and associated with an Early Launch Anti Malware (ELAM)driver.\n\nAs published by slaeryanin a CNO Development Labsblog post,  the ETW TIprovider can be disabled altogether by patching, i[...]\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50153", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, {"timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:02:51.818Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-23T13:02:51.818793Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/analystdark/efed7e96c74e14fb6b7163de5d9cfa27", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "c90ea2b0-1714-4a6a-a1ad-a6d4d7df3ca1", "content": "# ============================================================\n#  CTC by Dark (CatchTheCheat)\n#  Hardware- und Cheat-Analyse\n#  Ausfuehren als Administrator\n# ============================================================\n\n$L      = 'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP/Configuration'\n$OKVEN  = @('8086','1022','1002')\n$MUSTER = 'anydesk|rustdesk|teamviewer|parsec|dwservice|ultraviewer|ammyy'\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nfunction Test-Admin {\n    $id = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()\n    (New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal $id).IsInRole(\n        [Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)\n}\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nfunction Get-DevId {\n    param($Event)\n    $x = [xml]$Event.ToXml()\n    ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'DeviceInstanceId' }).'#text'\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  1 - PnP-Ereignisse\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PnpEvents {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Event-ID 411 (Startprobleme) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $e411 = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=411} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($e411.Count -gt 0) {\n        $e411 | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id,\n            @{n='Details';e={($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()}} |\n            Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Format-List\n        Write-Host \"Anzahl 411: $($e411.Count)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 411er gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PnP-Konfigurationsereignisse (400/410/420/430) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $cfg = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=400,410,420,430} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; EID=$_.Id; Geraet=(Get-DevId $_) } })\n    if ($cfg.Count -gt 0) {\n        $cfg | Sort-Object Zeit | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"Gesamt: $($cfg.Count) Ereignisse\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Konfigurationsereignisse.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  2 - Log-Integritaet und System-Eckdaten\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-LogIntegrity {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Geleerte Ereignisprotokolle (System EID 104) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $clr = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=104} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($clr.Count -gt 0) {\n        $clr | ForEach-Object {\n            [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Zeit     = $_.TimeCreated\n                Benutzer = $_.Properties[0].Value\n                Computer = $_.Properties[1].Value\n                Log      = $_.Properties[2].Value\n            }\n        } | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"ACHTUNG: Protokolle wurden geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Loeschvorgaenge protokolliert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Security-Log geleert (EID 1102) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $s1102 = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=1102} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($s1102.Count -gt 0) {\n        $s1102 | Select-Object TimeCreated | Format-Table -AutoSize\n        Write-Host \"ACHTUNG: Security-Log wurde geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Loeschung des Security-Logs.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== System ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $os = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem\n    Write-Host \"Installiert:  $($os.InstallDate)\"\n    Write-Host \"Letzter Boot: $($os.LastBootUpTime)\"\n    Write-Host \"Computer:     $env:COMPUTERNAME\"\n    Write-Host \"Benutzer:     $env:USERNAME\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Log-Status ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Get-WinEvent -ListLog $L,'System','Security','Application',\n        'Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object LogName, IsEnabled, RecordCount, LogMode | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"=== Zeitaenderungen (Kernel-General EID 1) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $zt = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=1;ProviderName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General'} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($zt.Count -gt 0) {\n        $zt | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{n='Info';e={($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()}} | Format-List\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine manuellen Zeitaenderungen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausfuehrungsartefakte: Zustand und Auffaelligkeiten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Ausfuehrungsartefakte ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Zeigt Zustand, KEIN kryptografischer Manipulationsbeweis.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \" Tiefenauswertung: Zimmerman-Tools AmcacheParser / AppCompatCacheParser / MFTECmd)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Amcache.hve\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Amcache.hve ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $am = \"$env:SystemRoot\\AppCompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\"\n    if (Test-Path $am) {\n        $f = Get-Item $am -Force\n        Write-Host (\"Groesse: {0:N0} Bytes | Erstellt: {1} | Geaendert: {2}\" -f $f.Length,$f.CreationTime,$f.LastWriteTime)\n        if ($f.Length -lt 100KB) {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Datei sehr klein - koennte geleert/zurueckgesetzt sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        $os2 = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem\n        if ($f.CreationTime -gt $os2.InstallDate.AddDays(1)) {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Erstellt deutlich nach Windows-Installation - moeglw. neu angelegt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"FEHLT - Amcache.hve nicht vorhanden (regeneriert sich normalerweise).\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # USN-Journal (NTFS-Aenderungsjournal)\n    Write-Host \"`n--- USN-Journal (Laufwerk C:) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $usn = &amp; fsutil usn queryjournal C: 2&gt;&amp;1\n    if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and $usn) {\n        $usn | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        $first = ($usn | Select-String 'Erste USN|First USN' | Select-Object -First 1) -replace '[^0-9x]',''\n        if ($first -match '^0x0+$' -or $first -eq '0') {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Erste USN = 0 - Journal wurde geloescht und neu angelegt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Journal nicht abfragbar oder deaktiviert.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"Ein DEAKTIVIERTES USN-Journal ist auf einem Gaming-PC ungewoehnlich.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # ShimCache / AppCompatCache\n    Write-Host \"`n--- ShimCache (AppCompatCache) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $shim = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCompatCache'\n    if (Test-Path $shim) {\n        $val = (Get-ItemProperty $shim -Name AppCompatCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).AppCompatCache\n        if ($val) {\n            Write-Host (\"Vorhanden, {0:N0} Bytes. Binaer - Auswertung nur mit AppCompatCacheParser.\" -f $val.Length)\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Schluessel vorhanden, aber leer.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: AppCompatCache nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # Prefetch\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Prefetch ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfE = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory Management\\PrefetchParameters' -Name EnablePrefetcher -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).EnablePrefetcher\n    $pfDir = \"$env:SystemRoot\\Prefetch\"\n    $pfCount = if (Test-Path $pfDir) { @(Get-ChildItem \"$pfDir\\*.pf\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Count } else { 0 }\n    Write-Host (\"EnablePrefetcher: {0} | .pf-Dateien: {1}\" -f $pfE, $pfCount)\n    if ($pfE -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Prefetch deaktiviert - haeufige Anti-Forensik-Massnahme.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } elseif ($pfCount -lt 20) {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Sehr wenige .pf-Dateien - Prefetch koennte geleert worden sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # SRUM\n    Write-Host \"`n--- SRUM ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $srum = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\sru\\SRUDB.dat\"\n    if (Test-Path $srum) {\n        $f = Get-Item $srum -Force\n        Write-Host (\"SRUDB.dat: {0:N0} Bytes | Geaendert: {1}\" -f $f.Length,$f.LastWriteTime)\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"SRUDB.dat nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  3 - PCI/PCIe-Geraete\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PciDevices {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PCI/PCIe-Geraete (aktuell) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host (\"{0,-6} {1,-6} {2,-10} {3,-18} {4}\" -f 'VEN','DEV','STATUS','KLASSE','NAME') -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Get-PnpDevice | Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI*' } | Sort-Object Class | ForEach-Object {\n        $v = [regex]::Match($_.InstanceId,'VEN_([0-9A-Fa-f]{4})').Groups[1].Value.ToUpper()\n        $d = [regex]::Match($_.InstanceId,'DEV_([0-9A-Fa-f]{4})').Groups[1].Value.ToUpper()\n        $c = if ($OKVEN -contains $v) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host (\"{0,-6} {1,-6} {2,-10} {3,-18} {4}\" -f $v,$d,$_.Status,$_.Class,$_.FriendlyName) -ForegroundColor $c\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Nicht mehr vorhandene PCI-Geraete ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $reg = @(Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\PCI' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object -ExpandProperty PSChildName)\n    $da  = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI*' } |\n        ForEach-Object { ($_.InstanceId -split '\\\\')[1] })\n    $weg = @($reg | Where-Object { $da -notcontains $_ })\n    if ($weg.Count -gt 0) {\n        $weg | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"FEHLT: $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Abweichung.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== setupapi.dev.log ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $sp = 'C:\\Windows\\INF\\setupapi.dev.log'\n    if (Test-Path $sp) {\n        $fi = Get-Item $sp\n        Write-Host (\"Groesse: {0:N0} Bytes | Erstellt: {1} | Geaendert: {2}\" -f $fi.Length,$fi.CreationTime,$fi.LastWriteTime)\n        $ids = @(Select-String -Path $sp -Pattern 'PCI\\\\VEN_[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}&amp;DEV_[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}' -AllMatches |\n            ForEach-Object { $_.Matches.Value } | Sort-Object -Unique)\n        if ($ids.Count -gt 0) { $ids }\n        else { Write-Host \"Keine PCI-Eintraege in der Datei.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Datei nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  4 - Entfernte Geraete im Zeitfenster\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemovedDevices {\n    param([int]$Stunden = 1)\n\n    $seit = (Get-Date).AddHours(-$Stunden)\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Entfernte Geraete seit $($seit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm')) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    $rem = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=420;StartTime=$seit} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Geraet=(Get-DevId $_) } })\n    if ($rem.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"--- Abgezogen (Ereignisprotokoll) ---\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $rem | Sort-Object Zeit | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 420-Ereignisse im Zeitfenster.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    $sig = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sig -Name RK -Namespace W -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\n    $da = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.InstanceId })\n    $treffer = @()\n    foreach ($zweig in @('PCI','USB','USBSTOR','HID')) {\n        $pfad = \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\$zweig\"\n        if (-not (Test-Path $pfad)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $el = $_\n            Get-ChildItem $el.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n                $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n                [void][W.RK]::RegQueryInfoKey($_.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n                $zeit = [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n                $iid  = \"$zweig\\$($el.PSChildName)\\$($_.PSChildName)\"\n                if ($zeit -ge $seit -and ($da -notcontains $iid)) {\n                    $treffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Zuletzt = $zeit\n                        Geraet  = $iid\n                        Name    = (Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).FriendlyName\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($treffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"--- Registry frisch angefasst, Geraet nicht mehr vorhanden ---\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $treffer | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Registry-Auffaelligkeiten im Zeitfenster.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Bei ausgeschaltetem Rechner entfernte Hardware\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"erzeugt KEINE Spur. Leeres Ergebnis ist keine Entlastung.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  5 - Datentraeger-Historie\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DiskHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Datentraeger-Historie (Partition/Diagnostic) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    $plog = @(Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object {\n            $dat = ([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n            [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Zeit   = $_.TimeCreated\n                EID    = $_.Id\n                Modell = ($dat | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'Model' }).'#text'\n                Serie  = ($dat | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'SerialNumber' }).'#text'\n            }\n        })\n\n    if ($plog.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"Log leer oder nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        return\n    }\n\n    $s = $plog | Sort-Object Zeit\n    Write-Host (\"Zeitraum: {0} bis {1}  ({2} Eintraege)\" -f $s[0].Zeit, $s[-1].Zeit, $plog.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Alle jemals erfassten Datentraeger ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $plog | Group-Object Serie | ForEach-Object {\n        $e = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Modell   = $e[0].Modell\n            Serie    = $_.Name\n            Erstmals = $e[0].Zeit\n            Zuletzt  = $e[-1].Zeit\n            Anzahl   = $_.Count\n        }\n    } | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"--- Im Log erfasst, aktuell NICHT angeschlossen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $jetzt = @(Get-Disk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.SerialNumber -replace '\\s','' })\n    $fehlt = @($plog | Group-Object Serie | Where-Object {\n        $sn = $_.Name -replace '[\\s\\.]',''\n        -not ($jetzt | Where-Object { $_ -and ($_ -replace '[\\s\\.]','') -like \"*$sn*\" })\n    })\n    if ($fehlt.Count -gt 0) {\n        $fehlt | ForEach-Object {\n            $e = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n            Write-Host (\"FEHLT: {0} | Serie {1} | zuletzt {2}\" -f $e[0].Modell, $_.Name, $e[-1].Zeit) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle erfassten Datentraeger sind angeschlossen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Letzte 30 Ereignisse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $plog | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 30 | Format-Table -AutoSize\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  6 - USB-Geraetehistorie\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-UsbHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== USB-Geraetehistorie ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $da = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.InstanceId })\n    foreach ($zweig in @('USBSTOR','USB')) {\n        $pfad = \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\$zweig\"\n        if (-not (Test-Path $pfad)) { continue }\n        Write-Host \"`n--- $zweig ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $el = $_\n            Get-ChildItem $el.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n                $p = Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                $iid = \"$zweig\\$($el.PSChildName)\\$($_.PSChildName)\"\n                [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Status = if ($da -contains $iid) { 'vorhanden' } else { 'FEHLT' }\n                    Name   = $p.FriendlyName\n                    Klasse = $p.Class\n                    Geraet = $el.PSChildName\n                    Serie  = $_.PSChildName\n                }\n            }\n        } | Sort-Object Status, Name | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    }\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Viele FEHLT-Eintraege unter USB sind normal (Ports, Hubs, Kabel).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- DeviceSetupManager: MAKCU / Arduino / Input-Emulator Spuren ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- DeviceSetupManager: MAKCU / Arduino / Input-Emulator ---\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(CH343/CH340/CH341 = Arduino-Klon | ESP32-S3 = MAKCU | COM-Port = serielles Geraet)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $dsmLog   = 'Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager/Admin'\n    $dsmOper  = 'Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager/Operational'\n    $dsmMuster = 'CH34|CH340|CH341|CH343|ESP32|ESP8266|MAKCU|Arduino|CP2102|CP210|PL2303|FT232|FTDI|silabser|usbser'\n    $comMuster = 'COM\\d+'\n\n    $dsmTreffer = @()\n    foreach ($log in @($dsmLog, $dsmOper)) {\n        $events = @(Get-WinEvent -LogName $log -MaxEvents 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($e in $events) {\n            if ($e.Message -match $dsmMuster -or $e.Message -match 'COM[3-9]|COM[1-9][0-9]') {\n                $comPort = if ($e.Message -match '(COM\\d+)') { $matches[1] } else { '' }\n                $chip    = ''\n                foreach ($m in @('CH343','CH340','CH341','CH34','ESP32-S3','ESP32','ESP8266','CP2102','CP210','PL2303','FT232','FTDI','silabser','usbser','MAKCU','Arduino')) {\n                    if ($e.Message -match [regex]::Escape($m)) { $chip = $m; break }\n                }\n                $dsmTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Zeit    = $e.TimeCreated\n                    EID     = $e.Id\n                    Chip    = $chip\n                    COM     = $comPort\n                    Meldung = ($e.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Substring(0, [Math]::Min(120, $e.Message.Length))\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($dsmTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!] TREFFER: Serielle/Arduino/MAKCU-Geraete im DeviceSetupManager-Log!\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $dsmTreffer | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 20 | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Chip -match 'ESP32|MAKCU') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] EID {1}\" -f $_.Zeit, $_.EID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($_.Chip) { Write-Host (\"  Chip/Typ : {0}\" -f $_.Chip) -ForegroundColor $col }\n            if ($_.COM)  { Write-Host (\"  COM-Port : {0}\" -f $_.COM)  -ForegroundColor $col }\n            Write-Host (\"  Meldung  : {0}...\" -f $_.Meldung) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`n  Bedeutung: CH34x = Arduino-Klon (Input-Emulator Basis)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"             ESP32-S3 = MAKCU oder aehnliches Aim-Geraet\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"             COM-Port-Eintrag = serielles USB-Geraet war angeschlossen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Arduino/MAKCU/ESP32-Spuren im DeviceSetupManager-Log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- COM-Port-Registry: jemals registrierte serielle Geraete ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- COM-Port-Historie (Registry) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $comKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\COM Name Arbiter\\Devices'\n    if (Test-Path $comKey) {\n        $comPorts = Get-ItemProperty $comKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($comPorts) {\n            $comPorts.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Name -notmatch '^PS' } | ForEach-Object {\n                Write-Host (\"  {0} = {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Value)\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  COM-Arbiter-Key nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  7 - Fernwartungssoftware\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemoteTools {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Fernwartungssoftware ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $fund = $false\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Installiert (Registry) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $uninst = @(\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*',\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*',\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*'\n    )\n    $tr = @(Get-ItemProperty $uninst -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, InstallDate, InstallLocation)\n    if ($tr) { $tr | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Nichts gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Prefetch (belegt AUSFUEHRUNG) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory Management\\PrefetchParameters' -Name EnablePrefetcher -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).EnablePrefetcher\n    if ($pfEnabled -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"Prefetch ist DEAKTIVIERT - dieser Test ist wertlos.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n    $pf = @(Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.pf' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object Name, CreationTime, LastWriteTime)\n    if ($pf) { $pf | Format-Table -AutoSize; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Kein Prefetch-Eintrag.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dateien / Ordner ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfade = @(\"$env:ProgramFiles\",\"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\",\"$env:APPDATA\",\n               \"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\",\"$env:ProgramData\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Downloads\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\")\n    $df = @(foreach ($p in $pfade) {\n        if (Test-Path $p) {\n            Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Depth 2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER } |\n                Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime\n        }\n    })\n    if ($df) { $df | Sort-Object CreationTime | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Dateien gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dienste ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sv = @(Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER -or $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER -or $_.PathName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object Name, DisplayName, State, StartMode, PathName)\n    if ($sv) { $sv | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Dienste.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Programmspuren in der Registry ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $rk = @(\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\MuiCache',\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store',\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store'\n    )\n    $sp = @(foreach ($k in $rk) {\n        if (Test-Path $k) {\n            (Get-Item $k).Property | Where-Object { $_ -match $MUSTER } |\n                ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Quelle=(Split-Path $k -Leaf); Eintrag=$_ } }\n        }\n    })\n    if ($sp) { $sp | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Registry-Spuren.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Firewall-Regeln ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $fw = @(Get-NetFirewallRule -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object DisplayName, Enabled, Direction, Action)\n    if ($fw) { $fw | Format-Table -AutoSize; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Firewall-Regeln.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    if ($fund) {\n        Write-Host \"`nTREFFER vorhanden - Eintraege einzeln pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"Fernwartung hat viele harmlose Gruende. Der Zeitpunkt entscheidet.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"`nKeine Hinweise auf Fernwartungssoftware.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  8 - Fernwartung: Sitzungen und Dateiuebertragungen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemoteSessions {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Fernwartung: Sitzungen und Dateiuebertragungen ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # Schluesselwoerter, die auf Dateiuebertragung hindeuten\n    $ftMuster = 'file transfer|filetransfer|Files\\b|Starting file|Download|Upload|transfer of|Dateiuebertragung|Datei\u00c3\u00bcbertragung'\n\n    # --- AnyDesk ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- AnyDesk ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $adPfade = @(\"$env:ProgramData\\AnyDesk\", \"$env:APPDATA\\AnyDesk\")\n    $adGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $adPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $adGefunden = $true\n        Write-Host \"Ordner: $p\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $p -Filter '*.trace' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            Select-Object Name, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n        # connection_trace.txt: eine Zeile pro Sitzung\n        $ct = Join-Path $p 'connection_trace.txt'\n        if (Test-Path $ct) {\n            Write-Host \"-- Sitzungen (connection_trace.txt) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Get-Content $ct -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Trim() } |\n                ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        }\n\n        # Dateiuebertragungen aus den Trace-Dateien\n        $tf = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Filter '*.trace' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $tf) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern $ftMuster -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Moegliche Dateiuebertragung in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $adGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine AnyDesk-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- RustDesk ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- RustDesk ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $rdPfade = @(\"$env:APPDATA\\RustDesk\", \"$env:ProgramData\\RustDesk\", \"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\RustDesk\")\n    $rdGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $rdPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $rdGefunden = $true\n        Write-Host \"Ordner: $p\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Include '*.log','*.toml' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n\n        $logs = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Filter '*.log' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $logs) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern ($ftMuster + '|remote_id|Connection from|session') -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Eintraege in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $rdGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine RustDesk-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- TeamViewer ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- TeamViewer ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $tvPfade = @(\"$env:APPDATA\\TeamViewer\", \"$env:ProgramData\\TeamViewer\",\n                 \"$env:ProgramFiles\\TeamViewer\", \"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\\TeamViewer\")\n    $tvGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $tvPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $tvGefunden = $true\n        $conn = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Include 'Connections*.txt' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $conn) {\n            Write-Host \"-- $($f.FullName) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Get-Content $f.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Trim() } |\n                Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        }\n        $tvlogs = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Filter '*Logfile*.log' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $tvlogs) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern $ftMuster -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Moegliche Dateiuebertragung in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 30 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $tvGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine TeamViewer-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- Gegenprobe: geloeschte Logs / Ordnerzeiten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Gegenprobe ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    foreach ($p in ($adPfade + $rdPfade + $tvPfade)) {\n        if (Test-Path $p) {\n            $d = Get-Item $p\n            $anz = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Count\n            Write-Host (\"{0} | Erstellt {1} | Geaendert {2} | {3} Dateien\" -f $p, $d.CreationTime, $d.LastWriteTime, $anz)\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Ordner vorhanden, aber Logdateien fehlen oder sind leer\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"= Spuren wurden geloescht. Das ist selbst ein Befund.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Zeitangaben in den Logs sind Ortszeit des Rechners.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  9 - Unsignierte Dateien (Treiber / Prozesse / Ablageorte)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-Unsigned {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Unsignierte Dateien ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # Signaturstatus, der als unauffaellig gilt\n    $okStatus = @('Valid')\n\n    # --- 9a: Geladene Kernel-Treiber (wichtigster Teil) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Geladene Kernel-Treiber ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $drv = @(Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Running' -and $_.PathName })\n    $drvBad = @()\n    foreach ($d in $drv) {\n        $path = ($d.PathName -replace '\\\\SystemRoot', $env:SystemRoot) -replace '^\\\\\\?\\?\\\\',''\n        if (-not (Test-Path $path)) { continue }\n        $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($sig.Status -notin $okStatus) {\n            $drvBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Name    = $d.Name\n                Status  = $sig.Status\n                Signierer = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1' } else { '-' }\n                Pfad    = $path\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($drvBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $drvBad | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($drvBad.Count) nicht gueltig signierte Treiber - EINZELN pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle geladenen Treiber gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 9b: Laufende Prozesse ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Laufende Prozesse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $procBad = @()\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Path } |\n        Select-Object -Property Path -Unique | ForEach-Object {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.Path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if ($sig.Status -notin $okStatus) {\n                $procBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Status    = $sig.Status\n                    Signierer = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1' } else { '-' }\n                    Pfad      = $_.Path\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    if ($procBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $procBad | Sort-Object Pfad | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($procBad.Count) nicht gueltig signierte Prozesse.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle laufenden Prozesse gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 9c: Ausfuehrbare Dateien in typischen Ablageorten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- .exe/.sys/.dll in Ablageorten (Temp, Downloads, AppData) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $orte = @(\"$env:TEMP\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Downloads\",\"$env:APPDATA\",\"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\Temp\",\"$env:ProgramData\")\n    $fileBad = @()\n    foreach ($o in $orte) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $o)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $o -Recurse -Depth 2 -Include '*.exe','*.sys','*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            ForEach-Object {\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                if ($sig.Status -eq 'NotSigned') {\n                    $fileBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Erstellt = $_.CreationTime\n                        Groesse  = $_.Length\n                        Pfad     = $_.FullName\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n    }\n    if ($fileBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $fileBad | Sort-Object Erstellt -Descending | Select-Object -First 60 | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($fileBad.Count) unsignierte Dateien (max. 60 gezeigt).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine unsignierten Dateien in den Ablageorten.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: 'UnknownError' heisst meist, dass die Datei nicht\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"signiert ist. Viele legitime Programme sind unsigniert -\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"ein unsignierter KERNEL-TREIBER ist der relevante Befund,\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"unsignierte Nutzerprogramme sind es meist nicht.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  10 - PowerShell-History und Ausfuehrungsprotokoll\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PSHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PowerShell-History ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # --- 10a: PSReadline-History aller Benutzer ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PSReadline ConsoleHost_history.txt (alle Profile) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $profile = Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $gefunden = $false\n    foreach ($u in $profile) {\n        $hf = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt'\n        if (Test-Path $hf) {\n            $gefunden = $true\n            $f = Get-Item $hf -Force\n            $zeilen = @(Get-Content $hf -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            Write-Host \"`nBenutzer: $($u.Name)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host (\"  Datei: {0:N0} Bytes | Geaendert: {1} | {2} Zeilen\" -f $f.Length,$f.LastWriteTime,$zeilen.Count)\n            if ($zeilen.Count -eq 0) {\n                Write-Host \"  AUFFAELLIG: History-Datei ist LEER.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"  --- Inhalt ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $zeilen | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"    $_\" }\n            }\n        } else {\n            # Datei fehlt, aber Profil existiert\n            $psDir = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell'\n            if (Test-Path $psDir) {\n                Write-Host \"`nBenutzer: $($u.Name)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host \"  AUFFAELLIG: PowerShell genutzt, aber History-Datei fehlt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $gefunden) {\n        Write-Host \"Keine PSReadline-History gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 10b: ScriptBlock-Logging (EID 4104) - ergiebigste Quelle ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- ScriptBlock-Logging (PowerShell/Operational EID 4104) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sb = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4104} -MaxEvents 200 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($sb.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"$($sb.Count) Ereignisse geladen. Zeige zusammengesetzte Skriptbloecke:\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        # Nur den ersten Teil jedes mehrteiligen Blocks nehmen (Teil 1 von N),\n        # damit ein Skript nicht N-fach erscheint; Windows-Eigenaufrufe filtern.\n        $sb | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | ForEach-Object {\n            $x = [xml]$_.ToXml()\n            $data = $x.Event.EventData.Data\n            $teil = ($data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'MessageNumber' }).'#text'\n            $code = ($data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ScriptBlockText' }).'#text'\n            [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Teil=$teil; Code=$code }\n        } | Where-Object {\n            $_.Teil -eq '1' -and\n            $_.Code -and\n            $_.Code -notmatch 'prompt|PSConsoleHostReadLine|Set-PSReadLine|__VSCode|Get-Module|CompletionPredictor|IsAzureContextPresent'\n        } | Select-Object -First 25 | ForEach-Object {\n            $c = ($_.Code -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()\n            if ($c.Length -gt 200) { $c = $c.Substring(0,200) + ' [...]' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]\" -f $_.Zeit) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host (\"  {0}\" -f $c)\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"ScriptBlock-Logging nicht aktiv oder keine Eintraege.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"(Standardmaessig aus - Fehlen ist hier NICHT auffaellig.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 10c: Modul-Logging (EID 4103) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Modul-Logging (EID 4103) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $ml = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4103} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($ml.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"$($ml.Count) Ereignisse vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Kein Modul-Logging.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 10e: HostApplication aus Klassik-Log (EID 400/600) ---\n    # Standardmaessig AKTIV - zeigt die Startkommandozeile jeder PS-Sitzung.\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Start-Kommandozeilen (Windows PowerShell EID 400/600) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $klassik = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Windows PowerShell';Id=400,600} -MaxEvents 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($klassik.Count -gt 0) {\n        $verdacht = '-enc |-encodedcommand|-e [A-Za-z0-9+/]{20}|downloadstring|downloadfile|downloaddata|-w hidden|-windowstyle hidden|invoke-expression| iex |frombase64|webclient|start-bitstransfer|certutil.*-urlcache|bitsadmin|invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|\\bcurl |\\bwget |\\birm |\\biwr |net\\.webclient|system\\.net\\.http|http://|https://'\n        $cmds = $klassik | ForEach-Object {\n            if ($_.Message -match 'HostApplication=(.+?)(\\r?\\n|$)') {\n                [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Cmd=$matches[1].Trim() }\n            }\n        } | Where-Object { $_.Cmd } |\n            Group-Object Cmd | ForEach-Object {\n                $g = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n                [PSCustomObject]@{ Erstmals=$g[0].Zeit; Zuletzt=$g[-1].Zeit; Anzahl=$_.Count; Cmd=$_.Name }\n            } | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending\n\n        Write-Host \"$($cmds.Count) unterschiedliche Start-Kommandozeilen:\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        # Bekannt-gute Aufrufe, die trotz Download-Muster NICHT rot sein sollen\n        # (der Lade-Einzeiler des Pruefwerkzeugs selbst).\n        $eigenesTool = 'gist\\.githubusercontent\\.com/analystdark|pnpcheck\\.ps1'\n        foreach ($c in $cmds) {\n            $ausg = $c.Cmd\n            if ($ausg.Length -gt 200) { $ausg = $ausg.Substring(0,200) + ' [...]' }\n            if ($c.Cmd -match $verdacht -and $c.Cmd -notmatch $eigenesTool) {\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]  ({1}x)\" -f $c.Zuletzt, $c.Anzahl) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"  VERDAECHTIG: {0}\" -f $ausg) -ForegroundColor Red\n            } else {\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]  ({1}x)\" -f $c.Zuletzt, $c.Anzahl) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host (\"  {0}\" -f $ausg)\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`nRot = Muster wie -enc, hidden, DownloadString, IEX (nicht immer boese,\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"aber typisch fuer verschleierte Ausfuehrung - einzeln pruefen).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 400/600-Ereignisse - Klassik-Log leer oder geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"(Dieses Log ist normal AKTIV; ein leeres ist auffaellig.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 10d: Wurde das PowerShell-Log geleert? ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PowerShell-Log-Status ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Get-WinEvent -ListLog 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational','Windows PowerShell' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object LogName, IsEnabled, RecordCount | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Eine leere/fehlende History bei sonst genutztem PowerShell\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"deutet auf gezieltes Loeschen hin - selbst ein Befund.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  11 - Discord-Account-IDs (nur User-ID, KEINE Token)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DiscordId {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Discord-Account-IDs ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Liest ausschliesslich die user_id_cache-Kennung.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \" Token werden NICHT gelesen oder ausgegeben.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $enc = [System.Text.Encoding]::GetEncoding('ISO-8859-1')\n    $script:treffer = @()\n\n    # Hilfsfunktion: eine Datei nach user_id_cache absuchen\n    $scan = {\n        param($file,$user,$quelle)\n        try { $raw = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($file, $enc) } catch { return }\n        foreach ($m in [regex]::Matches($raw, 'user_id_cache[^\\d]{0,20}(\\d{17,20})')) {\n            $script:treffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Benutzer=$user; Quelle=$quelle; ID=$m.Groups[1].Value }\n        }\n    }\n\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $user   = $_.Name\n        $roam   = Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming'\n        $local  = Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Local'\n\n        # --- Desktop-App (alle Discord-Varianten) ---\n        foreach ($fl in @('discord','discordcanary','discordptb','discorddevelopment')) {\n            $ldb = Join-Path $roam \"$fl\\Local Storage\\leveldb\"\n            if (Test-Path $ldb) {\n                Get-ChildItem $ldb -Include '*.ldb','*.log' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                    ForEach-Object { &amp; $scan $_.FullName $user \"App:$fl\" }\n            }\n        }\n\n        # --- Chromium-Browser (Profile: Default, Profile 1, ...) ---\n        $chromium = @{\n            'Chrome'  = \"$local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\"\n            'Edge'    = \"$local\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\"\n            'Brave'   = \"$local\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data\"\n            'Vivaldi' = \"$local\\Vivaldi\\User Data\"\n            'OperaGX' = \"$roam\\Opera Software\\Opera GX Stable\"\n            'Opera'   = \"$roam\\Opera Software\\Opera Stable\"\n        }\n        foreach ($b in $chromium.Keys) {\n            $root = $chromium[$b]\n            if (-not (Test-Path $root)) { continue }\n            # Opera hat kein Profile-Unterverzeichnis, Chrome/Edge/Brave schon\n            Get-ChildItem $root -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'Default' -or $_.Name -like 'Profile *' } |\n                ForEach-Object {\n                    $ldb = Join-Path $_.FullName 'Local Storage\\leveldb'\n                    if (Test-Path $ldb) {\n                        Get-ChildItem $ldb -Include '*.ldb','*.log' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                            ForEach-Object { &amp; $scan $_.FullName $user \"$b/$($_.Directory.Parent.Parent.Name)\" }\n                    }\n                }\n            # Opera-Fall (leveldb direkt unter root)\n            $ldbDirect = Join-Path $root 'Local Storage\\leveldb'\n            if (Test-Path $ldbDirect) {\n                Get-ChildItem $ldbDirect -Include '*.ldb','*.log' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                    ForEach-Object { &amp; $scan $_.FullName $user $b }\n            }\n        }\n\n        # --- Firefox (localStorage in SQLite) ---\n        $ffRoot = Join-Path $roam 'Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles'\n        if (Test-Path $ffRoot) {\n            Get-ChildItem $ffRoot -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n                $lsRoot = Join-Path $_.FullName 'storage\\default'\n                if (Test-Path $lsRoot) {\n                    Get-ChildItem $lsRoot -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                        Where-Object { $_.Name -like '*discord*' } | ForEach-Object {\n                            Get-ChildItem $_.FullName -Include '*.sqlite' -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                                ForEach-Object { &amp; $scan $_.FullName $user 'Firefox' }\n                        }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($script:treffer.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`nKeine Discord-User-ID gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"(Discord nicht installiert/eingeloggt, nur portable genutzt, oder Daten entfernt.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        return\n    }\n\n    # Deduplizieren und Account-Alter aus der Snowflake ableiten\n    $script:treffer | Group-Object ID | ForEach-Object {\n        $id = $_.Name\n        $created = try {\n            $ms = ([int64]$id -shr 22) + 1420070400000\n            [DateTimeOffset]::FromUnixTimeMilliseconds($ms).UtcDateTime\n        } catch { $null }\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            DiscordID   = $id\n            Erstellt    = if ($created) { $created.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') + ' UTC' } else { '?' }\n            GefundenBei = (($_.Group | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Benutzer -Unique) -join ', ')\n            Quelle      = (($_.Group | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Quelle -Unique) -join ', ')\n        }\n    } | Sort-Object Erstellt | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n\n    $anz = @($script:treffer | Select-Object -ExpandProperty ID -Unique).Count\n    if ($anz -gt 1) {\n        Write-Host \"$anz unterschiedliche Discord-IDs auf diesem Rechner.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"Mehrere Accounts koennen auf geteilte Nutzung oder Ban-Ausweichen deuten - im Kontext pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"1 Discord-ID gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    Write-Host \"Quelle = App-Variante oder Browser/Profil, in dem die ID lag.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Erstelldatum ist aus der ID berechnet (Snowflake), kein Online-Abruf.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  12 - PE Binary &amp; Driver Heuristics Inspector\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PEInspector {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PE Binary &amp; Driver Heuristics Inspector ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(SHA256, BYOVD-Abgleich, Signatur, PE-Header, Entropie, APIs, Keywords)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Tipp: Start-Transcript (P) vorher aktivieren um Ergebnis zu sichern.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $byovdHashes = @{\n        \"01ee72782b1d4182da0eef7f9859f7aa2f89cc46e9df51ef2807f43db4872121\" = \"RTCore64.sys (Micro-Star CVE-2019-16098)\"\n        \"31f4d725d8d7e01dd582120aa0f23223fa1ac3cb4414f4e5da801db9402ab490\" = \"gdrv.sys (GIGABYTE CVE-2018-19320)\"\n        \"eb601822c9a7da4175345a55018698dc54fe66d11a91d1e434f676ab65d382bb\" = \"Capcom.sys (Root-Exploit / SMEP)\"\n        \"046e8c8959d72215a774136e632831f2ff2cc0bcbc2becc278912efee7e3cf40\" = \"mhyprot2.sys (miHoYo Process/Memory Killer)\"\n        \"a66d92ff488e0402b8813c9fb60cf649372d65ab19aa67a421dff03fc29fc2a2\" = \"AsrDrv103.sys (ASRock Physical Memory R/W)\"\n        \"60c38ea120015ff363fe9d63c5a70ebfb44766b9319de8d98d248b6bb83c509a\" = \"ene.sys (ENE Technology DeviceIoControl)\"\n    }\n    $packerSections = @(\"upx0\",\"upx1\",\"upx2\",\".vmp0\",\".vmp1\",\".vmp2\",\"themida\",\".themida\",\".enigma1\",\".enigma2\",\".aspack\",\".adata\",\"pec1\",\"pec2\",\".mpress1\",\".mpress2\")\n    $dangerousAPIs = @{\n        \"Process Injection\"  = @(\"VirtualAllocEx\",\"WriteProcessMemory\",\"CreateRemoteThread\",\"NtQueueApcThread\",\"RtlCreateUserThread\",\"SetThreadContext\")\n        \"Memory Tampering\"   = @(\"NtMapViewOfSection\",\"ZwMapViewOfSection\",\"VirtualProtectEx\",\"NtWriteVirtualMemory\")\n        \"Kernel Interaction\" = @(\"ZwLoadDriver\",\"NtLoadDriver\",\"DeviceIoControl\",\"ObRegisterCallbacks\",\"MmCopyVirtualMemory\",\"MmMapIoSpace\")\n        \"Anti-Debug/Evasion\" = @(\"IsDebuggerPresent\",\"CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent\",\"NtQueryInformationProcess\",\"NtSetInformationThread\")\n    }\n    $suspiciousStrings = @(\n        # Cheat-Funktionen\n        'aimbot','wallhack','silentaim','triggerbot','cheatengine',\n        'processhacker','kdmapper','blackbone','drvload','kernelhook','minifilter',\n        # Injection-Techniken (aus realem WptsExtensions.dll Fund)\n        'manualmap','manual map','manualmapping',\n        'kernelmap','kernel manual map',\n        'injecthost','injectmonitor','injecttrigger',\n        'trigger=%s','injected ok','inject failed',\n        # Weitere Injection-Indikatoren\n        'reflectiveinject','reflective inject','shellcode',\n        'dllinjection','dll injection','remotethread',\n        'mapviewofsection inject','zwmapviewofsection'\n    )\n    # Wortgrenz-Keywords (kommen auch in legitimen Dateien vor)\n    $suspiciousStringsWB = @('hack','inject')\n\n    # Datei waehlen\n    $ziel = Read-Host \"`nPfad zur Datei (.exe/.dll/.sys) - leer lassen fuer Datei-Dialog\"\n    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ziel)) {\n        Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $dlg = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.OpenFileDialog\n        $dlg.Filter = \"Binaries &amp; Treiber (*.exe;*.dll;*.sys)|*.exe;*.dll;*.sys|Alle (*.*)|*.*\"\n        if ($dlg.ShowDialog() -eq 'OK') { $ziel = $dlg.FileName }\n        else { Write-Host \"Abgebrochen.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow; return }\n    }\n    if (-not (Test-Path $ziel)) { Write-Host \"Datei nicht gefunden: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n    if ((Get-Item $ziel).PSIsContainer) { Write-Host \"Pfad ist ein Ordner, keine Datei: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    $dateiname = Split-Path $ziel -Leaf\n    Write-Host \"`nZiel: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor White\n    Write-Host (\"=\" * 70) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    try { $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ziel) }\n    catch { Write-Host \"Lesefehler: $_\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    # Phase 1: SHA256 &amp; BYOVD\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 1: SHA256 &amp; BYOVD-Abgleich\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $hasher = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create()\n    $sha256 = [BitConverter]::ToString($hasher.ComputeHash($bytes)).Replace(\"-\",\"\").ToLower()\n    Write-Host \"    SHA256 : $sha256\"\n    if ($byovdHashes.ContainsKey($sha256)) {\n        Write-Host \"    [!!!] BYOVD ERKANNT: $($byovdHashes[$sha256])\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"    BYOVD  : Kein bekannter anfaelliger Treiber-Hash.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # Phase 2: Signatur &amp; EKUs\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 2: Digitale Signatur &amp; Zertifikats-EKUs\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $ziel -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    if ($sig) {\n        $sigCol = if ($sig.Status -eq 'Valid') { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host \"    Status     : $($sig.Status)\" -ForegroundColor $sigCol\n        if ($sig.SignerCertificate) {\n            Write-Host \"    Inhaber    : $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1')\"\n            Write-Host \"    Aussteller : $($sig.SignerCertificate.Issuer -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1')\"\n            foreach ($ext in $sig.SignerCertificate.Extensions) {\n                if ($ext -is [System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509EnhancedKeyUsageExtension]) {\n                    foreach ($oid in $ext.EnhancedKeyUsages) {\n                        switch ($oid.Value) {\n                            \"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.1.1\" { Write-Host \"    [EKU] WHQL Hardware-Signatur\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n                            \"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.6\" { Write-Host \"    [EKU] Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Signing\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n                            \"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3\"       { Write-Host \"    [EKU] Standard Code-Signing\" }\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        } else { Write-Host \"    [!] Nicht signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n    }\n\n    # Phase 3: PE-Header\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 3: PE-Header &amp; Anomalien\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    if ($bytes.Length -lt 64) { Write-Host \"    Datei zu klein.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    $stream = [System.IO.FileStream]::new($ziel, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read)\n    $reader = [System.IO.BinaryReader]::new($stream)\n    $highestRawEnd = 0\n\n    try {\n        if ($reader.ReadUInt16() -ne 0x5A4D) { Write-Host \"    Kein MZ-Header.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n        $null = $stream.Seek(0x3C, 0); $peOff = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek($peOff, 0)\n        if ($reader.ReadUInt32() -ne 0x00004550) { Write-Host \"    Keine PE-Signatur.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt16()              # Machine\n        $numSec = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt32()              # TimeDateStamp\n        $null = $stream.Seek(10, 1)\n        $optHdrSize = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt16()              # Characteristics\n        $optPos = $stream.Position\n        $optMagic = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $is64 = ($optMagic -eq 0x20B)\n        $null = $stream.Seek($optPos + 16, 0); $epRVA = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek($optPos + 32, 0)\n        $secAlign = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $fileAlign = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek(16, 1); $sizeHdr = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $dllCharOff = if ($is64) { $optPos + 70 } else { $optPos + 46 }\n        $null = $stream.Seek($dllCharOff, 0); $dllChar = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $hasASLR = ($dllChar -band 0x0040) -ne 0\n        $hasDEP  = ($dllChar -band 0x0100) -ne 0\n\n        Write-Host \"    Architektur : $(if($is64){'x64'}else{'x86'})\"\n        Write-Host (\"    ASLR        : \" + $(if($hasASLR){'An'}else{'[!] AUS'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($hasASLR){'White'}else{'Red'})\n        Write-Host (\"    DEP/NX      : \" + $(if($hasDEP){'An'}else{'[!] AUS'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($hasDEP){'White'}else{'Red'})\n        Write-Host \"    Alignments  : Sektion=0x$($secAlign.ToString('X')) | Datei=0x$($fileAlign.ToString('X'))\"\n        if ($sizeHdr -gt 4096) { Write-Host \"    [!] SizeOfHeaders ungewoehnlich gross: $sizeHdr Bytes\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n\n        # Sanity-Check: Werte ausserhalb realistischer Grenzen = gepackt/geschuetzt\n        $parserValid = $true\n        if ($secAlign -gt 0x200000 -or $fileAlign -gt 0x100000 -or $sizeHdr -gt 0x100000) {\n            Write-Host \"`n    [!] PARSER-WARNUNG: Header-Werte ausserhalb normaler Bereiche.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        SectionAlignment=0x$($secAlign.ToString('X')) | FileAlignment=0x$($fileAlign.ToString('X')) | SizeOfHeaders=$sizeHdr\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        Datei ist wahrscheinlich gepackt oder geschuetzt (z.B. Electron/Chromium, VMProtect, Themida).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        Phase 4 (Sektionen) wird uebersprungen - Ergebnisse waeren nicht zuverlaessig.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            $parserValid = $false\n        }\n\n        # Phase 4: Sektionen\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 4: Sektionen, Entropie &amp; Packer-Erkennung\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        if (-not $parserValid) {\n            Write-Host \"    Uebersprungen (siehe Warnung oben).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        } else {\n        $null = $stream.Seek($peOff + 4 + 20 + $optHdrSize, 0)\n        $sectionMap = @()\n\n        for ($i = 0; $i -lt $numSec; $i++) {\n            $nameB = $reader.ReadBytes(8)\n            $sn    = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($nameB).Trim([char]0)\n            $vSize = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $vAddr = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $rSize = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $rPtr  = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $null = $stream.Seek(12, 1); $sChar = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $isX = ($sChar -band 0x20000000) -ne 0\n            $isW = ($sChar -band 0x80000000) -ne 0\n            if (($rPtr + $rSize) -gt $highestRawEnd) { $highestRawEnd = $rPtr + $rSize }\n            $sectionMap += @{ VirtAddr=$vAddr; VirtSize=[Math]::Max($vSize,1); RawPtr=$rPtr }\n\n            # Entropie inline berechnen\n            $ent = 0.0\n            if ($rSize -gt 0 -and ($rPtr + $rSize) -le $bytes.Length) {\n                $cnt = @{}\n                for ($x = $rPtr; $x -lt ($rPtr + $rSize); $x++) { $b = $bytes[$x]; $cnt[$b] = $cnt[$b] + 1 }\n                foreach ($k in $cnt.Keys) { $p = $cnt[$k] / $rSize; $ent -= $p * [Math]::Log($p, 2) }\n                $ent = [Math]::Round($ent, 2)\n            }\n\n            $fl = \"\"\n            if ($isW -and $isX) { $fl += \" [ALERT: W+X]\" }\n            if ($packerSections -contains $sn.ToLower()) { $fl += \" [PACKER]\" }\n            $col = if ($fl) { 'Red' } elseif ($ent -gt 7.0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'White' }\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] Raw:{1,-8} Virt:{2,-8} Entropie:{3}{4}\" -f $sn.PadRight(8),$rSize,$vSize,$ent,$fl) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($rSize -eq 0 -and $vSize -gt 0) { Write-Host \"      [!] 0 Bytes auf Platte, $vSize im RAM (Loader/Unpacker)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            if ($sn -eq '.text' -and $ent -gt 7.0) { Write-Host \"      [!] .text Entropie $ent/8.0 - Code verschluesselt oder gepackt!\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n        }\n\n        # Phase 4b: Import-Tabelle &amp; DLL-Hijacking-Kandidaten\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 4b: Import-Tabelle &amp; DLL-Hijacking-Check\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        $importDirPos = if ($is64) { $optPos + 120 } else { $optPos + 104 }\n        $null = $stream.Seek($importDirPos, 0)\n        $importRVA  = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $importSz   = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n\n        if ($importRVA -eq 0 -or $importSz -eq 0) {\n            Write-Host \"    Keine Import-Tabelle vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        } else {\n            # RVA -&gt; Datei-Offset\n            $importOff = -1L\n            foreach ($s in $sectionMap) {\n                if ($importRVA -ge $s.VirtAddr -and $importRVA -lt ($s.VirtAddr + $s.VirtSize)) {\n                    $importOff = [int64]($importRVA - $s.VirtAddr + $s.RawPtr); break\n                }\n            }\n\n            if ($importOff -lt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"    Import-Tabelle nicht mappbar (gepackt?).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            } else {\n                $importedDLLs = @()\n                $pos = [int64]$importOff\n                while ($pos + 20 -le $bytes.Length) {\n                    $nameRVA = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($bytes, $pos + 12)\n                    if ($nameRVA -eq 0) { break }\n                    $nameOff = -1L\n                    foreach ($s in $sectionMap) {\n                        if ($nameRVA -ge $s.VirtAddr -and $nameRVA -lt ($s.VirtAddr + $s.VirtSize)) {\n                            $nameOff = [int64]($nameRVA - $s.VirtAddr + $s.RawPtr); break\n                        }\n                    }\n                    if ($nameOff -ge 0) {\n                        $sb = [System.Text.StringBuilder]::new()\n                        $nx = [int64]$nameOff\n                        while ($nx -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$nx] -ne 0) { $null = $sb.Append([char]$bytes[$nx]); $nx++ }\n                        $dn = $sb.ToString()\n                        if ($dn -match '(?i)\\.dll$') { $importedDLLs += $dn }\n                    }\n                    $pos += 20\n                }\n\n                Write-Host \"    Importierte DLLs: $($importedDLLs.Count)\"\n                $parentDir = Split-Path $ziel -Parent\n                $hijackFound = $false\n                foreach ($dll in $importedDLLs) {\n                    $sameDir = Join-Path $parentDir $dll\n                    if (Test-Path $sameDir) {\n                        $dllSig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $sameDir -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                        $dllStatus = if ($dllSig) { $dllSig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                        $dllColor = if ($dllStatus -eq 'Valid') { 'Yellow' } else { 'Red' }\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!] HIJACK-KANDIDAT: {0}\" -f $dll) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        Write-Host (\"        Pfad: {0}\" -f $sameDir) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        Write-Host (\"        Signatur: {0}\" -f $dllStatus) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        $hijackFound = $true\n                    }\n                }\n                if (-not $hijackFound) {\n                    Write-Host \"    Keine gleichnamigen DLLs im selben Ordner.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        } # Ende else parserValid\n\n        # Phase 5: Overlay &amp; eingebettete PEs\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 5: Overlay &amp; eingebettete PE-Dateien\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        if ($bytes.Length -gt $highestRawEnd -and $highestRawEnd -gt 0) {\n            $ovSize = $bytes.Length - $highestRawEnd\n            $cnt2 = @{}\n            for ($x = $highestRawEnd; $x -lt $bytes.Length; $x++) { $b=$bytes[$x]; $cnt2[$b]=$cnt2[$b]+1 }\n            $oe = 0.0\n            foreach ($k in $cnt2.Keys) { $p=$cnt2[$k]/$ovSize; $oe -= $p*[Math]::Log($p,2) }\n            Write-Host \"    [!] OVERLAY: $ovSize Bytes angehaengt (Entropie $([Math]::Round($oe,2))/8.0)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"    Kein Overlay.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n        $embN = 0\n        for ($j = 64; $j -lt ($bytes.Length - 1024); $j += 4) {\n            if ($bytes[$j] -eq 0x4D -and $bytes[$j+1] -eq 0x5A) {\n                $lf = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($bytes, $j + 0x3C)\n                if ($lf -gt 0 -and ($j+$lf+4) -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$j+$lf] -eq 0x50 -and $bytes[$j+$lf+1] -eq 0x45) {\n                    Write-Host \"    [!] Eingebettetes PE bei Offset 0x$($j.ToString('X')) (Dropper/Payload?)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                    $embN++\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        if ($embN -eq 0) { Write-Host \"    Keine eingebetteten PE-Dateien.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    } finally { $reader.Close() }\n\n    # Phase 6: PDB-Pfad\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 6: Debug-Informationen (PDB-Pfad)\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $pdb = $null\n    for ($i = 0; $i -lt ($bytes.Length - 28); $i++) {\n        if ($bytes[$i] -eq 0x52 -and $bytes[$i+1] -eq 0x53 -and $bytes[$i+2] -eq 0x44 -and $bytes[$i+3] -eq 0x53) {\n            $ss = $i + 24; $se = $ss\n            while ($se -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$se] -ne 0) { $se++ }\n            if ($se -gt $ss) {\n                $p = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($bytes, $ss, $se-$ss)\n                if ($p -match '(?i)\\.pdb$') { $pdb = $p; break }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $pdb) {\n        $ra = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytes)\n        if ($ra -match '([a-zA-Z]:\\\\[^\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F-\\xFF]+\\.pdb)') { $pdb = $matches[1] }\n    }\n    if ($pdb) {\n        Write-Host \"    Build-Pfad: $pdb\"\n        if ($pdb -match '(?i)(cheat|inject|hook|hack|aim|esp|driver|bypass)') {\n            Write-Host \"    [!] ALERT: Verdaechtiges Keyword im Build-Pfad!\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else { Write-Host \"    PDB: Nicht gefunden oder gestrippt.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n    # Phase 7: High-Risk APIs &amp; Cheat-Keywords\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 7: High-Risk APIs &amp; Cheat-Keywords\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $rawAscii = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytes)\n    $apiTreffer = $false\n    foreach ($cat in $dangerousAPIs.Keys) {\n        $matched = @($dangerousAPIs[$cat] | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match [regex]::Escape($_) })\n        if ($matched.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"    [!] $cat ($($matched.Count)): $($matched -join ', ')\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $apiTreffer = $true\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $apiTreffer) { Write-Host \"    Keine gefaehrlichen APIs im Klartext.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    $foundKW = @($suspiciousStrings | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match [regex]::Escape($_) })\n    $foundKW += @($suspiciousStringsWB | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match \"\\b$([regex]::Escape($_))\\b\" })\n    $foundKW = $foundKW | Select-Object -Unique\n    if ($foundKW.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"    [!] Verdaechtige Keywords: $($foundKW -join ', ')\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else { Write-Host \"    Keine Cheat-Keywords im Klartext.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n$('=' * 70)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Scan abgeschlossen: $dateiname\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Ergebnis wird im aktiven Transcript gesichert (Menue P).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer groessere Dateien (.sys/.exe) empfiehlt sich zusaetzlich VirusTotal.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  13 - DLL Hijacking Live-Check (laufende Prozesse)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DLLHijackCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== DLL Hijacking Live-Check ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Pr\u00c3\u00bcft laufende Prozesse auf Module aus unerwarteten Pfaden)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Pfade die als legitim gelten\n    $okPfade = @(\n        \"$env:SystemRoot\\\",\n        \"$env:ProgramFiles\\\",\n        \"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\\\",\n        \"$env:ProgramData\\Microsoft\\\"\n    )\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Module aus unerwarteten Pfaden ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $treffer = @()\n\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Path } | ForEach-Object {\n        $proc    = $_\n        $procDir = (Split-Path $proc.Path -Parent).ToLower().TrimEnd('\\') + '\\'\n        try {\n            $proc.Modules | Where-Object { $_.FileName -and $_.FileName -notmatch '(?i)\\.(node|ocx|cpl|ax)$' } | ForEach-Object {\n                $modPath = $_.FileName\n                $modPathL = $modPath.ToLower()\n                $istOK = ($okPfade | Where-Object { $modPathL.StartsWith($_.ToLower()) }) -or\n                         $modPathL.StartsWith($procDir)\n                if (-not $istOK) {\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $modPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    $treffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Prozess  = $proc.Name\n                        PID      = $proc.Id\n                        Modul    = $_.ModuleName\n                        Pfad     = $modPath\n                        Signatur = $status\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        } catch {}\n    }\n\n    if ($treffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        # Unsignierte zuerst\n        $treffer | Sort-Object Signatur, Prozess | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Signatur -eq 'Valid') { 'Yellow' } else { 'Red' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Prozess, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Modul : {0}\" -f $_.Modul) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad  : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Sig   : {0}\" -f $_.Signatur) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n        $unsigned = @($treffer | Where-Object { $_.Signatur -ne 'Valid' })\n        Write-Host \"`n$($treffer.Count) Treffer gesamt, davon $($unsigned.Count) nicht gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor $(if($unsigned.Count -gt 0){'Red'}else{'Yellow'})\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine auffaelligen Module gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # Spielprozesse gezielt pruefen\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Spielprozesse gezielt pruefen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $spielNamen = @('FiveM','FiveM_GTAProcess','GTA5','RageMP','altv','RedM','cfx')\n    $spielProcs = @(Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match ($spielNamen -join '|') })\n    if ($spielProcs.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($sp in $spielProcs) {\n            Write-Host \"`n  Prozess: $($sp.Name) (PID $($sp.Id))\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            try {\n                $sp.Modules | Where-Object { $_.FileName } | ForEach-Object {\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FileName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    if ($status -ne 'Valid') {\n                        Write-Host (\"  [!] Unsigniert: {0}\" -f $_.FileName) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    }\n                }\n            } catch {\n                Write-Host \"  Zugriff auf Module verweigert (Adminrechte noetig).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine FiveM/GTA-Prozesse laufend.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Gelb = signiert aber ungewoehnlicher Pfad.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"         Rot  = unsigniert oder Signatur ungueltig = Befund pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer Live-Analyse laufender Injektion: Sysinternals Process Monitor empfohlen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- Bekannte DLL-Hijacking-Zielordner ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Bekannte Hijacking-Zielordner (wbem, Tasks, Sysprep...) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Bekannte Ziel-DLLs fuer wbem-Hijacking (aus realen Faellen)\n    # PHANTOM = diese Dateien existieren auf normalem Windows NICHT in wbem\n    # Ihr blo\u00c3\u0178es Vorhandensein ist bereits verdaechtig - Signatur egal\n    $wbemPhantom = @(\n        'WptsExtensions.dll',   # Phantom-DLL - existiert nie in wbem (Trojan.Yogi u.a.)\n        'WaasMedicSvc.dll',     # Phantom-DLL - gehoert nicht in wbem\n        'wlbsctrl.dll'          # Phantom-DLL - IKEEXT-Hijacking-Ziel\n    )\n    $wbemTargets = @(\n        'msdtcprx.dll',\n        'wmicmiplugin.dll',\n        'wbemcomn.dll'\n    )\n\n    $hijackOrdner = @{\n        'wbem'    = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem'\n        'Tasks'   = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks'\n        'Sysprep' = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\Sysprep'\n        'Spool'   = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3'\n    }\n\n    $hijackFund = $false\n    foreach ($name in $hijackOrdner.Keys) {\n        $ordner = $hijackOrdner[$name]\n        if (-not (Test-Path $ordner)) { continue }\n\n        $dlls = @(Get-ChildItem $ordner -Filter '*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        if ($dlls.Count -eq 0) { continue }\n\n        Write-Host \"`n  [$name] $ordner\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        foreach ($f in $dlls) {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $f.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n            $signierer = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) {\n                $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1'\n            } else { '-' }\n\n            $istMS      = $signierer -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n            $istPhantom = $wbemPhantom -contains $f.Name\n            $istTarget  = $wbemTargets -contains $f.Name\n            $istVerd    = (-not $istMS) -or ($status -ne 'Valid')\n\n            if ($istPhantom) {\n                # Phantom-DLLs sind immer ein Befund - egal ob signiert\n                $col = 'Red'\n                Write-Host (\"    [!!!] PHANTOM-DLL: {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}\" -f $f.Name, $status, $signierer) -ForegroundColor $col\n                Write-Host (\"          Diese Datei gehoert NICHT in diesen Ordner - Hijacking-Beweis!\" ) -ForegroundColor $col\n                $hijackFound = $true\n            } elseif ($istVerd -or $istTarget) {\n                $col = if ($status -ne 'Valid' -or -not $istMS) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                $hinweis = if ($istTarget -and -not $istMS) { ' [BEKANNTES HIJACK-ZIEL + FREMD]' } elseif ($istTarget) { ' [BEKANNTES HIJACK-ZIEL]' } else { '' }\n                Write-Host (\"    [!] {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}{3}\" -f $f.Name, $status, $signierer, $hinweis) -ForegroundColor $col\n                $hijackFund = $true\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (-not $hijackFund) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen DLLs in Hijacking-Zielordnern.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- setupapi.dev.log auf USB-Spuren pruefen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- SetupAPI: USB-Cheat-Lader-Spuren ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $setupLog = 'C:\\Windows\\INF\\setupapi.dev.log'\n    if (Test-Path $setupLog) {\n        $hits = @(Select-String -Path $setupLog -Pattern 'setupplatform|cheat|hack|bypass|inject|loader|DMASetup|dma_setup' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Verdaechtige Begriffe in setupapi.dev.log:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $hits | Select-Object -First 20 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"    $($_.Line.Trim())\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine verdaechtigen Cheat-Begriffe in setupapi.dev.log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n        # Datei-Zeitstempel: frisch erstellt nach Windows-Installation?\n        $f = Get-Item $setupLog\n        $os2 = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($os2 -and $f.CreationTime -gt $os2.InstallDate.AddDays(7)) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] setupapi.dev.log wurde deutlich nach Windows-Installation erstellt - moeglicherweise neu angelegt (Spurverwischung).\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  setupapi.dev.log fehlt - Datei koennte geloescht worden sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  14 - Systemprozesse &amp; Registry-Injection-Vektoren\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-SystemProcessCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Systemprozesse &amp; Injection-Vektoren ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Pr\u00c3\u00bcft kritische Prozesse auf fremde Module + Registry-Einstiegspunkte)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 14a: Kritische Systemprozesse auf nicht-Microsoft-Module ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Fremde Module in Systemprozessen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $kritisch = @('svchost','lsass','winlogon','services','spoolsv','wininit',\n                  'csrss','explorer','lsm','dllhost','dwm','ctfmon','taskhostw',\n                  'msdtc','audiodg','SearchIndexer','WmiPrvSE')\n\n    # Bekannte legitime Dritt-Hersteller die in Systemprozesse laden duerfen\n    $vertrauenswuerdig = @(\n        'Malwarebytes','NVIDIA','Adobe','Intel Corporation','Advanced Micro Devices',\n        'Logitech','Razer','SteelSeries','Corsair','ASUS','MSI','Gigabyte',\n        'Realtek','Qualcomm','Broadcom','Apple','Google','Dropbox','OneDrive'\n    )\n    # Geschuetzte Prozesse bei denen leere Module normal sind (PPL)\n    $geschuetzt = @('lsass','csrss','wininit','services','smss','MsMpEng')\n\n    $systemFund = $false\n    foreach ($pName in $kritisch) {\n        $procs = @(Get-Process -Name $pName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($proc in $procs) {\n            try {\n                $fremd   = @()\n                $pathlos = @()\n                $proc.Modules | ForEach-Object {\n                    # Nur Module MIT Namen aber OHNE Pfad = Reflective Injection Kandidat\n                    # Leere Eintraege ohne Namen = Enumerierungs-Artefakt, kein Fund\n                    if ($_.ModuleName -and -not $_.FileName) {\n                        if ($geschuetzt -notcontains $pName) {\n                            $pathlos += $_.ModuleName\n                        }\n                        return\n                    }\n                    if (-not $_.FileName) { return }\n\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FileName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and\n                             $sig.SignerCertificate -and\n                             $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n                    if (-not $istMS) {\n                        $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                        $sign   = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) {\n                            $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1'\n                        } else { 'Nicht signiert' }\n                        # Bekannte legitime Hersteller: grau, nicht rot\n                        $istBekannt = $vertrauenswuerdig | Where-Object { $sign -match [regex]::Escape($_) }\n                        $fremd += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                            Modul    = $_.ModuleName\n                            Pfad     = $_.FileName\n                            Sig      = $status\n                            Signierer= $sign\n                            Bekannt  = [bool]$istBekannt\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n\n                # Nur ausgeben wenn wirklich verdaechtig (unbekannt/unsigniert ODER pathlos)\n                $echteWarnungen = @($fremd | Where-Object { -not $_.Bekannt -or $_.Sig -ne 'Valid' })\n                $bekannteListe  = @($fremd | Where-Object { $_.Bekannt -and $_.Sig -eq 'Valid' })\n\n                if ($echteWarnungen.Count -gt 0 -or $pathlos.Count -gt 0) {\n                    Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $proc.Name, $proc.Id) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    $systemFund = $true\n                    foreach ($m in $echteWarnungen) {\n                        $col = if ($m.Sig -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!] {0}\" -f $m.Modul) -ForegroundColor $col\n                        Write-Host (\"        Pfad     : {0}\" -f $m.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n                        Write-Host (\"        Sig      : {0} | {1}\" -f $m.Sig, $m.Signierer) -ForegroundColor $col\n                    }\n                    foreach ($m in $pathlos) {\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!!!] Modul ohne Dateipfad: $m (Reflective Injection?)\" ) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    }\n                }\n                if ($bekannteListe.Count -gt 0) {\n                    Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1} - bekannte Dritt-Software ({2} Module):\" -f $proc.Name, $proc.Id, $bekannteListe.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                    $bekannteListe | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    $($_.Modul) | $($_.Signierer)\") -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n                }\n            } catch {\n                if ($geschuetzt -notcontains $pName) {\n                    Write-Host (\"  [{0}] PID {1} - Zugriff verweigert\" -f $pName, $proc.Id) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $systemFund) {\n        Write-Host \"Alle geprueften Systemprozesse: nur Microsoft-signierte Module.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 14b: AppInit_DLLs ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- AppInit_DLLs (laedt in JEDEN Prozess mit user32.dll) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $appInitKeys = @(\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows'\n    )\n    foreach ($k in $appInitKeys) {\n        if (Test-Path $k) {\n            $val = (Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).AppInit_DLLs\n            $load = (Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LoadAppInit_DLLs\n            if ($val -and $val.Trim()) {\n                Write-Host \"  [!!!] AppInit_DLLs GESETZT: $val\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host \"        LoadAppInit_DLLs: $load\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"  $k : Leer (gut).\" -ForegroundColor Green\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- 14c: Winlogon Injection (Shell, Userinit, Notify) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Winlogon Injection-Vektoren ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $wlKey = 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon'\n    if (Test-Path $wlKey) {\n        $wl = Get-ItemProperty $wlKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        # Shell sollte nur explorer.exe sein\n        if ($wl.Shell -and $wl.Shell -notmatch '^explorer\\.exe$') {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Shell != explorer.exe: $($wl.Shell)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"  Shell     : $($wl.Shell) (OK)\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n        # Userinit\n        if ($wl.Userinit -and $wl.Userinit -notmatch 'userinit\\.exe') {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Userinit auffaellig: $($wl.Userinit)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"  Userinit  : $($wl.Userinit) (OK)\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n    }\n\n    # --- 14d: LSA Security Packages ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- LSA Authentication &amp; Security Packages ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $lsaKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa'\n    if (Test-Path $lsaKey) {\n        $lsa = Get-ItemProperty $lsaKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $authPkg = $lsa.'Authentication Packages'\n        $secPkg  = $lsa.'Security Packages'\n        $notifPkg= $lsa.'Notification Packages'\n        $standard = @('msv1_0','','scecli')\n        foreach ($pkg in $authPkg) {\n            if ($pkg -and $standard -notcontains $pkg.ToLower()) {\n                Write-Host \"  [!] Unbekanntes Auth-Package: $pkg\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  Auth-Packages  : $($authPkg -join ', ')\"\n        Write-Host \"  Sec-Packages   : $($secPkg -join ', ')\"\n        Write-Host \"  Notify-Packages: $($notifPkg -join ', ')\"\n    }\n\n    # --- 14e: Dienste mit DLL in ungewoehnlichem Pfad ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dienst-DLLs ausserhalb von System32/SysWOW64 ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dienste = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.ImagePath -like '*svchost*' }\n    $fremdDienst = $false\n    foreach ($svc in $dienste) {\n        $param = $svc.PSPath -replace 'Registry::',''\n        $paramKey = $param + '\\Parameters'\n        if (Test-Path \"Registry::$paramKey\") {\n            $dll = (Get-ItemProperty \"Registry::$paramKey\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).ServiceDll\n            if ($dll -and $dll -notmatch '(?i)^(%SystemRoot%|C:\\\\Windows)\\\\(System32|SysWOW64)\\\\') {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!] Dienst '{0}' laedt DLL aus ungewoehnlichem Pfad:\" -f $svc.PSChildName) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"      $dll\") -ForegroundColor Red\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature ($dll -replace '%SystemRoot%',$env:SystemRoot) -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                if ($sig) { Write-Host (\"      Sig: {0}\" -f $sig.Status) -ForegroundColor Red }\n                $fremdDienst = $true\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $fremdDienst) { Write-Host \"  Alle Dienst-DLLs in erwarteten Systempfaden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: lsass-Module sind ohne SeDebugPrivilege oft nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer Kernel-Level-Injection (DKOM, direkte Speichermanipulation):\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"PowerShell reicht nicht aus - da braucht es WinPmem oder Volatility.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  15 - HVCI / Memory Integrity &amp; Code Integrity Treiber-Check\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-HVCICheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== HVCI / Memory Integrity &amp; Inkompatible Treiber ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Deaktivierte Speicherintegritaet + geblockte Kernel-Treiber = DMA-Indiz)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 15a: HVCI-Status ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Memory Integrity (HVCI) Status ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $hvciKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'\n    $vbsKey  = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard'\n    $hvciAktiv = $false\n\n    if (Test-Path $hvciKey) {\n        $hvci = Get-ItemProperty $hvciKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $hvciAktiv = $hvci.Enabled -eq 1\n        $col = if ($hvciAktiv) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host (\"  HVCI (Speicherintegritaet) : {0}\" -f $(if($hvciAktiv){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT [!]'})) -ForegroundColor $col\n        if (-not $hvciAktiv) {\n            Write-Host \"  --&gt; Inkompatible Treiber koennen in den Kernel geladen werden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"      DMA-Karten mit schwach signierten Treibern nutzen genau das.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"  Manuell pruefen: Windows-Sicherheit \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Geraetesicherheit \u00e2\u2020\u2019 Kernisolierung\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  HVCI-Key nicht gefunden - VBS moeglicherweise nicht konfiguriert.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    if (Test-Path $vbsKey) {\n        $vbs = Get-ItemProperty $vbsKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $vbsAktiv = $vbs.EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity -eq 1\n        Write-Host (\"  VBS (Virt. Based Security)  : {0}\" -f $(if($vbsAktiv){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($vbsAktiv){'Green'}else{'Yellow'})\n    }\n\n    # Secure Boot\n    try {\n        $sb = Confirm-SecureBootUEFI -ErrorAction Stop\n        Write-Host (\"  Secure Boot                 : {0}\" -f $(if($sb){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT [!]'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($sb){'Green'}else{'Red'})\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Secure Boot                 : Nicht abfragbar (Legacy BIOS oder kein UEFI)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 15b: Code Integrity Log - geblockte Treiber ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Code Integrity: geblockte / abgelehnte Treiber ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Event 3033 = geblockt | 3034 = Boot-Treiber | 3076 = Audit | 3077 = Prozess)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $ciEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{\n        LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational'\n        Id      = 3033, 3034, 3076, 3077\n    } -MaxEvents 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n\n    # Bekannte legitime Security-DLLs die bei HVCI haeufig 3033 ausloesen\n    $ciWhitelist = @('mbae64\\.dll','mbae\\.dll','mbamswissarmy','MBAMSwissArmy',\n                     'mbamsi64\\.dll','mbamsi\\.dll','mbamupdatetool',\n                     'hmpalert','hmpalert64','CrExigency','sophos','mbae')\n\n    if ($ciEvents.Count -gt 0) {\n        $ciGefiltert = @($ciEvents | Where-Object {\n            $msg = $_.Message\n            -not ($ciWhitelist | Where-Object { $msg -match $_ })\n        })\n        $ciGefiltert_kurz = @($ciEvents | Where-Object {\n            $msg = $_.Message\n            ($ciWhitelist | Where-Object { $msg -match $_ })\n        })\n\n        if ($ciGefiltert_kurz.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  (Herausgefiltert: $($ciGefiltert_kurz.Count)x bekannte Security-Software wie Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n\n        if ($ciGefiltert.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  $($ciGefiltert.Count) relevante Ereignisse:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $ciGefiltert | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 20 | ForEach-Object {\n                $eid = $_.Id\n                $col = if ($eid -in @(3033,3034)) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                $msg = ($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ')\n                $datei = if ($msg -match '\\\\([^\\\\]+\\.sys|[^\\\\]+\\.dll)') { $matches[1] } else { '' }\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] EID {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $eid) -ForegroundColor $col\n                if ($datei) { Write-Host (\"  Treiber : {0}\" -f $datei) -ForegroundColor $col }\n                Write-Host (\"  Details : {0}...\" -f $msg.Substring(0, [Math]::Min(160, $msg.Length))) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine unbekannten geblockten Treiber - nur bekannte Security-Software.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine geblockten Treiber im Code Integrity Log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        if ($hvciAktiv) {\n            Write-Host \"  (HVCI aktiv = Treiber werden gar nicht erst geladen - das ist gut)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- 15c: bcdedit - Testsigning und Integritaets-Bypass ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Boot-Konfiguration: Testsigning &amp; Integrity-Checks ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $bcd = &amp; bcdedit /enum 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-String\n    $testsigning = $bcd -match 'testsigning\\s+yes'\n    $nointegrity = $bcd -match 'nointegritychecks\\s+yes'\n    $dbgmode     = $bcd -match 'debug\\s+yes'\n\n    Write-Host (\"  Testsigning        : {0}\" -f $(if($testsigning){'[!!!] AKTIV - unsignierte Treiber erlaubt!'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($testsigning){'Red'}else{'Green'})\n    Write-Host (\"  NoIntegrityChecks  : {0}\" -f $(if($nointegrity){'[!!!] AKTIV - Integritaetspruefung umgangen!'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($nointegrity){'Red'}else{'Green'})\n    Write-Host (\"  Debug-Modus        : {0}\" -f $(if($dbgmode){'[!] Aktiv'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($dbgmode){'Yellow'}else{'Green'})\n\n    if ($testsigning -or $nointegrity) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] Treibersignaturen sind aktiv umgangen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"        Jeder beliebige unsignierte Kernel-Treiber kann geladen werden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"        Das ist eine Grundvoraussetzung vieler DMA- und Cheat-Treiber.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # --- 15d: Inkompatible Treiber aus pnputil (ergaenzt HVCI-Liste) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Installierte Treiber ohne gueltige WHQL-Signatur ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Diese wuerden die HVCI-Aktivierung verhindern)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    try {\n        $pnpOut = &amp; pnputil /enum-drivers 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-String\n        $bloecke = $pnpOut -split '(?=Veroeffentlichter Name|Published Name)'\n        $verdaechtig = @($bloecke | Where-Object {\n            $_ -match 'Nicht signiert|Not Signed|Unsigned' -or\n            ($_ -match '(Signierer|Signer)\\s*:' -and $_ -notmatch '(?i)Microsoft|WHQL')\n        })\n        if ($verdaechtig.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] $($verdaechtig.Count) potenziell inkompatible Treiber:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $verdaechtig | Select-Object -First 10 | ForEach-Object {\n                $name = if ($_ -match 'oem\\d+\\.inf') { $matches[0] } else { '' }\n                $pub  = if ($_ -match '(?:Herausgeber|Publisher)\\s*:\\s*(.+)') { $matches[1].Trim() } else { '' }\n                if ($name) { Write-Host (\"  {0} | {1}\" -f $name, $pub) -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine offensichtlich unsignierten Treiber gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  pnputil nicht verfuegbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nFazit-Hilfe:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Testsigning=Ja + unbekannter Treiber = starker DMA-Hinweis\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  HVCI deaktiviert + CI-Events = Treiber wurde installiert und verweigert\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Gut konfigurierte DMA-Karten (echt signiert) erscheinen NICHT im CI-Log\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  16 - System32 Fremdkoerper &amp; Typosquatting-Check\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-System32Check {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== System32 Fremdkoerper &amp; Typosquatting ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Nicht-Microsoft DLLs + verdaechtige Namen + frische Dateien in System32)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $sys32 = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\"\n    $osInstall = (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).InstallDate\n\n    # Bekannte kritische DLL-Namen fuer Typosquatting-Pruefung\n    # Angreifer ersetzen gerne l\u00e2\u2020\u20191, o\u00e2\u2020\u20190, I\u00e2\u2020\u2019l usw.\n    $kritischeDLLs = @(\n        'ntdll','kernel32','kernelbase','user32','advapi32','rpcrt4',\n        'msvcrt','sechost','combase','ucrtbase','win32u','gdi32',\n        'ole32','oleaut32','shell32','shlwapi','wininet','ws2_32',\n        'crypt32','bcrypt','ncrypt','lsasrv','wintrust','wldp'\n    )\n\n    # Bekannte Phantom-DLLs die NIE in System32 gehoeren\n    $system32Phantom = @(\n        'WptsExtensions.dll','WaasMedicSvc.dll','wlbsctrl.dll',\n        'cryptbase2.dll','version2.dll','cryptsp2.dll'\n    )\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Nicht-Microsoft DLLs in System32 ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Scanne... (kann 30-60 Sekunden dauern)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $fremd   = @()\n    $phantom = @()\n    $frisch  = @()\n    $typo    = @()\n\n    $dlls = @(Get-ChildItem $sys32 -Filter '*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    $total = $dlls.Count\n    $i = 0\n\n    foreach ($f in $dlls) {\n        $i++\n        if ($i % 200 -eq 0) { Write-Host \"  ... $i / $total gepr\u00c3\u00bcft\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n        # Phantom-DLL Direkttreffer\n        if ($system32Phantom -contains $f.Name) {\n            $phantom += $f\n            continue\n        }\n\n        # Signaturpruefung - bei gueltigem MS-Zertifikat sofort weiter\n        $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $f.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and\n                 $sig.SignerCertificate -and\n                 $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n        if ($istMS) { continue }\n\n        $status   = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n        $signierer = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) {\n            $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1'\n        } else { 'Nicht signiert' }\n\n        $fremd += [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Name      = $f.Name\n            Sig       = $status\n            Signierer = $signierer\n            Erstellt  = $f.CreationTime\n            Groesse   = $f.Length\n        }\n\n        # Frisch nach Windows-Installation erstellt?\n        if ($osInstall -and $f.CreationTime -gt $osInstall.AddDays(30)) {\n            $frisch += $f.Name\n        }\n\n        # Typosquatting-Pruefung\n        $nameBasis = [System.IO.Path]::GetFileNameWithoutExtension($f.Name).ToLower()\n        foreach ($legit in $kritischeDLLs) {\n            if ($nameBasis -ne $legit) {\n                # Levenshtein-Distanz 1 = ein Zeichen anders\n                $dist = 0\n                $a = $nameBasis.ToCharArray()\n                $b = $legit.ToCharArray()\n                if ([Math]::Abs($a.Length - $b.Length) -le 1) {\n                    $diff = 0\n                    $minLen = [Math]::Min($a.Length, $b.Length)\n                    for ($x = 0; $x -lt $minLen; $x++) {\n                        if ($a[$x] -ne $b[$x]) { $diff++ }\n                    }\n                    $diff += [Math]::Abs($a.Length - $b.Length)\n                    if ($diff -le 1) {\n                        $typo += [PSCustomObject]@{ Datei=$f.Name; AehnlichWie=\"$legit.dll\" }\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausgabe Phantom ---\n    if ($phantom.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] PHANTOM-DLLs in System32 (gehoeren NICHT hierher):\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $phantom | ForEach-Object {\n            $sig2 = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            Write-Host (\"  {0} | Sig: {1} | Erstellt: {2}\" -f $_.Name, $(if($sig2){$sig2.Status}else{'Unbekannt'}), $_.CreationTime) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausgabe Fremd ---\n    if ($fremd.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  {0} nicht-Microsoft DLLs in System32:\" -f $fremd.Count) -ForegroundColor Red\n        $fremd | Sort-Object Erstellt -Descending | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Sig -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0,-35} Sig: {1,-12} Erstellt: {2}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Sig, $_.Erstellt) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($_.Signierer -ne 'Nicht signiert') {\n                Write-Host (\"      Signierer: {0}\" -f $_.Signierer) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"`n  Alle DLLs in System32 sind Microsoft-signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausgabe Frisch ---\n    if ($frisch.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  [!] {0} DLLs nach Windows-Installation erstellt/geaendert:\" -f $frisch.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        $frisch | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"  $_\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausgabe Typosquatting ---\n    if ($typo.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] Moegliches Typosquatting:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $typo | ForEach-Object {\n            Write-Host (\"  {0} sieht aus wie {1}\" -f $_.Datei, $_.AehnlichWie) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"`n  Kein Typosquatting bekannter System-DLLs gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Nicht-MS-signierte DLLs koennen legitim sein (z.B. AV-Software).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Rot + frisches Erstelldatum + unbekannter Signierer = hoechste Prioritaet.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Typosquatting-Treffer immer manuell pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  17 - DMA Fuser &amp; Zweiter-PC-Verbindungen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-FuserCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== DMA Fuser &amp; Zweiter-PC-Verbindungen ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Netzwerkverbindungen, windowlose Prozesse, Named Pipes, bekannte Fuser)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 17a: Bekannte Fuser-Prozessnamen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Bekannte DMA-Fuser Prozesse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $fuserNamen = @(\n        'pcileech','memflow','memprocfs','dmaclient','dmaservice',\n        'easymapi','leechcore','leechagent','fpga','dma_client',\n        'scatterclient','scatter','vmmdll','vmmsharp',\n        'winpmem','rekall','volatility','dumpit'\n    )\n    $fuserGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($n in $fuserNamen) {\n        $p = @(Get-Process -Name $n -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        if ($p.Count -gt 0) {\n            $p | ForEach-Object {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!!!] {0} (PID {1}) - {2}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Id, $_.Path) -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n            $fuserGefunden = $true\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $fuserGefunden) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine bekannten Fuser-Prozesse gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17b: Netzwerkverbindungen zu lokalen IPs (PC2-Verbindung) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Netzwerkverbindungen zu lokalen IPs (DMA PC2) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(192.168.x.x / 10.x.x.x / 172.16-31.x.x auf ungewoehnlichen Ports)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $bekanntePortsOK = @(80,443,8080,8443,3389,5985,5986,53,67,68,123,137,138,139,445,1900,5353)\n    $lokaleVerbindungen = @()\n\n    Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $remIP = $_.RemoteAddress\n        $remPort = $_.RemotePort\n        $istLokal = $remIP -match '^192\\.168\\.|^10\\.|^172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.'\n        $portUngewoehnlich = $bekanntePortsOK -notcontains $remPort\n\n        if ($istLokal -and $portUngewoehnlich) {\n            $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $lokaleVerbindungen += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Prozess  = if ($proc) { $proc.Name } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                PID      = $_.OwningProcess\n                LokPort  = $_.LocalPort\n                RemoteIP = $remIP\n                RemPort  = $remPort\n                Pfad     = if ($proc) { $proc.Path } else { '-' }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($lokaleVerbindungen.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] $($lokaleVerbindungen.Count) Verbindungen zu lokalen IPs auf ungewoehnlichen Ports:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $lokaleVerbindungen | Sort-Object RemoteIP | ForEach-Object {\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Prozess, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Remote: {0}:{1}  (lokal Port {2})\" -f $_.RemoteIP, $_.RemPort, $_.LokPort) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad  : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen lokalen Netzwerkverbindungen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17c: Windowlose Prozesse ohne bekanntes Elternteil ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Windowlose Hintergrundprozesse (moegliche versteckte Fuser) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $systemProz = @('svchost','services','lsass','csrss','wininit','smss','System',\n                    'Registry','fontdrvhost','dwm','WmiPrvSE','spoolsv','SearchIndexer',\n                    'RuntimeBroker','ShellExperienceHost','StartMenuExperienceHost',\n                    'sihost','taskhostw','ctfmon','conhost','dllhost','audiodg',\n                    'MsMpEng','NisSrv','SecurityHealthService','TextInputHost')\n\n    $verdaechtigeProz = @()\n    Add-Type @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic class WinAPI {\n    [DllImport(\"user32.dll\")]\n    public static extern bool IsWindowVisible(IntPtr hWnd);\n    [DllImport(\"user32.dll\")]\n    public static extern IntPtr GetForegroundWindow();\n}\n\"@ -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.Name -notin $systemProz -and\n        $_.MainWindowHandle -eq [IntPtr]::Zero -and\n        $_.SessionId -eq (Get-Process -PID $PID).SessionId\n    } | ForEach-Object {\n        $p = $_\n        # Nur Prozesse mit Pfad und ohne Fenster die nicht bekannte Apps sind\n        if ($p.Path -and $p.Path -notmatch '(?i)\\\\Windows\\\\|\\\\Program Files\\\\|\\\\Program Files \\(x86\\)\\\\') {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $p.Path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $sig.SignerCertificate -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n            if (-not $istMS) {\n                $verdaechtigeProz += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Name     = $p.Name\n                    PID      = $p.Id\n                    Pfad     = $p.Path\n                    Sig      = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    Signierer= if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1' } else { '-' }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($verdaechtigeProz.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  $($verdaechtigeProz.Count) windowlose, nicht-MS-signierte Prozesse ausserhalb Systemordner:\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        $verdaechtigeProz | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Sig -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Sig  : {0} | {1}\" -f $_.Sig, $_.Signierer) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen windowlosen Prozesse.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17d: Named Pipes mit DMA-typischen Namen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Named Pipes (DMA/Fuser-Kommunikation) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dmaPipeMuster = 'dma|fuser|pcileech|memflow|leech|scatter|fpga|cheat|inject|overlay|radar'\n    try {\n        $pipes = @([System.IO.Directory]::GetFiles('\\\\.\\pipe\\') 2&gt;$null)\n        $verdPipes = @($pipes | Where-Object { $_ -match $dmaPipeMuster })\n        if ($verdPipes.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Verdaechtige Named Pipes:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $verdPipes | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"  $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine DMA-typischen Named Pipes.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  (Alle Pipes: $($pipes.Count) vorhanden)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } catch {\n        # Alternativer Weg ueber Sysinternals wenn verfuegbar\n        Write-Host \"  Direkter Pipe-Zugriff nicht moeglich. Alternativ:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  handle.exe -a | findstr '\\pipe' (Sysinternals)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 17e: Autostart-Eintraege fuer Fuser ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Autostart-Eintraege (Fuser beim Boot) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $autoKeys = @(\n        'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run',\n        'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce'\n    )\n    foreach ($k in $autoKeys) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $k)) { continue }\n        $vals = Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $vals.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Name -notmatch '^PS' } | ForEach-Object {\n            $pfad = $_.Value -replace '\"','' -replace ' .*$',''\n            if (Test-Path $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $sig.SignerCertificate -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n                if (-not $istMS) {\n                    $col = if ($sig -and $sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                    Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} = {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Value) -ForegroundColor $col\n                    Write-Host (\"      Sig: {0}\" -f $(if($sig){$sig.Status}else{'Unbekannt'})) -ForegroundColor $col\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  Autostart-Check abgeschlossen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`nFuser-Erkennungs-Tipp:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Netzwerkverbindung zu 192.168.x.x auf Port &gt;10000 + windowloser Prozess = starkes Indiz.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Fuser laufen oft nur waehrend des Spiels - deshalb Pruefung waehrend aktiver Session.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 17f: Display-Analyse (HDMI-Splitter / Capture-Setup) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Display-Analyse (HDMI-Splitter / gespiegeltes Bild) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Mehr Displays als Monitore sichtbar = moeglicher Splitter oder Capture-Input)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    try {\n        $monitors = @(Get-CimInstance -Namespace root\\wmi -ClassName WmiMonitorID -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        Write-Host (\"  Erkannte Displays: {0}\" -f $monitors.Count)\n        foreach ($m in $monitors) {\n            $hersteller = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.ManufacturerName | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '?' }\n            $modell     = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.UserFriendlyName  | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '?' }\n            $serial     = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.SerialNumberID    | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '' }\n            $col = 'White'\n            $hinweis = ''\n            # Typische Capture-Card oder Virtual-Display Hersteller\n            if ($hersteller -match '(?i)AVerMedia|Elgato|Magewell|Blackmagic|Datapath|DisplayLink|ITE|GENERIC|VirtualDisplay|Parsec|NoMachine') {\n                $col = 'Red'\n                $hinweis = ' [!] CAPTURE/VIRTUAL DISPLAY'\n            }\n            Write-Host (\"  {0,-8} {1,-25} Serial: {2}{3}\" -f $hersteller.Trim(), $modell.Trim(), $serial.Trim(), $hinweis) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n\n        if ($monitors.Count -gt 2) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} Displays erkannt - mehr als 2 ist ungewoehnlich fuer einen Gaming-PC.\" -f $monitors.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"      Moeglicher HDMI-Splitter oder Capture-Eingang aktiv.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Display-Abfrage fehlgeschlagen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 17g: Capture-Cards und Video-Devices auf PC1 ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Capture-Cards &amp; Video-Geraete auf diesem PC ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $captureGeraete = @(Get-PnpDevice -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.Class -match '(?i)Media|Image|Camera' -and $_.Status -eq 'OK'\n    })\n    if ($captureGeraete.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($g in $captureGeraete) {\n            $istVerd = $g.FriendlyName -match '(?i)capture|hdmi|video|grabber|avermedia|elgato|magewell|blackmagic|hauppauge'\n            $col = if ($istVerd) { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $g.Class, $g.FriendlyName) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($istVerd) {\n                Write-Host (\"  --&gt; Capture-Device: {0}\" -f $g.InstanceId) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host \"      Pruefe ob das Geraet fuer Cheat-Capture oder legitimes Streaming genutzt wird.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Video/Capture-Geraete gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17h: Aktive GPU-Ausgaenge (mehr als physische Monitore) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- GPU: aktive Video-Ausgaenge ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Get-CimInstance Win32_VideoController -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        Write-Host (\"  GPU       : {0}\" -f $_.Name)\n        Write-Host (\"  Adapter   : {0}\" -f $_.AdapterCompatibility)\n        Write-Host (\"  Aufloesung: {0}x{1}\" -f $_.CurrentHorizontalResolution, $_.CurrentVerticalResolution)\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHDMI-Splitter-Tipp:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Physische Pruefung: 2 HDMI-Kabel am Monitor (Input 1 + Input 2) ist verdaechtig.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Ein zweiter laufender PC ohne sichtbare Aktivitaet = moeglicher Cheat-PC.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Netzwerk (Punkt 17b) findet die DMA-Verbindung zwischen PC1 und PC2.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  18 - Forensische Tools herunterladen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-ToolDownload {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Forensische Tools - Download ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Alle Tools sind kostenlos und Open Source / Freeware)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $zielOrdner = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\CTC_Tools\"\n    if (-not (Test-Path $zielOrdner)) {\n        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $zielOrdner | Out-Null\n        Write-Host \"Ordner erstellt: $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Zielordner: $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    $tools = [ordered]@{\n        '1' = @{\n            Name   = 'Everything 1.4 (Blitzschnelle Dateisuche)'\n            URL    = 'https://www.voidtools.com/Everything-1.4.1.1024.x64.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Findet DLLs, .sys-Dateien und Cheat-Dateien sofort'\n        }\n        '2' = @{\n            Name   = 'System Informer (Prozesse, Handles, Netzwerk)'\n            URL    = 'github_latest'\n            Repo   = 'winsiderss/systeminformer'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt geladene DLLs, Named Pipes und versteckte Prozesse'\n        }\n        '3' = @{\n            Name   = 'Autoruns (Alle Autostart-Eintraege)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Autoruns.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt JEDEN Autostart-Eintrag - Fuser-Erkennung'\n        }\n        '4' = @{\n            Name   = 'Process Monitor (Live Datei/Registry/Netzwerk)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/ProcessMonitor.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt phantom DLL-Suchen in Echtzeit (DLL Hijacking live)'\n        }\n        '5' = @{\n            Name   = 'TCPView (Netzwerkverbindungen live)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/TCPView.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Fuser-Verbindungen zu PC2 in Echtzeit sehen'\n        }\n        '6' = @{\n            Name   = 'Handle (Named Pipes &amp; Handles)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Handle.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt alle Named Pipes - DMA Fuser Kommunikation'\n        }\n        '7' = @{\n            Name   = 'Strings (Strings aus Binaerdateien extrahieren)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Strings.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Wie im WptsExtensions.dll Fund - inject/manualmap Strings sehen'\n        }\n        '8' = @{\n            Name   = 'Hollows Hunter (Injizierte Module finden)'\n            URL    = 'github_latest'\n            Repo   = 'hasherezade/hollows_hunter'\n            Zip    = $false\n            Tipp   = 'Findet reflective injection und manual mapped Code in Prozessen'\n        }\n        'A' = @{ Name = 'Alle Tools herunterladen'; URL = ''; Zip = $false; Tipp = '' }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  Verfuegbare Tools:\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    foreach ($k in $tools.Keys) {\n        if ($k -eq 'A') {\n            Write-Host \"`n  [A] Alle herunterladen\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        } else {\n            $t = $tools[$k]\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $k, $t.Name) -ForegroundColor White\n            Write-Host (\"      --&gt; {0}\" -f $t.Tipp) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  [Q] Abbrechen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $wahl = (Read-Host \"`nAuswahl\").Trim().ToUpper()\n    if ($wahl -eq 'Q') { return }\n\n    $zuLaden = if ($wahl -eq 'A') { $tools.Keys | Where-Object { $_ -ne 'A' } } else { @($wahl) }\n\n    foreach ($k in $zuLaden) {\n        if (-not $tools.ContainsKey($k)) { Write-Host \"Unbekannte Auswahl: $k\" -ForegroundColor Red; continue }\n        $tool = $tools[$k]\n        Write-Host (\"`n[{0}] Lade {1}...\" -f $k, $tool.Name) -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n        $url = $tool.URL\n\n        # GitHub Latest Release URL holen\n        if ($url -eq 'github_latest') {\n            try {\n                Write-Host \"  GitHub Release API abfragen...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $apiUrl = \"https://api.github.com/repos/$($tool.Repo)/releases/latest\"\n                $release = Invoke-RestMethod $apiUrl -Headers @{'User-Agent'='CTC-by-Dark'} -ErrorAction Stop\n                # Passende Asset-URL finden (x64, Windows)\n                $asset = $release.assets | Where-Object {\n                    $_.name -match '(?i)x64|amd64|win64' -and\n                    $_.name -match '(?i)\\.zip$|\\.exe$' -and\n                    $_.name -notmatch '(?i)debug|pdb|symbols'\n                } | Select-Object -First 1\n\n                if ($asset) {\n                    $url = $asset.browser_download_url\n                    Write-Host (\"  Version: {0} | Asset: {1}\" -f $release.tag_name, $asset.name) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                } else {\n                    Write-Host \"  Kein passendes Asset gefunden. Bitte manuell herunterladen:\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                    Write-Host (\"  https://github.com/{0}/releases\" -f $tool.Repo) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                    continue\n                }\n            } catch {\n                Write-Host (\"  GitHub-Abfrage fehlgeschlagen: {0}\" -f $_) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"  Manuell: https://github.com/{0}/releases\" -f $tool.Repo) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                continue\n            }\n        }\n\n        # Dateiname aus URL\n        $dateiName = [System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($url)\n        $zielPfad  = Join-Path $zielOrdner $dateiName\n\n        try {\n            Write-Host (\"  Download: {0}\" -f $url) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $zielPfad -UseBasicParsing -ErrorAction Stop\n            Write-Host (\"  Gespeichert: {0}\" -f $zielPfad) -ForegroundColor Green\n\n            # ZIP entpacken\n            if ($tool.Zip -and $dateiName -match '\\.zip$') {\n                $extraktOrdner = Join-Path $zielOrdner ([System.IO.Path]::GetFileNameWithoutExtension($dateiName))\n                if (-not (Test-Path $extraktOrdner)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $extraktOrdner | Out-Null }\n                Expand-Archive -Path $zielPfad -DestinationPath $extraktOrdner -Force\n                Remove-Item $zielPfad -Force\n                Write-Host (\"  Entpackt: {0}\" -f $extraktOrdner) -ForegroundColor Green\n            }\n        } catch {\n            Write-Host (\"  Fehler: {0}\" -f $_) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Manuell herunterladen: {0}\" -f $url) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n======================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  Tools gespeichert in:\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"======================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"Empfohlene Reihenfolge fuer eine Analyse:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  1. Autoruns    - Was startet beim Boot?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  2. TCPView     - Welche Verbindungen laufen?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  3. ProcMon     - Welche DLLs werden gesucht?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  4. SysInformer - Was ist in den Prozessen geladen?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  5. Everything  - Verdaechtige Dateien suchen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  6. HollowsHunter - Injizierte Module aufdecken\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  Menue\n# ============================================================\nfunction Show-Menu {\n    Write-Host \"\"\n    Write-Host \"============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  CTC by Dark - CatchTheCheat               \" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  1  PnP-Ereignisse (411 / 400 / 410 / 420)\"\n    Write-Host \"  2  Log-Integritaet, System, Ausfuehrungsartefakte\"\n    Write-Host \"  3  PCI/PCIe-Geraete\"\n    Write-Host \"  4  Entfernte Geraete (Zeitfenster)\"\n    Write-Host \"  5  Datentraeger-Historie\"\n    Write-Host \"  6  USB-Geraetehistorie\"\n    Write-Host \"  7  Fernwartungssoftware (installiert / ausgefuehrt)\"\n    Write-Host \"  8  Fernwartung: Sitzungen und Dateiuebertragungen\"\n    Write-Host \"  9  Unsignierte Dateien (Treiber / Prozesse)\"\n    Write-Host \" 10  PowerShell-History und -Protokoll\"\n    Write-Host \" 11  Discord-Account-IDs (nur ID, keine Token)\"\n    Write-Host \" 12  PE Binary &amp; Driver Heuristics Inspector\"\n    Write-Host \" 13  DLL Hijacking Live-Check (laufende Prozesse)\"\n    Write-Host \" 14  Systemprozesse &amp; Registry-Injection-Vektoren\"\n    Write-Host \" 15  HVCI / Memory Integrity &amp; Inkompatible Treiber\"\n    Write-Host \" 16  System32 Fremdkoerper &amp; Typosquatting\"\n    Write-Host \" 17  DMA Fuser &amp; Zweiter-PC-Verbindungen\"\n    Write-Host \" 18  Forensische Tools herunterladen\"\n    Write-Host \"\"\n    Write-Host \"  A  Alles nacheinander\"\n    Write-Host \"  P  Protokoll auf Desktop starten/stoppen\"\n    Write-Host \"  Q  Beenden\"\n    Write-Host \"============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n}\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nif (-not (Test-Admin)) {\n    Write-Host \"WARNUNG: Nicht als Administrator gestartet.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    Write-Host \"Das Kernel-PnP-Log ist so nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    Write-Host \"\"\n}\n\n$protokoll = $false\n\ndo {\n    Show-Menu\n    $wahl = (Read-Host \"Auswahl\").Trim().ToUpper()\n\n    switch ($wahl) {\n        '1' { Invoke-PnpEvents }\n        '2' { Invoke-LogIntegrity }\n        '3' { Invoke-PciDevices }\n        '4' {\n              $h = Read-Host \"Zeitfenster in Stunden (Enter = 1)\"\n              if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($h)) { $h = 1 }\n              Invoke-RemovedDevices -Stunden ([int]$h)\n            }\n        '5' { Invoke-DiskHistory }\n        '6' { Invoke-UsbHistory }\n        '7' { Invoke-RemoteTools }\n        '8' { Invoke-RemoteSessions }\n        '9' { Invoke-Unsigned }\n        '10' { Invoke-PSHistory }\n        '11' { Invoke-DiscordId }\n        '12' { Invoke-PEInspector }\n        '13' { Invoke-DLLHijackCheck }\n        '14' { Invoke-SystemProcessCheck }\n        '15' { Invoke-HVCICheck }\n        '16' { Invoke-System32Check }\n        '17' { Invoke-FuserCheck }\n        '18' { Invoke-ToolDownload }\n        'A' {\n              Invoke-LogIntegrity\n              Invoke-PnpEvents\n              Invoke-PciDevices\n              Invoke-RemovedDevices -Stunden 24\n              Invoke-DiskHistory\n              Invoke-UsbHistory\n              Invoke-RemoteTools\n              Invoke-RemoteSessions\n              Invoke-Unsigned\n              Invoke-PSHistory\n              Invoke-DiscordId\n              Invoke-DLLHijackCheck\n              Invoke-SystemProcessCheck\n              Invoke-HVCICheck\n              Invoke-FuserCheck\n              Write-Host \"`n[Punkt 16 wird im A-Durchlauf uebersprungen - manuell starten wegen Laufzeit]\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        'P' {\n              if ($protokoll) {\n                  try { Stop-Transcript | Out-Null } catch {}\n                  $protokoll = $false\n                  Write-Host \"Protokoll gestoppt.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              } else {\n                  $pfad = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_by_dark_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').txt\"\n                  try {\n                      Start-Transcript -Path $pfad | Out-Null\n                      $protokoll = $true\n                      Write-Host \"Protokoll laeuft: $pfad\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                  } catch {\n                      Write-Host \"Protokoll konnte nicht gestartet werden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                  }\n              }\n            }\n        'Q' { }\n        default { Write-Host \"Ungueltige Eingabe.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n    }\n\n    if ($wahl -ne 'Q') {\n        Write-Host \"\"\n        Read-Host \"Enter fuer Menue\"\n        Clear-Host\n    }\n\n} while ($wahl -ne 'Q')\n\nif ($protokoll) { try { Stop-Transcript | Out-Null } catch {} }\nWrite-Host \"Beendet.\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n", "url": "https://gist.github.com/analystdark/efed7e96c74e14fb6b7163de5d9cfa27"}, {"timestamp": "2026-10-10T19:02:40Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-10-10T19:02:40.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/analystdark/f70b483d398735a0a7a1e380bbf01e87", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "634b1b2b-9fd0-4ac8-9407-0e4ae4abb30a", "content": "# ============================================================\n#  CTC by Dark (CatchTheCheat)\n#  Hardware- und Cheat-Analyse\n#  Ausfuehren als Administrator\n# ============================================================\n\n$L      = 'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP/Configuration'\n$OKVEN  = @('8086','1022','1002')\n$MUSTER = 'anydesk|rustdesk|teamviewer|parsec|dwservice|ultraviewer|ammyy'\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\n# BEKANNTE CHEAT-/BYPASS-NAMEN (vom Team pflegen)\n# Werden rot markiert in: Browserverlauf, Suchanfragen, Downloads,\n# DNS-Cache, Prefetch-Ladelisten (22) und Timeline (19).\n# Gross-/Kleinschreibung egal, Treffer auch innerhalb von Woertern.\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\n$CheatNamen = @(\n    # 'name'\n)\n# Bekannte Cheat-Domains (Webseite, Loader-/Auth-Server). Auch Subdomains werden erkannt.\n$CheatDomains = @(\n    # 'beispiel-cheat.xyz'\n)\n# Bekannte Cheat-Signierer: Firmennamen aus Code-Signatur-Zertifikaten, mit denen Cheats signiert sind\n# (Cheat-Anbieter kaufen oder stehlen Zertifikate, um Signatur-Scanner zu umgehen)\n$CheatSigner = @(\n    # 'Firmenname laut Zertifikat'\n)\n# Legitime Treffer, die NICHT markiert werden sollen\n$CheatNamenAusnahmen = '(?!)'   # z. B. '(?i)legitimes-produkt\\.com' - '(?!)' trifft nie zu\n\nfunction Get-CheatName([string]$text) {\n    if (-not $text) { return $null }\n    foreach ($d in $CheatDomains) { if ($text -match ('(?i)(^|[^a-z0-9-])(?:[a-z0-9-]+\\.)*' + [regex]::Escape($d) + '\\b')) { return $d } }\n    if ($CheatNamen.Count -eq 0 -or $text -match $CheatNamenAusnahmen) { return $null }\n    foreach ($n in $CheatNamen) { if ($text -match [regex]::Escape($n)) { return $n } }\n    return $null\n}\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nfunction Test-Admin {\n    $id = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()\n    (New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal $id).IsInRole(\n        [Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)\n}\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nfunction Get-DevId {\n    param($Event)\n    $x = [xml]$Event.ToXml()\n    ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'DeviceInstanceId' }).'#text'\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  1 - PnP-Ereignisse\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PnpEvents {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Event-ID 411 (Startprobleme) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $e411 = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=411} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($e411.Count -gt 0) {\n        $e411 | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id,\n            @{n='Details';e={($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()}} |\n            Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Format-List\n        Write-Host \"Anzahl 411: $($e411.Count)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 411er gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PnP-Konfigurationsereignisse (400/410/420/430) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $cfg = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=400,410,420,430} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; EID=$_.Id; Geraet=(Get-DevId $_) } })\n    if ($cfg.Count -gt 0) {\n        $cfg | Sort-Object Zeit | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"Gesamt: $($cfg.Count) Ereignisse\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Konfigurationsereignisse.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  2 - Log-Integritaet und System-Eckdaten\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-LogIntegrity {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Geleerte Ereignisprotokolle (System EID 104) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $clr = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=104} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($clr.Count -gt 0) {\n        $clr | ForEach-Object {\n            [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Zeit     = $_.TimeCreated\n                Benutzer = $_.Properties[0].Value\n                Computer = $_.Properties[1].Value\n                Log      = $_.Properties[2].Value\n            }\n        } | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"ACHTUNG: Protokolle wurden geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Loeschvorgaenge protokolliert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Security-Log geleert (EID 1102) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $s1102 = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=1102} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($s1102.Count -gt 0) {\n        $s1102 | Select-Object TimeCreated | Format-Table -AutoSize\n        Write-Host \"ACHTUNG: Security-Log wurde geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Loeschung des Security-Logs.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== System ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $os = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem\n    Write-Host \"Installiert:  $($os.InstallDate)\"\n    Write-Host \"Letzter Boot: $($os.LastBootUpTime)\"\n    Write-Host \"Computer:     $env:COMPUTERNAME\"\n    Write-Host \"Benutzer:     $env:USERNAME\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Log-Status ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Get-WinEvent -ListLog $L,'System','Security','Application',\n        'Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object LogName, IsEnabled, RecordCount, LogMode | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"=== Zeitaenderungen (Kernel-General EID 1) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(NTP-Korrekturen im ms-Bereich durch svchost = normal; grosse Spruenge durch andere Prozesse = Befund)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $zt = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=1;ProviderName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General'} -MaxEvents 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($zt.Count -gt 0) {\n        $ntpKorrekturen = 0\n        $echteSpruenge  = @()\n        $ausZeiten      = @()\n        foreach ($e in $zt) {\n            $x = [xml]$e.ToXml()\n            $alt  = ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'OldTime' }).'#text'\n            $neu  = ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'NewTime' }).'#text'\n            $proc = ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ProcessName' }).'#text'\n            $grund= ($x.Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'Reason' }).'#text'\n            $sekunden = $null\n            try { $sekunden = ([DateTime]$neu - [DateTime]$alt).TotalSeconds } catch {}\n\n            $istSvchost = $proc -match '(?i)\\\\svchost\\.exe$'\n            $istKlein   = ($null -ne $sekunden) -and ([Math]::Abs($sekunden) -lt 60)\n\n            # Grund 2 = Hardware-Uhr beim Start/Aufwachen, Grund 3 = Zeitzone. Vorwaerts = PC war aus - normal.\n            if (($grund -eq '2' -or $grund -eq '3') -and ($null -ne $sekunden) -and $sekunden -ge 0) {\n                $ausZeiten += [PSCustomObject]@{ Aus=$alt; An=$neu; Stunden=[Math]::Round($sekunden / 3600, 1); Grund=$grund }\n                continue\n            }\n            if ($istSvchost -and $istKlein) {\n                $ntpKorrekturen++\n            } else {\n                $echteSpruenge += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Zeit     = $e.TimeCreated\n                    Sprung   = if ($null -ne $sekunden) { [Math]::Round($sekunden, 1) } else { '?' }\n                    Prozess  = if ($proc) { Split-Path $proc -Leaf } else { '?' }\n                    Grund    = $grund\n                    Von      = $alt\n                    Nach     = $neu\n                }\n            }\n        }\n\n        if ($ntpKorrekturen -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  $ntpKorrekturen NTP-Korrektur(en) durch svchost (unter 60 s) - normal.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n        if ($ausZeiten.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  {0} Systemstart(s)/Aufwachen - Uhr aus der Hardware-Uhr uebernommen (normal). Zeiten, in denen der PC aus war:\" -f $ausZeiten.Count) -ForegroundColor Green\n            foreach ($a in ($ausZeiten | Sort-Object { try { [DateTime]$_.An } catch { [DateTime]::MinValue } } -Descending | Select-Object -First 10)) {\n                $vonL = try { ([DateTime]$a.Aus).ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } catch { $a.Aus }\n                $bisL = try { ([DateTime]$a.An).ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } catch { $a.An }\n                Write-Host (\"    aus {0}  -&gt;  an {1}   ({2} h){3}\" -f $vonL, $bisL, $a.Stunden, $(if ($a.Grund -eq '3') { '  [Zeitzone]' } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n        if ($echteSpruenge.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"`n  [!] $($echteSpruenge.Count) auffaellige Zeitaenderung(en):\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $echteSpruenge | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | ForEach-Object {\n                $richtung = if ($_.Sprung -is [double] -and $_.Sprung -lt 0) { if ($_.Grund -eq '2') { ' RUECKWAERTS (Hardware-/BIOS-Uhr verstellt!)' } else { ' RUECKWAERTS' } } else { '' }\n                $col = if ($_.Sprung -is [double] -and [Math]::Abs($_.Sprung) -ge 3600) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] Sprung: {1} s{2}\" -f $_.Zeit, $_.Sprung, $richtung) -ForegroundColor $col\n                Write-Host (\"  Prozess : {0}\" -f $_.Prozess) -ForegroundColor $col\n                Write-Host (\"  Grund   : {0}\" -f $_.Grund) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                Write-Host (\"  Von/Nach: {0} -&gt; {1}\" -f $_.Von, $_.Nach) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n            Write-Host \"`n  Rueckwaerts + Nicht-svchost = klassische Zeitstempel-Manipulation.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        } elseif ($ntpKorrekturen -eq 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine Zeitaenderungen protokolliert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Zeitaenderungen protokolliert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- Log-Groessen-Manipulation (stille Spurverwischung ohne 104/1102) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Log-Groessen: Manipulation ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Verkleinerte Logs ueberschreiben Eintraege sofort - kein Loesch-Event)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Windows-Standardgroessen\n    $logStandard = [ordered]@{\n        'Windows PowerShell'                          = 15728640   # 15 MB\n        'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'    = 15728640   # 15 MB\n        'Security'                                    = 20971520   # 20 MB\n        'System'                                      = 20971520   # 20 MB\n        'Application'                                 = 20971520   # 20 MB\n        'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP/Configuration'  = 1052672    # 1 MB\n        'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational' = 1052672    # 1 MB\n        'Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager/Admin'  = 1052672    # 1 MB\n        'Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic'      = 1052672    # 1 MB\n    }\n\n    # Helfer fuer Registry-Key-Zeitstempel\n    $sigRQ = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sigRQ -Name RK2 -Namespace W2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\n    $manipuliert = @()\n    foreach ($logName in $logStandard.Keys) {\n        $erwartet = $logStandard[$logName]\n        $log = Get-WinEvent -ListLog $logName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if (-not $log) { continue }\n\n        $aktuell = $log.MaximumSizeInBytes\n        $prozent = [Math]::Round(($aktuell / $erwartet) * 100)\n\n        # Registry-Zeitstempel: wann wurde die Log-Konfiguration zuletzt geaendert?\n        $chanKey = \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WINEVT\\Channels\\$logName\"\n        $legacyKey = \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\$logName\"\n        $regKey = if (Test-Path $chanKey) { $chanKey } elseif (Test-Path $legacyKey) { $legacyKey } else { $null }\n        $geaendert = $null\n        if ($regKey) {\n            try {\n                $k = Get-Item $regKey -ErrorAction Stop\n                $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n                [void][W2.RK2]::RegQueryInfoKey($k.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n                $geaendert = [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n            } catch {}\n        }\n\n        $col = 'Green'; $flag = ''\n        if ($prozent -lt 25) {\n            $col = 'Red';    $flag = ' [!!!] STARK VERKLEINERT'\n        } elseif ($prozent -lt 75) {\n            $col = 'Yellow'; $flag = ' [!] verkleinert'\n        }\n\n        $prozentAnzeige = if ($prozent -gt 100) { '&gt;100' } else { $prozent }\n        $zeile = \"  {0,-48} {1,6} KB ({2,4}% vom Standard){3}\" -f $logName, [Math]::Round($aktuell/1024), $prozentAnzeige, $flag\n        Write-Host $zeile -ForegroundColor $col\n        if ($flag -and $geaendert) {\n            Write-Host (\"      Konfiguration geaendert: {0}\" -f $geaendert) -ForegroundColor $col\n            $manipuliert += [PSCustomObject]@{ Log=$logName; Groesse=$aktuell; Geaendert=$geaendert }\n        }\n\n        # Modus: Retain/AutoBackup statt Circular kann auch Manipulation sein\n        if ($log.LogMode -ne 'Circular') {\n            Write-Host (\"      LogMode: {0} (Standard: Circular)\" -f $log.LogMode) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($manipuliert.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!] $($manipuliert.Count) Log(s) verkleinert. Zeitpunkt der Aenderung mit Bypass-Verdacht abgleichen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"      Typischer Ablauf: Bypass laden -&gt; Log verkleinern -&gt; Eintraege werden sofort ueberschrieben.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"`n  Alle Log-Groessen im Normalbereich.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # Wurde wevtutil / Limit-EventLog ausgefuehrt? (das Werkzeug fuer Log-Manipulation)\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Log-Manipulations-Befehle in der PowerShell-Historie ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    # Nur Befehle, die Logs leeren, verkleinern oder abschalten.\n    # 'wevtutil um/im' (Manifest ab-/anmelden) nutzen Treiber wie Realtek bei jedem Start - harmlos.\n    $manipMuster = '(?i)wevtutil(\\.exe)?\\s+(cl|clear-log)\\b|wevtutil(\\.exe)?\\s+(sl|set-log)\\b.*(/ms:|/e:false|/enabled:false|/rt:)|Limit-EventLog|Clear-EventLog|Remove-EventLog|MaximumSizeInBytes\\s*=|Set-ItemProperty.*(WINEVT|\\\\EventLog\\\\).*(MaxSize|Enabled)'\n    $manipTreffer = @()\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $hf = Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt'\n        if (Test-Path $hf) {\n            $h = @(Select-String -Path $hf -Pattern $manipMuster -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Line -notmatch 'CTC_by_Dark|pnpcheck\\.ps1|ctcbydark|analystdark' })\n            foreach ($z in $h) { $manipTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Benutzer=$_.Name; Befehl=$z.Line.Trim() } }\n        }\n    }\n    # Eigene Skriptbloecke ausschliessen - das Tool enthaelt die Suchbegriffe selbst\n    $eigenerCode = 'CTC by Dark|CatchTheCheat|CTC_by_Dark|pnpcheck\\.ps1|ctcbydark|\\$manipMuster|\\$logStandard|Log-Groessen: Manipulation'\n    # 4104: grosse Skripte werden in Teile zerlegt - Teile ueber ScriptBlockId zusammenhalten,\n    # damit ALLE Teile eines als CTC erkannten Skripts wegfallen (nicht nur Teil 1 mit dem Kopf)\n    $sbAlle  = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4104} -MaxEvents 1000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    $sbTeile = @(foreach ($e in $sbAlle) {\n        $d = ([xml]$e.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Zeit = $e.TimeCreated\n            Id   = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ScriptBlockId' }).'#text'\n            Text = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ScriptBlockText' }).'#text'\n        }\n    })\n    $eigeneIds = @{}\n    foreach ($sbT in $sbTeile) { if ($sbT.Id -and $sbT.Text -match $eigenerCode) { $eigeneIds[$sbT.Id] = $true } }\n    $sbManip = @($sbTeile | Where-Object { -not $eigeneIds.ContainsKey([string]$_.Id) -and $_.Text -match $manipMuster })\n\n    # 400/600: Startbefehle deduplizieren (ein Start erzeugt mehrere Eintraege)\n    $klassikCmd = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Windows PowerShell';Id=400,600} -MaxEvents 2000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        if ($_.Message -match 'HostApplication=(.+?)(\\r?\\n|$)') { [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Cmd=$matches[1].Trim() } }\n    })\n    $manifestN = @($klassikCmd | Where-Object { $_.Cmd -match '(?i)wevtutil(\\.exe)?\\s+(um|im|uninstall-manifest|install-manifest)\\b' }).Count\n    $clManip = @($klassikCmd | Where-Object { $_.Cmd -match $manipMuster -and $_.Cmd -notmatch $eigenerCode } | Group-Object Cmd | ForEach-Object {\n        $g = @($_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit)\n        [PSCustomObject]@{ Cmd=$_.Name; Anzahl=$_.Count; Erst=$g[0].Zeit; Letzt=$g[-1].Zeit }\n    })\n\n    if ($manipTreffer.Count -gt 0 -or $sbManip.Count -gt 0 -or $clManip.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!!!] Log-Manipulationsbefehle gefunden:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $manipTreffer | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    [History/{0}] {1}\" -f $_.Benutzer, $_.Befehl) -ForegroundColor Red }\n        $clManip | Sort-Object Letzt -Descending | ForEach-Object {\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0} bis {1}, {2}x] {3}\" -f $_.Erst, $_.Letzt, $_.Anzahl, $_.Cmd) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        $sbManip | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 15 | ForEach-Object {\n            $c = ([string]$_.Text -replace '\\s+',' ')\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1}\" -f $_.Zeit, $c.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(150,$c.Length))) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Log-Manipulationsbefehle in PowerShell-Spuren.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        Write-Host \"  (Hinweis: wer die History loescht, versteckt auch das - Log-Groesse oben zaehlt trotzdem)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($manifestN -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  ({0}x 'wevtutil um/im' ausgeblendet - Treiber melden ihr Log-Manifest an/ab, z. B. Realtek. Harmlos.)\" -f $manifestN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausfuehrungsartefakte: Zustand und Auffaelligkeiten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Ausfuehrungsartefakte ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Zeigt Zustand, KEIN kryptografischer Manipulationsbeweis.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \" Tiefenauswertung: Zimmerman-Tools AmcacheParser / AppCompatCacheParser / MFTECmd)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Amcache.hve\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Amcache.hve ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $am = \"$env:SystemRoot\\AppCompat\\Programs\\Amcache.hve\"\n    if (Test-Path $am) {\n        $f = Get-Item $am -Force\n        Write-Host (\"Groesse: {0:N0} Bytes | Erstellt: {1} | Geaendert: {2}\" -f $f.Length,$f.CreationTime,$f.LastWriteTime)\n        if ($f.Length -lt 100KB) {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Datei sehr klein - koennte geleert/zurueckgesetzt sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        $os2 = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem\n        if ($f.CreationTime -gt $os2.InstallDate.AddDays(1)) {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Erstellt deutlich nach Windows-Installation - moeglw. neu angelegt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"FEHLT - Amcache.hve nicht vorhanden (regeneriert sich normalerweise).\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # USN-Journal (NTFS-Aenderungsjournal)\n    Write-Host \"`n--- USN-Journal (Laufwerk C:) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $usn = &amp; fsutil usn queryjournal C: 2&gt;&amp;1\n    if ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0 -and $usn) {\n        $usn | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        $first = ($usn | Select-String 'Erste USN|First USN' | Select-Object -First 1) -replace '[^0-9x]',''\n        if ($first -match '^0x0+$' -or $first -eq '0') {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Erste USN = 0 - Journal wurde geloescht und neu angelegt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Journal nicht abfragbar oder deaktiviert.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"Ein DEAKTIVIERTES USN-Journal ist auf einem Gaming-PC ungewoehnlich.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # ShimCache / AppCompatCache\n    Write-Host \"`n--- ShimCache (AppCompatCache) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $shim = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCompatCache'\n    if (Test-Path $shim) {\n        $val = (Get-ItemProperty $shim -Name AppCompatCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).AppCompatCache\n        if ($val) {\n            Write-Host (\"Vorhanden, {0:N0} Bytes. Binaer - Auswertung nur mit AppCompatCacheParser.\" -f $val.Length)\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Schluessel vorhanden, aber leer.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: AppCompatCache nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # Prefetch\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Prefetch ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfE = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory Management\\PrefetchParameters' -Name EnablePrefetcher -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).EnablePrefetcher\n    $pfDir = \"$env:SystemRoot\\Prefetch\"\n    $pfCount = if (Test-Path $pfDir) { @(Get-ChildItem \"$pfDir\\*.pf\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Count } else { 0 }\n    Write-Host (\"EnablePrefetcher: {0} | .pf-Dateien: {1}\" -f $pfE, $pfCount)\n    if ($pfE -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Prefetch deaktiviert - haeufige Anti-Forensik-Massnahme.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } elseif ($pfCount -lt 20) {\n        Write-Host \"AUFFAELLIG: Sehr wenige .pf-Dateien - Prefetch koennte geleert worden sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # SRUM\n    Write-Host \"`n--- SRUM ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $srum = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\sru\\SRUDB.dat\"\n    if (Test-Path $srum) {\n        $f = Get-Item $srum -Force\n        Write-Host (\"SRUDB.dat: {0:N0} Bytes | Geaendert: {1}\" -f $f.Length,$f.LastWriteTime)\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"SRUDB.dat nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Geloeschte / neu angelegte Ereignisprotokoll-Dateien\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Ereignisprotokoll-Dateien: geloescht und neu angelegt? ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Eine .evtx-Datei, die deutlich juenger ist als Windows, wurde geloescht oder ersetzt)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $osInstLog = (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).InstallDate\n    # Kernprotokolle werden ab der Installation geschrieben - spaeter angelegt = geloescht/ersetzt\n    $kernLogs = @('System','Application','Security','Windows PowerShell','Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational',\n                  'Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP%4Configuration','Microsoft-Windows-Partition%4Diagnostic',\n                  'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational','Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity%4Operational',\n                  'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security%4Firewall','Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Boot%4Operational',\n                  'Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational')\n    # Diese legt Windows oft erst beim ersten Eintrag oder beim Einschalten an - nur Hinweis\n    $bedarfLogs = @('Microsoft-Windows-AppID%4Operational','Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler%4Operational','Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client%4Operational',\n                    'Microsoft-Windows-Storage-ClassPnP%4Operational','Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager%4Admin','Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity%4Operational')\n    $wichtigeLogs = $kernLogs + $bedarfLogs\n    $logOrdner = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\"\n    $neuAngelegt = 0\n    if ($osInstLog) {\n        foreach ($ln in $wichtigeLogs) {\n            $lf = Get-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $logOrdner \"$ln.evtx\") -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $lf) { continue }\n            if ($lf.CreationTime -gt $osInstLog.AddDays(1)) {\n                $neuAngelegt++\n                if ($kernLogs -contains $ln) {\n                    Write-Host (\"  [!] {0}.evtx  angelegt {1}  (Windows installiert {2}) - KERNPROTOKOLL\" -f $ln, $lf.CreationTime, $osInstLog) -ForegroundColor Red\n                } else {\n                    Write-Host (\"  [?] {0}.evtx  angelegt {1}  - Windows legt diese Datei oft erst beim ersten Eintrag an; nur mit Dienststopp zur selben Zeit ein Beweis\" -f $ln, $lf.CreationTime) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        if ($neuAngelegt -eq 0) { Write-Host \"  Alle wichtigen Protokolldateien stammen aus der Windows-Installation - keine geloescht/ersetzt.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n        else { Write-Host \"  Neu angelegt = die alte Datei wurde geloescht. Dafuer muss der Ereignisprotokoll-Dienst gestoppt werden (siehe unten).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    }\n\n    # Dienststopps des Ereignisprotokolls (Voraussetzung zum Loeschen einer .evtx)\n    $evSvc = @()\n    $evSvc += @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='System'; Id=7036,7040 } -MaxEvents 3000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Message -match '(?i)Windows Event Log|Windows-Ereignisprotokoll|EventLog' -and $_.Message -match '(?i)beendet|stopped|deaktiviert|disabled|manuell|demand' })\n    $evSvc += @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName='Security'; Id=1100 } -MaxEvents 200 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($evSvc.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Ereignisprotokoll-Dienst beendet / umgestellt (bei Herunterfahren normal - auf Zeitpunkte ohne Neustart achten):\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        $evSvc | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 15 | ForEach-Object {\n            $m = ($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] EID {1}  {2}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $_.Id, $m.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(110,$m.Length))) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n        }\n    }\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Microsoft Defender: Erkennungen, geloeschte Historie, Abschaltungen, Ausnahmen\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Microsoft Defender: Erkennungen, Historie, Abschaltungen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $defLog = 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational'\n    $defEv = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{ LogName=$defLog; Id=1013,1116,1117,1118,1119,5000,5001,5007,5010,5012 } -MaxEvents 3000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    $histDel = @($defEv | Where-Object Id -eq 1013)\n    if ($histDel.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] Erkennungs-Historie GELOESCHT (EID 1013) - von Hand oder automatische Bereinigung:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $histDel | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 10 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    [{0}]\" -f $_.TimeCreated) -ForegroundColor Red }\n        Write-Host \"    Die Erkennungen selbst stehen trotzdem weiter unten (Ereignisse 1116/1117 und MPLog).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    $erk = @($defEv | Where-Object { $_.Id -in 1116,1117,1118,1119 })\n    if ($erk.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  {0} Defender-Erkennungen/-Massnahmen:\" -f $erk.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        foreach ($e in ($erk | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 25)) {\n            $d = @{}; ([xml]$e.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | ForEach-Object { $d[$_.Name] = $_.'#text' }\n            $name = $d['Threat Name']; $pfad = $d['Path']; $akt = $d['Action Name']\n            $cn = Get-CheatName (\"{0} {1}\" -f $name, $pfad)\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] EID {1}  {2}{3}\" -f $e.TimeCreated, $e.Id, $name, $(if ($cn) { \"   &lt;-- BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $(if ($e.Id -eq 1116) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' })\n            if ($pfad) { Write-Host (\"        {0}\" -f ($pfad -replace '^(file|containerfile|process|regkey|webfile):_', '')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n            if ($akt)  { Write-Host (\"        Massnahme: {0}\" -f $akt) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n            if ($pfad -match '(?i)Invoke-RestMethod|Invoke-WebRequest|\\birm\\b|\\biwr\\b|DownloadString|raw\\.githubusercontent|gist\\.github') {\n                $url = if ($pfad -match \"(https?://[^'`\"\\s\\)]+)\") { $matches[1] } else { '' }\n                Write-Host (\"        Hinweis: Skript direkt aus dem Netz ausgefuehrt{0} - Adresse pruefen; auch Pruef-Tools (und CTC) werden so erkannt.\" -f $(if ($url) { \": $url\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Defender-Erkennungen im Protokoll.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    $aus = @($defEv | Where-Object { $_.Id -in 5001,5010,5012 })\n    $an  = @($defEv | Where-Object { $_.Id -eq 5000 } | Sort-Object TimeCreated)\n    if ($aus.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] Schutz abgeschaltet (5001 Echtzeitschutz, 5010 Spyware-Scan, 5012 Virenscan) - mit Dauer bis zum Wiedereinschalten:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($a in ($aus | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 15)) {\n            $wieder = $an | Where-Object { $_.TimeCreated -gt $a.TimeCreated } | Select-Object -First 1\n            $dauer  = if ($wieder) { $min = ($wieder.TimeCreated - $a.TimeCreated).TotalMinutes; if ($min -lt 120) { \"{0:N0} Min. aus\" -f $min } else { \"{0:N1} Std. aus\" -f ($min / 60) } } else { 'nicht wieder eingeschaltet (oder Neustart)' }\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] EID {1}  {2}\" -f $a.TimeCreated, $a.Id, $dauer) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        # Muster: Schutz aus und innerhalb von 30 Minuten Erkennungs-Historie geloescht\n        $muster = @()\n        foreach ($h in $histDel) {\n            $vorher = $aus | Where-Object { $_.TimeCreated -lt $h.TimeCreated -and ($h.TimeCreated - $_.TimeCreated).TotalMinutes -le 30 } | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 1\n            if ($vorher) { $muster += \"Schutz aus {0:dd.MM. HH:mm} -&gt; Historie geloescht {1:HH:mm}\" -f $vorher.TimeCreated, $h.TimeCreated }\n        }\n        if ($muster.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!!!] MUSTER ({0}x): Echtzeitschutz abgeschaltet und kurz danach Erkennungs-Historie geloescht\" -f $muster.Count) -ForegroundColor Red\n            $muster | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"        $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n            Write-Host \"        Typischer Ablauf: Schutz aus -&gt; etwas starten, das Defender meldet -&gt; Spuren entfernen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n    $konf = @($defEv | Where-Object { $_.Id -eq 5007 -and $_.Message -match '(?i)Exclusions|Ausschl|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|DisableAntiSpyware|TamperProtection' })\n    if ($konf.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] Defender-Einstellungen geaendert (Ausnahmen / Abschaltung / Manipulationsschutz):\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $konf | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 15 | ForEach-Object {\n            $m = ($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ')\n            $neu = if ($m -match '(?i)(Neuer Wert|New value):\\s*(.*?)\\s*(Alter Wert|Old value):') { $matches[2].Trim() } elseif ($m -match '(?i)(Neuer Wert|New value):\\s*(.+)$') { $matches[2].Trim() } else { '' }\n            $alt = if ($m -match '(?i)(Alter Wert|Old value):\\s*(.+?)\\s*((Neuer Wert|New value):|$)') { $matches[2].Trim() } else { '' }\n            $wert = if ($neu) { $neu } else { $alt }\n            $ausnahme = if ($wert -match '(?i)\\\\Exclusions\\\\(Paths|Extensions|Processes|IpAddresses)\\\\(.+?)\\s*=') { \"{0}: {1}\" -f $matches[1], $matches[2] } else { $null }\n            if ($ausnahme) {\n                if ($neu) { Write-Host (\"    [{0}] AUSNAHME HINZUGEFUEGT  {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $ausnahme) -ForegroundColor Red }\n                else      { Write-Host (\"    [{0}] Ausnahme entfernt      {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $ausnahme) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }\n            } else {\n                $txt = if ($wert) { $wert } else { $m.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(140,$m.Length)) }\n                Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $txt) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n            }\n        }\n        $aktuell = @()\n        try { $mp = Get-MpPreference -ErrorAction Stop; $aktuell = @($mp.ExclusionPath) + @($mp.ExclusionProcess) + @($mp.ExclusionExtension) | Where-Object { $_ } } catch {}\n        if ($aktuell.Count -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"    Aktuell aktive Ausnahmen: {0}\" -f ($aktuell -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor Red }\n    }\n    # MPLog: Defender-eigene Textprotokolle, enthalten Erkennungen auch nach geloeschter Historie\n    $mpl = @(Get-ChildItem \"$env:ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Support\\MPLog-*.log\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($mpl.Count -gt 0) {\n        $mpTreffer = @()\n        foreach ($f in $mpl) {\n            try {\n                $muster = 'DETECTIONEVENT|DETECTION_?ADD|Threat\\s*name|ThreatName'\n                $z = @(Select-String -LiteralPath $f.FullName -Pattern $muster -ErrorAction Stop)\n                if ($z.Count -eq 0) { $z = @(Select-String -LiteralPath $f.FullName -Pattern $muster -Encoding Unicode -ErrorAction Stop) }\n                $mpTreffer += @($z | ForEach-Object { $_.Line.Trim() })\n            } catch {}\n        }\n        $mpTreffer = @($mpTreffer | Select-Object -Unique)\n        if ($mpTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  MPLog: {0} Erkennungszeilen (bleiben auch nach geloeschter Historie):\" -f $mpTreffer.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            $mpTreffer | Select-Object -Last 15 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    {0}\" -f $_.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(170,$_.Length))) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  MPLog: keine Erkennungszeilen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  3 - PCI/PCIe-Geraete\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PciDevices {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PCI/PCIe-Geraete (aktuell) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host (\"{0,-6} {1,-6} {2,-10} {3,-18} {4}\" -f 'VEN','DEV','STATUS','KLASSE','NAME') -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Get-PnpDevice | Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI*' } | Sort-Object Class | ForEach-Object {\n        $v = [regex]::Match($_.InstanceId,'VEN_([0-9A-Fa-f]{4})').Groups[1].Value.ToUpper()\n        $d = [regex]::Match($_.InstanceId,'DEV_([0-9A-Fa-f]{4})').Groups[1].Value.ToUpper()\n        $c = if ($OKVEN -contains $v) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host (\"{0,-6} {1,-6} {2,-10} {3,-18} {4}\" -f $v,$d,$_.Status,$_.Class,$_.FriendlyName) -ForegroundColor $c\n    }\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    # PCIe-Verbindung: Geschwindigkeit/Lanes passen zum Chip? (gefaelschte IDs fallen hier auf)\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PCIe-Verbindung der Geraete (Geschwindigkeit/Lanes) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Eine DMA-Karte kann die ID eines echten Geraets faelschen - nicht aber die ausgehandelte PCIe-Geschwindigkeit)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    # Hoechste PCIe-Generation, die der ECHTE Chip beherrscht (1 = 2,5 GT/s, 2 = 5 GT/s, 3 = 8 GT/s, 4 = 16 GT/s)\n    $maxGen = @{\n        '10EC:8168' = 1; '10EC:8136' = 1; '10EC:8161' = 1; '10EC:8167' = 1; '10EC:8169' = 1   # Realtek RTL8111/8168/8101 Gigabit\n        '10EC:8125' = 2; '10EC:3000' = 2                                                     # Realtek 2,5G\n        '8086:1539' = 1; '8086:1533' = 1; '8086:157B' = 1                                    # Intel I211 / I210\n        '8086:15F3' = 2; '8086:125B' = 2; '8086:125C' = 2                                    # Intel I225 / I226\n        '1102:0012' = 1; '1102:0011' = 1                                                     # Creative Sound Blaster PCIe\n        '12AB:0380' = 1                                                                      # YUAN / Elgato HD60 Pro\n    }\n    $genTxt = @{ 1='Gen1 2,5 GT/s'; 2='Gen2 5 GT/s'; 3='Gen3 8 GT/s'; 4='Gen4 16 GT/s'; 5='Gen5 32 GT/s' }\n    $netz = @{}\n    Get-NetAdapter -IncludeHidden -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { if ($_.PnPDeviceID) { $netz[$_.PnPDeviceID.ToUpper()] = $_ } }\n\n    $pciAlle = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI\\VEN_*' -and $_.Class -notin @('System','USB','SecurityDevices') -and $_.Class })\n    foreach ($d in $pciAlle) {\n        $ven = [regex]::Match($d.InstanceId, 'VEN_([0-9A-F]{4})').Groups[1].Value\n        $dev = [regex]::Match($d.InstanceId, 'DEV_([0-9A-F]{4})').Groups[1].Value\n        $key = \"$($ven):$($dev)\"\n        $p = @{}\n        foreach ($kn in 'DEVPKEY_PciDevice_CurrentLinkSpeed','DEVPKEY_PciDevice_CurrentLinkWidth','DEVPKEY_PciDevice_MaxLinkSpeed','DEVPKEY_PciDevice_MaxLinkWidth') {\n            try { $v = (Get-PnpDeviceProperty -InstanceId $d.InstanceId -KeyName $kn -ErrorAction Stop).Data; if ($null -ne $v) { $p[$kn] = [int]$v } } catch {}\n        }\n        $cs = $p['DEVPKEY_PciDevice_CurrentLinkSpeed']; $cw = $p['DEVPKEY_PciDevice_CurrentLinkWidth']\n        $ms = $p['DEVPKEY_PciDevice_MaxLinkSpeed'];     $mw = $p['DEVPKEY_PciDevice_MaxLinkWidth']\n        $lauf = if ($cs) { \"{0} x{1}\" -f $(if ($genTxt.ContainsKey($cs)) { $genTxt[$cs] } else { \"Gen$cs\" }), $cw } else { 'nicht abfragbar' }\n        $kann = if ($ms) { \"{0} x{1}\" -f $(if ($genTxt.ContainsKey($ms)) { $genTxt[$ms] } else { \"Gen$ms\" }), $mw } else { '-' }\n\n        $befund = ''; $col = 'DarkGray'\n        if ($maxGen.ContainsKey($key) -and (($ms -and $ms -gt $maxGen[$key]) -or ($cs -and $cs -gt $maxGen[$key]))) {\n            $befund = \"[!!!] Dieser Chip kann hoechstens $($genTxt[$maxGen[$key]]) - das Geraet meldet mehr. ID GEFAELSCHT (DMA-Karte?)\"\n            $col = 'Red'\n        } elseif ($ven -eq '10EE' -or $ven -eq '1172' -or $ven -eq '1204') {\n            $befund = '[!!!] FPGA-Hersteller (Xilinx/Altera/Lattice) - typische DMA-Hardware'; $col = 'Red'\n        }\n        Write-Host (\"  {0,-9} {1,-45} laeuft: {2,-18} kann: {3}\" -f $key, ($d.FriendlyName -replace '\\s+',' ').Substring(0, [Math]::Min(45, ($d.FriendlyName -replace '\\s+',' ').Length)), $lauf, $kann) -ForegroundColor $(if ($col -eq 'Red') { 'Red' } else { 'White' })\n        if ($befund) { Write-Host \"            $befund\" -ForegroundColor $col }\n\n        # Netzwerkkarten: arbeitet sie wirklich?\n        if ($d.Class -eq 'Net') {\n            $na = $netz[$d.InstanceId.ToUpper()]\n            if ($na) {\n                $mac = [string]$na.MacAddress\n                $macVerd = (-not $mac) -or $mac -match '^(00-){5}00$' -or $mac -match '^(FF-){5}FF$'\n                $ip = @(Get-NetIPAddress -InterfaceIndex $na.ifIndex -AddressFamily IPv4 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.IPAddress -notmatch '^169\\.254\\.' }).Count -gt 0\n                $txt = \"            Netzwerk: Status {0} | MAC {1} | {2}\" -f $na.Status, $(if ($mac) { $mac } else { 'KEINE' }), $(if ($ip) { 'hat IP-Adresse' } else { 'keine IP-Adresse' })\n                Write-Host $txt -ForegroundColor $(if ($macVerd) { 'Red' } elseif ($na.Status -ne 'Up') { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' })\n                if ($macVerd) { Write-Host \"            [!!!] Netzwerkkarte ohne gueltige MAC-Adresse - bei echter Hardware kaum moeglich\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n                elseif ($na.Status -ne 'Up') { Write-Host \"            Hinweis: Karte nicht verbunden. Wird sie ueberhaupt genutzt? Bei Tarnung als Netzwerkkarte typisch - physisch pruefen (Kabel? LED?).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"            [!] Als Netzwerkkarte gemeldet, aber Windows fuehrt sie nicht als Netzwerkadapter - verdaechtig\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  Tipp: Onboard-Chips laufen meist mit der Geschwindigkeit, die der Chip kann. Eine 'Realtek' mit Gen2 oder x4 ist keine Realtek.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Nicht mehr vorhandene PCI-Geraete ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $reg = @(Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\PCI' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object -ExpandProperty PSChildName)\n    $da  = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI*' } |\n        ForEach-Object { ($_.InstanceId -split '\\\\')[1] })\n    $weg = @($reg | Where-Object { $da -notcontains $_ })\n    if ($weg.Count -gt 0) {\n        $weg | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"FEHLT: $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Abweichung.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== setupapi.dev.log ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $sp = 'C:\\Windows\\INF\\setupapi.dev.log'\n    if (Test-Path $sp) {\n        $fi = Get-Item $sp\n        Write-Host (\"Groesse: {0:N0} Bytes | Erstellt: {1} | Geaendert: {2}\" -f $fi.Length,$fi.CreationTime,$fi.LastWriteTime)\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Datei nicht vorhanden - wurde sie geloescht?\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # Echte PCI-Installationen aus setupapi (inkl. rotierter Alt-Logs) - NICHT die Treiber-Kataloglisten\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PCI-Geraete, die je installiert wurden (setupapi, echte Installationen) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Nur '[Device Install ... - PCI\\...]'-Abschnitte mit Instanzpfad; Treiberpaket-ID-Listen werden ignoriert)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $fpgaVen   = '(?i)VEN_(10EE|1172|1204|1D0F|1556)'\n    $vorhanden = @{}\n    Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.InstanceId -like 'PCI*' } | ForEach-Object { $vorhanden[$_.InstanceId.ToUpper()] = $true }\n    $install = @{}\n    foreach ($logDatei in @(Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Windows\\INF\\setupapi*.log' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match '(?i)^setupapi\\.(dev|setup|offline)' })) {\n        $aktId = $null\n        try {\n            $fs = [System.IO.File]::Open($logDatei.FullName, 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite')\n            $sr = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($fs)\n        } catch { Write-Host \"  $($logDatei.Name) nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray; continue }\n        while ($null -ne ($zeile = $sr.ReadLine())) {\n            if ($zeile -match '^&gt;&gt;&gt;\\s+\\[.*Device Install.*? - (PCI\\\\VEN_[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}&amp;DEV_[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}[^\\\\\\]]*\\\\[^\\]]+)\\]') {\n                $aktId = $matches[1].ToUpper()\n                continue\n            }\n            if ($aktId -and $zeile -match '^&gt;&gt;&gt;\\s+Section start (\\d{4}/\\d{2}/\\d{2} \\d{2}:\\d{2}:\\d{2})') {\n                $zt = [DateTime]::ParseExact($matches[1], 'yyyy/MM/dd HH:mm:ss', [Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture)\n                if (-not $install.ContainsKey($aktId) -or $zt -lt $install[$aktId]) { $install[$aktId] = $zt }\n                $aktId = $null\n            }\n        }\n        $sr.Close()\n    }\n    if ($install.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine PCI-Installationsabschnitte gefunden (Log leer oder bereinigt?).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    } else {\n        $fehltN = 0\n        foreach ($id in ($install.Keys | Sort-Object { $install[$_] })) {\n            $ven = [regex]::Match($id,'VEN_([0-9A-F]{4})').Groups[1].Value\n            $dev = [regex]::Match($id,'DEV_([0-9A-F]{4})').Groups[1].Value\n            $da  = $vorhanden.ContainsKey($id)\n            $flag = ''; $col = 'DarkGray'\n            if ($id -match $fpgaVen) { $flag += ' [FPGA-HERSTELLER]'; $col = 'Red' }\n            if (-not $da) { $flag += ' [FEHLT HEUTE]'; $fehltN++; if ($col -ne 'Red') { $col = 'Yellow' } }\n            Write-Host (\"  {0}  VEN {1} DEV {2}  {3}{4}\" -f $install[$id].ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'), $ven, $dev, $id, $flag) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n        Write-Host (\"`n  {0} PCI-Instanzen je installiert, davon {1} heute nicht mehr vorhanden.\" -f $install.Count, $fehltN) -ForegroundColor $(if ($fehltN -gt 0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' })\n        Write-Host \"  FEHLT HEUTE bei einer Steckkarte = sie steckte einmal und wurde entfernt (Datum = erste Installation).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  Normal sind FEHLT-Eintraege nach GPU-Tausch oder Board-/BIOS-Wechsel - Zeitpunkt pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  4 - Entfernte Geraete im Zeitfenster\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemovedDevices {\n    param([int]$Stunden = 1)\n\n    $seit = (Get-Date).AddHours(-$Stunden)\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Entfernte Geraete seit $($seit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm')) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    $rem = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$L;Id=420;StartTime=$seit} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Geraet=(Get-DevId $_) } })\n    if ($rem.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"--- Abgezogen (Ereignisprotokoll) ---\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $rem | Sort-Object Zeit | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 420-Ereignisse im Zeitfenster.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    $sig = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sig -Name RK -Namespace W -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\n    $da = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.InstanceId })\n    $treffer = @()\n    foreach ($zweig in @('PCI','USB','USBSTOR','HID')) {\n        $pfad = \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\$zweig\"\n        if (-not (Test-Path $pfad)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $el = $_\n            Get-ChildItem $el.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n                $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n                [void][W.RK]::RegQueryInfoKey($_.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n                $zeit = [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n                $iid  = \"$zweig\\$($el.PSChildName)\\$($_.PSChildName)\"\n                if ($zeit -ge $seit -and ($da -notcontains $iid)) {\n                    $treffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Zuletzt = $zeit\n                        Geraet  = $iid\n                        Name    = (Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).FriendlyName\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($treffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"--- Registry frisch angefasst, Geraet nicht mehr vorhanden ---\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $treffer | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine Registry-Auffaelligkeiten im Zeitfenster.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Bei ausgeschaltetem Rechner entfernte Hardware\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"erzeugt KEINE Spur. Leeres Ergebnis ist keine Entlastung.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  5 - Datentraeger-Historie\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DiskHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Datentraeger-Historie (Partition/Diagnostic) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    $plog = @(Get-WinEvent -LogName 'Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        ForEach-Object {\n            $dat = ([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n            [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Zeit   = $_.TimeCreated\n                EID    = $_.Id\n                Modell = ($dat | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'Model' }).'#text'\n                Serie  = ($dat | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'SerialNumber' }).'#text'\n            }\n        })\n\n    if ($plog.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"Log leer oder nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        return\n    }\n\n    $s = $plog | Sort-Object Zeit\n    Write-Host (\"Zeitraum: {0} bis {1}  ({2} Eintraege)\" -f $s[0].Zeit, $s[-1].Zeit, $plog.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Alle jemals erfassten Datentraeger ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $plog | Group-Object Serie | ForEach-Object {\n        $e = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Modell   = $e[0].Modell\n            Serie    = $_.Name\n            Erstmals = $e[0].Zeit\n            Zuletzt  = $e[-1].Zeit\n            Anzahl   = $_.Count\n        }\n    } | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"--- Im Log erfasst, aktuell NICHT angeschlossen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $jetzt = @(Get-Disk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.SerialNumber -replace '\\s','' })\n    $fehlt = @($plog | Group-Object Serie | Where-Object {\n        $sn = $_.Name -replace '[\\s\\.]',''\n        -not ($jetzt | Where-Object { $_ -and ($_ -replace '[\\s\\.]','') -like \"*$sn*\" })\n    })\n    if ($fehlt.Count -gt 0) {\n        $fehlt | ForEach-Object {\n            $e = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n            Write-Host (\"FEHLT: {0} | Serie {1} | zuletzt {2}\" -f $e[0].Modell, $_.Name, $e[-1].Zeit) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle erfassten Datentraeger sind angeschlossen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Letzte 30 Ereignisse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $plog | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 30 | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Spuren von Laufwerken, die heute NICHT vorhanden sind\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Spuren von Laufwerken, die heute NICHT vorhanden sind (USB-Stick, geloeschte Partition, Container) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Ein Cheat vom abgezogenen Stick hinterlaesst keine Datei auf C: - aber diese Verweise)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcDos {\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastError = true)]\n    public static extern uint QueryDosDevice(string lpDeviceName, StringBuilder lpTargetPath, int ucchMax);\n}\n\"@\n    $vorhanden = @([System.IO.DriveInfo]::GetDrives() | Where-Object { $_.IsReady } | ForEach-Object { $_.Name.Substring(0,1).ToUpper() })\n    $volAktuell = @{}\n    foreach ($cc in 67..90) {\n        $sbD = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder 260\n        try { if ([CtcDos]::QueryDosDevice(([string][char]$cc) + ':', $sbD, 260) -gt 0) { $volAktuell[$sbD.ToString().ToLower()] = [string][char]$cc } } catch {}\n    }\n    $spuren = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList\n    $merke = {\n        param([string]$quelle, [string]$pfad, $zeit, [string]$extra)\n        $p = $pfad.Trim('\"', ' ')\n        if ($p -match '^([A-Za-z]):\\\\') {\n            $lw = $matches[1].ToUpper()\n            if ($vorhanden -notcontains $lw) { [void]$spuren.Add([PSCustomObject]@{ LW=\"$($lw):\"; Quelle=$quelle; Pfad=$p; Zeit=$zeit; Extra=$extra }) }\n        }\n    }\n    $rot13 = { param([string]$s) -join ($s.ToCharArray() | ForEach-Object { $c = [int]$_; if ($c -ge 65 -and $c -le 90) { [char](65 + ($c - 65 + 13) % 26) } elseif ($c -ge 97 -and $c -le 122) { [char](97 + ($c - 97 + 13) % 26) } else { $_ } }) }\n\n    $sids = @(Get-ChildItem 'Registry::HKEY_USERS' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.PSChildName -match '^S-1-5-21-[\\d-]+$' } | ForEach-Object { $_.PSChildName })\n    foreach ($sid in $sids) {\n        $basis = \"Registry::HKEY_USERS\\$sid\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\"\n        # UserAssist: Programmstarts mit Zaehler und letzter Ausfuehrung (Namen ROT13-kodiert)\n        Get-ChildItem \"$basis\\UserAssist\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $cnt = Join-Path $_.PSPath 'Count'\n            $k = Get-Item $cnt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $k) { return }\n            foreach ($n in $k.GetValueNames()) {\n                $name = &amp; $rot13 $n\n                if ($name -notmatch '^[A-Za-z]:\\\\') { continue }\n                $b = $k.GetValue($n); $zeit = $null; $anz = ''\n                if ($b -is [byte[]] -and $b.Length -ge 68) {\n                    $ft = [BitConverter]::ToInt64($b, 60); if ($ft -gt 0) { try { $zeit = [DateTime]::FromFileTime($ft) } catch {} }\n                    $anz = \"{0}x gestartet\" -f [BitConverter]::ToInt32($b, 4)\n                }\n                &amp; $merke 'UserAssist (Programmstart)' $name $zeit $anz\n            }\n        }\n        # Ausfuehren-Dialog und eingegebene Pfade\n        foreach ($sub in @('RunMRU','TypedPaths')) {\n            $k = Get-Item \"$basis\\$sub\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $k) { continue }\n            $zt = $null\n            foreach ($n in $k.GetValueNames()) {\n                if ($n -eq 'MRUList') { continue }\n                &amp; $merke $(if ($sub -eq 'RunMRU') { 'Win+R (Ausfuehren)' } else { 'Explorer-Adresszeile' }) (([string]$k.GetValue($n)) -replace '\\\\1$','') $zt ''\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    # BAM: Programmstarts mit Zeit - auch von Datentraegern, die als HarddiskVolumeN nicht mehr existieren\n    Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $k = $_\n        foreach ($n in $k.GetValueNames()) {\n            if ($n -notmatch '^\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume\\d+\\\\') { continue }\n            $b = $k.GetValue($n); $zeit = $null\n            if ($b -is [byte[]] -and $b.Length -ge 8) { try { $zeit = [DateTime]::FromFileTime([BitConverter]::ToInt64($b, 0)) } catch {} }\n            $dev = ([regex]::Match($n, '^\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume\\d+')).Value.ToLower()\n            if ($volAktuell.ContainsKey($dev)) {\n                &amp; $merke 'BAM (Programmstart)' ($volAktuell[$dev] + ':' + $n.Substring($dev.Length)) $zeit ''\n            } else {\n                [void]$spuren.Add([PSCustomObject]@{ LW=($dev -replace '^\\\\device\\\\','') ; Quelle='BAM (Programmstart)'; Pfad=$n; Zeit=$zeit; Extra='Datentraeger existiert nicht mehr' })\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    # Zuletzt geoeffnete Dateien (Verknuepfungen im Recent-Ordner)\n    try {\n        $sh = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell\n        Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Recent\\*.lnk' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            try { $ziel = $sh.CreateShortcut($_.FullName).TargetPath } catch { $ziel = '' }\n            if ($ziel) { &amp; $merke 'Zuletzt geoeffnet (LNK)' $ziel $_.LastWriteTime '' }\n        }\n    } catch {}\n\n    # Welches Geraet hatte den Buchstaben zuletzt? (MountedDevices)\n    $geraet = @{}\n    $md = Get-Item 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\MountedDevices' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    if ($md) {\n        foreach ($n in $md.GetValueNames()) {\n            if ($n -notmatch '^\\\\DosDevices\\\\([A-Z]):$') { continue }\n            $lw = $matches[1] + ':'\n            $b = $md.GetValue($n); $txt = 'unbekannt'\n            if ($b -is [byte[]]) {\n                if ($b.Length -eq 12) { $txt = 'MBR-Partition (Festplatte oder Stick)' }\n                elseif ($b.Length -ge 8 -and [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($b, 0, 8) -eq 'DMIO:ID:') { $txt = 'GPT-Partition (interne oder externe Platte)' }\n                else {\n                    $s = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($b)\n                    if ($s -match '(?i)USBSTOR#Disk&amp;Ven_([^&amp;#]*)&amp;Prod_([^&amp;#]*)') { $txt = \"USB-STICK/USB-PLATTE: {0} {1}\" -f $matches[1], $matches[2] }\n                    elseif ($s -match '(?i)SCSI#(Disk|CdRom)&amp;Ven_([^&amp;#]*)&amp;Prod_([^&amp;#]*)') { $txt = \"{0} {1} {2}\" -f $matches[1], $matches[2], $matches[3] }\n                    elseif ($s -match '(?i)Virtual_DVD|VHD|Msft') { $txt = 'virtuelles Laufwerk (ISO/VHD eingebunden)' }\n                    elseif ($s -match '(?i)STORAGE#Volume|veracrypt|truecrypt') { $txt = 'Software-Volume (z. B. verschluesselter Container)' }\n                    elseif ($s -match '(?i)#([^#]+)#') { $txt = $matches[1] }\n                }\n            }\n            $geraet[$lw] = $txt\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($spuren.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Verweise auf Laufwerke, die heute fehlen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        $ausfuehrbar = '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|bat|cmd|ps1|vbs|js|hta|msi|scr|com)$'\n        foreach ($g in ($spuren | Group-Object LW | Sort-Object Name)) {\n            $dev = if ($geraet.ContainsKey($g.Name)) { $geraet[$g.Name] } else { 'kein Eintrag in MountedDevices (Netzlaufwerk, Container oder geloeschte Zuordnung)' }\n            $exeN = @($g.Group | Where-Object { $_.Pfad -match $ausfuehrbar }).Count\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [!] Laufwerk {0} - heute NICHT vorhanden | zuletzt: {1} | {2} Verweise, davon {3} Programme/Skripte\" -f $g.Name, $dev, $g.Count, $exeN) -ForegroundColor $(if ($exeN) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' })\n            $eindeutig = $g.Group | Sort-Object { if ($_.Zeit) { $_.Zeit } else { [datetime]::MinValue } } -Descending | Group-Object Pfad | ForEach-Object { $_.Group[0] }\n            foreach ($s in ($eindeutig | Select-Object -First 25)) {\n                $cn  = Get-CheatName $s.Pfad\n                $col = if ($cn -or $s.Pfad -match $ausfuehrbar) { 'Red' } else { 'DarkYellow' }\n                $zt  = if ($s.Zeit) { ([datetime]$s.Zeit).ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } else { '      -         ' }\n                Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1,-28} {2}{3}{4}\" -f $zt, $s.Quelle, $s.Pfad, $(if ($s.Extra) { \"  ($($s.Extra))\" } else { '' }), $(if ($cn) { \"   &lt;-- BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $col\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`n  Programme von einem fehlenden Laufwerk = vom Stick/Container gestartet. Zeitpunkt in Punkt 19, Geraet in Punkt 6 pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  Harmlos sind z. B. alte Spiele-Bibliotheken auf einer ausgebauten Platte oder Installations-Sticks - Pfad und Name entscheiden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  6 - USB-Geraetehistorie\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-UsbHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== USB-Geraetehistorie ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $da = @(Get-PnpDevice -PresentOnly -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.InstanceId })\n    foreach ($zweig in @('USBSTOR','USB')) {\n        $pfad = \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\$zweig\"\n        if (-not (Test-Path $pfad)) { continue }\n        Write-Host \"`n--- $zweig ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $el = $_\n            Get-ChildItem $el.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n                $p = Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                $iid = \"$zweig\\$($el.PSChildName)\\$($_.PSChildName)\"\n                [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Status = if ($da -contains $iid) { 'vorhanden' } else { 'FEHLT' }\n                    Name   = $p.FriendlyName\n                    Klasse = $p.Class\n                    Geraet = $el.PSChildName\n                    Serie  = $_.PSChildName\n                }\n            }\n        } | Sort-Object Status, Name | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n    }\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Viele FEHLT-Eintraege unter USB sind normal (Ports, Hubs, Kabel).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- DeviceSetupManager: MAKCU / Arduino / Input-Emulator Spuren ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- DeviceSetupManager: MAKCU / Arduino / Input-Emulator ---\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(CH343/CH340/CH341 = Arduino-Klon | ESP32-S3 = MAKCU | COM-Port = serielles Geraet)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $dsmLog   = 'Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager/Admin'\n    $dsmOper  = 'Microsoft-Windows-DeviceSetupManager/Operational'\n    $dsmMuster = 'CH34|CH340|CH341|CH343|ESP32|ESP8266|MAKCU|Arduino|CP2102|CP210|PL2303|FT232|FTDI|silabser|usbser'\n    $comMuster = 'COM\\d+'\n\n    $dsmTreffer = @()\n    foreach ($log in @($dsmLog, $dsmOper)) {\n        $events = @(Get-WinEvent -LogName $log -MaxEvents 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($e in $events) {\n            if ($e.Message -match $dsmMuster -or $e.Message -match 'COM[3-9]|COM[1-9][0-9]') {\n                $comPort = if ($e.Message -match '(COM\\d+)') { $matches[1] } else { '' }\n                $chip    = ''\n                foreach ($m in @('CH343','CH340','CH341','CH34','ESP32-S3','ESP32','ESP8266','CP2102','CP210','PL2303','FT232','FTDI','silabser','usbser','MAKCU','Arduino')) {\n                    if ($e.Message -match [regex]::Escape($m)) { $chip = $m; break }\n                }\n                $dsmTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Zeit    = $e.TimeCreated\n                    EID     = $e.Id\n                    Chip    = $chip\n                    COM     = $comPort\n                    Meldung = ($e.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Substring(0, [Math]::Min(120, $e.Message.Length))\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($dsmTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!] TREFFER: Serielle/Arduino/MAKCU-Geraete im DeviceSetupManager-Log!\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $dsmTreffer | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 20 | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Chip -match 'ESP32|MAKCU') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] EID {1}\" -f $_.Zeit, $_.EID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($_.Chip) { Write-Host (\"  Chip/Typ : {0}\" -f $_.Chip) -ForegroundColor $col }\n            if ($_.COM)  { Write-Host (\"  COM-Port : {0}\" -f $_.COM)  -ForegroundColor $col }\n            Write-Host (\"  Meldung  : {0}...\" -f $_.Meldung) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`n  Bedeutung: CH34x = Arduino-Klon (Input-Emulator Basis)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"             ESP32-S3 = MAKCU oder aehnliches Aim-Geraet\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"             COM-Port-Eintrag = serielles USB-Geraet war angeschlossen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Arduino/MAKCU/ESP32-Spuren im DeviceSetupManager-Log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- COM-Port-Registry: jemals registrierte serielle Geraete ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- COM-Port-Historie (Registry) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $comKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\COM Name Arbiter\\Devices'\n    if (Test-Path $comKey) {\n        $comPorts = Get-ItemProperty $comKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($comPorts) {\n            $comPorts.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Name -notmatch '^PS' } | ForEach-Object {\n                Write-Host (\"  {0} = {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Value)\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  COM-Arbiter-Key nicht vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  7 - Fernwartungssoftware\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemoteTools {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Fernwartungssoftware ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $fund = $false\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Installiert (Registry) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $uninst = @(\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*',\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*',\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*'\n    )\n    $tr = @(Get-ItemProperty $uninst -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, InstallDate, InstallLocation)\n    if ($tr) { $tr | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Nichts gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Prefetch (belegt AUSFUEHRUNG) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory Management\\PrefetchParameters' -Name EnablePrefetcher -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).EnablePrefetcher\n    if ($pfEnabled -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"Prefetch ist DEAKTIVIERT - dieser Test ist wertlos.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n    $pf = @(Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.pf' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object Name, CreationTime, LastWriteTime)\n    if ($pf) { $pf | Format-Table -AutoSize; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Kein Prefetch-Eintrag.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dateien / Ordner ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $pfade = @(\"$env:ProgramFiles\",\"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\",\"$env:APPDATA\",\n               \"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\",\"$env:ProgramData\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Downloads\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\")\n    $df = @(foreach ($p in $pfade) {\n        if (Test-Path $p) {\n            Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Depth 2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER } |\n                Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime\n        }\n    })\n    if ($df) { $df | Sort-Object CreationTime | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Dateien gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dienste ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sv = @(Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Name -match $MUSTER -or $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER -or $_.PathName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object Name, DisplayName, State, StartMode, PathName)\n    if ($sv) { $sv | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Dienste.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Programmspuren in der Registry ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $rk = @(\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\MuiCache',\n      'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store',\n      'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Compatibility Assistant\\Store'\n    )\n    $sp = @(foreach ($k in $rk) {\n        if (Test-Path $k) {\n            (Get-Item $k).Property | Where-Object { $_ -match $MUSTER } |\n                ForEach-Object { [PSCustomObject]@{ Quelle=(Split-Path $k -Leaf); Eintrag=$_ } }\n        }\n    })\n    if ($sp) { $sp | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Registry-Spuren.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Firewall-Regeln ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $fw = @(Get-NetFirewallRule -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match $MUSTER } |\n        Select-Object DisplayName, Enabled, Direction, Action)\n    if ($fw) { $fw | Format-Table -AutoSize; $fund = $true }\n    else { Write-Host \"Keine Firewall-Regeln.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    if ($fund) {\n        Write-Host \"`nTREFFER vorhanden - Eintraege einzeln pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"Fernwartung hat viele harmlose Gruende. Der Zeitpunkt entscheidet.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"`nKeine Hinweise auf Fernwartungssoftware.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  8 - Fernwartung: Sitzungen und Dateiuebertragungen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemoteSessions {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Fernwartung: Sitzungen und Dateiuebertragungen ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # Schluesselwoerter, die auf Dateiuebertragung hindeuten\n    $ftMuster = 'file transfer|filetransfer|Files\\b|Starting file|Download|Upload|transfer of|Dateiuebertragung'\n\n    # --- AnyDesk ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- AnyDesk ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $adPfade = @(\"$env:ProgramData\\AnyDesk\", \"$env:APPDATA\\AnyDesk\")\n    $adGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $adPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $adGefunden = $true\n        Write-Host \"Ordner: $p\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $p -Filter '*.trace' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            Select-Object Name, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n        # connection_trace.txt: eine Zeile pro Sitzung\n        $ct = Join-Path $p 'connection_trace.txt'\n        if (Test-Path $ct) {\n            Write-Host \"-- Sitzungen (connection_trace.txt) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Get-Content $ct -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Trim() } |\n                ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        }\n\n        # Dateiuebertragungen aus den Trace-Dateien\n        $tf = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Filter '*.trace' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $tf) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern $ftMuster -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Moegliche Dateiuebertragung in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $adGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine AnyDesk-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- RustDesk ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- RustDesk ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $rdPfade = @(\"$env:APPDATA\\RustDesk\", \"$env:ProgramData\\RustDesk\", \"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\RustDesk\")\n    $rdGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $rdPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $rdGefunden = $true\n        Write-Host \"Ordner: $p\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Include '*.log','*.toml' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            Select-Object FullName, Length, CreationTime, LastWriteTime | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n\n        $logs = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Filter '*.log' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $logs) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern ($ftMuster + '|remote_id|Connection from|session') -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Eintraege in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $rdGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine RustDesk-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- TeamViewer ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- TeamViewer ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $tvPfade = @(\"$env:APPDATA\\TeamViewer\", \"$env:ProgramData\\TeamViewer\",\n                 \"$env:ProgramFiles\\TeamViewer\", \"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\\TeamViewer\")\n    $tvGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($p in $tvPfade) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $p)) { continue }\n        $tvGefunden = $true\n        $conn = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Include 'Connections*.txt' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $conn) {\n            Write-Host \"-- $($f.FullName) --\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Get-Content $f.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Trim() } |\n                Select-Object -Last 40 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $_\" }\n        }\n        $tvlogs = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Filter '*Logfile*.log' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($f in $tvlogs) {\n            $hits = @(Select-String -Path $f.FullName -Pattern $ftMuster -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"-- Moegliche Dateiuebertragung in $($f.Name) --\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                $hits | Select-Object -Last 30 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"   $($_.Line.Trim())\" }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $tvGefunden) { Write-Host \"Keine TeamViewer-Ordner vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # --- Gegenprobe: geloeschte Logs / Ordnerzeiten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Gegenprobe ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    foreach ($p in ($adPfade + $rdPfade + $tvPfade)) {\n        if (Test-Path $p) {\n            $d = Get-Item $p\n            $anz = @(Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Count\n            Write-Host (\"{0} | Erstellt {1} | Geaendert {2} | {3} Dateien\" -f $p, $d.CreationTime, $d.LastWriteTime, $anz)\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Ordner vorhanden, aber Logdateien fehlen oder sind leer\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"= Spuren wurden geloescht. Das ist selbst ein Befund.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Zeitangaben in den Logs sind Ortszeit des Rechners.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  9 - Unsignierte Dateien (Treiber / Prozesse / Ablageorte)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-Unsigned {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Unsignierte Dateien ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # Signaturstatus, der als unauffaellig gilt\n    $okStatus = @('Valid')\n\n    # --- 9a: Geladene Kernel-Treiber (wichtigster Teil) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Geladene Kernel-Treiber ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $drv = @(Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Running' -and $_.PathName })\n    $drvBad = @()\n    foreach ($d in $drv) {\n        $path = ($d.PathName -replace '\\\\SystemRoot', $env:SystemRoot) -replace '^\\\\\\?\\?\\\\',''\n        if (-not (Test-Path $path)) { continue }\n        $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($sig.Status -notin $okStatus) {\n            $drvBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Name    = $d.Name\n                Status  = $sig.Status\n                Signierer = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n                Pfad    = $path\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($drvBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $drvBad | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($drvBad.Count) nicht gueltig signierte Treiber - EINZELN pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle geladenen Treiber gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 9b: Laufende Prozesse ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Laufende Prozesse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $procBad = @()\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Path } |\n        Select-Object -Property Path -Unique | ForEach-Object {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.Path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if ($sig.Status -notin $okStatus) {\n                $procBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Status    = $sig.Status\n                    Signierer = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n                    Pfad      = $_.Path\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    if ($procBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $procBad | Sort-Object Pfad | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($procBad.Count) nicht gueltig signierte Prozesse.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Alle laufenden Prozesse gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 9c: Ausfuehrbare Dateien in typischen Ablageorten ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- .exe/.sys/.dll in Ablageorten (Temp, Downloads, AppData) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $orte = @(\"$env:TEMP\",\"$env:USERPROFILE\\Downloads\",\"$env:APPDATA\",\"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\Temp\",\"$env:ProgramData\")\n    $fileBad = @()\n    foreach ($o in $orte) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $o)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $o -Recurse -Depth 2 -Include '*.exe','*.sys','*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            ForEach-Object {\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                if ($sig.Status -eq 'NotSigned') {\n                    $fileBad += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Erstellt = $_.CreationTime\n                        Groesse  = $_.Length\n                        Pfad     = $_.FullName\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n    }\n    if ($fileBad.Count -gt 0) {\n        $fileBad | Sort-Object Erstellt -Descending | Select-Object -First 60 | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap\n        Write-Host \"$($fileBad.Count) unsignierte Dateien (max. 60 gezeigt).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine unsignierten Dateien in den Ablageorten.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: 'UnknownError' heisst meist, dass die Datei nicht\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"signiert ist. Viele legitime Programme sind unsigniert -\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"ein unsignierter KERNEL-TREIBER ist der relevante Befund,\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"unsignierte Nutzerprogramme sind es meist nicht.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  10 - PowerShell-History und Ausfuehrungsprotokoll\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PSHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PowerShell-History ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # --- 10a: PSReadline-History aller Benutzer ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PSReadline ConsoleHost_history.txt (alle Profile) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $profile = Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $gefunden = $false\n    foreach ($u in $profile) {\n        $hf = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt'\n        if (Test-Path $hf) {\n            $gefunden = $true\n            $f = Get-Item $hf -Force\n            $zeilen = @(Get-Content $hf -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            Write-Host \"`nBenutzer: $($u.Name)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host (\"  Datei: {0:N0} Bytes | Geaendert: {1} | {2} Zeilen\" -f $f.Length,$f.LastWriteTime,$zeilen.Count)\n            if ($zeilen.Count -eq 0) {\n                Write-Host \"  AUFFAELLIG: History-Datei ist LEER.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"  --- Inhalt ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $zeilen | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"    $_\" }\n            }\n        } else {\n            # Datei fehlt, aber Profil existiert\n            $psDir = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell'\n            if (Test-Path $psDir) {\n                Write-Host \"`nBenutzer: $($u.Name)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host \"  AUFFAELLIG: PowerShell genutzt, aber History-Datei fehlt.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $gefunden) {\n        Write-Host \"Keine PSReadline-History gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 10b: ScriptBlock-Logging (EID 4104) - ergiebigste Quelle ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- ScriptBlock-Logging (PowerShell/Operational EID 4104) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sb = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4104} -MaxEvents 200 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($sb.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"$($sb.Count) Ereignisse geladen. Zeige zusammengesetzte Skriptbloecke:\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        # Nur den ersten Teil jedes mehrteiligen Blocks nehmen (Teil 1 von N),\n        # damit ein Skript nicht N-fach erscheint; Windows-Eigenaufrufe filtern.\n        $sb | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | ForEach-Object {\n            $x = [xml]$_.ToXml()\n            $data = $x.Event.EventData.Data\n            $teil = ($data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'MessageNumber' }).'#text'\n            $code = ($data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ScriptBlockText' }).'#text'\n            [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Teil=$teil; Code=$code }\n        } | Where-Object {\n            $_.Teil -eq '1' -and\n            $_.Code -and\n            $_.Code -notmatch 'prompt|PSConsoleHostReadLine|Set-PSReadLine|__VSCode|Get-Module|CompletionPredictor|IsAzureContextPresent'\n        } | Select-Object -First 25 | ForEach-Object {\n            $c = ($_.Code -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()\n            if ($c.Length -gt 200) { $c = $c.Substring(0,200) + ' [...]' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]\" -f $_.Zeit) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host (\"  {0}\" -f $c)\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"ScriptBlock-Logging nicht aktiv oder keine Eintraege.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"(Standardmaessig aus - Fehlen ist hier NICHT auffaellig.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 10c: Modul-Logging (EID 4103) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Modul-Logging (EID 4103) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $ml = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4103} -MaxEvents 20 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($ml.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"$($ml.Count) Ereignisse vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Kein Modul-Logging.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 10e: HostApplication aus Klassik-Log (EID 400/600) ---\n    # Standardmaessig AKTIV - zeigt die Startkommandozeile jeder PS-Sitzung.\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Start-Kommandozeilen (Windows PowerShell EID 400/600) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $klassik = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Windows PowerShell';Id=400,600} -MaxEvents 500 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($klassik.Count -gt 0) {\n        $verdacht = '-enc |-encodedcommand|-e [A-Za-z0-9+/]{20}|downloadstring|downloadfile|downloaddata|-w hidden|-windowstyle hidden|invoke-expression| iex |frombase64|webclient|start-bitstransfer|certutil.*-urlcache|bitsadmin|invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|\\bcurl |\\bwget |\\birm |\\biwr |net\\.webclient|system\\.net\\.http|http://|https://|wevtutil(\\.exe)?\\s+(cl|clear-log|sl|set-log)\\b|limit-eventlog|clear-eventlog|remove-eventlog|maximumsizeinbytes\\s*='\n        $cmds = $klassik | ForEach-Object {\n            if ($_.Message -match 'HostApplication=(.+?)(\\r?\\n|$)') {\n                [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Cmd=$matches[1].Trim() }\n            }\n        } | Where-Object { $_.Cmd } |\n            Group-Object Cmd | ForEach-Object {\n                $g = $_.Group | Sort-Object Zeit\n                [PSCustomObject]@{ Erstmals=$g[0].Zeit; Zuletzt=$g[-1].Zeit; Anzahl=$_.Count; Cmd=$_.Name }\n            } | Sort-Object Zuletzt -Descending\n\n        Write-Host \"$($cmds.Count) unterschiedliche Start-Kommandozeilen:\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        # Bekannt-gute Aufrufe, die trotz Download-Muster NICHT rot sein sollen\n        # (der Lade-Einzeiler des Pruefwerkzeugs selbst).\n        $eigenesTool = 'gist\\.githubusercontent\\.com/analystdark|pnpcheck\\.ps1|ctcbydark'\n        # Muster, die einen Aufruf einordnen helfen (kein Beweis, aber Kontext)\n        $hinweisMuster = [ordered]@{\n            '(?i)ECHO_[A-Z_]+|\\\\echo-[0-9A-F]{6}-'    = 'ECHO - kommerzielles Screenshare-/Pruef-Tool (kein Cheat). Zeitpunkt = eine fruehere Pruefung'\n            'c12a7328-f81f-11d2-ba4b-00a0c93ec93b'  = 'fragt die EFI-Systempartition ab (Bootloader-Bereich - EFI-Cheats ODER Pruef-Tools)'\n            '(?i)mountvol|bcdedit|bcdboot'           = 'greift auf Boot-Konfiguration/EFI zu'\n            '(?i)fivem|gta5|citizenfx'               = 'fragt FiveM/GTA-Prozesse oder -Dateien ab'\n            '(?i)X509Certificate|Get-AuthenticodeSignature' = 'prueft Zertifikate/Signaturen'\n            '^--pid=\\d+$'                            = 'Programm mit eingebetteter PowerShell, an einen anderen Prozess (PID) angehaengt - welches Programm: Punkt 19 zum Zeitpunkt'\n            '(?i)-NonInteractive'                    = 'von einem Programm im Hintergrund gesteuert, nicht von Hand getippt'\n            '(?i)\\s-v(ersion)?\\s+2(\\.0)?\\b'           = 'erzwingt PowerShell 2.0 - umgeht Skript-Protokollierung und AMSI (Verschleierungstechnik; manche alte Installer auch)'\n            '(?i)-InputFormat Text -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted' = 'Muster der Node.js-Bibliothek \"systeminformation\" (Electron-Apps wie Launcher/Overlays) - Hardware-Abfrage'\n            '(?i)\\.(bat|cmd)\\b.*-Verb\\s+runAs|runAs.*\\.(bat|cmd)\\b' = 'BATCH-DATEI MIT ADMINRECHTEN gestartet - Inhalt pruefen (Dienste stoppen/Logs leeren = Spuren verwischen?)'\n            '(?i)dienst|service|sysmain|pcasvc|\\bdps\\b|eventlog|\\bbam\\b'    = 'bezieht sich auf Windows-Dienste - System-Log 7036/7040 zu diesem Zeitpunkt pruefen'\n        }\n        $echoZeiten = @($cmds | Where-Object { $_.Cmd -match '(?i)ECHO_[A-Z_]+|\\\\echo-[0-9A-F]{6}-' } | ForEach-Object { [datetime]$_.Zuletzt })\n        foreach ($c in $cmds) {\n            $ausg = $c.Cmd\n            if ($ausg.Length -gt 200) { $ausg = $ausg.Substring(0,200) + ' [...]' }\n            $beiEcho = $false\n            if ($echoZeiten.Count -gt 0 -and $c.Cmd -match '(?i)-NonInteractive' -and $c.Cmd -notmatch '(?i)ECHO_[A-Z_]+') {\n                foreach ($ez in $echoZeiten) { if ([Math]::Abs(([datetime]$c.Zuletzt - $ez).TotalMinutes) -le 10) { $beiEcho = $true; break } }\n            }\n\n            # -EncodedCommand automatisch entschluesseln (Base64, UTF-16LE)\n            $klar = $null\n            if ($c.Cmd -match '(?i)\\s-(e|ec|en|enc|enco|encod|encode|encoded|encodedc|encodedco|encodedcom|encodedcomm|encodedcomma|encodedcomman|encodedcommand)\\s+([A-Za-z0-9+/=]{16,})') {\n                $b64 = $matches[2]\n                if ($b64.Length % 4 -ne 0) { $b64 = ($b64 -replace '=+$', ''); $b64 = $b64.Substring(0, $b64.Length - ($b64.Length % 4)) }\n                try { $klar = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($b64)) } catch { $klar = $null }\n                # Nur lesbaren Text akzeptieren (sonst war es kein echtes EncodedCommand)\n                if ($klar) {\n                    $lesbar = ($klar.ToCharArray() | Where-Object { ([int]$_ -ge 32 -and [int]$_ -lt 127) -or $_ -in \"`r\",\"`n\",\"`t\" }).Count\n                    if ($lesbar -lt $klar.Length * 0.9) { $klar = $null }\n                }\n            }\n            $klarKurz = if ($klar) { (($klar -replace '\\s+', ' ').Trim()) } else { $null }\n            if ($klarKurz -and $klarKurz.Length -gt 400) { $klarKurz = $klarKurz.Substring(0, 400) + ' [...]' }\n\n            $pruefText  = if ($klar) { $klar } else { $c.Cmd }\n            $verdMuster = $verdacht -replace '-enc \\|-encodedcommand\\|-e \\[A-Za-z0-9\\+/\\]\\{20\\}\\|', ''\n            $klarVerd   = $klar -and ($klar -match $verdMuster)\n            $istVerd    = ($c.Cmd -match $verdacht -and $c.Cmd -notmatch $eigenesTool) -and (-not $klar -or $klarVerd)\n            $nurKodiert = $klar -and -not $klarVerd -and $c.Cmd -notmatch $eigenesTool\n\n            if ($istVerd) {\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]  ({1}x)\" -f $c.Zuletzt, $c.Anzahl) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"  VERDAECHTIG: {0}\" -f $ausg) -ForegroundColor Red\n            } elseif ($nurKodiert) {\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]  ({1}x)\" -f $c.Zuletzt, $c.Anzahl) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host (\"  VERSCHLUESSELT (Klartext ohne Download-/Verschleierungsmuster): {0}\" -f $ausg) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            } else {\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}]  ({1}x)\" -f $c.Zuletzt, $c.Anzahl) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host (\"  {0}\" -f $ausg)\n            }\n            if ($klarKurz) {\n                Write-Host (\"    Klartext: {0}\" -f $klarKurz) -ForegroundColor $(if ($klarVerd) { 'Red' } else { 'Cyan' })\n            }\n            if ($beiEcho) { Write-Host \"    Hinweis: zeitlich Teil einer ECHO-Pruefung (innerhalb 10 Min. um einen Echo-Aufruf)\" -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }\n            foreach ($m in $hinweisMuster.Keys) {\n                if ($pruefText -match $m -or $c.Cmd -match $m) {\n                    $col = if ($hinweisMuster[$m] -match '^(BATCH|erzwingt)') { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkYellow' }\n                    Write-Host (\"    Hinweis: {0}\" -f $hinweisMuster[$m]) -ForegroundColor $col\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`nZusammenhang: Mehrere '-NonInteractive'-Aufrufe in derselben Minute stammen meist von EINEM Programm.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"Welches Programm das war, zeigt Punkt 19 (BAM/Prefetch) mit diesem Zeitpunkt als Startzeit.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"`nRot = Muster wie -enc, hidden, DownloadString, IEX (nicht immer boese,\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"aber typisch fuer verschleierte Ausfuehrung - einzeln pruefen).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine 400/600-Ereignisse - Klassik-Log leer oder geleert.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"(Dieses Log ist normal AKTIV; ein leeres ist auffaellig.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 10d: Wurde das PowerShell-Log geleert? ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PowerShell-Log-Status ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Get-WinEvent -ListLog 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational','Windows PowerShell' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Select-Object LogName, IsEnabled, RecordCount | Format-Table -AutoSize\n\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Eine leere/fehlende History bei sonst genutztem PowerShell\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"deutet auf gezieltes Loeschen hin - selbst ein Befund.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  12 - PE Binary &amp; Driver Heuristics Inspector\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-PEInspector {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== PE Binary &amp; Driver Heuristics Inspector ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Hashes, BYOVD, Signatur, PE-Header, Pruefsumme, Sektionen, Einstiegspunkt, APIs, Gesamtbewertung)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Tipp: Start-Transcript (P) vorher aktivieren um Ergebnis zu sichern.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $byovdHashes = @{\n        \"01ee72782b1d4182da0eef7f9859f7aa2f89cc46e9df51ef2807f43db4872121\" = \"RTCore64.sys (Micro-Star CVE-2019-16098)\"\n        \"31f4d725d8d7e01dd582120aa0f23223fa1ac3cb4414f4e5da801db9402ab490\" = \"gdrv.sys (GIGABYTE CVE-2018-19320)\"\n        \"eb601822c9a7da4175345a55018698dc54fe66d11a91d1e434f676ab65d382bb\" = \"Capcom.sys (Root-Exploit / SMEP)\"\n        \"046e8c8959d72215a774136e632831f2ff2cc0bcbc2becc278912efee7e3cf40\" = \"mhyprot2.sys (miHoYo Process/Memory Killer)\"\n        \"a66d92ff488e0402b8813c9fb60cf649372d65ab19aa67a421dff03fc29fc2a2\" = \"AsrDrv103.sys (ASRock Physical Memory R/W)\"\n        \"60c38ea120015ff363fe9d63c5a70ebfb44766b9319de8d98d248b6bb83c509a\" = \"ene.sys (ENE Technology DeviceIoControl)\"\n    }\n    $packerSections = @(\"upx0\",\"upx1\",\"upx2\",\".vmp0\",\".vmp1\",\".vmp2\",\"themida\",\".themida\",\".enigma1\",\".enigma2\",\".aspack\",\".adata\",\"pec1\",\"pec2\",\".mpress1\",\".mpress2\")\n    $dangerousAPIs = @{\n        \"Process Injection\"  = @(\"VirtualAllocEx\",\"WriteProcessMemory\",\"CreateRemoteThread\",\"NtQueueApcThread\",\"RtlCreateUserThread\",\"SetThreadContext\")\n        \"Memory Tampering\"   = @(\"NtMapViewOfSection\",\"ZwMapViewOfSection\",\"VirtualProtectEx\",\"NtWriteVirtualMemory\")\n        \"Kernel Interaction\" = @(\"ZwLoadDriver\",\"NtLoadDriver\",\"DeviceIoControl\",\"ObRegisterCallbacks\",\"MmCopyVirtualMemory\",\"MmMapIoSpace\")\n        \"Anti-Debug/Evasion\" = @(\"IsDebuggerPresent\",\"CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent\",\"NtQueryInformationProcess\",\"NtSetInformationThread\")\n    }\n    $suspiciousStrings = @(\n        # Cheat-Funktionen\n        'aimbot','wallhack','silentaim','triggerbot','cheatengine',\n        'processhacker','kdmapper','blackbone','drvload','kernelhook','minifilter',\n        # Injection-Techniken (aus realem WptsExtensions.dll Fund)\n        'manualmap','manual map','manualmapping',\n        'kernelmap','kernel manual map',\n        'injecthost','injectmonitor','injecttrigger',\n        'trigger=%s','injected ok','inject failed',\n        # Weitere Injection-Indikatoren\n        'reflectiveinject','reflective inject','shellcode',\n        'dllinjection','dll injection','remotethread',\n        'mapviewofsection inject','zwmapviewofsection'\n    )\n    # Wortgrenz-Keywords (kommen auch in legitimen Dateien vor)\n    $suspiciousStringsWB = @('hack','inject')\n\n    # Datei waehlen\n    $ziel = Read-Host \"`nPfad zur Datei (.exe/.dll/.sys) - leer lassen fuer Datei-Dialog\"\n    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ziel)) {\n        Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $dlg = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.OpenFileDialog\n        $dlg.Filter = \"Binaries &amp; Treiber (*.exe;*.dll;*.sys)|*.exe;*.dll;*.sys|Alle (*.*)|*.*\"\n        if ($dlg.ShowDialog() -eq 'OK') { $ziel = $dlg.FileName }\n        else { Write-Host \"Abgebrochen.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow; return }\n    }\n    if (-not (Test-Path $ziel)) { Write-Host \"Datei nicht gefunden: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n    if ((Get-Item $ziel).PSIsContainer) { Write-Host \"Pfad ist ein Ordner, keine Datei: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    $dateiname = Split-Path $ziel -Leaf\n    Write-Host \"`nZiel: $ziel\" -ForegroundColor White\n    Write-Host (\"=\" * 70) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    try { $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ziel) }\n    catch { Write-Host \"Lesefehler: $_\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    # Befunde fuer die Gesamtbewertung am Ende (Stufe HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW) und entlastender Kontext\n    $befunde = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList\n    $kontext = New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList\n    $bef = { param($stufe, $bereich, $text) [void]$befunde.Add([PSCustomObject]@{ Stufe=$stufe; Bereich=$bereich; Text=$text }) }\n    $istTreiber = $dateiname -match '(?i)\\.sys$'\n\n    # Phase 1: Hashes &amp; BYOVD\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 1: Hashes &amp; BYOVD-Abgleich\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $hasher = [System.Security.Cryptography.SHA256]::Create()\n    $sha256 = [BitConverter]::ToString($hasher.ComputeHash($bytes)).Replace(\"-\",\"\").ToLower()\n    $md5    = [BitConverter]::ToString([System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create().ComputeHash($bytes)).Replace(\"-\",\"\").ToLower()\n    Write-Host (\"    Groesse: {0:N0} Bytes\" -f $bytes.Length)\n    Write-Host \"    SHA256 : $sha256\"\n    Write-Host \"    MD5    : $md5\"\n    Write-Host \"    VT     : https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/$sha256\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $byovdNamen = '(?i)^(iqvw64e|rtcore64|rtcore32|gdrv|asrdrv\\d*|asio\\d*|asupio|capcom|mhyprot\\d*|dbutil_2_3|ene|winring0\\w*|glckio\\d*|nvoclock|atillk64|bs_rcio\\d*|phymem\\w*|inpoutx64|zam64|kprocesshacker|speedfan|hw64)\\.sys$'\n    if ($byovdHashes.ContainsKey($sha256)) {\n        Write-Host \"    [!!!] BYOVD ERKANNT: $($byovdHashes[$sha256])\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'BYOVD' \"Hash eines bekannten verwundbaren Treibers: $($byovdHashes[$sha256])\"\n    } elseif ($dateiname -match $byovdNamen) {\n        Write-Host \"    [!] BYOVD  : Dateiname gehoert zu einem bekannten verwundbaren Treiber (Kernel-Mapper wie kdmapper nutzen solche).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"                 Hash nicht in der Liste - Version ueber den VirusTotal-Link pruefen. Neuere Herstellerversionen sind oft gepatcht.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        &amp; $bef 'MEDIUM' 'BYOVD' \"Dateiname eines bekannten verwundbaren Treibers ($dateiname) - Version/Hash pruefen\"\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"    BYOVD  : Kein bekannter anfaelliger Treiber-Hash.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    # Ort: Treiber gehoeren nach System32\\drivers oder in den DriverStore\n    if ($istTreiber -and $ziel -match '(?i)\\\\(Temp|Downloads|Desktop)\\\\|\\\\AppData\\\\|\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\') {\n        Write-Host \"    [!!!] Treiberdatei in einem Benutzer-/Temp-Ordner - dort legen Kernel-Mapper ihren Treiber ab.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'Speicherort' 'Treiber (.sys) liegt in Temp/Downloads/Desktop/AppData'\n    }\n\n    # Phase 2: Signatur &amp; EKUs\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 2: Digitale Signatur &amp; Zertifikats-EKUs\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $ziel -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    if ($sig) {\n        $sigCol = if ($sig.Status -eq 'Valid') { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host \"    Status     : $($sig.Status)\" -ForegroundColor $sigCol\n        if ($sig.SignerCertificate) {\n            Write-Host \"    Inhaber    : $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2')\"\n            Write-Host \"    Aussteller : $($sig.SignerCertificate.Issuer -replace '^CN=([^,]+).*','$1')\"\n            foreach ($ext in $sig.SignerCertificate.Extensions) {\n                if ($ext -is [System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509EnhancedKeyUsageExtension]) {\n                    foreach ($oid in $ext.EnhancedKeyUsages) {\n                        switch ($oid.Value) {\n                            \"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.1.1\" { Write-Host \"    [EKU] WHQL Hardware-Signatur\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n                            \"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.6\" { Write-Host \"    [EKU] Windows Kernel-Mode Driver Signing\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n                            \"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3\"       { Write-Host \"    [EKU] Standard Code-Signing\" }\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        } else { Write-Host \"    [!] Nicht signiert.\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n        if ($sig.Status -eq 'Valid') {\n            [void]$kontext.Add(\"Gueltige Authenticode-Signatur: \" + ($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2'))\n        } elseif ($sig.Status -eq 'HashMismatch') {\n            &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'Signatur' 'HashMismatch - Datei wurde nach dem Signieren veraendert'\n        } else {\n            &amp; $bef $(if ($istTreiber) { 'HIGH' } else { 'MEDIUM' }) 'Signatur' \"Keine gueltige Signatur ($($sig.Status))\"\n        }\n    }\n\n    # Phase 3: PE-Header\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 3: PE-Header &amp; Anomalien\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    if ($bytes.Length -lt 64) { Write-Host \"    Datei zu klein.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n    $stream = [System.IO.FileStream]::new($ziel, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read)\n    $reader = [System.IO.BinaryReader]::new($stream)\n    $highestRawEnd = 0\n\n    try {\n        if ($reader.ReadUInt16() -ne 0x5A4D) { Write-Host \"    Kein MZ-Header.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n        $null = $stream.Seek(0x3C, 0); $peOff = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek($peOff, 0)\n        if ($reader.ReadUInt32() -ne 0x00004550) { Write-Host \"    Keine PE-Signatur.\" -ForegroundColor Red; return }\n\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt16()              # Machine\n        $numSec = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt32()              # TimeDateStamp\n        $null = $stream.Seek(8, 1)                # PointerToSymbolTable + NumberOfSymbols\n        $optHdrSize = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $null = $reader.ReadUInt16()              # Characteristics\n        $optPos = $stream.Position\n        $optMagic = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $is64 = ($optMagic -eq 0x20B)\n        $null = $stream.Seek($optPos + 16, 0); $epRVA = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek($optPos + 32, 0)\n        $secAlign = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $fileAlign = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $null = $stream.Seek($optPos + 60, 0); $sizeHdr = $reader.ReadUInt32()   # SizeOfHeaders\n        $dllCharOff = $optPos + 70                # DllCharacteristics (PE32 und PE32+)\n        $null = $stream.Seek($dllCharOff, 0); $dllChar = $reader.ReadUInt16()\n        $hasASLR = ($dllChar -band 0x0040) -ne 0\n        $hasDEP  = ($dllChar -band 0x0100) -ne 0\n\n        Write-Host \"    Architektur : $(if($is64){'x64'}else{'x86'})\"\n        Write-Host (\"    ASLR        : \" + $(if($hasASLR){'An'}else{'[!] AUS'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($hasASLR){'White'}else{'Red'})\n        Write-Host (\"    DEP/NX      : \" + $(if($hasDEP){'An'}else{'[!] AUS'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($hasDEP){'White'}else{'Red'})\n        Write-Host \"    Alignments  : Sektion=0x$($secAlign.ToString('X')) | Datei=0x$($fileAlign.ToString('X'))\"\n        if ($sizeHdr -gt 4096) { Write-Host \"    [!] SizeOfHeaders ungewoehnlich gross: $sizeHdr Bytes\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n        if (-not $hasASLR) { &amp; $bef 'MEDIUM' 'PE-Header' 'ASLR (DYNAMIC_BASE) ausgeschaltet' }\n        if (-not $hasDEP)  { &amp; $bef 'MEDIUM' 'PE-Header' 'DEP/NX ausgeschaltet' }\n\n        # PE-Pruefsumme: Windows verlangt bei Treibern eine korrekte Pruefsumme\n        try {\n            Add-Type -Namespace CtcPe -Name Chk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -MemberDefinition '[DllImport(\"imagehlp.dll\", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)] public static extern uint MapFileAndCheckSumW(string file, out uint header, out uint calc);'\n            $chkHdr = [uint32]0; $chkCalc = [uint32]0\n            if ([CtcPe.Chk]::MapFileAndCheckSumW($ziel, [ref]$chkHdr, [ref]$chkCalc) -eq 0) {\n                if ($chkHdr -eq 0) {\n                    Write-Host \"    Pruefsumme  : nicht gesetzt (bei EXE/DLL ueblich)\" -ForegroundColor $(if ($istTreiber) { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' })\n                    if ($istTreiber) { &amp; $bef 'MEDIUM' 'PE-Header' 'Treiber ohne PE-Pruefsumme' }\n                } elseif ($chkHdr -eq $chkCalc) {\n                    Write-Host \"    Pruefsumme  : korrekt (0x$($chkHdr.ToString('X8')))\"\n                    [void]$kontext.Add('PE-Pruefsumme mathematisch korrekt')\n                } else {\n                    Write-Host \"    [!] Pruefsumme falsch: Kopf 0x$($chkHdr.ToString('X8')) / berechnet 0x$($chkCalc.ToString('X8')) - Datei nach dem Bauen veraendert (Patch?)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                    &amp; $bef $(if ($istTreiber) { 'HIGH' } else { 'LOW' }) 'PE-Header' 'PE-Pruefsumme stimmt nicht - Datei nachtraeglich veraendert'\n                }\n            }\n        } catch {}\n\n        # Sanity-Check: Werte ausserhalb realistischer Grenzen = gepackt/geschuetzt\n        $parserValid = $true\n        if ($secAlign -gt 0x200000 -or $fileAlign -gt 0x100000 -or $sizeHdr -gt 0x100000) {\n            Write-Host \"`n    [!] PARSER-WARNUNG: Header-Werte ausserhalb normaler Bereiche.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        SectionAlignment=0x$($secAlign.ToString('X')) | FileAlignment=0x$($fileAlign.ToString('X')) | SizeOfHeaders=$sizeHdr\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        PE-Kopf ist manipuliert oder beschaedigt - typisch fuer Protector (VMProtect, Themida) oder bewusst verfaelschte Loader.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"        Phase 4 (Sektionen) wird uebersprungen - Ergebnisse waeren nicht zuverlaessig.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            $parserValid = $false\n            &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'PE-Header' 'PE-Kopf mit unplausiblen Werten (Protector oder absichtlich verfaelscht)'\n        }\n\n        # Phase 4: Sektionen\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 4: Sektionen, Entropie &amp; Packer-Erkennung\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        if (-not $parserValid) {\n            Write-Host \"    Uebersprungen (siehe Warnung oben).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        } else {\n        $null = $stream.Seek($peOff + 4 + 20 + $optHdrSize, 0)\n        $sectionMap = @()\n\n        for ($i = 0; $i -lt $numSec; $i++) {\n            $nameB = $reader.ReadBytes(8)\n            $sn    = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($nameB).Trim([char]0)\n            $vSize = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $vAddr = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $rSize = $reader.ReadUInt32(); $rPtr  = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $null = $stream.Seek(12, 1); $sChar = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n            $isX = ($sChar -band 0x20000000) -ne 0\n            $isW = ($sChar -band 0x80000000) -ne 0\n            if (($rPtr + $rSize) -gt $highestRawEnd) { $highestRawEnd = $rPtr + $rSize }\n            $sectionMap += @{ VirtAddr=$vAddr; VirtSize=[Math]::Max($vSize,1); RawPtr=$rPtr; Name=$sn; W=$isW; X=$isX }\n\n            # Entropie inline berechnen\n            $ent = 0.0\n            if ($rSize -gt 0 -and ($rPtr + $rSize) -le $bytes.Length) {\n                $cnt = @{}\n                for ($x = $rPtr; $x -lt ($rPtr + $rSize); $x++) { $b = $bytes[$x]; $cnt[$b] = $cnt[$b] + 1 }\n                foreach ($k in $cnt.Keys) { $p = $cnt[$k] / $rSize; $ent -= $p * [Math]::Log($p, 2) }\n                $ent = [Math]::Round($ent, 2)\n            }\n\n            $fl = \"\"\n            if ($isW -and $isX) { $fl += \" [ALERT: W+X]\" }\n            if ($packerSections -contains $sn.ToLower()) { $fl += \" [PACKER]\" }\n            $col = if ($fl) { 'Red' } elseif ($ent -gt 7.0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'White' }\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] Raw:{1,-8} Virt:{2,-8} Entropie:{3}{4}\" -f $sn.PadRight(8),$rSize,$vSize,$ent,$fl) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($rSize -eq 0 -and $vSize -gt 0) { Write-Host \"      [!] 0 Bytes auf Platte, $vSize im RAM (Loader/Unpacker)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            if ($sn -eq '.text' -and $ent -gt 7.0) { Write-Host \"      [!] .text Entropie $ent/8.0 - Code verschluesselt oder gepackt!\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n            if ($isW -and $isX) { &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'PE-Struktur' \"Sektion '$sn' ist gleichzeitig beschreibbar und ausfuehrbar (RWX) - Code kann sich zur Laufzeit selbst veraendern\" }\n            if ($packerSections -contains $sn.ToLower()) { &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'PE-Struktur' \"Packer-/Protector-Sektion '$sn'\" }\n            if ($isX -and $ent -gt 7.2) { &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'PE-Struktur' \"Code-Sektion '$sn' verschluesselt/gepackt (Entropie $ent)\" }\n        }\n\n        # Einstiegspunkt: liegt er in einer beschreibbaren Sektion oder ausserhalb aller Sektionen?\n        if ($epRVA -gt 0) {\n            $epSek = $sectionMap | Where-Object { $epRVA -ge $_.VirtAddr -and $epRVA -lt ($_.VirtAddr + $_.VirtSize) } | Select-Object -First 1\n            if (-not $epSek) {\n                Write-Host (\"    [!] Einstiegspunkt 0x{0:X} liegt in KEINER Sektion\" -f $epRVA) -ForegroundColor Red\n                &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'Einstiegspunkt' 'Einstiegspunkt ausserhalb aller Sektionen'\n            } elseif ($epSek.W) {\n                Write-Host (\"    [!] Einstiegspunkt 0x{0:X} liegt in beschreibbarer Sektion '{1}'\" -f $epRVA, $epSek.Name) -ForegroundColor Red\n                &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'Einstiegspunkt' \"Einstiegspunkt in beschreibbarer Sektion '$($epSek.Name)' (typisch fuer Packer und selbstmodifizierenden Code)\"\n            } else {\n                Write-Host (\"    Einstiegspunkt 0x{0:X} in Sektion '{1}' (nicht beschreibbar - normal)\" -f $epRVA, $epSek.Name) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n\n        # Phase 4b: Import-Tabelle &amp; DLL-Hijacking-Kandidaten\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 4b: Import-Tabelle &amp; DLL-Hijacking-Check\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        $importDirPos = if ($is64) { $optPos + 120 } else { $optPos + 104 }\n        $null = $stream.Seek($importDirPos, 0)\n        $importRVA  = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n        $importSz   = $reader.ReadUInt32()\n\n        if ($importRVA -eq 0 -or $importSz -eq 0) {\n            Write-Host \"    Keine Import-Tabelle vorhanden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        } else {\n            # RVA -&gt; Datei-Offset\n            $importOff = -1L\n            foreach ($s in $sectionMap) {\n                if ($importRVA -ge $s.VirtAddr -and $importRVA -lt ($s.VirtAddr + $s.VirtSize)) {\n                    $importOff = [int64]($importRVA - $s.VirtAddr + $s.RawPtr); break\n                }\n            }\n\n            if ($importOff -lt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"    Import-Tabelle nicht mappbar (gepackt?).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            } else {\n                $importedDLLs = @()\n                $pos = [int64]$importOff\n                while ($pos + 20 -le $bytes.Length) {\n                    $nameRVA = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($bytes, $pos + 12)\n                    if ($nameRVA -eq 0) { break }\n                    $nameOff = -1L\n                    foreach ($s in $sectionMap) {\n                        if ($nameRVA -ge $s.VirtAddr -and $nameRVA -lt ($s.VirtAddr + $s.VirtSize)) {\n                            $nameOff = [int64]($nameRVA - $s.VirtAddr + $s.RawPtr); break\n                        }\n                    }\n                    if ($nameOff -ge 0) {\n                        $sb = [System.Text.StringBuilder]::new()\n                        $nx = [int64]$nameOff\n                        while ($nx -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$nx] -ne 0) { $null = $sb.Append([char]$bytes[$nx]); $nx++ }\n                        $dn = $sb.ToString()\n                        if ($dn -match '(?i)\\.dll$') { $importedDLLs += $dn }\n                    }\n                    $pos += 20\n                }\n\n                Write-Host \"    Importierte DLLs: $($importedDLLs.Count)\"\n                $parentDir = Split-Path $ziel -Parent\n                $hijackFound = $false\n                foreach ($dll in $importedDLLs) {\n                    $sameDir = Join-Path $parentDir $dll\n                    if (Test-Path $sameDir) {\n                        $dllSig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $sameDir -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                        $dllStatus = if ($dllSig) { $dllSig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                        $dllColor = if ($dllStatus -eq 'Valid') { 'Yellow' } else { 'Red' }\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!] HIJACK-KANDIDAT: {0}\" -f $dll) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        Write-Host (\"        Pfad: {0}\" -f $sameDir) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        Write-Host (\"        Signatur: {0}\" -f $dllStatus) -ForegroundColor $dllColor\n                        $hijackFound = $true\n                    }\n                }\n                if (-not $hijackFound) {\n                    Write-Host \"    Keine gleichnamigen DLLs im selben Ordner.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        } # Ende else parserValid\n\n        # Phase 5: Overlay &amp; eingebettete PEs\n        Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 5: Overlay &amp; eingebettete PE-Dateien\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n        if ($bytes.Length -gt $highestRawEnd -and $highestRawEnd -gt 0) {\n            $ovSize = $bytes.Length - $highestRawEnd\n            $cnt2 = @{}\n            for ($x = $highestRawEnd; $x -lt $bytes.Length; $x++) { $b=$bytes[$x]; $cnt2[$b]=$cnt2[$b]+1 }\n            $oe = 0.0\n            foreach ($k in $cnt2.Keys) { $p=$cnt2[$k]/$ovSize; $oe -= $p*[Math]::Log($p,2) }\n            Write-Host \"    [!] OVERLAY: $ovSize Bytes angehaengt (Entropie $([Math]::Round($oe,2))/8.0)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"    Kein Overlay.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n        $embN = 0\n        for ($j = 64; $j -lt ($bytes.Length - 1024); $j += 4) {\n            if ($bytes[$j] -eq 0x4D -and $bytes[$j+1] -eq 0x5A) {\n                $lf = [BitConverter]::ToUInt32($bytes, $j + 0x3C)\n                if ($lf -gt 0 -and ($j+$lf+4) -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$j+$lf] -eq 0x50 -and $bytes[$j+$lf+1] -eq 0x45) {\n                    Write-Host \"    [!] Eingebettetes PE bei Offset 0x$($j.ToString('X')) (Dropper/Payload?)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                    $embN++\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        if ($embN -eq 0) { Write-Host \"    Keine eingebetteten PE-Dateien.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    } finally { $reader.Close() }\n\n    # Phase 6: PDB-Pfad\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 6: Debug-Informationen (PDB-Pfad)\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $pdb = $null\n    for ($i = 0; $i -lt ($bytes.Length - 28); $i++) {\n        if ($bytes[$i] -eq 0x52 -and $bytes[$i+1] -eq 0x53 -and $bytes[$i+2] -eq 0x44 -and $bytes[$i+3] -eq 0x53) {\n            $ss = $i + 24; $se = $ss\n            while ($se -lt $bytes.Length -and $bytes[$se] -ne 0) { $se++ }\n            if ($se -gt $ss) {\n                $p = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($bytes, $ss, $se-$ss)\n                if ($p -match '(?i)\\.pdb$') { $pdb = $p; break }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $pdb) {\n        $ra = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytes)\n        if ($ra -match '([a-zA-Z]:\\\\[^\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F-\\xFF]+\\.pdb)') { $pdb = $matches[1] }\n    }\n    if ($pdb) {\n        Write-Host \"    Build-Pfad: $pdb\"\n        if ($pdb -match '(?i)(cheat|inject|hook|hack|aim|esp|driver|bypass)') {\n            Write-Host \"    [!] ALERT: Verdaechtiges Keyword im Build-Pfad!\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else { Write-Host \"    PDB: Nicht gefunden oder gestrippt.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n    # Phase 7: High-Risk APIs &amp; Cheat-Keywords\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 7: High-Risk APIs &amp; Cheat-Keywords\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $rawAscii = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($bytes)\n    $apiTreffer = $false\n    foreach ($cat in $dangerousAPIs.Keys) {\n        $matched = @($dangerousAPIs[$cat] | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match [regex]::Escape($_) })\n        if ($matched.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"    [!] $cat ($($matched.Count)): $($matched -join ', ')\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $apiTreffer = $true\n            $stufeApi = switch ($cat) { 'Process Injection' { if ($matched.Count -ge 2) { 'MEDIUM' } else { 'LOW' } } 'Memory Tampering' { 'LOW' } 'Kernel Interaction' { 'LOW' } default { $null } }\n            if ($stufeApi) { &amp; $bef $stufeApi 'APIs' \"$($cat): $($matched -join ', ')\" }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $apiTreffer) { Write-Host \"    Keine gefaehrlichen APIs im Klartext.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    $foundKW = @($suspiciousStrings | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match [regex]::Escape($_) })\n    $foundKW += @($suspiciousStringsWB | Where-Object { $rawAscii -match \"\\b$([regex]::Escape($_))\\b\" })\n    $foundKW = $foundKW | Select-Object -Unique\n    if ($foundKW.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"    [!] Verdaechtige Keywords: $($foundKW -join ', ')\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        &amp; $bef 'HIGH' 'Keywords' \"Cheat-Begriffe im Klartext: $($foundKW -join ', ')\"\n    } else { Write-Host \"    Keine Cheat-Keywords im Klartext.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # Phase 8: Gesamtbewertung\n    $hoch = @($befunde | Where-Object Stufe -eq 'HIGH').Count\n    $mitt = @($befunde | Where-Object Stufe -eq 'MEDIUM').Count\n    $gesamt = if ($hoch -gt 0) { 'HIGH RISK' } elseif ($mitt -gt 0) { 'MEDIUM RISK' } elseif ($befunde.Count -gt 0) { 'LOW RISK' } else { 'UNAUFFAELLIG' }\n    $gCol   = if ($hoch -gt 0) { 'Red' } elseif ($mitt -gt 0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' }\n    Write-Host \"`n[*] Phase 8: Gesamtbewertung\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host (\"    [+] ERGEBNIS: {0}   ({1} hoch, {2} mittel, {3} niedrig)\" -f $gesamt, $hoch, $mitt, ($befunde.Count - $hoch - $mitt)) -ForegroundColor $gCol\n    foreach ($b in ($befunde | Sort-Object { @{ HIGH=0; MEDIUM=1; LOW=2 }[$_.Stufe] })) {\n        $c = switch ($b.Stufe) { 'HIGH' { 'Red' } 'MEDIUM' { 'Yellow' } default { 'DarkGray' } }\n        Write-Host (\"    [{0,-6}] [{1}] {2}\" -f $b.Stufe, $b.Bereich, $b.Text) -ForegroundColor $c\n    }\n    if ($kontext.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"    Entlastender Kontext:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        $kontext | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"      + $_\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"    Die Stufe bewertet nur den AUFBAU der Datei. Signierte Hersteller-Treiber haben oft RWX-/INIT-Sektionen -\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"    entscheidend sind Signierer, Speicherort und ob die Datei zu installierter Hardware/Software gehoert.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`n$('=' * 70)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Scan abgeschlossen: $dateiname\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"Hinweis: Ergebnis wird im aktiven Transcript gesichert (Menue P).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer groessere Dateien (.sys/.exe) empfiehlt sich zusaetzlich VirusTotal.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  13 - DLL Hijacking Live-Check (laufende Prozesse)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DLLHijackCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== DLL Hijacking Live-Check ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Prueft laufende Prozesse auf Module aus unerwarteten Pfaden)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Pfade die als legitim gelten\n    $okPfade = @(\n        \"$env:SystemRoot\\\",\n        \"$env:ProgramFiles\\\",\n        \"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\\\",\n        \"$env:ProgramData\\Microsoft\\\"\n    )\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Module aus unerwarteten Pfaden ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $treffer = @()\n\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Path } | ForEach-Object {\n        $proc    = $_\n        $procDir = (Split-Path $proc.Path -Parent).ToLower().TrimEnd('\\') + '\\'\n        try {\n            $proc.Modules | Where-Object { $_.FileName -and $_.FileName -notmatch '(?i)\\.(node|ocx|cpl|ax)$' } | ForEach-Object {\n                $modPath = $_.FileName\n                $modPathL = $modPath.ToLower()\n                $istOK = ($okPfade | Where-Object { $modPathL.StartsWith($_.ToLower()) }) -or\n                         $modPathL.StartsWith($procDir)\n                if (-not $istOK) {\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $modPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    $treffer += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                        Prozess  = $proc.Name\n                        PID      = $proc.Id\n                        Modul    = $_.ModuleName\n                        Pfad     = $modPath\n                        Signatur = $status\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        } catch {}\n    }\n\n    if ($treffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        # Unsignierte zuerst\n        $treffer | Sort-Object Signatur, Prozess | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Signatur -eq 'Valid') { 'Yellow' } else { 'Red' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Prozess, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Modul : {0}\" -f $_.Modul) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad  : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Sig   : {0}\" -f $_.Signatur) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n        $unsigned = @($treffer | Where-Object { $_.Signatur -ne 'Valid' })\n        Write-Host \"`n$($treffer.Count) Treffer gesamt, davon $($unsigned.Count) nicht gueltig signiert.\" -ForegroundColor $(if($unsigned.Count -gt 0){'Red'}else{'Yellow'})\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine auffaelligen Module gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # Spielprozesse gezielt pruefen\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Spielprozesse gezielt pruefen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $spielNamen = @('FiveM','FiveM_GTAProcess','GTA5','RageMP','altv','RedM','cfx')\n    $spielProcs = @(Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match ($spielNamen -join '|') })\n    if ($spielProcs.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($sp in $spielProcs) {\n            Write-Host \"`n  Prozess: $($sp.Name) (PID $($sp.Id))\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            try {\n                $sp.Modules | Where-Object { $_.FileName } | ForEach-Object {\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FileName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    if ($status -ne 'Valid') {\n                        Write-Host (\"  [!] Unsigniert: {0}\" -f $_.FileName) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    }\n                }\n            } catch {\n                Write-Host \"  Zugriff auf Module verweigert (Adminrechte noetig).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Keine FiveM/GTA-Prozesse laufend.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: Gelb = signiert aber ungewoehnlicher Pfad.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"         Rot  = unsigniert oder Signatur ungueltig = Befund pruefen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer Live-Analyse laufender Injektion: Sysinternals Process Monitor empfohlen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- Bekannte DLL-Hijacking-Zielordner ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Bekannte Hijacking-Zielordner (wbem, Tasks, Sysprep...) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Bekannte Ziel-DLLs fuer wbem-Hijacking (aus realen Faellen)\n    # PHANTOM = diese Dateien existieren auf normalem Windows NICHT in wbem\n    # Ihr blosses Vorhandensein ist bereits verdaechtig - Signatur egal\n    $wbemPhantom = @(\n        'WptsExtensions.dll',   # Phantom-DLL - existiert nie in wbem (Trojan.Yogi u.a.)\n        'WaasMedicSvc.dll',     # Phantom-DLL - gehoert nicht in wbem\n        'wlbsctrl.dll'          # Phantom-DLL - IKEEXT-Hijacking-Ziel\n    )\n    $wbemTargets = @(\n        'msdtcprx.dll',\n        'wmicmiplugin.dll',\n        'wbemcomn.dll'\n    )\n\n    $hijackOrdner = @{\n        'wbem'    = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem'\n        'Tasks'   = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks'\n        'Sysprep' = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\Sysprep'\n        'Spool'   = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3'\n    }\n\n    $hijackFund = $false\n    foreach ($name in $hijackOrdner.Keys) {\n        $ordner = $hijackOrdner[$name]\n        if (-not (Test-Path $ordner)) { continue }\n\n        $dlls = @(Get-ChildItem $ordner -Filter '*.dll' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        if ($dlls.Count -eq 0) { continue }\n\n        Write-Host \"`n  [$name] $ordner\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        foreach ($f in $dlls) {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $f.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n            $signierer = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) {\n                $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2'\n            } else { '-' }\n\n            $istMS      = $signierer -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n            $istPhantom = $wbemPhantom -contains $f.Name\n            $istTarget  = $wbemTargets -contains $f.Name\n            $istVerd    = (-not $istMS) -or ($status -ne 'Valid')\n\n            if ($istPhantom) {\n                # Phantom-DLLs sind immer ein Befund - egal ob signiert\n                $col = 'Red'\n                Write-Host (\"    [!!!] PHANTOM-DLL: {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}\" -f $f.Name, $status, $signierer) -ForegroundColor $col\n                Write-Host (\"          Diese Datei gehoert NICHT in diesen Ordner - Hijacking-Beweis!\" ) -ForegroundColor $col\n                $hijackFound = $true\n            } elseif ($istVerd -or $istTarget) {\n                $col = if ($status -ne 'Valid' -or -not $istMS) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                $hinweis = if ($istTarget -and -not $istMS) { ' [BEKANNTES HIJACK-ZIEL + FREMD]' } elseif ($istTarget) { ' [BEKANNTES HIJACK-ZIEL]' } else { '' }\n                Write-Host (\"    [!] {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}{3}\" -f $f.Name, $status, $signierer, $hinweis) -ForegroundColor $col\n                $hijackFund = $true\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if (-not $hijackFund) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen DLLs in Hijacking-Zielordnern.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- setupapi.dev.log auf USB-Spuren pruefen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- SetupAPI: USB-Cheat-Lader-Spuren ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $setupLog = 'C:\\Windows\\INF\\setupapi.dev.log'\n    if (Test-Path $setupLog) {\n        # Ganzwort-Suche: 'bypass'/'loader'/'inject' nur als eigenes Wort - sonst Treffer in\n        # NVIDIA-Treibern (nvobjectloader64.dll, libcuda_loader.so) und Bluetooth (_HCIBYPASS)\n        $cheatMuster = '(?i)(?|]*?\\.(dll|sys|exe|cfg|inf|cat)\\b'\n\n        $begriffe = @(); $laufwerk = @()\n        $fsA = [System.IO.File]::Open($setupLog, 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite')\n        $srA = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($fsA)\n        $abschnitt = ''\n        while ($null -ne ($zeile = $srA.ReadLine())) {\n            if ($zeile -match '^&gt;&gt;&gt;\\s+Section start (\\d{4}/\\d{2}/\\d{2} \\d{2}:\\d{2}:\\d{2})') { $abschnitt = $matches[1]; continue }\n            if ($zeile -match $harmlos) { continue }\n            if ($zeile -match $cheatMuster) { $begriffe += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$abschnitt; Zeile=$zeile.Trim() } }\n            elseif ($zeile -match $fremdLw)  { $laufwerk += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$abschnitt; Zeile=$zeile.Trim() } }\n        }\n        $srA.Close()\n\n        if ($begriffe.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Verdaechtige Begriffe in setupapi.dev.log:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $begriffe | Select-Object -First 25 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1}\" -f $_.Zeit, $_.Zeile) -ForegroundColor Red }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine verdaechtigen Cheat-Begriffe in setupapi.dev.log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n\n        Write-Host \"`n--- Installationen von anderen Laufwerken als C: (USB-Stick, zweite Platte) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        $laufwerk = @($laufwerk | Group-Object Zeile | ForEach-Object { $_.Group[0] })\n        if ($laufwerk.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} Eintraege mit Dateien von fremden Laufwerken:\" -f $laufwerk.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            $laufwerk | Select-Object -First 30 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1}\" -f $_.Zeit, $_.Zeile) -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            Write-Host \"    Treiber-CDs und Downloads auf D: sind normal - unbekannte .dll/.cfg von einem Stick sind es nicht.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine Installationen von fremden Laufwerken.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n        # Datei-Zeitstempel: frisch erstellt nach Windows-Installation?\n        $f = Get-Item $setupLog\n        $os2 = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($os2 -and $f.CreationTime -gt $os2.InstallDate.AddDays(7)) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] setupapi.dev.log wurde deutlich nach Windows-Installation erstellt - moeglicherweise neu angelegt (Spurverwischung).\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  setupapi.dev.log fehlt - Datei koennte geloescht worden sein.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  14 - Systemprozesse &amp; Registry-Injection-Vektoren\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-SystemProcessCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Systemprozesse &amp; Injection-Vektoren ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Prueft kritische Prozesse auf fremde Module + Registry-Einstiegspunkte)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 14a: Kritische Systemprozesse auf nicht-Microsoft-Module ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Fremde Module in Systemprozessen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $kritisch = @('svchost','lsass','winlogon','services','spoolsv','wininit',\n                  'csrss','explorer','lsm','dllhost','dwm','ctfmon','taskhostw',\n                  'msdtc','audiodg','SearchIndexer','WmiPrvSE')\n\n    # Bekannte legitime Dritt-Hersteller die in Systemprozesse laden duerfen\n    $vertrauenswuerdig = @(\n        'Malwarebytes','NVIDIA','Adobe','Intel Corporation','Advanced Micro Devices',\n        'Logitech','Razer','SteelSeries','Corsair','ASUS','MSI','Gigabyte',\n        'Realtek','Qualcomm','Broadcom','Apple','Google','Dropbox','OneDrive'\n    )\n    # Geschuetzte Prozesse bei denen leere Module normal sind (PPL)\n    $geschuetzt = @('lsass','csrss','wininit','services','smss','MsMpEng')\n\n    $systemFund = $false\n    foreach ($pName in $kritisch) {\n        $procs = @(Get-Process -Name $pName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        foreach ($proc in $procs) {\n            try {\n                $fremd   = @()\n                $pathlos = @()\n                $proc.Modules | ForEach-Object {\n                    # Nur Module MIT Namen aber OHNE Pfad = Reflective Injection Kandidat\n                    # Leere Eintraege ohne Namen = Enumerierungs-Artefakt, kein Fund\n                    if ($_.ModuleName -and -not $_.FileName) {\n                        if ($geschuetzt -notcontains $pName) {\n                            $pathlos += $_.ModuleName\n                        }\n                        return\n                    }\n                    if (-not $_.FileName) { return }\n\n                    $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FileName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                    $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and\n                             $sig.SignerCertificate -and\n                             $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n                    if (-not $istMS) {\n                        $status = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                        $sign   = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) {\n                            $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2'\n                        } else { 'Nicht signiert' }\n                        # Bekannte legitime Hersteller: grau, nicht rot\n                        $istBekannt = $vertrauenswuerdig | Where-Object { $sign -match [regex]::Escape($_) }\n                        $fremd += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                            Modul    = $_.ModuleName\n                            Pfad     = $_.FileName\n                            Sig      = $status\n                            Signierer= $sign\n                            Bekannt  = [bool]$istBekannt\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n\n                # Nur ausgeben wenn wirklich verdaechtig (unbekannt/unsigniert ODER pathlos)\n                $echteWarnungen = @($fremd | Where-Object { -not $_.Bekannt -or $_.Sig -ne 'Valid' })\n                $bekannteListe  = @($fremd | Where-Object { $_.Bekannt -and $_.Sig -eq 'Valid' })\n\n                if ($echteWarnungen.Count -gt 0 -or $pathlos.Count -gt 0) {\n                    Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $proc.Name, $proc.Id) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    $systemFund = $true\n                    foreach ($m in $echteWarnungen) {\n                        $col = if ($m.Sig -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!] {0}\" -f $m.Modul) -ForegroundColor $col\n                        Write-Host (\"        Pfad     : {0}\" -f $m.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n                        Write-Host (\"        Sig      : {0} | {1}\" -f $m.Sig, $m.Signierer) -ForegroundColor $col\n                    }\n                    foreach ($m in $pathlos) {\n                        Write-Host (\"    [!!!] Modul ohne Dateipfad: $m (Reflective Injection?)\" ) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    }\n                }\n                if ($bekannteListe.Count -gt 0) {\n                    Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1} - bekannte Dritt-Software ({2} Module):\" -f $proc.Name, $proc.Id, $bekannteListe.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                    $bekannteListe | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    $($_.Modul) | $($_.Signierer)\") -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n                }\n            } catch {\n                if ($geschuetzt -notcontains $pName) {\n                    Write-Host (\"  [{0}] PID {1} - Zugriff verweigert\" -f $pName, $proc.Id) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $systemFund) {\n        Write-Host \"Alle geprueften Systemprozesse: nur Microsoft-signierte Module.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 14b: AppInit_DLLs ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- AppInit_DLLs (laedt in JEDEN Prozess mit user32.dll) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $appInitKeys = @(\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows'\n    )\n    foreach ($k in $appInitKeys) {\n        if (Test-Path $k) {\n            $val = (Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).AppInit_DLLs\n            $load = (Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).LoadAppInit_DLLs\n            if ($val -and $val.Trim()) {\n                Write-Host \"  [!!!] AppInit_DLLs GESETZT: $val\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host \"        LoadAppInit_DLLs: $load\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"  $k : Leer (gut).\" -ForegroundColor Green\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- 14c: Winlogon Injection (Shell, Userinit, Notify) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Winlogon Injection-Vektoren ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $wlKey = 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon'\n    if (Test-Path $wlKey) {\n        $wl = Get-ItemProperty $wlKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        # Shell sollte nur explorer.exe sein\n        if ($wl.Shell -and $wl.Shell -notmatch '^explorer\\.exe$') {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Shell != explorer.exe: $($wl.Shell)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"  Shell     : $($wl.Shell) (OK)\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n        # Userinit\n        if ($wl.Userinit -and $wl.Userinit -notmatch 'userinit\\.exe') {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Userinit auffaellig: $($wl.Userinit)\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        } else { Write-Host \"  Userinit  : $($wl.Userinit) (OK)\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n    }\n\n    # --- 14d: LSA Security Packages ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- LSA Authentication &amp; Security Packages ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $lsaKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa'\n    if (Test-Path $lsaKey) {\n        $lsa = Get-ItemProperty $lsaKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $authPkg = $lsa.'Authentication Packages'\n        $secPkg  = $lsa.'Security Packages'\n        $notifPkg= $lsa.'Notification Packages'\n        $standard = @('msv1_0','','scecli')\n        foreach ($pkg in $authPkg) {\n            if ($pkg -and $standard -notcontains $pkg.ToLower()) {\n                Write-Host \"  [!] Unbekanntes Auth-Package: $pkg\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  Auth-Packages  : $($authPkg -join ', ')\"\n        Write-Host \"  Sec-Packages   : $($secPkg -join ', ')\"\n        Write-Host \"  Notify-Packages: $($notifPkg -join ', ')\"\n    }\n\n    # --- 14e: Dienste mit DLL in ungewoehnlichem Pfad ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Dienst-DLLs ausserhalb von System32/SysWOW64 ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dienste = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.ImagePath -like '*svchost*' }\n    $fremdDienst = $false\n    foreach ($svc in $dienste) {\n        $param = $svc.PSPath -replace 'Registry::',''\n        $paramKey = $param + '\\Parameters'\n        if (Test-Path \"Registry::$paramKey\") {\n            $dll = (Get-ItemProperty \"Registry::$paramKey\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).ServiceDll\n            if ($dll -and $dll -notmatch '(?i)^(%SystemRoot%|C:\\\\Windows)\\\\(System32|SysWOW64)\\\\') {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!] Dienst '{0}' laedt DLL aus ungewoehnlichem Pfad:\" -f $svc.PSChildName) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"      $dll\") -ForegroundColor Red\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature ($dll -replace '%SystemRoot%',$env:SystemRoot) -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                if ($sig) { Write-Host (\"      Sig: {0}\" -f $sig.Status) -ForegroundColor Red }\n                $fremdDienst = $true\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $fremdDienst) { Write-Host \"  Alle Dienst-DLLs in erwarteten Systempfaden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHinweis: lsass-Module sind ohne SeDebugPrivilege oft nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"Fuer Kernel-Level-Injection (DKOM, direkte Speichermanipulation):\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"PowerShell reicht nicht aus - da braucht es WinPmem oder Volatility.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  15 - HVCI / Memory Integrity &amp; Code Integrity Treiber-Check\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-HVCICheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== HVCI / Memory Integrity &amp; Inkompatible Treiber ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Deaktivierte Speicherintegritaet + geblockte Kernel-Treiber = DMA-Indiz)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 15a: HVCI-Status ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Memory Integrity (HVCI) Status ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $hvciKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'\n    $vbsKey  = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard'\n    $hvciAktiv = $false\n\n    if (Test-Path $hvciKey) {\n        $hvci = Get-ItemProperty $hvciKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $hvciAktiv = $hvci.Enabled -eq 1\n        $col = if ($hvciAktiv) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host (\"  HVCI (Speicherintegritaet) : {0}\" -f $(if($hvciAktiv){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT [!]'})) -ForegroundColor $col\n        if (-not $hvciAktiv) {\n            Write-Host \"  --&gt; Inkompatible Treiber koennen in den Kernel geladen werden.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"      DMA-Karten mit schwach signierten Treibern nutzen genau das.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"  Manuell pruefen: Windows-Sicherheit \u2192 Geraetesicherheit \u2192 Kernisolierung\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  HVCI-Key nicht gefunden - VBS moeglicherweise nicht konfiguriert.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    if (Test-Path $vbsKey) {\n        $vbs = Get-ItemProperty $vbsKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $vbsAktiv = $vbs.EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity -eq 1\n        Write-Host (\"  VBS (Virt. Based Security)  : {0}\" -f $(if($vbsAktiv){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($vbsAktiv){'Green'}else{'Yellow'})\n    }\n\n    # Secure Boot\n    $sb = $null\n    try {\n        $sb = Confirm-SecureBootUEFI -ErrorAction Stop\n        Write-Host (\"  Secure Boot                 : {0}\" -f $(if($sb){'AKTIV'}else{'DEAKTIVIERT [!]'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($sb){'Green'}else{'Red'})\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Secure Boot                 : Nicht abfragbar (Legacy BIOS oder kein UEFI)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    # --- 15b: Code Integrity Log - geblockte Treiber ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Code Integrity: geblockte / abgelehnte Treiber ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Event 3033 = geblockt | 3034 = Boot-Treiber | 3076 = Audit | 3077 = Prozess)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $ciEvents = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{\n        LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational'\n        Id      = 3033, 3034, 3076, 3077\n    } -MaxEvents 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n\n    # Bekannte legitime Security-DLLs die bei HVCI haeufig 3033 ausloesen\n    $ciWhitelist = @('mbae64\\.dll','mbae\\.dll','mbamswissarmy','MBAMSwissArmy',\n                     'mbamsi64\\.dll','mbamsi\\.dll','mbamupdatetool',\n                     'hmpalert','hmpalert64','CrExigency','sophos','mbae')\n\n    if ($ciEvents.Count -gt 0) {\n        $ciGefiltert = @($ciEvents | Where-Object {\n            $msg = $_.Message\n            -not ($ciWhitelist | Where-Object { $msg -match $_ })\n        })\n        $ciGefiltert_kurz = @($ciEvents | Where-Object {\n            $msg = $_.Message\n            ($ciWhitelist | Where-Object { $msg -match $_ })\n        })\n\n        if ($ciGefiltert_kurz.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  (Herausgefiltert: $($ciGefiltert_kurz.Count)x bekannte Security-Software wie Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n\n        if ($ciGefiltert.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  $($ciGefiltert.Count) relevante Ereignisse:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $ciGefiltert | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Select-Object -First 20 | ForEach-Object {\n                $eid = $_.Id\n                $col = if ($eid -in @(3033,3034)) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                $msg = ($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ')\n                $datei = if ($msg -match '\\\\([^\\\\]+\\.sys|[^\\\\]+\\.dll)') { $matches[1] } else { '' }\n                Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] EID {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $eid) -ForegroundColor $col\n                if ($datei) { Write-Host (\"  Treiber : {0}\" -f $datei) -ForegroundColor $col }\n                Write-Host (\"  Details : {0}...\" -f $msg.Substring(0, [Math]::Min(160, $msg.Length))) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine unbekannten geblockten Treiber - nur bekannte Security-Software.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine geblockten Treiber im Code Integrity Log.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        if ($hvciAktiv) {\n            Write-Host \"  (HVCI aktiv = Treiber werden gar nicht erst geladen - das ist gut)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- 15c: bcdedit - Testsigning und Integritaets-Bypass ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Boot-Konfiguration: Testsigning &amp; Integrity-Checks ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $bcd = &amp; bcdedit /enum 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-String\n    $testsigning = $bcd -match 'testsigning\\s+yes'\n    $nointegrity = $bcd -match 'nointegritychecks\\s+yes'\n    $dbgmode     = $bcd -match 'debug\\s+yes'\n\n    Write-Host (\"  Testsigning        : {0}\" -f $(if($testsigning){'[!!!] AKTIV - unsignierte Treiber erlaubt!'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($testsigning){'Red'}else{'Green'})\n    Write-Host (\"  NoIntegrityChecks  : {0}\" -f $(if($nointegrity){'[!!!] AKTIV - Integritaetspruefung umgangen!'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($nointegrity){'Red'}else{'Green'})\n    Write-Host (\"  Debug-Modus        : {0}\" -f $(if($dbgmode){'[!] Aktiv'}else{'Deaktiviert (OK)'})) -ForegroundColor $(if($dbgmode){'Yellow'}else{'Green'})\n\n    if ($testsigning -or $nointegrity) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] Treibersignaturen sind aktiv umgangen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"        Jeder beliebige unsignierte Kernel-Treiber kann geladen werden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"        Das ist eine Grundvoraussetzung vieler DMA- und Cheat-Treiber.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    }\n\n    # --- 15d: Inkompatible Treiber aus pnputil (ergaenzt HVCI-Liste) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Installierte Treiber ohne gueltige WHQL-Signatur ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Diese wuerden die HVCI-Aktivierung verhindern)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    try {\n        $pnpOut = &amp; pnputil /enum-drivers 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-String\n        $bloecke = $pnpOut -split '(?=Veroeffentlichter Name|Published Name)'\n        $verdaechtig = @($bloecke | Where-Object {\n            $_ -match 'Nicht signiert|Not Signed|Unsigned' -or\n            ($_ -match '(Signierer|Signer)\\s*:' -and $_ -notmatch '(?i)Microsoft|WHQL')\n        })\n        if ($verdaechtig.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] $($verdaechtig.Count) potenziell inkompatible Treiber:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $verdaechtig | Select-Object -First 10 | ForEach-Object {\n                $name = if ($_ -match 'oem\\d+\\.inf') { $matches[0] } else { '' }\n                $pub  = if ($_ -match '(?:Herausgeber|Publisher)\\s*:\\s*(.+)') { $matches[1].Trim() } else { '' }\n                if ($name) { Write-Host (\"  {0} | {1}\" -f $name, $pub) -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine offensichtlich unsignierten Treiber gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  pnputil nicht verfuegbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 15e: DMA-Schutz - IOMMU / VT-d, Windows-DMA-Schutz, Aenderungszeitpunkte ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- DMA-Schutz: IOMMU (AMD) / VT-d (Intel) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Viele DMA-Karten verlangen: IOMMU bzw. VT-d im BIOS AUS + Kernisolierung AUS)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Collections.Generic;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcFw {\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", SetLastError = true)]\n    static extern uint EnumSystemFirmwareTables(uint provider, byte[] buffer, uint size);\n    public static string[] Acpi() {\n        uint prov = 0x41435049;                       // 'ACPI'\n        uint n = EnumSystemFirmwareTables(prov, null, 0);\n        if (n == 0) return new string[0];\n        byte[] b = new byte[n];\n        EnumSystemFirmwareTables(prov, b, n);\n        var l = new List();\n        for (int i = 0; i + 4 &lt;= n; i += 4) l.Add(Encoding.ASCII.GetString(b, i, 4));\n        return l.ToArray();\n    }\n}\n\"@\n    $sigRQ3 = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sigRQ3 -Name RK3 -Namespace W3 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $keyZeit = {\n        param($pfad)\n        try {\n            $k = Get-Item $pfad -ErrorAction Stop\n            $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n            [void][W3.RK3]::RegQueryInfoKey($k.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n            [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n        } catch { $null }\n    }\n\n    $cpuHersteller = [string](Get-CimInstance Win32_Processor -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1).Manufacturer\n    $istAmd   = $cpuHersteller -match '(?i)AMD'\n    $iommuName = if ($istAmd) { 'IOMMU (AMD-Vi)' } else { 'VT-d (Intel)' }\n    $tabellen = @()\n    try { $tabellen = @([CtcFw]::Acpi()) } catch {}\n    $iommuAn = $null\n    if ($tabellen.Count -gt 0) {\n        $iommuAn = [bool]($tabellen | Where-Object { $_ -match '^(DMAR|RAMD|IVRS|SRVI)$' })\n        $col = if ($iommuAn) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        $txt = if ($iommuAn) { 'AN (Firmware meldet IOMMU-Tabelle)' } else { 'AUS [!] - keine DMAR/IVRS-Tabelle, im BIOS deaktiviert' }\n        Write-Host (\"  {0,-27} : {1}\" -f $iommuName, $txt) -ForegroundColor $col\n    } else {\n        Write-Host (\"  {0,-27} : nicht ermittelbar (Firmware-Tabellen nicht lesbar)\" -f $iommuName) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    $dg = Get-CimInstance -Namespace 'root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\DeviceGuard' -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $dmaSchutz = $null\n    if ($dg) {\n        $dmaSchutz = @($dg.AvailableSecurityProperties) -contains 3\n        Write-Host (\"  Windows DMA-Schutz verfuegbar: {0}\" -f $(if ($dmaSchutz) { 'JA' } else { 'NEIN [!]' })) -ForegroundColor $(if ($dmaSchutz) { 'Green' } else { 'Yellow' })\n        $vbsLauf = switch ([int]$dg.VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus) { 2 { 'laeuft' } 1 { 'konfiguriert, laeuft NICHT' } default { 'aus' } }\n        $hvciLauf = @($dg.SecurityServicesRunning) -contains 2\n        Write-Host (\"  VBS tatsaechlich           : {0}\" -f $vbsLauf) -ForegroundColor $(if ($vbsLauf -eq 'laeuft') { 'Green' } else { 'Yellow' })\n        Write-Host (\"  HVCI tatsaechlich aktiv    : {0}\" -f $(if ($hvciLauf) { 'JA' } else { 'NEIN' })) -ForegroundColor $(if ($hvciLauf) { 'Green' } else { 'Yellow' })\n    }\n    $hyp = [bool](Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).HypervisorPresent\n    Write-Host (\"  Hypervisor aktiv           : {0}\" -f $(if ($hyp) { 'JA' } else { 'NEIN' })) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # Wann wurden Speicherintegritaet / VBS zuletzt umgestellt?\n    $zHvci = &amp; $keyZeit 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'\n    $zVbs  = &amp; $keyZeit 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard'\n    $osInst = (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).InstallDate\n    foreach ($e in @(@{ N='Speicherintegritaet (HVCI)'; Z=$zHvci }, @{ N='VBS / Device Guard'; Z=$zVbs })) {\n        if (-not $e.Z) { continue }\n        $neu = $osInst -and $e.Z -gt $osInst.AddHours(2)\n        $col = if ($neu -and -not $hvciAktiv) { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' }\n        Write-Host (\"  {0,-27} zuletzt geaendert: {1}{2}\" -f $e.N, $e.Z, $(if ($neu) { '  (nach der Windows-Installation umgestellt)' } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $col\n    }\n    if ($osInst) { Write-Host (\"  Windows installiert am     : {0}\" -f $osInst) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n    # Gesamtbild\n    $faktoren = @()\n    if ($iommuAn -eq $false) { $faktoren += \"$iommuName aus\" }\n    if (-not $hvciAktiv)     { $faktoren += 'Speicherintegritaet aus' }\n    if ($sb -eq $false)      { $faktoren += 'Secure Boot aus' }\n    if ($dg -and $dmaSchutz -eq $false -and $iommuAn -ne $false) { $faktoren += 'Windows-DMA-Schutz nicht verfuegbar' }\n    Write-Host \"\"\n    if ($iommuAn -eq $false -and -not $hvciAktiv) {\n        Write-Host (\"  [!!!] TYPISCHES DMA-PROFIL: {0}\" -f ($faktoren -join ' + ')) -ForegroundColor Red\n        Write-Host \"        Genau diese Einstellungen verlangen die meisten DMA-Karten. Mit Punkt 3 (Steckkarten) und 17 (Fuser) abgleichen.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    } elseif ($faktoren.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  [!] Abgeschwaechter Schutz: {0}\" -f ($faktoren -join ' + ')) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"      Allein kein Beweis - viele Gaming-PCs haben das ab Werk. Zusammen mit Hardware-Spuren werten.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  DMA-Schutz vollstaendig aktiv - eine DMA-Karte haette es hier deutlich schwerer.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nFazit-Hilfe:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  IOMMU/VT-d AUS + Speicherintegritaet AUS = typisches DMA-Profil\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Testsigning=Ja + unbekannter Treiber = starker DMA-Hinweis\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  HVCI deaktiviert + CI-Events = Treiber wurde installiert und verweigert\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Gut konfigurierte DMA-Karten (echt signiert) erscheinen NICHT im CI-Log\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  16 - System32 Fremdkoerper &amp; Typosquatting-Check\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-System32Check {\n    param([string]$Umfang)\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Signatur-Scan jeder DLL, EXE und SYS ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  [1] Systemordner (System32/SysWOW64 inkl. Unterordner) - schnell\" -ForegroundColor White\n    Write-Host \"  [2] Ganzes Windows-Laufwerk (Standard)\" -ForegroundColor White\n    Write-Host \"  [3] Alle Laufwerke inkl. zweiter Platten und USB-Sticks\" -ForegroundColor White\n    if (-not $umfang) { $umfang = (Read-Host \"Umfang (Enter = 2)\").Trim() } else { Write-Host \"Umfang (automatisch): $umfang\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    if ($umfang -notin @('1','2','3')) { $umfang = '2' }\n\n    $uhr = [System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch]::StartNew()\n    $bekannteSigner = '(?i)NVIDIA|Intel|Advanced Micro|AMD|Realtek|Qualcomm|Broadcom|Logitech|Razer|Corsair|Elgato|Malwarebytes|ASUSTeK|Micro-Star|Gigabyte|MediaTek|Synaptics|Dolby|Waves|Nahimic|Creative|SteelSeries|Adobe|Google|Mozilla|Oracle|VMware|Valve|Epic Games|Electronic Arts|Ubisoft|Rockstar|Discord|Spotify|Zoom|Dropbox|Apple|Python Software|OpenJS|Node\\.js|JetBrains|Autodesk|Cisco|Citrix|Overwolf|Riot|Blizzard|Microsoft|^\\.NET|Windows Phone|Json\\.NET|Prism|Medal|Ferox Games|The Qt Company|OBS Project|TeamSpeak|BattlEye|KRAFTON|PUBG|Bluehole|Unity Technologies|Skutta|Winsider|ZimTech|Kilonova|MUSIC Tribe|Zhongshan Eurotec|REALiX|Pocket Soft|WireGuard|TC-Helicon|Brave Software|Gen Digital|NortonLifeLock|Symantec|Avast|AVG Technologies|Now\\.gg|BlueStack|NetEase|Netease|VOICEMOD|Roblox|Bitdefender|ESET|Kaspersky'\n    $fernwartung    = '(?i)PURSLANE|RustDesk|AnyDesk|TeamViewer|Splashtop|Parsec|UltraViewer|Ammyy|DWService'\n    $pruefTools     = '(?i)Inspect Element'                       # Echo\n    $makroRx        = '(?i)\\\\[^\\\\]*(autoclick|auto-click|tinytask|macro ?recorder|macrorecorder|pulover|jitbit|mouse ?recorder|clickermann|opautoclicker|gs ?auto ?clicker)[^\\\\]*$|\\.ahk$'\n    $phantomRx      = '(?i)\\\\WptsExtensions\\.dll$|\\\\(cryptbase2|version2|cryptsp2)\\.dll$|\\\\wbem\\\\(WaaSMedicSvc|wlbsctrl)\\.dll$'\n    $sysDllName     = '(?i)\\\\(version|winhttp|wininet|dbghelp|dbgcore|uxtheme|dwmapi|cryptbase|cryptsp|winmm|userenv|profapi|wtsapi32|iphlpapi|netapi32|mpr|secur32|sspicli|wldp|amsi|msimg32|oleacc|propsys|edputil|winsta|dsound|hid|setupapi|cfgmgr32|wer|dbgeng|srvcli|netutils|ntmarta|mscms|winspool)\\.dll$'\n    $auslassen      = '(?i)^[A-Z]:\\\\Windows\\\\(WinSxS|SystemApps|assembly\\\\NativeImages_[^\\\\]*|Installer\\\\\\$PatchCache\\$)(\\\\|$)|^[A-Z]:\\\\Windows\\\\Installer\\\\\\{[0-9A-Fa-f-]+\\}(\\\\|$)|\\\\Microsoft\\\\NetFramework\\\\BreadcrumbStore(\\\\|$)|\\\\WindowsApps(\\\\|$)|\\\\System Volume Information(\\\\|$)'\n    $kritischeDLLs  = @('ntdll','kernel32','kernelbase','user32','advapi32','rpcrt4','msvcrt','sechost','combase','ucrtbase',\n                        'win32u','gdi32','ole32','oleaut32','shell32','shlwapi','wininet','ws2_32','crypt32','bcrypt','ncrypt',\n                        'lsasrv','wintrust','wldp','amsi','version','winhttp','dbghelp','cryptbase','cryptsp')\n    $osInstall  = (Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).InstallDate\n    $sysLw      = $env:SystemDrive.ToUpper()\n    $grenzeNeu  = (Get-Date).AddDays(-14)\n\n    $wurzeln = switch ($umfang) {\n        '1' { @(\"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\", \"$env:SystemRoot\\SysWOW64\") }\n        '2' { @(\"$sysLw\\\") }\n        '3' { @([System.IO.DriveInfo]::GetDrives() | Where-Object { $_.IsReady -and $_.DriveType -in 'Fixed','Removable' } | ForEach-Object { $_.RootDirectory.FullName }) }\n    }\n    Write-Host (\"  Umfang: {0}\" -f ($wurzeln -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 1) Alle DLLs sammeln (rekursiv, ohne Verknuepfungen, Ordner ohne Zugriff merken) ---\n    Write-Host \"  Sammle Dateien...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dateien      = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[string]\n    $ordnerFehler = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[string]\n    $ausgelassenN = 0\n    $stapel = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.Stack[string]\n    foreach ($w in $wurzeln) { if (Test-Path $w) { $stapel.Push($w) } }\n    while ($stapel.Count -gt 0) {\n        $d = $stapel.Pop()\n        if ($d -match $auslassen) { $ausgelassenN++; continue }\n        try {\n            foreach ($muster in @('*.dll','*.exe','*.sys')) { foreach ($f in [System.IO.Directory]::EnumerateFiles($d, $muster)) { $dateien.Add($f) } }\n            foreach ($s in [System.IO.Directory]::EnumerateDirectories($d)) {\n                try {\n                    if (([System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($s) -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -eq 0) { $stapel.Push($s) }\n                } catch { $ordnerFehler.Add($s) }\n            }\n        } catch { $ordnerFehler.Add($d) }\n        if ($dateien.Count % 5000 -eq 0 -and $dateien.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Progress -Activity 'CTC Signatur-Scan' -Status (\"Sammle ... {0:N0} DLLs\" -f $dateien.Count)\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host (\"  {0:N0} Dateien gefunden (DLL/EXE/SYS), pruefe Signaturen parallel...\" -f $dateien.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 2) Tiefenanalyse vorbereiten (C#, laeuft in allen Threads) ---\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.IO;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Collections.Generic;\nusing System.Text.RegularExpressions;\npublic static class CtcTief3 {\n    static double Entropie(byte[] b, int off, int len) {\n        int[] c = new int[256];\n        for (int i = off; i &lt; off + len; i++) c[b[i]]++;\n        double e = 0;\n        foreach (int n in c) { if (n == 0) continue; double p = (double)n / len; e -= p * Math.Log(p, 2); }\n        return e;\n    }\n    static readonly string[] Schreibend = { \"writeprocessmemory\", \"ntwritevirtualmemory\", \"createremotethread\", \"createremotethreadex\",\n                                            \"ntcreatethreadex\", \"rtlcreateuserthread\", \"ntqueueapcthread\", \"mmcopyvirtualmemory\" };\n    const string ZielRx = @\"FiveM_[A-Za-z0-9_]*GTAProcess|FiveM_b\\d{4}|FiveM_GameProcess|GTA5(_Enhanced)?\\.exe|RedM_[A-Za-z]*Process|CitizenFX|citizen-scripting|FiveM\\.exe\";\n    public static string Analyse(string pfad, string apiRx, string kwRx, string domRx) {\n        var g = new List();\n        try {\n            var fi = new FileInfo(pfad);\n            if (fi.Length &lt; 64) return \"\";\n            if (fi.Length &gt; 64L * 1024 * 1024) return \"zu gross fuer Tiefenanalyse (ueber 64 MB)\";\n            byte[] b;\n            using (var fs = new FileStream(pfad, FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite | FileShare.Delete)) {\n                b = new byte[fs.Length]; int gelesen = 0;\n                while (gelesen &lt; b.Length) { int n = fs.Read(b, gelesen, b.Length - gelesen); if (n &lt;= 0) break; gelesen += n; }\n            }\n            // PE-Sektionen\n            if (b[0] == 0x4D &amp;&amp; b[1] == 0x5A) {\n                int pe = BitConverter.ToInt32(b, 0x3C);\n                if (pe &gt; 0 &amp;&amp; pe &lt; b.Length - 248 &amp;&amp; b[pe] == 0x50 &amp;&amp; b[pe + 1] == 0x45 &amp;&amp; b[pe + 2] == 0 &amp;&amp; b[pe + 3] == 0) {\n                    int nsec = BitConverter.ToUInt16(b, pe + 6);\n                    int opt  = BitConverter.ToUInt16(b, pe + 20);\n                    int sec  = pe + 24 + opt;\n                    for (int i = 0; i &lt; Math.Min(nsec, 96); i++) {\n                        int o = sec + i * 40; if (o + 40 &gt; b.Length) break;\n                        string name = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(b, o, 8).TrimEnd('\\0');\n                        uint rawSize = BitConverter.ToUInt32(b, o + 16), rawPtr = BitConverter.ToUInt32(b, o + 20), ch = BitConverter.ToUInt32(b, o + 36);\n                        bool x = (ch &amp; 0x20000000) != 0, w = (ch &amp; 0x80000000) != 0;\n                        if (Regex.IsMatch(name, @\"^UPX\\d$\", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase))\n                            g.Add(\"UPX-gepackt (\" + name + \")\");\n                        else if (Regex.IsMatch(name, @\"^(\\.vmp\\d|\\.themida|\\.winlice|\\.enigma\\d|\\.aspack|\\.adata|\\.mpress\\d|\\.petite|pec\\d|\\.boom|\\.ropf|\\.vlizer)$\", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase))\n                            g.Add(\"Protector-Sektion \" + name);\n                        if (x &amp;&amp; w) g.Add(\"W+X-Sektion \" + name);\n                        if (x &amp;&amp; rawSize &gt; 4096 &amp;&amp; (long)rawPtr + rawSize &lt;= b.Length) {\n                            double e = Entropie(b, (int)rawPtr, (int)rawSize);\n                            if (e &gt; 7.2) g.Add(string.Format(\"Code-Sektion {0} verschluesselt/gepackt (Entropie {1:0.00})\", name, e));\n                        }\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n            string asc = Encoding.GetEncoding(28591).GetString(b);\n            string uni = Encoding.Unicode.GetString(b);\n            // Injection-Funktionen: mind. 2, davon mind. 1 schreibende/Remote-Thread-Funktion\n            var apis = new HashSet(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);\n            foreach (Match m in Regex.Matches(asc, apiRx)) apis.Add(m.Value);\n            bool schreibt = false;\n            foreach (string a in apis) if (Array.IndexOf(Schreibend, a.ToLowerInvariant()) &gt;= 0) { schreibt = true; break; }\n            if (apis.Count &gt;= 2 &amp;&amp; schreibt) g.Add(\"Injection-APIs: \" + string.Join(\", \", apis));\n            // Externer Speicherleser (ESP/Radar/Aimbot ueber Eingaben): liest fremden Speicher, schreibt aber nicht\n            bool liest = apis.Contains(\"ReadProcessMemory\") || apis.Contains(\"NtReadVirtualMemory\");\n            if (liest &amp;&amp; !(apis.Count &gt;= 2 &amp;&amp; schreibt) &amp;&amp; Regex.IsMatch(asc, @\"\\bOpenProcess\\b\"))\n                g.Add(\"liest fremden Prozessspeicher (OpenProcess + ReadProcessMemory)\");\n            // Ziel-Spiel: Prozess- oder Modulnamen von FiveM/GTA/RedM im Code\n            Match z = Regex.Match(asc, ZielRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);\n            if (!z.Success) z = Regex.Match(uni, ZielRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);\n            if (z.Success) g.Add(\"Ziel-Spiel im Code: \" + z.Value);\n            // ImGui - Menue-Bibliothek fast aller Cheat-Overlays\n            if (Regex.IsMatch(asc, @\"imgui\\.ini|Dear ImGui|ImGuiContext|ImGui::\", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase))\n                g.Add(\"ImGui-Oberflaeche (typisch fuer Cheat-Menues/Overlays)\");\n            // Cheat-Begriffe im Code\n            var kw = new HashSet(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);\n            foreach (Match m in Regex.Matches(asc, kwRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase)) kw.Add(m.Value.ToLowerInvariant());\n            foreach (Match m in Regex.Matches(uni, kwRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase)) kw.Add(m.Value.ToLowerInvariant());\n            if (kw.Count &gt; 0) g.Add(\"Cheat-Begriffe im Code: \" + string.Join(\", \", kw));\n            // Bekannte Cheat-Domains im Code\n            if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(domRx)) {\n                Match d = Regex.Match(asc, domRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);\n                if (!d.Success) d = Regex.Match(uni, domRx, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);\n                if (d.Success) g.Add(\"CHEAT-DOMAIN im Code: \" + d.Value);\n            }\n            // Verdaechtiger Build-Pfad\n            Match pdb = Regex.Match(asc, @\"[A-Za-z]:\\\\[^\\x00-\\x1F\"\"&lt;&gt;|]{3,200}\\.pdb\", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);\n            if (pdb.Success &amp;&amp; Regex.IsMatch(pdb.Value, @\"\\\\[^\\\\]*(cheat|hack|inject|bypass|spoof|aimbot|triggerbot|wallhack|mapper)[^\\\\]*\\\\|\\\\(esp|dma|loader|external|internal)\\\\\", RegexOptions.IgnoreCase))\n                g.Add(\"verdaechtiger Build-Pfad: \" + pdb.Value);\n        } catch { }\n        return string.Join(\" | \", g);\n    }\n}\n\"@\n    $apiRx = '\\b(VirtualAllocEx|WriteProcessMemory|CreateRemoteThreadEx|CreateRemoteThread|NtCreateThreadEx|RtlCreateUserThread|NtWriteVirtualMemory|NtQueueApcThread|QueueUserAPC|SetWindowsHookExA|SetWindowsHookExW|NtMapViewOfSection|ZwMapViewOfSection|MmCopyVirtualMemory|ReadProcessMemory|NtReadVirtualMemory)\\b'\n    $kwRx  = '\\b(aimbot|wallhack|triggerbot|silent_?aim|manual_?map(per)?|kdmapper|dll_?injector|hwid_?spoof(er)?|spoofer|esp_(box|name|line|skeleton|health)|cheat_?menu|lua_?executor|anti_?cheat_?bypass|ac_?bypass|no_?recoil|recoil_?control)\\b'\n    $domRx = if ($CheatDomains.Count -gt 0) { '(?= 5 neue DLLs im selben Ordner = Programm wurde installiert, nicht einzeln listen\n    $neuInstall = @()\n    $neuGruppen = @($prioritaet | Where-Object { $_.Rang -eq 6 } | Group-Object { Split-Path $_.R.Pfad -Parent } | Where-Object { $_.Count -ge 5 })\n    foreach ($g in $neuGruppen) {\n        $zeiten = @($g.Group | ForEach-Object { $_.R.Erstellt } | Sort-Object)\n        $neuInstall += [PSCustomObject]@{ Ordner=$g.Name; Anzahl=$g.Count; Zeit=$zeiten[0] }\n        foreach ($x in $g.Group) { $restlich += $x.R }\n    }\n    $neuOrdner = @{}; foreach ($g in $neuGruppen) { $neuOrdner[$g.Name] = $true }\n    $prioritaet = @($prioritaet | Where-Object { -not ($_.Rang -eq 6 -and $neuOrdner.ContainsKey((Split-Path $_.R.Pfad -Parent))) })\n\n    # --- 4) Ausgabe ---\n    Write-Host \"\"\n    Write-Host (\"  Gescannt   : {0,9:N0}\" -f $ergebnisse.Count) -ForegroundColor White\n    Write-Host (\"  Verifiziert: {0,9:N0}\" -f $verifiziert) -ForegroundColor Green\n    Write-Host (\"  Unsigniert : {0,9:N0}   davon auffaellig: {1:N0}\" -f $markiert.Count, $prioritaet.Count) -ForegroundColor $(if ($prioritaet.Count) { 'Red' } elseif ($markiert.Count) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' })\n    $tiefN = @($markiert | Where-Object { $_.Tief -ne $null }).Count\n    Write-Host (\"  Tiefenanalyse: alle {0:N0} unsignierten DLLs auf Cheat-Begriffe, Injection, Protectoren und Build-Pfade geprueft\" -f $markiert.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host (\"  Fremd      : {0,9:N0}   (+ {1:N0} bekannte Hersteller/Treiberpakete)\" -f $fremd.Count, $bekanntN) -ForegroundColor $(if ($fremd.Count) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' })\n    Write-Host (\"  Fehler     : {0,9:N0}   | Ordner ohne Zugriff: {1} | bewusst ausgelassen: {2}\" -f $fehler.Count, $ordnerFehler.Count, $ausgelassenN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host (\"  Dauer      : {0:N1} s mit {1} Threads\" -f $uhr.Elapsed.TotalSeconds, $threads) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    if ($phantom.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] PHANTOM-DLLs (gehoeren an diesen Ort NIE hin):\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($r in $phantom) { Write-Host (\"    {0}  [Sig: {1} | {2}]\" -f $r.Pfad, $r.Status, $r.Signierer) -ForegroundColor Red }\n    }\n    if ($typo.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  [!!!] Typosquatting im Windows-Ordner - Name aehnelt einer System-DLL:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($x in $typo) { Write-Host (\"    {0}   sieht aus wie {1}\" -f $x.Pfad, $x.Wie) -ForegroundColor Red }\n    }\n\n    $hashMap = @{}\n    if ($prioritaet.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  --- AUFFAELLIG: {0} Dateien nach Prioritaet (unsigniert oder unbekannter Signierer) ---\" -f $prioritaet.Count) -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($x in ($prioritaet | Sort-Object Rang, { $_.R.Pfad })) {\n            $r = $x.R\n            $hash = $r.Hash\n            $cn = Get-CheatName $r.Pfad\n            Write-Host (\"`n    {0}\" -f $r.Pfad) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} | Status: {1}{2}\" -f $x.Grund, $r.Status, $(if ($cn) { \" | BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor Red\n            if ($r.Tief -and $x.Grund -notmatch 'Tiefenanalyse') { Write-Host (\"      Tiefenanalyse: {0}\" -f $r.Tief) -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n            if ($r.Erstellt) { Write-Host (\"      erstellt {0} | {1:N0} KB{2}\" -f $r.Erstellt, [Math]::Round([double]$r.Groesse / 1KB), $(if ($osInstall -and $r.Erstellt -gt $osInstall.AddDays(30)) { '  [nach Windows-Installation]' } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n            if ($hash) { Write-Host (\"      VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/{0}\" -f $hash) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($neuInstall.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"`n  --- Neu installierte Programme (letzte 14 Tage, viele neue Dateien auf einmal) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        foreach ($n in ($neuInstall | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending)) {\n            $cn = Get-CheatName $n.Ordner\n            Write-Host (\"    {0}  {1,5} Dateien  {2}{3}\" -f $n.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'), $n.Anzahl, $n.Ordner, $(if ($cn) { \"   &lt;-- BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $(if ($cn) { 'Red' } else { 'DarkGray' })\n        }\n        Write-Host \"    Unbekannter Programmname hier = pruefen, was kurz vor der Pruefung installiert wurde.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($installerReste.Count -gt 0) {\n        $iOrdner = @($installerReste | ForEach-Object { Split-Path $_.Pfad -Parent } | Sort-Object -Unique)\n        Write-Host (\"`n  ({0} DLLs aus Installer-Entpackungen in Temp ausgeblendet, {1} Ordner, z. B. {2})\" -f $installerReste.Count, $iOrdner.Count, $iOrdner[0]) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($schwach.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  --- Schwache Hinweise aus der Tiefenanalyse ({0}) - in Spielen/Anti-Cheats oft legitim ---\" -f $schwach.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n        foreach ($r in ($schwach | Sort-Object Pfad | Select-Object -First 25)) {\n            Write-Host (\"    {0}\" -f $r.Pfad) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n            Write-Host (\"      {0}\" -f $r.Tief) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n        if ($schwach.Count -gt 25) { Write-Host (\"    ... und {0} weitere (siehe CSV, Spalte Tiefenanalyse)\" -f ($schwach.Count - 25)) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    }\n    if ($restlich.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  --- Weitere unsignierte Dateien ({0:N0}) - einzeln, jeweils tiefenanalysiert ohne starken Befund ---\" -f $restlich.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        $letzterOrdner = ''\n        foreach ($r in ($restlich | Sort-Object Pfad)) {\n            $ordner = Split-Path $r.Pfad -Parent\n            if ($ordner -ne $letzterOrdner) { Write-Host (\"`n    [{0}]\" -f $ordner) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow; $letzterOrdner = $ordner }\n            $cn = Get-CheatName $r.Pfad\n            $col = if ($cn) { 'Red' } else { 'White' }\n            $zeit = if ($r.Erstellt) { $r.Erstellt.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } else { '?' }\n            Write-Host (\"      {0,-45} {1,9:N0} KB  erstellt {2}  {3}{4}\" -f (Split-Path $r.Pfad -Leaf), [Math]::Round([double]$r.Groesse / 1KB), $zeit, $r.Status, $(if ($cn) { \"   &lt;-- BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($r.Tief) { Write-Host (\"        Tiefenanalyse: {0}\" -f $r.Tief) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }\n            if ($r.Hash) { Write-Host (\"        https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/{0}\" -f $r.Hash) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($fremdRest.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  --- FREMD: gueltig signiert, unbekannter Hersteller, ohne Befund ({0}) ---\" -f $fremdRest.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"  (Signatur beweist nur, WER unterschrieben hat - nicht, dass die Datei harmlos ist)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        foreach ($g in ($fremdRest | Group-Object Signierer | Sort-Object Count -Descending)) {\n            $fwTxt = if ($g.Name -match $fernwartung) { '   &lt;-- FERNWARTUNG' } else { '' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n    {0}  ({1}){2}\" -f $g.Name, $g.Count, $fwTxt) -ForegroundColor $(if ($fwTxt) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' })\n            foreach ($r in ($g.Group | Sort-Object Pfad)) {\n                Write-Host (\"      {0}\" -f $r.Pfad) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                if ($r.Tief) { Write-Host (\"        Tiefenanalyse: {0}\" -f $r.Tief) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($fehler.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  --- FEHLER: {0} Dateien nicht pruefbar (gesperrt/kein Zugriff) - Liste in der CSV ---\" -f $fehler.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 5) CSV-Export ---\n    $csv = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_signaturen_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv\"\n    try {\n        $prioMap = @{}; foreach ($x in $prioritaet) { $prioMap[$x.R.Pfad] = $x.Grund }\n        $ergebnisse | Select-Object Pfad, Status, Signierer,\n            @{ n='Auffaellig'; e={ $prioMap[$_.Pfad] } },\n            @{ n='Erstellt';   e={ if ($_.Erstellt) { $_.Erstellt.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } else { '' } } },\n            Attribute, Fehler, @{ n='Tiefenanalyse'; e={ $_.Tief } },\n            @{ n='GroesseKB';  e={ if ($_.Groesse) { [Math]::Round([double]$_.Groesse / 1KB) } else { '' } } },\n            @{ n='SHA256';     e={ $_.Hash } },\n            @{ n='VirusTotal'; e={ if ($_.Hash) { 'https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/' + $_.Hash } else { '' } } } |\n            Export-Csv -Path $csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 -Delimiter ';'\n        Write-Host \"`n  Alle Ergebnisse gespeichert: $csv\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  CSV-Export fehlgeschlagen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 6) HTML-Bericht (wird direkt aus den Scan-Daten erzeugt) ---\n    try {\n        $enc   = { param($s) [System.Net.WebUtility]::HtmlEncode([string]$s) }\n        $kbTxt = { param($g) if ($g) { '{0:N0} KB' -f [Math]::Round([double]$g / 1KB) } else { '' } }\n        $ztTxt = { param($d) if ($d) { ([datetime]$d).ToString('yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm') } else { '' } }\n        $vtTxt = { param($h) if ($h) { \"VirusTotal\" } else { '' } }\n        $zeileHtml = {\n            param($r, [string]$grund, [string]$klasse)\n            $sigTxt = if ($r.Status -eq 'Valid') { 'signiert: ' + $r.Signierer } else { $r.Status }\n            \"$(&amp; $enc $r.Pfad)$(&amp; $enc $grund)$(&amp; $enc $sigTxt)$(&amp; $ztTxt $r.Erstellt)$(&amp; $kbTxt $r.Groesse)$(&amp; $enc $r.Tief)$(&amp; $vtTxt $r.Hash)\"\n        }\n        $tabKopf = '\nDateiGrundSignaturErstelltGroesseTiefenanalyseLink'\n        $os    = Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $jetzt = Get-Date\n\n        $sb = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder\n        [void]$sb.Append(@\"\n\n\nCTC Signatur-Scan - $(&amp; $enc $env:COMPUTERNAME)\n\n:root { --bg:#0f1115; --karte:#171a21; --rand:#262b36; --text:#d7dbe3; --grau:#7d8594; --rot:#ff5c5c; --gelb:#f2c14e; --gruen:#4ecb71; --blau:#5cc8ff; }\n* { box-sizing:border-box; }\nbody { margin:0; background:var(--bg); color:var(--text); font:14px/1.45 \"Segoe UI\",system-ui,sans-serif; }\nheader { padding:22px 28px; border-bottom:1px solid var(--rand); background:linear-gradient(180deg,#151924,#0f1115); }\nh1 { margin:0 0 4px; font-size:21px; } h1 span { color:var(--blau); }\n.meta { color:var(--grau); font-size:13px; }\nmain { padding:20px 28px; }\n.kacheln { display:grid; grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(140px,1fr)); gap:10px; margin-bottom:18px; }\n.kachel { background:var(--karte); border:1px solid var(--rand); border-radius:10px; padding:12px 14px; }\n.kachel b { display:block; font-size:24px; } .kachel small { color:var(--grau); }\n.k-rot b { color:var(--rot); } .k-gelb b { color:var(--gelb); } .k-gruen b { color:var(--gruen); }\n.leiste { position:sticky; top:0; z-index:5; background:var(--bg); padding:10px 0; display:flex; gap:8px; }\ninput, button { background:var(--karte); color:var(--text); border:1px solid var(--rand); border-radius:8px; padding:7px 12px; font:inherit; }\ninput { flex:1; }\ndetails { background:var(--karte); border:1px solid var(--rand); border-radius:10px; margin-bottom:12px; overflow:hidden; }\nsummary { cursor:pointer; padding:12px 16px; font-weight:600; }\nsummary small { color:var(--grau); font-weight:400; margin-left:8px; }\n.wrap { overflow-x:auto; }\ntable { width:100%; border-collapse:collapse; font-size:12.5px; }\nth { text-align:left; color:var(--grau); font-weight:600; padding:7px 10px; border-top:1px solid var(--rand); cursor:pointer; white-space:nowrap; user-select:none; }\nth:hover { color:var(--blau); }\ntd { padding:7px 10px; border-top:1px solid var(--rand); vertical-align:top; }\ntd.pfad { font-family:Consolas,\"Cascadia Mono\",monospace; word-break:break-all; min-width:320px; }\ntd.tief { color:var(--gelb); font-size:12px; max-width:420px; }\ntd.num, td.nw { white-space:nowrap; } td.num { text-align:right; }\ntr.rot td:first-child { border-left:3px solid var(--rot); } tr.rot td.pfad { color:var(--rot); }\ntr.gelb td:first-child { border-left:3px solid var(--gelb); }\ntr.grau td { color:var(--grau); } tr.grau td.tief { color:var(--gelb); }\na { color:var(--blau); } .leer { color:var(--grau); padding:10px 16px; } ul { margin:0; padding:6px 16px 12px 34px; }\nli { font-family:Consolas,monospace; font-size:12.5px; word-break:break-all; padding:2px 0; } li.rot { color:var(--rot); }\n.hinweis { color:var(--grau); font-size:12.5px; padding:6px 2px; }\n\n\n\n  \nCTC by Dark &ndash; Signatur-Scan und Tiefenanalyse\n  \nPC $(&amp; $enc $env:COMPUTERNAME) &middot; Benutzer $(&amp; $enc $env:USERNAME) &middot; $(&amp; $enc $os.Caption) $(&amp; $enc $os.Version) &middot; $($jetzt.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'))\n  Umfang: $(&amp; $enc ($wurzeln -join ', ')) &middot; Dauer $('{0:N1}' -f $uhr.Elapsed.TotalSeconds) s mit $threads Threads\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n$('{0:N0}' -f $ergebnisse.Count)gescannt (DLL/EXE/SYS)\n  \n$('{0:N0}' -f $verifiziert)gueltig signiert\n  \n$($prioritaet.Count + $phantom.Count + $typo.Count)auffaellig\n  \n$($schwach.Count)schwache Hinweise\n  \n$('{0:N0}' -f $markiert.Count)unsigniert gesamt\n  \n$($fremd.Count)unbekannte Signierer\n  \n$($fehler.Count)nicht pruefbar\n\n\n\n  \n  Alles aufAlles zu\n\n\nTipp: Auf eine Spaltenueberschrift klicken, um zu sortieren. Rot bedeutet &quot;pruefen&quot;, nicht automatisch Cheat.\n\"@)\n\n        # Phantom-DLLs und Typosquatting\n        if ($phantom.Count -gt 0 -or $typo.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append('\nPhantom-DLLs und Typosquattinggehoeren an diesen Ort nie hin\n')\n            foreach ($r in $phantom) { [void]$sb.Append(\"\n$(&amp; $enc $r.Pfad) &nbsp; [$(&amp; $enc $r.Status) | $(&amp; $enc $r.Signierer)]\") }\n            foreach ($x in $typo)    { [void]$sb.Append(\"\n$(&amp; $enc $x.Pfad) &nbsp; sieht aus wie $(&amp; $enc $x.Wie)\") }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        # Auffaellig\n        [void]$sb.Append(\"\nAuffaellig ($($prioritaet.Count))nach Prioritaet sortiert\")\n        if ($prioritaet.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append('\n' + $tabKopf)\n            foreach ($x in ($prioritaet | Sort-Object Rang, { $_.R.Pfad })) {\n                $kl = if ($x.Rang -le 2) { 'rot' } else { 'gelb' }\n                [void]$sb.Append((&amp; $zeileHtml $x.R $x.Grund $kl))\n            }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        } else { [void]$sb.Append('\nKeine auffaelligen Dateien.') }\n        [void]$sb.Append('')\n\n        # Neu installierte Programme\n        if ($neuInstall.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append(\"\nNeu installierte Programme ($($neuInstall.Count))viele neue Dateien auf einmal, letzte 14 Tage\n\")\n            foreach ($n in ($neuInstall | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending)) { [void]$sb.Append(\"\n$($n.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm')) &nbsp; $($n.Anzahl) Dateien &nbsp; $(&amp; $enc $n.Ordner)\") }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        # Schwache Hinweise\n        if ($schwach.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append(\"\nSchwache Hinweise ($($schwach.Count))in Spielen, Anti-Cheats und Installern oft legitim\n$tabKopf\")\n            foreach ($r in ($schwach | Sort-Object Pfad)) { [void]$sb.Append((&amp; $zeileHtml $r '' 'grau')) }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        # Unbekannte Signierer ohne Befund\n        if ($fremdRest.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append(\"\nUnbekannte Signierer ohne Befund ($($fremdRest.Count))Signatur beweist nur, wer unterschrieben hat\n$tabKopf\")\n            foreach ($r in ($fremdRest | Sort-Object Signierer, Pfad)) {\n                $fw = if ($r.Signierer -match $fernwartung) { 'FERNWARTUNG' } else { '' }\n                [void]$sb.Append((&amp; $zeileHtml $r $fw $(if ($fw) { 'gelb' } else { 'grau' })))\n            }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        # Weitere unsignierte Dateien\n        if ($restlich.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append(\"\nWeitere unsignierte Dateien ($('{0:N0}' -f $restlich.Count))einzeln tiefenanalysiert, ohne starken Befund\n$tabKopf\")\n            foreach ($r in ($restlich | Sort-Object Pfad)) { [void]$sb.Append((&amp; $zeileHtml $r '' 'grau')) }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        # Installer-Reste, Fehler, uebersprungene Ordner\n        if ($installerReste.Count -gt 0 -or $fehler.Count -gt 0 -or $ordnerFehler.Count -gt 0) {\n            [void]$sb.Append('\nAusgeblendet und nicht pruefbar\n')\n            foreach ($r in $installerReste) { [void]$sb.Append(\"\nInstaller-Rest: $(&amp; $enc $r.Pfad)\") }\n            foreach ($r in $fehler)         { [void]$sb.Append(\"\nFehler: $(&amp; $enc $r.Pfad) &nbsp; ($(&amp; $enc $r.Fehler))\") }\n            foreach ($o in $ordnerFehler)   { [void]$sb.Append(\"\nOrdner ohne Zugriff: $(&amp; $enc $o)\") }\n            [void]$sb.Append('')\n        }\n\n        [void]$sb.Append(@\"\n\nVollstaendige Liste aller $('{0:N0}' -f $ergebnisse.Count) Dateien: $(&amp; $enc $csv)\nGrenze: Echt signierte, aber verwundbare Treiber (BYOVD) und dateiloser Code im Speicher sind hier nicht sichtbar - dafuer Punkt 21.\n\n\nfunction suchen(q){q=q.toLowerCase();document.querySelectorAll('tbody tr, li').forEach(function(r){r.style.display=!q||r.textContent.toLowerCase().indexOf(q)&gt;=0?'':'none';});if(q){alle(true);}}\nfunction alle(o){document.querySelectorAll('details').forEach(function(d){d.open=o;});}\ndocument.querySelectorAll('table.sort th').forEach(function(th,i){th.onclick=function(){var tb=th.closest('table').tBodies[0],rs=[].slice.call(tb.rows),a=(th.getAttribute('data-a')=='1')?'0':'1';th.setAttribute('data-a',a);rs.sort(function(x,y){var p=x.cells[i].textContent,q=y.cells[i].textContent;return a=='1'?p.localeCompare(q,'de',{numeric:true}):q.localeCompare(p,'de',{numeric:true});});rs.forEach(function(r){tb.appendChild(r);});};});\n\n\n\"@)\n        $html = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_signaturen_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').html\"\n        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($html, $sb.ToString(), (New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding($false)))\n        Write-Host \"  HTML-Bericht gespeichert: $html\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        try { Start-Process $html } catch { Write-Host \"  Bitte die Datei manuell im Browser oeffnen.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host (\"  HTML-Bericht konnte nicht erstellt werden: {0}\" -f $_.Exception.Message) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Prioritaet: Cheat-Name &gt; HashMismatch &gt; Papierkorb &gt; Windows-Ordner &gt; Temp &gt; Side-Loading &gt; neu &gt; versteckt.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Die 'uebrigen' unsignierten DLLs sind meist Spiele und Tools - nur ansehen, wenn der Ordnername unbekannt ist.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Grenze: Echt signierte Treiber (BYOVD) und dateiloser Code sind hier 'sauber' -&gt; Punkte 21c und 21a.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  17 - DMA Fuser &amp; Zweiter-PC-Verbindungen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-FuserCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== DMA Fuser &amp; Zweiter-PC-Verbindungen ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Netzwerkverbindungen, windowlose Prozesse, Named Pipes, bekannte Fuser)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 17a: Bekannte Fuser-Prozessnamen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Bekannte DMA-Fuser Prozesse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $fuserNamen = @(\n        'pcileech','memflow','memprocfs','dmaclient','dmaservice',\n        'easymapi','leechcore','leechagent','fpga','dma_client',\n        'scatterclient','scatter','vmmdll','vmmsharp',\n        'winpmem','rekall','volatility','dumpit'\n    )\n    $fuserGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($n in $fuserNamen) {\n        $p = @(Get-Process -Name $n -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        if ($p.Count -gt 0) {\n            $p | ForEach-Object {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!!!] {0} (PID {1}) - {2}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Id, $_.Path) -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n            $fuserGefunden = $true\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $fuserGefunden) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine bekannten Fuser-Prozesse gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17b: Netzwerkverbindungen zu lokalen IPs (PC2-Verbindung) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Netzwerkverbindungen zu lokalen IPs (DMA PC2) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(192.168.x.x / 10.x.x.x / 172.16-31.x.x auf ungewoehnlichen Ports)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $bekanntePortsOK = @(80,443,8080,8443,3389,5985,5986,53,67,68,123,137,138,139,445,1900,5353)\n    $lokaleVerbindungen = @()\n\n    Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $remIP = $_.RemoteAddress\n        $remPort = $_.RemotePort\n        $istLokal = $remIP -match '^192\\.168\\.|^10\\.|^172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.'\n        $portUngewoehnlich = $bekanntePortsOK -notcontains $remPort\n\n        if ($istLokal -and $portUngewoehnlich) {\n            $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $lokaleVerbindungen += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                Prozess  = if ($proc) { $proc.Name } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                PID      = $_.OwningProcess\n                LokPort  = $_.LocalPort\n                RemoteIP = $remIP\n                RemPort  = $remPort\n                Pfad     = if ($proc) { $proc.Path } else { '-' }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($lokaleVerbindungen.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] $($lokaleVerbindungen.Count) Verbindungen zu lokalen IPs auf ungewoehnlichen Ports:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $lokaleVerbindungen | Sort-Object RemoteIP | ForEach-Object {\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Prozess, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Remote: {0}:{1}  (lokal Port {2})\" -f $_.RemoteIP, $_.RemPort, $_.LokPort) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad  : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen lokalen Netzwerkverbindungen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17c: Windowlose Prozesse ohne bekanntes Elternteil ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Windowlose Hintergrundprozesse (moegliche versteckte Fuser) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $systemProz = @('svchost','services','lsass','csrss','wininit','smss','System',\n                    'Registry','fontdrvhost','dwm','WmiPrvSE','spoolsv','SearchIndexer',\n                    'RuntimeBroker','ShellExperienceHost','StartMenuExperienceHost',\n                    'sihost','taskhostw','ctfmon','conhost','dllhost','audiodg',\n                    'MsMpEng','NisSrv','SecurityHealthService','TextInputHost')\n\n    $verdaechtigeProz = @()\n    Add-Type @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic class WinAPI {\n    [DllImport(\"user32.dll\")]\n    public static extern bool IsWindowVisible(IntPtr hWnd);\n    [DllImport(\"user32.dll\")]\n    public static extern IntPtr GetForegroundWindow();\n}\n\"@ -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n\n    Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.Name -notin $systemProz -and\n        $_.MainWindowHandle -eq [IntPtr]::Zero -and\n        $_.SessionId -eq (Get-Process -PID $PID).SessionId\n    } | ForEach-Object {\n        $p = $_\n        # Nur Prozesse mit Pfad und ohne Fenster die nicht bekannte Apps sind\n        if ($p.Path -and $p.Path -notmatch '(?i)\\\\Windows\\\\|\\\\Program Files\\\\|\\\\Program Files \\(x86\\)\\\\') {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $p.Path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $sig.SignerCertificate -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n            if (-not $istMS) {\n                $verdaechtigeProz += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                    Name     = $p.Name\n                    PID      = $p.Id\n                    Pfad     = $p.Path\n                    Sig      = if ($sig) { $sig.Status } else { 'Unbekannt' }\n                    Signierer= if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    if ($verdaechtigeProz.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  $($verdaechtigeProz.Count) windowlose, nicht-MS-signierte Prozesse ausserhalb Systemordner:\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        $verdaechtigeProz | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Sig -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.PID) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Pfad : {0}\" -f $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"  Sig  : {0} | {1}\" -f $_.Sig, $_.Signierer) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen windowlosen Prozesse.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17d: Named Pipes mit DMA-typischen Namen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Named Pipes (DMA/Fuser-Kommunikation) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dmaPipeMuster = 'dma|fuser|pcileech|memflow|leech|scatter|fpga|cheat|inject|overlay|radar'\n    try {\n        $pipes = @([System.IO.Directory]::GetFiles('\\\\.\\pipe\\') 2&gt;$null)\n        $verdPipes = @($pipes | Where-Object { $_ -match $dmaPipeMuster })\n        if ($verdPipes.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] Verdaechtige Named Pipes:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $verdPipes | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"  $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine DMA-typischen Named Pipes.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  (Alle Pipes: $($pipes.Count) vorhanden)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } catch {\n        # Alternativer Weg ueber Sysinternals wenn verfuegbar\n        Write-Host \"  Direkter Pipe-Zugriff nicht moeglich. Alternativ:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  handle.exe -a | findstr '\\pipe' (Sysinternals)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 17e: Autostart-Eintraege fuer Fuser ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Autostart-Eintraege (Fuser beim Boot) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $autoKeys = @(\n        'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run',\n        'HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce',\n        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce'\n    )\n    foreach ($k in $autoKeys) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $k)) { continue }\n        $vals = Get-ItemProperty $k -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $vals.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Name -notmatch '^PS' } | ForEach-Object {\n            $pfad = $_.Value -replace '\"','' -replace ' .*$',''\n            if (Test-Path $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                $istMS = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $sig.SignerCertificate -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -match '(?i)Microsoft'\n                if (-not $istMS) {\n                    $col = if ($sig -and $sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                    Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} = {1}\" -f $_.Name, $_.Value) -ForegroundColor $col\n                    Write-Host (\"      Sig: {0}\" -f $(if($sig){$sig.Status}else{'Unbekannt'})) -ForegroundColor $col\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  Autostart-Check abgeschlossen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Write-Host \"`nFuser-Erkennungs-Tipp:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Netzwerkverbindung zu 192.168.x.x auf Port &gt;10000 + windowloser Prozess = starkes Indiz.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Fuser laufen oft nur waehrend des Spiels - deshalb Pruefung waehrend aktiver Session.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 17f: Display-Analyse (HDMI-Splitter / Capture-Setup) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Display-Analyse (HDMI-Splitter / gespiegeltes Bild) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Mehr Displays als Monitore sichtbar = moeglicher Splitter oder Capture-Input)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    try {\n        $monitors = @(Get-CimInstance -Namespace root\\wmi -ClassName WmiMonitorID -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n        Write-Host (\"  Erkannte Displays: {0}\" -f $monitors.Count)\n        foreach ($m in $monitors) {\n            $hersteller = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.ManufacturerName | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '?' }\n            $modell     = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.UserFriendlyName  | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '?' }\n            $serial     = try { [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString(($m.SerialNumberID    | Where-Object {$_ -ne 0})) } catch { '' }\n            $col = 'White'\n            $hinweis = ''\n            # Typische Capture-Card oder Virtual-Display Hersteller\n            if ($hersteller -match '(?i)AVerMedia|Elgato|Magewell|Blackmagic|Datapath|DisplayLink|ITE|GENERIC|VirtualDisplay|Parsec|NoMachine') {\n                $col = 'Red'\n                $hinweis = ' [!] CAPTURE/VIRTUAL DISPLAY'\n            }\n            Write-Host (\"  {0,-8} {1,-25} Serial: {2}{3}\" -f $hersteller.Trim(), $modell.Trim(), $serial.Trim(), $hinweis) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n\n        if ($monitors.Count -gt 2) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} Displays erkannt - mehr als 2 ist ungewoehnlich fuer einen Gaming-PC.\" -f $monitors.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            Write-Host \"      Moeglicher HDMI-Splitter oder Capture-Eingang aktiv.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Display-Abfrage fehlgeschlagen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 17g: Capture-Cards und Video-Devices auf PC1 ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Capture-Cards &amp; Video-Geraete auf diesem PC ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $captureGeraete = @(Get-PnpDevice -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.Class -match '(?i)Media|Image|Camera' -and $_.Status -eq 'OK'\n    })\n    if ($captureGeraete.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($g in $captureGeraete) {\n            $istVerd = $g.FriendlyName -match '(?i)capture|hdmi|video|grabber|avermedia|elgato|magewell|blackmagic|hauppauge'\n            $col = if ($istVerd) { 'Yellow' } else { 'DarkGray' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $g.Class, $g.FriendlyName) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($istVerd) {\n                Write-Host (\"  --&gt; Capture-Device: {0}\" -f $g.InstanceId) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                Write-Host \"      Pruefe ob das Geraet fuer Cheat-Capture oder legitimes Streaming genutzt wird.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Video/Capture-Geraete gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 17h: Aktive GPU-Ausgaenge (mehr als physische Monitore) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- GPU: aktive Video-Ausgaenge ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Get-CimInstance Win32_VideoController -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        Write-Host (\"  GPU       : {0}\" -f $_.Name)\n        Write-Host (\"  Adapter   : {0}\" -f $_.AdapterCompatibility)\n        Write-Host (\"  Aufloesung: {0}x{1}\" -f $_.CurrentHorizontalResolution, $_.CurrentVerticalResolution)\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nHDMI-Splitter-Tipp:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Physische Pruefung: 2 HDMI-Kabel am Monitor (Input 1 + Input 2) ist verdaechtig.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Ein zweiter laufender PC ohne sichtbare Aktivitaet = moeglicher Cheat-PC.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Netzwerk (Punkt 17b) findet die DMA-Verbindung zwischen PC1 und PC2.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  18 - Forensische Tools herunterladen\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-ToolDownload {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Forensische Tools - Download ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Alle Tools sind kostenlos und Open Source / Freeware)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $zielOrdner = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\CTC_Tools\"\n    if (-not (Test-Path $zielOrdner)) {\n        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $zielOrdner | Out-Null\n        Write-Host \"Ordner erstellt: $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"Zielordner: $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    $tools = [ordered]@{\n        '1' = @{\n            Name   = 'Everything 1.4 (Blitzschnelle Dateisuche)'\n            URL    = 'https://www.voidtools.com/Everything-1.4.1.1024.x64.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Findet DLLs, .sys-Dateien und Cheat-Dateien sofort'\n        }\n        '2' = @{\n            Name   = 'System Informer (Prozesse, Handles, Netzwerk)'\n            URL    = 'github_latest'\n            Repo   = 'winsiderss/systeminformer'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt geladene DLLs, Named Pipes und versteckte Prozesse'\n        }\n        '3' = @{\n            Name   = 'Autoruns (Alle Autostart-Eintraege)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Autoruns.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt JEDEN Autostart-Eintrag - Fuser-Erkennung'\n        }\n        '4' = @{\n            Name   = 'Process Monitor (Live Datei/Registry/Netzwerk)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/ProcessMonitor.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt phantom DLL-Suchen in Echtzeit (DLL Hijacking live)'\n        }\n        '5' = @{\n            Name   = 'TCPView (Netzwerkverbindungen live)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/TCPView.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Fuser-Verbindungen zu PC2 in Echtzeit sehen'\n        }\n        '6' = @{\n            Name   = 'Handle (Named Pipes &amp; Handles)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Handle.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Zeigt alle Named Pipes - DMA Fuser Kommunikation'\n        }\n        '7' = @{\n            Name   = 'Strings (Strings aus Binaerdateien extrahieren)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.sysinternals.com/files/Strings.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Wie im WptsExtensions.dll Fund - inject/manualmap Strings sehen'\n        }\n        '8' = @{\n            Name   = 'Hollows Hunter (Injizierte Module finden)'\n            URL    = 'github_latest'\n            Repo   = 'hasherezade/hollows_hunter'\n            Zip    = $false\n            Tipp   = 'Findet reflective injection und manual mapped Code in Prozessen'\n        }\n        '9' = @{\n            Name   = 'SrumECmd (Netzwerkverkehr pro Programm, rueckwirkend)'\n            URL    = 'https://download.ericzimmermanstools.com/net9/SrumECmd.zip'\n            Zip    = $true\n            Tipp   = 'Fuer Punkt 20: Netzwerkverkehr auch geloeschter Programme. Braucht .NET 9 Runtime. Falls Download scheitert: ericzimmerman.github.io'\n        }\n        'A' = @{ Name = 'Alle Tools herunterladen'; URL = ''; Zip = $false; Tipp = '' }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  Verfuegbare Tools:\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    foreach ($k in $tools.Keys) {\n        if ($k -eq 'A') {\n            Write-Host \"`n  [A] Alle herunterladen\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        } else {\n            $t = $tools[$k]\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $k, $t.Name) -ForegroundColor White\n            Write-Host (\"      --&gt; {0}\" -f $t.Tipp) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  [Q] Abbrechen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $wahl = (Read-Host \"`nAuswahl\").Trim().ToUpper()\n    if ($wahl -eq 'Q') { return }\n\n    $zuLaden = if ($wahl -eq 'A') { $tools.Keys | Where-Object { $_ -ne 'A' } } else { @($wahl) }\n\n    foreach ($k in $zuLaden) {\n        if (-not $tools.ContainsKey($k)) { Write-Host \"Unbekannte Auswahl: $k\" -ForegroundColor Red; continue }\n        $tool = $tools[$k]\n        Write-Host (\"`n[{0}] Lade {1}...\" -f $k, $tool.Name) -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n        $url = $tool.URL\n\n        # GitHub Latest Release URL holen\n        if ($url -eq 'github_latest') {\n            try {\n                Write-Host \"  GitHub Release API abfragen...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $apiUrl = \"https://api.github.com/repos/$($tool.Repo)/releases/latest\"\n                $release = Invoke-RestMethod $apiUrl -Headers @{'User-Agent'='CTC-by-Dark'} -ErrorAction Stop\n                # Passende Asset-URL finden (x64, Windows)\n                $asset = $release.assets | Where-Object {\n                    $_.name -match '(?i)x64|amd64|win64' -and\n                    $_.name -match '(?i)\\.zip$|\\.exe$' -and\n                    $_.name -notmatch '(?i)debug|pdb|symbols'\n                } | Select-Object -First 1\n\n                if ($asset) {\n                    $url = $asset.browser_download_url\n                    Write-Host (\"  Version: {0} | Asset: {1}\" -f $release.tag_name, $asset.name) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                } else {\n                    Write-Host \"  Kein passendes Asset gefunden. Bitte manuell herunterladen:\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                    Write-Host (\"  https://github.com/{0}/releases\" -f $tool.Repo) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                    continue\n                }\n            } catch {\n                Write-Host (\"  GitHub-Abfrage fehlgeschlagen: {0}\" -f $_) -ForegroundColor Red\n                Write-Host (\"  Manuell: https://github.com/{0}/releases\" -f $tool.Repo) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                continue\n            }\n        }\n\n        # Dateiname aus URL\n        $dateiName = [System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($url)\n        $zielPfad  = Join-Path $zielOrdner $dateiName\n\n        try {\n            Write-Host (\"  Download: {0}\" -f $url) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $url -OutFile $zielPfad -UseBasicParsing -ErrorAction Stop\n            Write-Host (\"  Gespeichert: {0}\" -f $zielPfad) -ForegroundColor Green\n\n            # ZIP entpacken\n            if ($tool.Zip -and $dateiName -match '\\.zip$') {\n                $extraktOrdner = Join-Path $zielOrdner ([System.IO.Path]::GetFileNameWithoutExtension($dateiName))\n                if (-not (Test-Path $extraktOrdner)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $extraktOrdner | Out-Null }\n                Expand-Archive -Path $zielPfad -DestinationPath $extraktOrdner -Force\n                Remove-Item $zielPfad -Force\n                Write-Host (\"  Entpackt: {0}\" -f $extraktOrdner) -ForegroundColor Green\n            }\n        } catch {\n            Write-Host (\"  Fehler: {0}\" -f $_) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"  Manuell herunterladen: {0}\" -f $url) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n======================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  Tools gespeichert in:\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  $zielOrdner\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"======================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"Empfohlene Reihenfolge fuer eine Analyse:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  1. Autoruns    - Was startet beim Boot?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  2. TCPView     - Welche Verbindungen laufen?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  3. ProcMon     - Welche DLLs werden gesucht?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  4. SysInformer - Was ist in den Prozessen geladen?\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  5. Everything  - Verdaechtige Dateien suchen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  6. HollowsHunter - Injizierte Module aufdecken\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  19 - Session-Rekonstruktion: Was lief nach der Fernwartung?\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-SessionTimeline {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Session-Rekonstruktion (Timeline nach Fernwartung) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Alle Quellen chronologisch: Programme, PowerShell, Defender, Dienste, neue/geloeschte Dateien)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $fwMuster  = 'rustdesk|anydesk|teamviewer|parsec|ultraviewer|splashtop|supremo|getscreen|aeroadmin'\n    $eigenCode = 'CTC by Dark|CatchTheCheat|CTC_by_Dark|pnpcheck\\.ps1|ctcbydark|analystdark|Invoke-SessionTimeline'\n    $verdPS    = '(?i)-enc\\b|-encodedcommand|-e\\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20}|hidden|\\biex\\b|invoke-expression|downloadstring|downloadfile|\\birm\\b|\\biwr\\b|invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|https?://|add-mppreference|set-mppreference|frombase64|reflection\\.assembly|start-bitstransfer|certutil|bypass'\n\n    $kurz = {\n        param([string]$m, [int]$n = 180)\n        $m2 = ($m -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()\n        if ($m2.Length -gt $n) { $m2.Substring(0,$n) + ' [...]' } else { $m2 }\n    }\n\n    # --- Hilfsmittel: Device-Pfad -&gt; Laufwerk, Registry-Key-Zeitstempel ---\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcDos {\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastError = true)]\n    public static extern uint QueryDosDevice(string lpDeviceName, StringBuilder lpTargetPath, int ucchMax);\n}\n\"@\n    $sigRQ3 = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sigRQ3 -Name RK3 -Namespace W3 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $keyZeit = {\n        param($pfad)\n        try {\n            $k = Get-Item $pfad -ErrorAction Stop\n            $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n            [void][W3.RK3]::RegQueryInfoKey($k.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n            [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n        } catch { $null }\n    }\n\n    $devMap = @{}\n    foreach ($cc in 67..90) {\n        $lw = ([string][char]$cc) + ':'\n        $sb = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder 260\n        try { if ([CtcDos]::QueryDosDevice($lw, $sb, 260) -gt 0) { $devMap[$sb.ToString()] = $lw } } catch {}\n    }\n    $konvDev = {\n        param([string]$p)\n        foreach ($k in $devMap.Keys) {\n            if ($p.StartsWith($k + '\\', [StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { return ($devMap[$k] + $p.Substring($k.Length)) }\n        }\n        return $p\n    }\n\n    # --- BAM einlesen (jede ausgefuehrte EXE mit letzter Laufzeit, ueberlebt Loeschen) ---\n    $bam = @()\n    foreach ($root in @('HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings','HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\bam\\UserSettings')) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $root)) { continue }\n        foreach ($sidKey in (Get-ChildItem $root -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {\n            $props = Get-ItemProperty $sidKey.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $props) { continue }\n            foreach ($pr in $props.PSObject.Properties) {\n                if ($pr.Name -notlike '\\Device\\*') { continue }\n                $b = $pr.Value\n                if (-not ($b -is [byte[]]) -or $b.Length -lt 8) { continue }\n                $bam += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit = [DateTime]::FromFileTime([BitConverter]::ToInt64($b,0)); Pfad = (&amp; $konvDev $pr.Name) }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # Schritt 1: Start der Fernwartung finden\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Schritt 1: Fernwartungs-Start finden ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $anker = @()\n    foreach ($e in ($bam | Where-Object { $_.Pfad -match $fwMuster })) {\n        $anker += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$e.Zeit; Quelle='BAM (letzter Start)'; Info=$e.Pfad }\n    }\n    Get-ChildItem \"$env:SystemRoot\\Prefetch\\*.pf\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match $fwMuster } | ForEach-Object {\n        $anker += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.CreationTime;  Quelle='Prefetch (erster Start)'; Info=$_.Name }\n        $anker += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.LastWriteTime; Quelle='Prefetch (letzter Start)'; Info=$_.Name }\n    }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall';Id=2004,2071,2097} -MaxEvents 2000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Message -match $fwMuster } | ForEach-Object {\n            $anker += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.TimeCreated; Quelle='Firewall-Regel angelegt'; Info=(&amp; $kurz $_.Message 110) }\n        }\n    $rdLogs = @(\"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Roaming\\RustDesk\\log\",\n                \"$env:SystemRoot\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Roaming\\RustDesk\\log\",\n                \"$env:ProgramData\\RustDesk\")\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $rdLogs += (Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\RustDesk\\log') }\n    foreach ($lp in $rdLogs) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $lp)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $lp -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $anker += [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.LastWriteTime; Quelle='RustDesk-Log'; Info=$_.FullName }\n        }\n    }\n\n    $anker = @($anker | Sort-Object Zeit)\n    $standardStart = $null\n    if ($anker.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Gefundene Fernwartungs-Spuren:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($a in $anker) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1,-26} {2}\" -f $a.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm:ss'), $a.Quelle, $a.Info) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        $standardStart = $anker[0].Zeit.AddMinutes(-15)\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Fernwartungs-Spuren gefunden (BAM, Prefetch, Firewall, RustDesk-Logs).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"  Startzeit bitte manuell eingeben (z. B. den Zeitpunkt, den der Spieler nennt).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    $vorschlag = if ($standardStart) { $standardStart.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } else { 'keiner' }\n    $eingabe = Read-Host \"`nStartzeit der Timeline (Enter = $vorschlag | Format: 21.09.2026 20:15)\"\n    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($eingabe)) {\n        if (-not $standardStart) { Write-Host \"Keine Startzeit - Abbruch.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow; return }\n        $von = $standardStart\n    } else {\n        $dtIn = [DateTime]::MinValue\n        if (-not [DateTime]::TryParse($eingabe, [Globalization.CultureInfo]::GetCultureInfo('de-DE'), [Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::None, [ref]$dtIn)) {\n            Write-Host \"Datum nicht erkannt: $eingabe\" -ForegroundColor Red; return\n        }\n        $von = $dtIn\n    }\n    $hIn = Read-Host \"Zeitfenster in Stunden (Enter = 6)\"\n    $stunden = 6\n    if ($hIn -match '^\\d+$') { $stunden = [int]$hIn }\n    $bis = $von.AddHours($stunden)\n    Write-Host (\"`n  Zeitfenster: {0} bis {1}\" -f $von.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'), $bis.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm')) -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # Schritt 2: Alle Quellen im Zeitfenster sammeln\n    # ============================================================\n    $tl  = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[object]\n    $eigenStarts   = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[datetime]\n    $addTypeMuster = '(?i)^[a-z0-9]{8}\\.(dll|pdb|cs|0\\.cs|cmdline|out|err)$'\n    $mbInstalliert = Test-Path \"$env:ProgramData\\Malwarebytes\"\n    $nahEigen = {\n        param($z)\n        foreach ($es in $eigenStarts) { $d = ($z - $es).TotalSeconds; if ($d -ge -5 -and $d -le 300) { return $true } }\n        return $false\n    }\n    $add = {\n        param($z, [string]$q, [string]$i, [string]$s)\n        if ($z -and $z -ge $von -and $z -le $bis) { $tl.Add([PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$z; Quelle=$q; Info=$i; Stufe=$s }) }\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  Sammle Spuren...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # a) BAM\n    foreach ($e in $bam) {\n        if ($e.Zeit -lt $von -or $e.Zeit -gt $bis) { continue }\n        $weg  = ($e.Pfad -match '^[A-Z]:\\\\') -and -not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $e.Pfad)\n        $info = $e.Pfad; if ($weg) { $info += '  [GELOESCHT]' }\n        $s = 'Info'\n        if ($e.Pfad -match $fwMuster) { $s = 'Rot' }\n        elseif ($weg -or $e.Pfad -match '(?i)\\\\(Temp|Downloads|Desktop)\\\\') { $s = 'Gelb' }\n        &amp; $add $e.Zeit 'Programm (BAM)' $info $s\n    }\n\n    # b) Prefetch\n    $lolbins = '(?i)^(POWERSHELL|PWSH|CMD|WSCRIPT|CSCRIPT|MSHTA|RUNDLL32|REGSVR32|CERTUTIL|BITSADMIN|CURL|SC|REG|SCHTASKS|WEVTUTIL|BCDEDIT|NET|NET1|WMIC)\\.EXE$'\n    Get-ChildItem \"$env:SystemRoot\\Prefetch\\*.pf\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $exe = $_.BaseName -replace '-[0-9A-F]{8}$',''\n        $s = if ($exe -match $fwMuster) { 'Rot' } elseif ($exe -match $lolbins) { 'Gelb' } else { 'Info' }\n        &amp; $add $_.CreationTime 'Prefetch (erster Start)' $exe $s\n        if ($_.LastWriteTime -ne $_.CreationTime) { &amp; $add $_.LastWriteTime 'Prefetch (letzter Start)' $exe $s }\n    }\n\n    # c) PowerShell-Starts (EID 400/600 HostApplication)\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Windows PowerShell';Id=400,600;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        if ($_.Message -match 'HostApplication=(.+?)(\\r?\\n|$)') {\n            $cmd = $matches[1].Trim()\n            if ($cmd -match $eigenCode) { $eigenStarts.Add($_.TimeCreated); return }\n            $s = if ($cmd -match $verdPS) { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated 'PowerShell-Start' (&amp; $kurz $cmd 220) $s\n        }\n    }\n\n    # d) PowerShell-Code (EID 4104)\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';Id=4104;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        $d  = ([xml]$ev.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n        $nr   = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'MessageNumber' }).'#text'\n        $code = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ScriptBlockText' }).'#text'\n        if ($nr -ne '1' -or -not $code) { return }\n        if ($code -match $eigenCode -or $code -match '^\\s*#requires -version 3\\.0' -or $code -match 'PSConsoleHostReadLine') { return }\n        $s = if ($code -match $verdPS) { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n        &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'PowerShell-Code (4104)' (&amp; $kurz $code 220) $s\n    }\n\n    # e) Microsoft Defender\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational';Id=1116,1117,1118,1119,5001,5004,5007,5010,5012,5013;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        $m  = $ev.Message\n        $info = switch ($ev.Id) {\n            { $_ -in 1116,1117,1118,1119 } { 'Erkennung/Aktion: ' + (&amp; $kurz $m 200) }\n            5001 { 'ECHTZEITSCHUTZ DEAKTIVIERT' }\n            5004 { 'Echtzeitschutz-Konfiguration geaendert' }\n            5007 { if ($m -match '(New value|Neuer Wert):\\s*(.+?)(\\r?\\n|$)') { 'Konfig geaendert -&gt; ' + $matches[2].Trim() } else { 'Konfig geaendert: ' + (&amp; $kurz $m 160) } }\n            5010 { 'Malware-Scan deaktiviert' }\n            5012 { 'Virenscan deaktiviert' }\n            5013 { 'Manipulationsschutz hat Aenderung blockiert' }\n            default { &amp; $kurz $m 160 }\n        }\n        $s = if ($ev.Id -in 5001,5010,5012 -or $info -match '(?i)Exclusion') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n        &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'Defender' $info $s\n    }\n\n    # f) Dienste / Treiber installiert (System 7045)\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=7045;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        $d  = ([xml]$ev.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n        $n   = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ServiceName' }).'#text'\n        $img = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ImagePath' }).'#text'\n        $typ = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ServiceType' }).'#text'\n        $s = if ($typ -match '(?i)kernel|treiber' -or $img -notmatch '(?i)\\\\Windows\\\\|\\\\Program Files') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n        &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'Dienst installiert' (\"{0} | {1} | {2}\" -f $n, $typ, $img) $s\n    }\n\n    # g) Geplante Aufgaben + Security-Log (falls Auditing aktiv)\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational';Id=106,140,141;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated 'Geplante Aufgabe' (&amp; $kurz $_.Message 180) 'Gelb'\n    }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';Id=4688,4698,1102;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -MaxEvents 5000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        if ($ev.Id -eq 4688) {\n            $d  = ([xml]$ev.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data\n            $np = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'NewProcessName' }).'#text'\n            $cl = ($d | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'CommandLine' }).'#text'\n            $txt = if ($cl) { $cl } else { $np }\n            if ($txt -match $eigenCode) { return }\n            $s = if ($txt -match $verdPS) { 'Rot' } elseif ($txt -match '(?i)powershell|cmd\\.exe|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|curl') { 'Gelb' } else { 'Info' }\n            &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'Prozess (4688)' (&amp; $kurz $txt 220) $s\n        } elseif ($ev.Id -eq 4698) {\n            &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'Aufgabe erstellt (4698)' (&amp; $kurz $ev.Message 180) 'Rot'\n        } else {\n            &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated 'SECURITY-LOG GELEERT' '1102' 'Rot'\n        }\n    }\n\n    # h) Log geleert, Zeit verstellt, Firewall, CodeIntegrity, Geraete\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=104;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated 'LOG GELEERT' ([string]$_.Properties[2].Value) 'Rot'\n    }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System';Id=1;ProviderName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General';StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $pn = (([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ProcessName' }).'#text'\n        if ($pn -notmatch '(?i)svchost\\.exe$') { &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated 'Systemzeit geaendert' (\"durch \" + $pn) 'Rot' }\n    }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall';Id=2004,2006,2052,2071,2097;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $s = if ($_.Message -match $fwMuster) { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n        $q = if ($_.Id -in 2006,2052) { 'Firewall-Regel geloescht' } else { 'Firewall-Regel angelegt' }\n        &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated $q (&amp; $kurz $_.Message 160) $s\n    }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational';Id=3033,3034,3077;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Message -notmatch '(?i)mbae|mbamsi|mbamswissarmy|hmpalert' } | ForEach-Object {\n            &amp; $add $_.TimeCreated 'CodeIntegrity blockiert' (&amp; $kurz $_.Message 180) 'Rot'\n        }\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP/Configuration';Id=400,420;StartTime=$von;EndTime=$bis} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        $dev = (([xml]$ev.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'DeviceInstanceId' }).'#text'\n        if (-not $dev -or $dev -match 'MMDEVAPI') { return }\n        $s = if ($dev -match '(?i)VID_1A86|VID_303A|VID_2341|VID_0000|VID_301A|^PCI\\\\') { 'Gelb' } else { 'Info' }\n        $q = if ($ev.Id -eq 420) { 'Geraet entfernt' } else { 'Geraet konfiguriert' }\n        &amp; $add $ev.TimeCreated $q $dev $s\n    }\n\n    # i) PowerShell-History-Dateien, die im Fenster geschrieben wurden (inkl. SYSTEM-Profil)\n    $histDateien = @()\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $histDateien += [PSCustomObject]@{ Wer=$_.Name; Pfad=(Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt') }\n    }\n    $sysProfile = [ordered]@{\n        'SYSTEM'         = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\"\n        'SYSTEM (32bit)' = \"$env:SystemRoot\\SysWOW64\\config\\systemprofile\"\n        'LocalService'   = \"$env:SystemRoot\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\"\n        'NetworkService' = \"$env:SystemRoot\\ServiceProfiles\\NetworkService\"\n    }\n    foreach ($k in $sysProfile.Keys) {\n        $histDateien += [PSCustomObject]@{ Wer=$k; Pfad=(Join-Path $sysProfile[$k] 'AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt') }\n    }\n    foreach ($h in $histDateien) {\n        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $h.Pfad) {\n            $fi = Get-Item -LiteralPath $h.Pfad -Force\n            $s = if ($h.Wer -match 'SYSTEM|Service') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            &amp; $add $fi.LastWriteTime 'PS-History geschrieben' (\"{0} ({1} Bytes)\" -f $h.Wer, $fi.Length) $s\n        }\n    }\n\n    # j) Win+R Verlauf (RunMRU) - letzter Eintrag hat Zeitstempel\n    $runEintraege = @()\n    Get-ChildItem 'Registry::HKEY_USERS' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.PSChildName -match '^S-1-5-21-[\\d-]+$' } | ForEach-Object {\n        $sidAkt = $_.PSChildName\n        $rk = \"Registry::HKEY_USERS\\$sidAkt\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\RunMRU\"\n        if (-not (Test-Path $rk)) { return }\n        $p = Get-ItemProperty $rk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if (-not $p -or -not $p.MRUList) { return }\n        $letzte = &amp; $keyZeit $rk\n        $pos = 0\n        foreach ($ch in $p.MRUList.ToCharArray()) {\n            $wert = ([string]$p.([string]$ch)) -replace '\\\\1$',''\n            $runEintraege += [PSCustomObject]@{ SID=$sidAkt; Pos=$pos; Wert=$wert; Zeit=$(if ($pos -eq 0) { $letzte } else { $null }) }\n            $pos++\n        }\n        $erster = $runEintraege | Where-Object { $_.SID -eq $sidAkt -and $_.Pos -eq 0 } | Select-Object -First 1\n        if ($letzte -and $erster) {\n            $s = if ($erster.Wert -match $verdPS -or $erster.Wert -match '(?i)powershell|cmd|mshta') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            &amp; $add $letzte 'Win+R (letzte Eingabe)' $erster.Wert $s\n        }\n    }\n\n    # j2) Geplante Aufgaben direkt aus System32\\Tasks (Task-Log ist standardmaessig deaktiviert)\n    $taskRoot = \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\Tasks\"\n    Get-ChildItem $taskRoot -Recurse -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $f = $_\n        $cmdT = ''\n        try {\n            [xml]$tx = Get-Content -LiteralPath $f.FullName -Raw -ErrorAction Stop\n            $ex = @($tx.Task.Actions.Exec)[0]\n            if ($ex) { $cmdT = (\"{0} {1}\" -f $ex.Command, $ex.Arguments).Trim() }\n        } catch {}\n        $s = if ($cmdT -match $verdPS -or $cmdT -match '(?i)\\\\Temp\\\\|\\\\AppData\\\\|\\\\ProgramData\\\\|\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\|powershell|cmd\\.exe|mshta|rundll32') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n        $kurzName = $f.FullName.Substring($taskRoot.Length)\n        &amp; $add $f.CreationTime 'Aufgabe angelegt' (\"{0} -&gt; {1}\" -f $kurzName, $cmdT) $s\n        if ($f.LastWriteTime -ne $f.CreationTime) { &amp; $add $f.LastWriteTime 'Aufgabe geaendert' (\"{0} -&gt; {1}\" -f $kurzName, $cmdT) $s }\n    }\n\n    # k) Neu angelegte Dateien im Fenster\n    Write-Host \"  Suche neu angelegte Dateien im Zeitfenster...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $extMuster = '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|ps1|bat|cmd|vbs|js|hta|msi|zip|rar|7z|asi|lua)$'\n    $orte = @(\"$env:ProgramData\", \"$env:SystemRoot\\Temp\", \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\", \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\wbem\")\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $orte += @((Join-Path $_.FullName 'Desktop'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'Downloads'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'Documents'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData'))\n    }\n    foreach ($ort in $orte) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $ort)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $ort -Recurse -Depth 4 -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n            Where-Object { $_.Name -match $extMuster -and (($_.CreationTime -ge $von -and $_.CreationTime -le $bis) -or ($_.LastWriteTime -ge $von -and $_.LastWriteTime -le $bis)) } |\n            ForEach-Object {\n                $z = if ($_.CreationTime -ge $von -and $_.CreationTime -le $bis) { $_.CreationTime } else { $_.LastWriteTime }\n                if ($_.FullName -match '(?i)\\\\Malwarebytes\\\\|\\\\Windows Defender\\\\') { return }\n                if ($_.FullName -match $eigenCode) { return }\n                if ($_.Name -match $addTypeMuster -and (&amp; $nahEigen $z)) { return }\n                $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                $st  = if ($sig) { [string]$sig.Status } else { '?' }\n                $s = if ($st -ne 'Valid') { 'Rot' } else { 'Info' }\n                &amp; $add $z 'Datei angelegt' (\"{0}  [Sig: {1}]\" -f $_.FullName, $st) $s\n            }\n    }\n    Get-ChildItem \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\" -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.Name -match $extMuster -and $_.CreationTime -ge $von -and $_.CreationTime -le $bis } | ForEach-Object {\n            $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $_.FullName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $st  = if ($sig) { [string]$sig.Status } else { '?' }\n            $s = if ($st -ne 'Valid') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            &amp; $add $_.CreationTime 'Datei in System32' (\"{0}  [Sig: {1}]\" -f $_.FullName, $st) $s\n        }\n\n    # l) USN-Journal (optional) - zeigt auch GELOESCHTE Dateien\n    $usnWahl = Read-Host \"`nUSN-Journal durchsuchen? Zeigt auch GELOESCHTE Dateien im Zeitfenster (1-5 Min) [j/N]\"\n    if ($usnWahl -match '^[jJyY]') {\n        Write-Host \"  Lese USN-Journal (C:)...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        $kopf = @(&amp; fsutil usn readjournal C: csv 2&gt;$null | Select-Object -First 8)\n        $hdrZeile = $kopf | Where-Object { $_ -match ',' -and $_ -match '(?i)usn' } | Select-Object -First 1\n        if (-not $hdrZeile) {\n            Write-Host \"  USN-Journal nicht lesbar (deaktiviert, geloescht oder fsutil zu alt).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        } else {\n            $cols = @($hdrZeile -split ',' | ForEach-Object { $_.Trim().Trim('\"') })\n            $iName = -1; $iGrund = -1; $iZeit = -1\n            for ($c = 0; $c -lt $cols.Count; $c++) {\n                if ($iName  -lt 0 -and $cols[$c] -match '(?i)^(file ?name|dateiname)$') { $iName = $c }\n                if ($iGrund -lt 0 -and $cols[$c] -match '(?i)^(reason|grund|ursache)$') { $iGrund = $c }\n                if ($iZeit  -lt 0 -and $cols[$c] -match '(?i)^(time ?stamp|zeitstempel)$') { $iZeit = $c }\n            }\n            if ($iName -lt 0 -or $iZeit -lt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"  USN-Spalten nicht erkannt: $hdrZeile\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            } else {\n                $usnExt = '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|ps1|bat|cmd|vbs|js|hta|msi|zip|rar|7z|asi)\\b'\n                $zeilen = @(&amp; fsutil usn readjournal C: csv 2&gt;$null | Select-String -Pattern $usnExt | ForEach-Object { $_.Line })\n                Write-Host (\"  {0} Journal-Eintraege mit ausfuehrbaren Endungen - filtere Zeitfenster...\" -f $zeilen.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $hdrNamen = @(0..($cols.Count - 1) | ForEach-Object { \"c$_\" })\n                $usnN = 0\n                foreach ($r in ($zeilen | ConvertFrom-Csv -Header $hdrNamen)) {\n                    $werte = @($r.PSObject.Properties.Value)\n                    $dtU = [DateTime]::MinValue\n                    if (-not [DateTime]::TryParse([string]$werte[$iZeit], [ref]$dtU)) { continue }\n                    if ($dtU -lt $von -or $dtU -gt $bis) { continue }\n                    $grund = if ($iGrund -ge 0) { [string]$werte[$iGrund] } else { '' }\n                    # 'l.{1,2}sch' faengt 'loeschen' auch bei kaputter Umlaut-Kodierung der deutschen fsutil-Ausgabe\n                    if ($grund -notmatch '(?i)create|delete|rename|erstell|l.{1,2}sch|umbenenn') { continue }\n                    $name = [string]$werte[$iName]\n                    if ($name -match '^~|\\.tmp$') { continue }\n                    if ($name -notmatch '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|ps1|bat|cmd|vbs|js|hta|msi|zip|rar|7z|asi)$') { continue }\n                    if ($name -match '(?i)^__PSScriptPolicyTest_') { continue }\n                    if ($mbInstalliert -and $name -match '(?i)^[0-9a-f]{32}\\.zip$') { continue }\n                    if ($name -match $eigenCode) { continue }\n                    $istLoesch = $grund -match '(?i)delete|l.{1,2}sch'\n                    $quelleU = if ($istLoesch) { 'USN: GELOESCHT' } else { 'USN-Journal' }\n                    if ($name -match $addTypeMuster) {\n                        if (&amp; $nahEigen $dtU) { continue }\n                        $quelleU = 'USN: C#-Kompilat (Add-Type)'\n                        $s = 'Rot'\n                    } else {\n                        $s = if ($istLoesch -and $name -match '(?i)\\.(exe|ps1|bat|cmd|vbs|js|hta|sys|zip|rar|7z|asi)$') { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n                    }\n                    &amp; $add $dtU $quelleU (\"{0}  ({1})\" -f $name, (&amp; $kurz $grund 60)) $s\n                    $usnN++\n                }\n                Write-Host \"  $usnN USN-Eintraege im Zeitfenster uebernommen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # Schritt 3: Timeline ausgeben + exportieren\n    # ============================================================\n    foreach ($eintrag in $tl) {\n        $cn = Get-CheatName $eintrag.Info\n        if ($cn) { $eintrag.Stufe = 'Rot'; $eintrag.Quelle = \"CHEAT-NAME '$cn' | \" + $eintrag.Quelle }\n    }\n    $ergebnis = @($tl | Group-Object { '{0}|{1}|{2}' -f $_.Zeit.ToString('yyyyMMddHHmmss'), $_.Quelle, $_.Info } | ForEach-Object { $_.Group[0] } | Sort-Object Zeit)\n    $nRot  = @($ergebnis | Where-Object { $_.Stufe -eq 'Rot' }).Count\n    $nGelb = @($ergebnis | Where-Object { $_.Stufe -eq 'Gelb' }).Count\n    Write-Host (\"`n=== Timeline: {0} Eintraege | {1} rot | {2} gelb ===\" -f $ergebnis.Count, $nRot, $nGelb) -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    $nurWichtig = Read-Host \"Nur rote und gelbe Eintraege anzeigen? [J/n]\"\n    $zeigen = if ($nurWichtig -match '^[nN]') { $ergebnis } else { @($ergebnis | Where-Object { $_.Stufe -ne 'Info' }) }\n    foreach ($e in $zeigen) {\n        $col = switch ($e.Stufe) { 'Rot' { 'Red' } 'Gelb' { 'Yellow' } default { 'DarkGray' } }\n        Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1,-24} {2}\" -f $e.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM HH:mm:ss'), $e.Quelle, $e.Info) -ForegroundColor $col\n    }\n    $csv = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_timeline_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv\"\n    try {\n        $ergebnis | Select-Object @{n='Zeit';e={ $_.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm:ss') }}, Quelle, Stufe, Info |\n            Export-Csv -Path $csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 -Delimiter ';'\n        Write-Host \"`n  Vollstaendige Timeline gespeichert: $csv\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  CSV-Export fehlgeschlagen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # Schritt 4: Zeitunabhaengige Einrichtungs-Spuren\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Einrichtungs-Spuren (unabhaengig vom Zeitfenster) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Microsoft Defender: Status &amp; Ausnahmen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    try {\n        $st = Get-MpComputerStatus -ErrorAction Stop\n        $avs = @(Get-CimInstance -Namespace 'root/SecurityCenter2' -ClassName AntiVirusProduct -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -ExpandProperty displayName)\n        $fremdAV = @($avs | Where-Object { $_ -notmatch '(?i)Windows Defender|Microsoft Defender' })\n        $colSt = if ($st.RealTimeProtectionEnabled -or $fremdAV.Count -gt 0) { 'Green' } else { 'Red' }\n        Write-Host (\"  Echtzeitschutz: {0} | Manipulationsschutz: {1} | Dienst: {2}\" -f $st.RealTimeProtectionEnabled, $st.IsTamperProtected, $st.AMServiceEnabled) -ForegroundColor $colSt\n        if ($avs.Count -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"  Registrierter Virenschutz: {0}\" -f ($avs -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        if (-not $st.RealTimeProtectionEnabled) {\n            if ($fremdAV.Count -gt 0) {\n                Write-Host \"  Defender ist passiv, weil ein anderer Virenschutz aktiv ist - normal.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            } else {\n                Write-Host \"  [!] Echtzeitschutz AUS und kein anderer Virenschutz - Defender wurde abgeschaltet!\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Defender-Status nicht abfragbar (anderer Virenschutz aktiv?).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    try {\n        $mp = Get-MpPreference -ErrorAction Stop\n        $ausn = @()\n        foreach ($feld in 'ExclusionPath','ExclusionProcess','ExclusionExtension','ExclusionIpAddress') {\n            foreach ($v in @($mp.$feld)) { if ($v -and $v -notmatch '^N/A') { $ausn += [PSCustomObject]@{ Typ=$feld; Wert=$v } } }\n        }\n        if ($ausn.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host \"  [!] $($ausn.Count) Defender-Ausnahme(n):\" -ForegroundColor Red\n            $ausn | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"    {0,-20} {1}\" -f $_.Typ, $_.Wert) -ForegroundColor Red }\n            Write-Host \"    Ausnahmen fuer Temp/AppData/ProgramData oder einzelne EXEs = typischer Schritt beim Cheat-Einrichten.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"  Keine Defender-Ausnahmen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        }\n    } catch {\n        Write-Host \"  Defender-Ausnahmen nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Ausfuehren-Dialog (Win+R), neueste zuerst ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    if ($runEintraege.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($r in $runEintraege) {\n            $col = if ($r.Wert -match $verdPS -or $r.Wert -match '(?i)powershell|cmd|mshta|%temp%|appdata') { 'Red' } else { 'White' }\n            $zeitTxt = if ($r.Zeit) { \" (zuletzt {0})\" -f $r.Zeit } else { '' }\n            Write-Host (\"    {0}{1}\" -f $r.Wert, $zeitTxt) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Kein Win+R-Verlauf (leer oder geloescht).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`n--- PowerShell-History in System- und Dienstprofilen ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Befehle, die als SYSTEM liefen - z. B. ueber einen Fernwartungsdienst - landen NICHT in C:\\Users)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sysGefunden = $false\n    foreach ($h in ($histDateien | Where-Object { $_.Wer -match 'SYSTEM|Service' })) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $h.Pfad)) { continue }\n        $sysGefunden = $true\n        $fi = Get-Item -LiteralPath $h.Pfad -Force\n        Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} - geaendert {1}:\" -f $h.Wer, $fi.LastWriteTime) -ForegroundColor Red\n        Get-Content -LiteralPath $h.Pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -Last 50 | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_ -match $verdPS) { 'Red' } else { 'White' }\n            Write-Host \"    $_\" -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n    }\n    if (-not $sysGefunden) { Write-Host \"  Keine History in System-/Dienstprofilen.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Typischer Ablauf: Fernwartung startet -&gt; Defender-Ausnahme / Schutz aus -&gt; Download (irm/iwr/Browser)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  -&gt; Loader/Treiber (neue Datei, Dienst 7045) -&gt; Aufraeumen (USN-Loeschungen, Log geleert/verkleinert).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Fehlen die Befehle selbst, zaehlen die Wirkungen: Ausnahmen, neue Dateien, Dienste, Loeschungen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  20 - Handy-Fernsteuerung / Web-Panel\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-RemoteControlCheck {\n    param([switch]$OhneFrage)\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Fernsteuerung per Handy / Web-Panel ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Lauschende Ports, Verbindungen aus dem Heimnetz, Firewall-Freigaben, Hotspot, Cloud-Verbindungen)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $begriff = $null   # kein Suchbegriff - Cheats tragen ihren Namen nicht in Pfaden oder Domains\n\n    $privatNetz     = '^(10\\.|192\\.168\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.|169\\.254\\.|fe80:|fd|fc)'\n    $bekannteSigner = '(?i)Valve|NVIDIA|Discord|Spotify|Google|Razer|Logitech|Corsair|Elgato|Adobe|Malwarebytes|Epic Games|Riot|Medal|sipgate|OBS Project|TC-Helicon|Skillbrains|Electronic Arts|Ubisoft|Rockstar|Cfx|Intel|Advanced Micro|Realtek|Mozilla|Opera|Brave|Microsoft|Apple|Dropbox|Zoom|TeamSpeak|Overwolf|SteelSeries|Turtle Beach|Nahimic|ASUSTeK|Micro-Star|Gigabyte'\n\n    $sigCache = @{}\n    $pruefe = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        if (-not $pfad) { return [PSCustomObject]@{ Status='?'; Signierer='-'; MS=$false; Bekannt=$false } }\n        if ($sigCache.ContainsKey($pfad)) { return $sigCache[$pfad] }\n        $sig = $null\n        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $pfad) { $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }\n        $sgn = if ($sig -and $sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n        $ok  = $sig -and $sig.Status -eq 'Valid'\n        $r = [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Status    = $(if ($sig) { [string]$sig.Status } else { 'fehlt' })\n            Signierer = $sgn\n            MS        = ($ok -and $sgn -match '(?i)Microsoft')\n            Bekannt   = ($ok -and $sgn -match $bekannteSigner)\n        }\n        $sigCache[$pfad] = $r\n        $r\n    }\n    $farbe = {\n        param([string]$text, $si)\n        if ($begriff -and $text -match $begriff) { return 'Red' }\n        if ($si.Bekannt) { return 'DarkGray' }\n        if ($si.Status -ne 'Valid') {\n            if ($text -match '(?i)\\\\steamapps\\\\common\\\\') { return 'Yellow' }   # unsignierte Steam-Spiele sind normal\n            return 'Red'\n        }\n        return 'Yellow'\n    }\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcProc {\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", SetLastError = true)] static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(uint access, bool inherit, int pid);\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\")] static extern bool CloseHandle(IntPtr h);\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastError = true)]\n    static extern bool QueryFullProcessImageName(IntPtr h, int flags, StringBuilder name, ref int size);\n    public static string Pfad(int pid) {\n        IntPtr h = OpenProcess(0x1000, false, pid);   // QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION - klappt auch bei geschuetzten Prozessen\n        if (h == IntPtr.Zero) return null;\n        try { var sb = new StringBuilder(1024); int n = sb.Capacity; return QueryFullProcessImageName(h, 0, sb, ref n) ? sb.ToString() : null; }\n        finally { CloseHandle(h); }\n    }\n}\n\"@\n    $procPfad = {\n        param($proc)\n        if ($proc.Path) { return $proc.Path }\n        try { return [CtcProc]::Pfad([int]$proc.Id) } catch { return $null }\n    }\n    $zufallsMac = {\n        param([string]$mac)\n        if ($mac -match '^[0-9A-Fa-f]([0-9A-Fa-f])') { return '26AE'.Contains($matches[1].ToUpper()) }\n        return $false\n    }\n\n    # Device-Pfad -&gt; Laufwerksbuchstabe (SRUM und WFP speichern \\Device\\HarddiskVolumeX\\...)\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcDos {\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, SetLastError = true)]\n    public static extern uint QueryDosDevice(string lpDeviceName, StringBuilder lpTargetPath, int ucchMax);\n}\n\"@\n    $devMap = @{}\n    foreach ($cc in 67..90) {\n        $lw = ([string][char]$cc) + ':'\n        $sb = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder 260\n        try { if ([CtcDos]::QueryDosDevice($lw, $sb, 260) -gt 0) { $devMap[$sb.ToString().ToLower()] = $lw } } catch {}\n    }\n    $konv = {\n        param([string]$p)\n        $pl = $p.ToLower()\n        foreach ($k in $devMap.Keys) {\n            if ($pl.StartsWith($k + '\\')) { return ($devMap[$k] + $p.Substring($k.Length)) }\n        }\n        return $p\n    }\n    $sigRQ3 = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sigRQ3 -Name RK3 -Namespace W3 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $keyZeit = {\n        param($pfad)\n        try {\n            $k = Get-Item $pfad -ErrorAction Stop\n            $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n            [void][W3.RK3]::RegQueryInfoKey($k.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n            [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n        } catch { $null }\n    }\n\n    # Update-Reste: Versions-/Hash-Ordner durch * ersetzen und pruefen, ob eine andere Version existiert\n    $versionWild = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        $w = $pfad -replace '(?i)\\\\([a-z_]+-)?\\d+(\\.\\d+)+\\\\', '\\*\\'\n        $w = $w    -replace '(?i)\\\\[^\\\\]*_amd64_[0-9a-f]{16}\\\\', '\\*\\'\n        $w = $w    -replace '(?i)\\\\[0-9a-f]{12,}\\\\', '\\*\\'\n        return $w\n    }\n    $istUpdateRest = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        $w = &amp; $versionWild $pfad\n        if ($w -ne $pfad -and (Test-Path $w)) { return $true }\n        if ($pfad -match '^(.+?)\\s+--') {                     # Startparameter im Pfad ('chrome --flag...exe')\n            $b = $matches[1]; if ($b -notmatch '(?i)\\.exe$') { $b += '.exe' }\n            if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $b) { return $true }\n        }\n        return $false\n    }\n    # Installer/Updater, die sich nach getaner Arbeit selbst loeschen\n    $installerMuster = '(?i)\\\\is-[a-z0-9]{5}\\.tmp\\\\|\\\\ns[a-z0-9]{2,8}\\.tmp\\\\|\\\\ghub-|\\\\lghub\\\\|\\\\google\\d+_\\d+\\\\|\\\\ota-artifacts\\\\|\\\\onedrive\\\\update\\\\onedrivesetup\\.exe$|\\\\nvidia corporation\\\\nvidia app\\\\updateframework\\\\'\n\n    # MAC-Adressen im Heimnetz\n    $nachbarn = @{}\n    Get-NetNeighbor -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.LinkLayerAddress -and $_.LinkLayerAddress -notmatch '^(00-00-00-00-00-00|FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF)$' } |\n        ForEach-Object { $nachbarn[[string]$_.IPAddress] = [string]$_.LinkLayerAddress }\n\n    # --- 20a: Lauschende Ports fremder Programme ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Lauschende Ports (von anderen Geraeten erreichbar) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $listen = @()\n    Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.LocalAddress -notmatch '^(127\\.|::1$)' } |\n        ForEach-Object { $listen += [PSCustomObject]@{ Proto='TCP'; Port=$_.LocalPort; Adr=$_.LocalAddress; ProcId=$_.OwningProcess } }\n    Get-NetUDPEndpoint -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.LocalAddress -match '^(0\\.0\\.0\\.0|::)$' } |\n        ForEach-Object { $listen += [PSCustomObject]@{ Proto='UDP'; Port=$_.LocalPort; Adr=$_.LocalAddress; ProcId=$_.OwningProcess } }\n\n    $lauschPorts = @{}\n    $lauschFremd = @()\n    foreach ($l in $listen) {\n        $lauschPorts[\"$($l.ProcId)|$($l.Port)\"] = $true\n        if ($l.ProcId -in 0,4) { continue }\n        $p = Get-Process -Id $l.ProcId -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if (-not $p) { continue }\n        $pp = &amp; $procPfad $p\n        $si = &amp; $pruefe $pp\n        if ($si.MS) { continue }\n        $lauschFremd += [PSCustomObject]@{ Proto=$l.Proto; Port=$l.Port; Prozess=$p.Name; ProcId=$l.ProcId; Pfad=$pp; Si=$si }\n    }\n    $lauschFremd = @($lauschFremd | Group-Object { \"$($_.Proto)|$($_.Port)|$($_.ProcId)\" } | ForEach-Object { $_.Group[0] } | Sort-Object Proto, Port)\n    if ($lauschFremd.Count -gt 0) {\n        $grau = @()\n        $bunt = 0\n        foreach ($x in $lauschFremd) {\n            $col = &amp; $farbe (\"$($x.Pfad) $($x.Prozess)\") $x.Si\n            if ($col -eq 'DarkGray') { $grau += $x.Prozess; continue }\n            Write-Host (\"  {0} {1,-6} {2,-22} PID {3,-6} Sig: {4} | {5}\" -f $x.Proto, $x.Port, $x.Prozess, $x.ProcId, $x.Si.Status, $x.Si.Signierer) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"         {0}\" -f $x.Pfad) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            $bunt++\n        }\n        if ($bunt -eq 0) { Write-Host \"  Nur bekannte, gueltig signierte Programme lauschen.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n        if ($grau.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  ({0} Ports bekannter Hersteller ausgeblendet: {1})\" -f $grau.Count, (($grau | Sort-Object -Unique) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine nicht-Microsoft-Programme lauschen auf einem Netzwerk-Port.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 20b: Aktive Verbindungen AUS dem Heimnetz ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Aktive Verbindungen aus dem Heimnetz auf diesen PC (Handy -&gt; Panel) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $eingehend = @(Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.RemoteAddress -match $privatNetz -and $lauschPorts.ContainsKey(\"$($_.OwningProcess)|$($_.LocalPort)\")\n    })\n    if ($eingehend.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($c in $eingehend) {\n            $p   = Get-Process -Id $c.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            $mac = $nachbarn[[string]$c.RemoteAddress]\n            $zuf = if ($mac -and (&amp; $zufallsMac $mac)) { ' (zufaellige MAC - typisch Smartphone)' } else { '' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0} (PID {1}) Port {2}  &lt;-  {3}  MAC {4}{5}\" -f $p.Name, $c.OwningProcess, $c.LocalPort, $c.RemoteAddress, $(if ($mac) { $mac } else { '?' }), $zuf) -ForegroundColor Red\n            $pp = &amp; $procPfad $p\n            if ($pp) { Write-Host (\"      {0}\" -f $pp) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  Ein anderes Geraet im Heimnetz ist gerade mit einem Programm auf diesem PC verbunden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine eingehende Verbindung aus dem Heimnetz aktiv.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n        Write-Host \"  (Nur waehrend der Cheat laeuft und das Handy verbunden ist sichtbar.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # Geraete im Netz mit zufaelliger MAC (Smartphones)\n    $handys = @($nachbarn.GetEnumerator() | Where-Object {\n        $_.Key -match '^(10\\.|192\\.168\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.)' -and $_.Key -notmatch '\\.255$' -and (&amp; $zufallsMac $_.Value)\n    })\n    if ($handys.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  Geraete im Heimnetz mit zufaelliger MAC (meist Smartphones/Tablets): {0}\" -f (($handys | ForEach-Object { \"$($_.Key)\" }) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # --- 20c: Eingehende Firewall-Freigaben (ueberleben das Loeschen des Cheats) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Eingehende Firewall-Regeln fuer Programme ausserhalb von Windows (inkl. abgelehnter Abfragen) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Beim ersten Oeffnen eines Ports legt Windows eine Regel an - sie bleibt, auch wenn die EXE geloescht wird)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    $fwZeit = @{}\n    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall';Id=2004,2071,2097} -MaxEvents 5000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $ev = $_\n        $ap = (([xml]$ev.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'ApplicationPath' }).'#text'\n        if ($ap) {\n            $k = $ap.ToLower()\n            if (-not $fwZeit.ContainsKey($k) -or $ev.TimeCreated -lt $fwZeit[$k]) { $fwZeit[$k] = $ev.TimeCreated }\n        }\n    }\n\n    $regeln = @()\n    $fwKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules'\n    if (Test-Path $fwKey) {\n        $fw = Get-ItemProperty $fwKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        foreach ($pr in $fw.PSObject.Properties) {\n            if ($pr.Name -like 'PS*') { continue }\n            $v = [string]$pr.Value\n            if ($v -notmatch '\\|Dir=In\\|') { continue }\n            $block = $v -match '\\|Action=Block\\|'\n            if ($block -and $pr.Name -notmatch '(?i)Query User') { continue }\n            if ($v -notmatch '\\|App=([^|]+)') { continue }\n            $app = [Environment]::ExpandEnvironmentVariables($matches[1])\n            if ($app -match '(?i)^[A-Z]:\\\\Windows\\\\|^System$') { continue }\n            $rName = if ($v -match '\\|Name=([^|]+)') { $matches[1] } else { $pr.Name }\n            $regeln += [PSCustomObject]@{\n                App       = $app\n                Name      = $rName\n                Aktiv     = ($v -match '\\|Active=TRUE\\|')\n                Auto      = ($pr.Name -match '(?i)Query User')\n                Block     = $block\n                Existiert = (Test-Path -LiteralPath $app)\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    $regeln = @($regeln | Group-Object { $_.App.ToLower() } | ForEach-Object { $_.Group | Sort-Object Aktiv -Descending | Select-Object -First 1 })\n\n    $bekanntN = 0\n    $restListe = @()\n    $ausgabe  = @()\n    foreach ($r in $regeln) {\n        $si   = &amp; $pruefe $r.App\n        $zeit = $fwZeit[$r.App.ToLower()]\n        if ($r.Existiert -and $si.Bekannt -and -not ($begriff -and $r.App -match $begriff)) { $bekanntN++; continue }\n        if (-not $r.Existiert) {\n            # Update-Rest: dieselbe EXE existiert in einem anderen Versionsordner (Discord app-1.0.x, EdgeWebView 15x.x)\n            if (&amp; $istUpdateRest $r.App) { $restListe += ((Split-Path $r.App -Leaf) -replace '\\s+--.*$',''); continue }\n        }\n        $col = if (-not $r.Existiert) { 'Red' } else { &amp; $farbe $r.App $si }\n        $ausgabe += [PSCustomObject]@{ R=$r; Si=$si; Zeit=$zeit; Col=$col }\n    }\n    if ($ausgabe.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($a in ($ausgabe | Sort-Object { $_.R.Existiert }, { $_.Zeit } -Descending)) {\n            $flags = @()\n            if (-not $a.R.Existiert) { $flags += 'EXE GELOESCHT' }\n            if ($a.R.Auto -and -not $a.R.Block) { $flags += 'per Windows-Abfrage erlaubt' }\n            if ($a.R.Block)          { $flags += 'Windows-Abfrage ABGELEHNT (trotzdem Beweis fuer Port-Oeffnung)' }\n            if (-not $a.R.Aktiv)     { $flags += 'deaktiviert' }\n            $zeitTxt = if ($a.Zeit) { $a.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } else { 'Zeit unbekannt' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $zeitTxt, $a.R.App) -ForegroundColor $a.Col\n            Write-Host (\"        Regel: {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}\" -f $a.R.Name, $a.Si.Status, ($flags -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen eingehenden Freigaben.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    if ($bekanntN -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"  ({0} Freigaben bekannter, signierter Hersteller ausgeblendet)\" -f $bekanntN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    if ($restListe.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  ({0} Regeln alter Programmversionen/defekter Pfade ausgeblendet - neuere Version existiert: {1})\" -f $restListe.Count, (($restListe | Sort-Object -Unique) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  EXE GELOESCHT + Pfad in Temp/AppData/Downloads = Programm hat Verbindungen angenommen und ist verschwunden.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- 20d: Ausgehende Dauerverbindungen (Cloud-Panel) ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Ausgehende Verbindungen unbekannter Programme ins Internet (Cloud-Panel) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dnsMap = @{}\n    Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Data } | ForEach-Object {\n        $ip = [string]$_.Data\n        if (-not $dnsMap.ContainsKey($ip)) { $dnsMap[$ip] = [string]$_.Entry }\n    }\n    $raus = @()\n    $cheatVerb = @()\n    Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n        Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -notmatch $privatNetz -and $_.RemoteAddress -notmatch '^(127\\.|::1$|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|::$)' } |\n        ForEach-Object {\n            $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $p) { return }\n            $pp = &amp; $procPfad $p\n            $si = &amp; $pruefe $pp\n            $zielName = $dnsMap[[string]$_.RemoteAddress]\n            $cheatZiel = if ($zielName) { Get-CheatName $zielName } else { $null }\n            if ($cheatZiel) {\n                $cheatVerb += [PSCustomObject]@{ Prozess=$p.Name; ProcId=$p.Id; Pfad=$pp; Ziel=\"$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)\"; Domain=$zielName; Name=$cheatZiel; Sig=$si.Status; Signierer=$si.Signierer }\n                return\n            }\n            if ($si.MS -or $si.Bekannt) { return }\n            $raus += [PSCustomObject]@{ Prozess=$p.Name; ProcId=$p.Id; Pfad=$pp; Ziel=\"$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)\"; Domain=$dnsMap[[string]$_.RemoteAddress]; Si=$si }\n        }\n    if ($cheatVerb.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!!!] AKTIVE VERBINDUNG ZU BEKANNTER CHEAT-DOMAIN:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        foreach ($c in $cheatVerb) {\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} (PID {1}) -&gt; {2}  {3}   [{4}]\" -f $c.Prozess, $c.ProcId, $c.Ziel, $c.Domain, $c.Name) -ForegroundColor Red\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} | Sig: {1} | {2}\" -f $c.Pfad, $c.Sig, $c.Signierer) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n        Write-Host \"      Ist der Prozess signiert (svchost, explorer ...), steckt der Cheat sehr wahrscheinlich als DLL darin -&gt; Punkt 21a fuer diese PID.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($raus.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($g in ($raus | Group-Object ProcId)) {\n            $x = $g.Group[0]\n            $col = &amp; $farbe (\"$($x.Pfad) \" + (($g.Group | ForEach-Object { $_.Domain }) -join ' ')) $x.Si\n            Write-Host (\"  {0} (PID {1}) | Sig: {2} | {3}\" -f $x.Prozess, $x.ProcId, $x.Si.Status, $x.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            $g.Group | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"        -&gt; {0}  {1}\" -f $_.Ziel, $(if ($_.Domain) { $_.Domain } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine ausgehenden Verbindungen unbekannter Programme.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    if ($begriff) {\n        $dnsTreffer = @(Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Entry -match $begriff } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Entry -Unique)\n        if ($dnsTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] DNS-Cache enthaelt Suchbegriff: {0}\" -f ($dnsTreffer -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    }\n\n    # --- 20e: Netzwerk-Umgehungen ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- Netzwerk-Konfiguration ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Get-NetConnectionProfile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        Write-Host (\"  Profil {0}: {1}\" -f $_.InterfaceAlias, $_.NetworkCategory) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    # Firewall ausgeschaltet? Dann gibt es gar keine Abfrage.\n    Get-NetFirewallProfile -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $prof = $_\n        if (-not $prof.Enabled) {\n            $pk = switch ($prof.Name) { 'Domain' {'DomainProfile'} 'Private' {'StandardProfile'} default {'PublicProfile'} }\n            $zp = &amp; $keyZeit \"HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\$pk\"\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] Windows-Firewall AUS fuer Profil {0} (Einstellung zuletzt geaendert: {1}) - Verbindungen ohne jede Abfrage moeglich.\" -f $prof.Name, $zp) -ForegroundColor Red\n        }\n    }\n    $fwAend = @(Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall';Id=2003} -MaxEvents 15 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($fwAend.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Letzte Aenderungen an Firewall-Einstellungen (z. B. Firewall ein/aus):\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        $fwAend | ForEach-Object {\n            $m = ($_.Message -replace '\\s+',' ').Trim()\n            Write-Host (\"    [{0}] {1}\" -f $_.TimeCreated, $m.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(140,$m.Length))) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n    $hotspot = @(Get-NetAdapter -IncludeHidden -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {\n        $_.Status -eq 'Up' -and $_.InterfaceDescription -match '(?i)Wi-Fi Direct Virtual|Hosted Network|Virtual WiFi'\n    })\n    if ($hotspot.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] Mobiler Hotspot / WLAN-Direct AKTIV - ein Handy kann sich direkt mit dem PC verbinden, am Router vorbei.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $hotspot | ForEach-Object { Write-Host (\"      {0}\" -f $_.InterfaceDescription) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Kein mobiler Hotspot aktiv.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    $ppRoot = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PortProxy'\n    $ppEintraege = @()\n    if (Test-Path $ppRoot) {\n        Get-ChildItem $ppRoot -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $k = $_\n            $props = Get-ItemProperty $k.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if ($props) {\n                foreach ($pr in $props.PSObject.Properties) {\n                    if ($pr.Name -like 'PS*') { continue }\n                    $ppEintraege += (\"{0}: {1} -&gt; {2}\" -f $k.PSChildName, $pr.Name, $pr.Value)\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($ppEintraege.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  [!] Portweiterleitungen (netsh portproxy) eingerichtet:\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        $ppEintraege | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"      $_\" -ForegroundColor Red }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Portweiterleitungen.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # --- 20f: SRUM - Netzwerkverkehr pro Programm, rueckwirkend ---\n    Write-Host \"`n--- SRUM: Netzwerkverkehr pro Programm, rueckwirkend (auch GELOESCHTE EXEs) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"(Windows zaehlt stuendlich pro Programm gesendete/empfangene Bytes - voellig unabhaengig von der Firewall)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $srumTool = Get-ChildItem \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\CTC_Tools\" -Recurse -Filter 'SrumECmd.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1\n    if (-not $srumTool) {\n        Write-Host \"  SrumECmd fehlt - ueber Punkt 18 (Eintrag 9) laden oder von ericzimmerman.github.io nach Desktop\\CTC_Tools legen.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    } else {\n        # .NET-Laufzeit pruefen, die SrumECmd braucht (steht in dessen runtimeconfig.json)\n        $netFehlt = $false\n        $rc = Get-ChildItem $srumTool.DirectoryName -Filter '*.runtimeconfig.json' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1\n        if ($rc) {\n            try {\n                $j  = Get-Content $rc.FullName -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json\n                $fw = @(@($j.runtimeOptions.framework) + @($j.runtimeOptions.frameworks) | Where-Object { $_ -and $_.name })\n                $braucht = $fw | Where-Object { $_.name -match '^Microsoft\\.(NETCore|WindowsDesktop)\\.App$' } | Select-Object -First 1\n                if ($braucht) {\n                    $major = ($braucht.version -split '\\.')[0]\n                    $da = @(Get-ChildItem \"$env:ProgramFiles\\dotnet\\shared\\$($braucht.name)\" -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -like \"$major.*\" })\n                    if ($da.Count -eq 0) {\n                        Write-Host (\"  [!] SrumECmd braucht .NET {0} ({1}), das ist nicht installiert.\" -f $major, $braucht.name) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                        Write-Host (\"      Download: https://dotnet.microsoft.com/download/dotnet/{0}.0  -&gt;  '.NET Runtime' fuer Windows x64\" -f $major) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                        $netFehlt = $true\n                    }\n                }\n            } catch {}\n        }\n\n        if (-not $netFehlt) {\n            $arbeit = Join-Path $env:TEMP (\"ctc_srum_\" + (Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMddHHmmss'))\n            New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $arbeit -Force | Out-Null\n            $kopie = Join-Path $arbeit 'SRUDB.dat'\n            Write-Host \"  Kopiere SRUM-Datenbank samt Transaktionslogs ueber Schattenkopie (Original bleibt unberuehrt)...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            Get-ChildItem \"$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\sru\" -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Name -match '(?i)^SRU(DB\\.dat|.*\\.log|\\.chk)$' } | ForEach-Object {\n                    &amp; esentutl.exe /y $_.FullName /vss /d (Join-Path $arbeit $_.Name) 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-Null\n                }\n            $erfolg = $false\n            if (-not (Test-Path $kopie)) {\n                Write-Host \"  SRUDB.dat konnte nicht kopiert werden (Volumeschattenkopie-Dienst aus?).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n            } else {\n                # Kopie mit den mitkopierten Logs in einen sauberen Zustand bringen (nur die Kopie!)\n                Push-Location $arbeit\n                &amp; esentutl.exe /r sru /l $arbeit /s $arbeit /d $arbeit /i 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-Null\n                Pop-Location\n                Write-Host \"  Werte mit SrumECmd aus...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                $srOut = @(&amp; $srumTool.FullName -f $kopie --csv $arbeit 2&gt;&amp;1 | ForEach-Object { [string]$_ })\n                $csvDatei = Get-ChildItem $arbeit -Recurse -Filter '*NetworkUsage*.csv' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1\n                if (-not $csvDatei) {\n                    Write-Host \"  SrumECmd hat keine Netzwerkdaten erzeugt. Letzte Ausgabe von SrumECmd:\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                    $srOut | Where-Object { $_.Trim() } | Select-Object -Last 8 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host \"    $_\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n                    Write-Host \"  Arbeitsordner bleibt zur Pruefung erhalten: $arbeit\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                } else {\n                    $erfolg = $true\n                        $zeilen  = @(Import-Csv $csvDatei.FullName)\n                        $spalten = @($zeilen[0].PSObject.Properties.Name)\n                        $cApp  = $spalten | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)^ExeInfo$' }      | Select-Object -First 1\n                        $cZeit = $spalten | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)^Timestamp$' }    | Select-Object -First 1\n                        $cRx   = $spalten | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)BytesReceived' }  | Select-Object -First 1\n                        $cTx   = $spalten | Where-Object { $_ -match '(?i)BytesSent' }      | Select-Object -First 1\n                        $proApp = @{}\n                        foreach ($z in $zeilen) {\n                            $app = [string]$z.$cApp\n                            if (-not $app) { continue }\n                            $pfad = &amp; $konv $app\n                            $t  = [DateTime]::MinValue\n                            if ([DateTime]::TryParse([string]$z.$cZeit, [Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture, [Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AssumeUniversal -bor [Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AdjustToUniversal, [ref]$t)) {\n                                $t = [DateTime]::SpecifyKind($t, 'Utc').ToLocalTime()      # SrumECmd liefert UTC - in Ortszeit umrechnen wie der Rest von CTC\n                            } else { $t = $null }\n                            $rx = [int64]0; [void][int64]::TryParse([string]$z.$cRx, [ref]$rx)\n                            $tx = [int64]0; [void][int64]::TryParse([string]$z.$cTx, [ref]$tx)\n                            if (-not $proApp.ContainsKey($pfad)) { $proApp[$pfad] = [PSCustomObject]@{ Pfad=$pfad; Erst=$t; Letzt=$t; Bytes=[int64]0; Rx=[int64]0; Tx=[int64]0; Std=0; Stunden=(New-Object System.Collections.ArrayList) } }\n                            $o = $proApp[$pfad]\n                            $o.Bytes += ($rx + $tx); $o.Rx += $rx; $o.Tx += $tx; $o.Std++\n                            if ($t -and $pfad -match '(?i)\\\\(powershell|pwsh|powershell_ise|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|curl|msiexec|installutil|regasm|regsvcs|msbuild|wmic|hh)\\.exe$') {\n                                [void]$o.Stunden.Add([PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$t; Rx=$rx; Tx=$tx })\n                            }\n                            if ($t -and (-not $o.Erst  -or $t -lt $o.Erst))  { $o.Erst  = $t }\n                            if ($t -and (-not $o.Letzt -or $t -gt $o.Letzt)) { $o.Letzt = $t }\n                        }\n                        $kandidaten = @()\n                        $srumUpdate = @(); $srumInst = @()\n                        foreach ($o in $proApp.Values) {\n                            if ($o.Pfad -notmatch '^[A-Z]:\\\\') { continue }\n                            $da = Test-Path -LiteralPath $o.Pfad\n                            if (-not $da) {\n                                if (&amp; $istUpdateRest $o.Pfad)          { $srumUpdate += ((Split-Path $o.Pfad -Leaf) -replace '\\s+--.*$',''); continue }\n                                if ($o.Pfad -match $installerMuster)   { $srumInst   += (Split-Path $o.Pfad -Leaf); continue }\n                            }\n                            $si = &amp; $pruefe $o.Pfad\n                            # Windows-Werkzeuge, ueber die Skripte Dateien laden, NICHT ausblenden (LOLBins)\n                            $lolbin = $o.Pfad -match '(?i)\\\\(powershell|pwsh|powershell_ise|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|curl|msiexec|installutil|regasm|regsvcs|msbuild|wmic|hh)\\.exe$'\n                            if ($da -and ($si.MS -or $si.Bekannt) -and -not $lolbin) { continue }\n                            $col = if (-not $da) { 'Red' } else { &amp; $farbe $o.Pfad $si }\n                            $kandidaten += [PSCustomObject]@{ O=$o; Da=$da; Si=$si; Col=$col }\n                        }\n                        if ($kandidaten.Count -gt 0) {\n                            Write-Host (\"  {0} Programme mit Netzwerkverkehr, die weder Microsoft noch bekannten Herstellern gehoeren:\" -f $kandidaten.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                            foreach ($k in ($kandidaten | Sort-Object { -not $_.Da }, { $_.O.Letzt } -Descending | Select-Object -First 40)) {\n                                $flag = if (-not $k.Da) { '  [EXE GELOESCHT]' } else { \"  [Sig: $($k.Si.Status)]\" }\n                                Write-Host (\"  {0}{1}\" -f $k.O.Pfad, $flag) -ForegroundColor $k.Col\n                                Write-Host (\"      aktiv {0} bis {1} | {2} Stunden-Eintraege | empfangen {3} MB / gesendet {4} MB\" -f $k.O.Erst, $k.O.Letzt, $k.O.Std, [Math]::Round($k.O.Rx/1MB, 2), [Math]::Round($k.O.Tx/1MB, 2)) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                                if ($k.O.Pfad -match '(?i)\\\\(powershell|pwsh|powershell_ise|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|curl|msiexec|installutil|regasm|regsvcs|msbuild|wmic|hh)\\.exe$') {\n                                    Write-Host \"      Windows-Werkzeug mit Netzwerkverkehr: Skript hat Daten geladen. Grosse Empfangsmenge = Download einer Datei (CTC selbst laedt auch ueber PowerShell).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                                    if ($k.O.Pfad -match '(?i)\\\\SysWOW64\\\\') {\n                                        Write-Host \"      32-Bit-Variante: wird selten von Hand gestartet, meist von einem 32-Bit-Programm/Installer aufgerufen.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n                                    }\n                                    $grosse = @($k.O.Stunden | Group-Object { $_.Zeit.ToString('yyyyMMddHH') } | ForEach-Object {\n                                        [PSCustomObject]@{ Zeit=$_.Group[0].Zeit; Rx=($_.Group | Measure-Object Rx -Sum).Sum; Tx=($_.Group | Measure-Object Tx -Sum).Sum }\n                                    } | Where-Object { $_.Rx -ge 512KB } | Sort-Object Rx -Descending | Select-Object -First 6)\n                                    if ($grosse.Count -gt 0) {\n                                        Write-Host \"      Stunden mit den groessten Downloads (Zeitpunkt in Punkt 10 und 19 eingeben):\" -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n                                        foreach ($g in ($grosse | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending)) {\n                                            Write-Host (\"        {0}  empfangen {1,8:N2} MB  gesendet {2,6:N2} MB\" -f $g.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:00'), ($g.Rx/1MB), ($g.Tx/1MB)) -ForegroundColor DarkYellow\n                                        }\n                                    }\n                                }\n                            }\n                            Write-Host \"  Rot + GELOESCHT = Programm hat Daten uebertragen und existiert nicht mehr. Zeitraum in Punkt 19 als Startzeit nutzen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                        } else {\n                            Write-Host \"  Kein unbekanntes Programm mit Netzwerkverkehr im SRUM-Zeitraum.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                        }\n                        if ($srumUpdate.Count -gt 0) {\n                            Write-Host (\"  ({0} alte Programmversionen ausgeblendet - neuere Version existiert: {1})\" -f $srumUpdate.Count, (($srumUpdate | Sort-Object -Unique) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                        }\n                        if ($srumInst.Count -gt 0) {\n                            Write-Host (\"  ({0} Installer/Updater-Reste ausgeblendet, die sich selbst loeschen: {1})\" -f $srumInst.Count, (($srumInst | Sort-Object -Unique) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                        }\n                        $vollCsv = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_srum_netzwerk_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').csv\"\n                        Copy-Item $csvDatei.FullName $vollCsv -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                        Write-Host \"  Vollstaendige SRUM-Netzwerkdaten: $vollCsv  (Zeiten in der CSV sind UTC, hier oben Ortszeit)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                }\n            }\n            if ($erfolg) { Remove-Item $arbeit -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Lokales Panel : fremder Prozess lauscht + Verbindung aus dem LAN mit zufaelliger MAC = Handy steuert den PC.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Nachtraeglich : Firewall-Freigabe fuer geloeschte EXE in Temp/AppData - Zeitpunkt in Punkt 19 als Startzeit nutzen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Cloud-Panel   : Dauerverbindung eines unsignierten Programms zu einer unbekannten Domain.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Ohne Firewall : SRUM zeigt rueckwirkend jedes Programm mit Netzwerkverkehr - auch geloeschte.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Hinweis       : 20a/20b sehen nur, was gerade laeuft - rueckwirkend zaehlen 20c (Firewall) und 20f (SRUM).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  21 - Injection in signierte Prozesse / Dienste\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-InjectionCheck {\n    param([switch]$OhneFrage)\n\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Injection in signierte Prozesse und Dienste ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Manuell gemappter Code hat keine Datei - er liegt als privater ausfuehrbarer Speicher im Prozess)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.Collections.Generic;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcMem {\n    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]\n    public struct MBI64 {\n        public ulong BaseAddress; public ulong AllocationBase; public uint AllocationProtect; public uint Align1;\n        public ulong RegionSize; public uint State; public uint Protect; public uint Type; public uint Align2;\n    }\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", SetLastError = true)] static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(uint access, bool inherit, int pid);\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\")] static extern bool CloseHandle(IntPtr h);\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", SetLastError = true)] static extern IntPtr VirtualQueryEx(IntPtr h, IntPtr addr, out MBI64 mbi, IntPtr len);\n    [DllImport(\"kernel32.dll\", SetLastError = true)] static extern bool ReadProcessMemory(IntPtr h, IntPtr addr, byte[] buf, IntPtr size, out IntPtr read);\n\n    public class Bereich { public ulong Basis; public ulong Groesse; public uint Schutz; public bool MZ; public bool PE; }\n\n    public static List Scan(int pid, out string fehler) {\n        fehler = null;\n        var liste = new List();\n        IntPtr h = OpenProcess(0x0400 | 0x0010, false, pid);   // QUERY_INFORMATION | VM_READ\n        if (h == IntPtr.Zero) { fehler = \"kein Zugriff\"; return liste; }\n        try {\n            ulong addr = 0;\n            int size = Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(MBI64));\n            while (addr &lt; 0x7FFFFFFFFFFF) {\n                MBI64 m;\n                if (VirtualQueryEx(h, (IntPtr)(long)addr, out m, (IntPtr)size) == IntPtr.Zero) break;\n                bool commit = m.State == 0x1000;                 // MEM_COMMIT\n                bool exec   = (m.Protect &amp; 0xF0) != 0;           // PAGE_EXECUTE*\n                bool image  = m.Type == 0x1000000;               // MEM_IMAGE = gehoert zu einer Datei\n                bool guard  = (m.Protect &amp; 0x100) != 0;\n                if (commit &amp;&amp; exec &amp;&amp; !image &amp;&amp; !guard) {\n                    var b = new Bereich { Basis = m.BaseAddress, Groesse = m.RegionSize, Schutz = m.Protect };\n                    byte[] buf = new byte[0x400]; IntPtr gelesen;\n                    int n = (int)Math.Min((ulong)buf.Length, m.RegionSize);\n                    if (ReadProcessMemory(h, (IntPtr)(long)m.BaseAddress, buf, (IntPtr)n, out gelesen) &amp;&amp; (long)gelesen &gt;= 0x40) {\n                        if (buf[0] == 0x4D &amp;&amp; buf[1] == 0x5A) {\n                            b.MZ = true;\n                            int lfa = BitConverter.ToInt32(buf, 0x3C);\n                            if (lfa &gt; 0 &amp;&amp; lfa &lt; n - 4 &amp;&amp; buf[lfa] == 0x50 &amp;&amp; buf[lfa + 1] == 0x45 &amp;&amp; buf[lfa + 2] == 0 &amp;&amp; buf[lfa + 3] == 0) b.PE = true;\n                        }\n                    }\n                    liste.Add(b);\n                }\n                ulong next = m.BaseAddress + m.RegionSize;\n                if (next &lt;= addr) break;\n                addr = next;\n            }\n        } finally { CloseHandle(h); }\n        return liste;\n    }\n}\n\"@\n\n    $sigCache = @{}\n    $sigVon = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        if (-not $pfad) { return [PSCustomObject]@{ Status='?'; Signierer='-'; MS=$false } }\n        if ($sigCache.ContainsKey($pfad)) { return $sigCache[$pfad] }\n        $s = $null\n        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $pfad) { $s = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }\n        $sg = if ($s -and $s.SignerCertificate) { $s.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n        $r = [PSCustomObject]@{ Status=$(if ($s) { [string]$s.Status } else { 'fehlt' }); Signierer=$sg; MS=($s -and $s.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $sg -match '(?i)Microsoft') }\n        $sigCache[$pfad] = $r\n        $r\n    }\n    $sigRQ3 = '[DllImport(\"advapi32.dll\")]public static extern int RegQueryInfoKey(Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle h,System.Text.StringBuilder a,ref int b,int c,ref int d,ref int e,ref int f,ref int g,ref int i,ref int j,ref int k,ref long l);'\n    Add-Type -MemberDefinition $sigRQ3 -Name RK3 -Namespace W3 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n    $keyZeit = {\n        param($pfad)\n        try {\n            $k = Get-Item $pfad -ErrorAction Stop\n            $t = 0L; $z = 0; $n = New-Object Text.StringBuilder 1024\n            [void][W3.RK3]::RegQueryInfoKey($k.Handle,$n,[ref]$z,0,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$z,[ref]$t)\n            [DateTime]::FromFileTime($t)\n        } catch { $null }\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 21a: Speicher-Scan aller Prozesse\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 21a: Privater ausfuehrbarer Speicher ohne Datei (Manual Map / Reflective Injection) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Scanne Prozesse...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $jitModule = '(?i)^(clr|coreclr|clrjit|mscorwks|libcef|chrome_elf|node|jvm|v8|msedge|chrome|electron|qt5webengine\\w*|qt6webengine\\w*|webview2loader|embeddedbrowserwebview|mono.*|luajit.*|cefsharp.*)\\.dll$'\n    $jitNamen  = '(?i)^(chrome|msedge|msedgewebview2|firefox|opera|brave|vivaldi|discord|spotify|steamwebhelper|code|slack|teams|ms-teams|powershell|pwsh|java|javaw|node|obs64|epicgameslauncher|battle\\.net|riotclientux)$'\n    $sensibel  = '(?i)^(svchost|lsass|services|winlogon|wininit|csrss|spoolsv|explorer|dwm|taskhostw|runtimebroker|sihost|dllhost|wmiprvse|searchindexer|searchhost|ctfmon|audiodg|fontdrvhost|conhost|smss|securityhealthservice|wudfhost|unsecapp)$'\n\n    # JIT anhand der EXE erkennen - funktioniert auch bei 32-Bit-Prozessen, deren Module eine 64-Bit-PowerShell nicht sieht\n    $jitCache = @{}\n    $jitDatei = {\n        param([string]$exe)\n        if (-not $exe -or -not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $exe)) { return $false }\n        $key = $exe.ToLower()\n        if ($jitCache.ContainsKey($key)) { return $jitCache[$key] }\n        $r = $false\n        $dir = Split-Path $exe -Parent\n        if (Get-ChildItem $dir -File -Recurse -Depth 2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match '(?i)^(libcef\\.dll|chrome_elf\\.dll|qt[56]webenginecore\\.dll|v8\\.dll|node\\.dll|icudtl\\.dat|coreclr\\.dll|clrjit\\.dll|mono.*\\.dll|unityplayer\\.dll|gameassembly\\.dll|jvm\\.dll)$' } | Select-Object -First 1) { $r = $true }\n        if (-not $r) {\n            try {                                             # .NET-Programm? CLR-Datenverzeichnis (Index 14) gesetzt\n                $fs = [System.IO.File]::Open($exe, 'Open', 'Read', 'ReadWrite'); $br = New-Object System.IO.BinaryReader($fs)\n                $fs.Position = 0x3C; $pe = $br.ReadInt32()\n                $fs.Position = $pe + 24; $magic = $br.ReadUInt16()\n                $dd = if ($magic -eq 0x20B) { $pe + 24 + 112 } else { $pe + 24 + 96 }\n                $fs.Position = $dd + 14 * 8\n                if ($br.ReadUInt32() -ne 0) { $r = $true }\n                $br.Close()\n            } catch {}\n        }\n        $jitCache[$key] = $r\n        $r\n    }\n\n    $dienste = @{}\n    Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.ProcessId -gt 0 } | ForEach-Object {\n        $dienste[[int]$_.ProcessId] += @($_.Name)\n    }\n\n    $funde = @()\n    $alleProz = @()\n    $keinZugriff = 0\n    foreach ($p in @(Get-Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Id -gt 4 -and $_.Id -ne $PID })) {\n        $fehler = $null\n        $bereiche = [CtcMem]::Scan($p.Id, [ref]$fehler)\n        if ($fehler) { $keinZugriff++; continue }\n        if ($bereiche.Count -eq 0) { continue }\n\n        $peBereiche = @($bereiche | Where-Object { $_.MZ -or $_.PE })\n        $summe = [double](($bereiche | Measure-Object -Property Groesse -Sum).Sum)\n\n        $istJit = $p.Name -match $jitNamen\n        if (-not $istJit) { $istJit = &amp; $jitDatei $p.Path }\n        if (-not $istJit) {\n            try { $istJit = [bool]($p.Modules | Where-Object { $_.ModuleName -match $jitModule } | Select-Object -First 1) } catch {}\n        }\n        $istSens = $p.Name -match $sensibel\n        $alleProz += [PSCustomObject]@{ Proc=$p; Anzahl=$bereiche.Count; Summe=$summe; PE=$peBereiche; Jit=$istJit; Sens=$istSens }\n    }\n\n    # Grundlinie: dasselbe Muster (Anzahl + Groesse) in vielen verschiedenen Prozessen = systemweit (Windows,\n    # Sicherheits- oder Overlay-Software), kein Cheat. Wird ueberall abgezogen, bewertet wird nur, was darueber liegt.\n    $grundKB = 0; $grundN = 0; $grundTxt = ''\n    $haeufig = @($alleProz | Where-Object { -not $_.Jit -and $_.PE.Count -eq 0 } |\n        Group-Object { \"{0}|{1}\" -f $_.Anzahl, $_.Summe } | Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 1)\n    if ($haeufig.Count -gt 0 -and $haeufig[0].Count -ge 8) {\n        $bsp     = $haeufig[0].Group[0]\n        $grundKB = $bsp.Summe; $grundN = $haeufig[0].Count\n        $grundTxt = \"{0} Bereiche / {1} KB\" -f $bsp.Anzahl, [Math]::Round($bsp.Summe / 1KB)\n    }\n\n    foreach ($x in $alleProz) {\n        $netto = [Math]::Max(0, $x.Summe - $grundKB)\n        $stufe = $null\n        if ($x.PE.Count -gt 0)                                     { $stufe = 'Rot' }\n        elseif (-not $x.Jit -and $x.Sens -and $netto -ge 524288)   { $stufe = 'Rot' }\n        elseif (-not $x.Jit -and $netto -gt 65536)                 { $stufe = 'Gelb' }\n        if (-not $stufe) { continue }\n        $funde += [PSCustomObject]@{\n            Proc = $x.Proc; Stufe = $stufe; Anzahl = $x.Anzahl; KB = [Math]::Round($x.Summe / 1KB); NettoKB = [Math]::Round($netto / 1KB)\n            PE = $x.PE; Jit = $x.Jit; Dienste = $dienste[[int]$x.Proc.Id]\n        }\n    }\n    if ($grundN -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  Systemweites Grundmuster erkannt: {0} in {1} Prozessen - wird ueberall abgezogen (Windows/Sicherheits-/Overlay-Software).\" -f $grundTxt, $grundN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    if ($funde.Count -gt 0) {\n        # Prozessdetails (Kommandozeile, Startzeit, Elternprozess) fuer die Einordnung\n        $procInfo = @{}\n        Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $procInfo[[int]$_.ProcessId] = $_ }\n        $ctcElternPid = if ($procInfo.ContainsKey([int]$PID)) { [int]$procInfo[[int]$PID].ParentProcessId } else { -1 }\n\n        foreach ($f in ($funde | Sort-Object { $_.Stufe -ne 'Rot' }, { -$_.KB })) {\n            $si  = &amp; $sigVon $f.Proc.Path\n            $col = if ($f.Stufe -eq 'Rot') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            $dTxt = if ($f.Dienste) { \" | Dienste: \" + (($f.Dienste | Select-Object -First 6) -join ', ') } else { '' }\n            $fw = if ($f.Proc.Path -match $MUSTER -or $f.Proc.Name -match $MUSTER) { '   &lt;-- FERNWARTUNG LAEUFT (Punkt 8: Sitzungen pruefen)' } else { '' }\n\n            $wp     = $procInfo[[int]$f.Proc.Id]\n            $cmd    = if ($wp) { [string]$wp.CommandLine } else { '' }\n            $eltern = if ($wp) { $procInfo[[int]$wp.ParentProcessId] } else { $null }\n            $herkunft = $null; $hCol = $col\n            if ($f.Proc.Name -match '(?i)^(powershell|pwsh|powershell_ise)$') {\n                $kinderCtc = @($procInfo.Values | Where-Object { [int]$_.ParentProcessId -eq [int]$f.Proc.Id -and [string]$_.CommandLine -match '(?i)ctcbydark|CTC_by_Dark' }).Count -gt 0\n                if ($cmd -match '(?i)ctcbydark|CTC_by_Dark|analystdark') {\n                    $herkunft = 'CTC (dieses Tool) - kein Befund'; $hCol = 'DarkGray'\n                } elseif ([int]$f.Proc.Id -eq $ctcElternPid -or $kinderCtc) {\n                    $herkunft = 'Konsole, aus der CTC gestartet wurde - kein Befund'; $hCol = 'DarkGray'\n                } elseif ($cmd -match '(?i)ECHO_[A-Z_]+|\\\\echo-[0-9A-F]{6}-' -or ($eltern -and [string]$eltern.Name -match '(?i)^echo-')) {\n                    $herkunft = 'ECHO (Pruef-Tool) - kein Cheat'; $hCol = 'Yellow'\n                } elseif ($cmd -match '(?i)\\s-(e|ec|en|enc|encodedcommand)\\s|-w(indowstyle)?\\s+hidden|downloadstring|downloaddata|\\biex\\b|invoke-expression|\\birm\\b|\\biwr\\b|invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|frombase64|reflection\\.assembly') {\n                    $herkunft = 'VERDAECHTIG: verschleierter oder nachladender Start'; $hCol = 'Red'\n                } elseif (-not $cmd) {\n                    $herkunft = 'Kommandozeile nicht lesbar - Herkunft manuell pruefen'\n                } else {\n                    $herkunft = 'eigenstaendiges PowerShell-Fenster - wer hat es geoeffnet? (Elternprozess pruefen)'\n                }\n                if ($hCol -eq 'DarkGray' -or $hCol -eq 'Yellow') { $col = $hCol }\n            }\n\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] PID {1}{2}{3}\" -f $f.Proc.Name, $f.Proc.Id, $dTxt, $fw) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} | Sig: {1} ({2})\" -f $f.Proc.Path, $si.Status, $si.Signierer) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            if ($wp) {\n                $eTxt = if ($eltern) { \"{0} (PID {1})\" -f $eltern.Name, $eltern.ProcessId } else { \"PID $($wp.ParentProcessId) (beendet)\" }\n                Write-Host (\"      gestartet {0} | Elternprozess: {1}\" -f $wp.CreationDate, $eTxt) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                if ($cmd) {\n                    $cKurz = if ($cmd.Length -gt 230) { $cmd.Substring(0,230) + ' [...]' } else { $cmd }\n                    Write-Host (\"      Kommandozeile: {0}\" -f $cKurz) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                }\n            }\n            if ($herkunft) { Write-Host (\"      Einordnung: {0}\" -f $herkunft) -ForegroundColor $hCol }\n            $nTxt = if ($grundKB -gt 0 -and $f.NettoKB -ne $f.KB) { \" (ueber Grundmuster: $($f.NettoKB) KB)\" } else { '' }\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} private ausfuehrbare Bereiche, zusammen {1} KB{2}{3}\" -f $f.Anzahl, $f.KB, $nTxt, $(if ($f.Jit) { ' (Prozess mit JIT-Compiler)' } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $col\n            foreach ($b in ($f.PE | Select-Object -First 5)) {\n                $art = if ($b.PE) { 'vollstaendiger PE-Header (MZ+PE) - komplette DLL ohne Datei!' } else { 'MZ-Signatur' }\n                Write-Host (\"      [!!!] 0x{0:X} ({1} KB): {2}\" -f $b.Basis, [Math]::Round($b.Groesse / 1KB), $art) -ForegroundColor Red\n            }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`n  Rot  = PE-Header in dateilosem Speicher ODER ueber 512 KB (ueber Grundmuster) in einem Windows-Prozess.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  Gelb = groesserer ausfuehrbarer Privatspeicher in einem Programm ohne JIT - Hersteller-Overlays/Schutzsoftware moeglich.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"  Naechster Schritt: betroffene PID mit System Informer oder Hollows Hunter genauer ansehen / dumpen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Kein dateiloser ausfuehrbarer Code in Prozessen ohne JIT gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    if ($keinZugriff -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  ({0} geschuetzte Prozesse nicht lesbar, z. B. lsass/Antivirus - normal)\" -f $keinZugriff) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 21b: Einstiegswege in signierte Prozesse (rueckwirkend)\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 21b: Einstiegswege in signierte Prozesse ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $weg = 0\n\n    # IFEO: Debugger / VerifierDlls / GlobalFlag\n    foreach ($ifeo in @('HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options',\n                        'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options')) {\n        Get-ChildItem $ifeo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $k = $_; $pr = Get-ItemProperty $k.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n            if (-not $pr) { return }\n            $zt = &amp; $keyZeit $k.PSPath\n            if ($pr.VerifierDlls) {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!!!] IFEO VerifierDlls fuer {0}: {1}  (geaendert {2}) - DLL wird in JEDEN Start geladen\" -f $k.PSChildName, $pr.VerifierDlls, $zt) -ForegroundColor Red; $weg++\n            }\n            if ($pr.Debugger) {\n                $col = if ($pr.Debugger -match '(?i)\\\\(Temp|AppData|Downloads|ProgramData|Users\\\\Public)\\\\') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                Write-Host (\"  [!] IFEO Debugger fuer {0}: {1}  (geaendert {2})\" -f $k.PSChildName, $pr.Debugger, $zt) -ForegroundColor $col; $weg++\n            }\n            if ($pr.GlobalFlag -and ([int64]$pr.GlobalFlag -band 0x100)) {\n                Write-Host (\"  [!] IFEO GlobalFlag mit Application Verifier fuer {0}  (geaendert {1})\" -f $k.PSChildName, $zt) -ForegroundColor Yellow; $weg++\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    # SilentProcessExit\n    Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $pr = Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        if ($pr.MonitorProcess) { Write-Host (\"  [!] SilentProcessExit fuer {0} startet: {1}\" -f $_.PSChildName, $pr.MonitorProcess) -ForegroundColor Red; $weg++ }\n    }\n    # AppCertDlls\n    $acd = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDlls'\n    if (Test-Path $acd) {\n        (Get-ItemProperty $acd -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Name -notlike 'PS*' } | ForEach-Object {\n            Write-Host (\"  [!!!] AppCertDlls: {0} = {1}  (geaendert {2})\" -f $_.Name, $_.Value, (&amp; $keyZeit $acd)) -ForegroundColor Red; $weg++\n        }\n    }\n    # COM-Hijacking in der Benutzer-Registry (ueberschreibt systemweite COM-Klassen)\n    Get-ChildItem 'Registry::HKEY_USERS' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.PSChildName -match '^S-1-5-21-[\\d-]+_Classes$' } | ForEach-Object {\n        $clsidRoot = \"Registry::HKEY_USERS\\$($_.PSChildName)\\CLSID\"\n        Get-ChildItem $clsidRoot -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $ips = Join-Path $_.PSPath 'InprocServer32'\n            if (-not (Test-Path $ips)) { return }\n            $dll = [string](Get-ItemProperty $ips -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).'(default)'\n            if (-not $dll) { return }\n            $dllPfad = [Environment]::ExpandEnvironmentVariables($dll.Trim('\"'))\n            $si = &amp; $sigVon $dllPfad\n            $ueberschreibt = Test-Path (\"Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\\" + $_.PSChildName)\n            if ($si.Status -ne 'Valid' -or ($ueberschreibt -and -not $si.MS)) {\n                $col = if ($ueberschreibt) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n                $hin = if ($ueberschreibt) { 'UEBERSCHREIBT systemweite COM-Klasse' } else { 'nur Benutzer-COM' }\n                Write-Host (\"  [!] COM {0} -&gt; {1} | Sig: {2} | {3} (geaendert {4})\" -f $_.PSChildName, $dllPfad, $si.Status, $hin, (&amp; $keyZeit $ips)) -ForegroundColor $col; $weg++\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($weg -eq 0) { Write-Host \"  Keine IFEO-, AppCert-, SilentProcessExit- oder COM-Einstiege gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 21c: Verwundbare Treiber (Kernel Manual Map / BYOVD)\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 21c: Verwundbare Treiber (Kernel Manual Map, z. B. kdmapper) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $blKey = 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CI\\Config'\n    $bl = (Get-ItemProperty $blKey -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable\n    if ($null -ne $bl -and [int]$bl -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  [!!!] Microsoft-Sperrliste fuer verwundbare Treiber ABGESCHALTET (geaendert {0})\" -f (&amp; $keyZeit $blKey)) -ForegroundColor Red\n    } elseif ($null -ne $bl) {\n        Write-Host \"  Sperrliste fuer verwundbare Treiber aktiv.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Sperrliste: kein expliziter Wert (Windows-Standard).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    $byovd = '(?i)(^|\\\\)(iqvw64e|rtcore64|rtcore32|gdrv|asrdrv\\d*|asio\\d*|asupio|capcom|mhyprot\\d*|dbutil_2_3|\\bene\\b|winring0\\w*|glckio\\d*|nvoclock|atillk64|bs_rcio\\d*|phymem\\w*|inpoutx64|zam64|kprocesshacker|procexp1\\d\\d|gmer\\d*|speedfan|hw64|cpuz\\d+)\\.sys$'\n    $trTreffer = @()\n    Get-CimInstance Win32_SystemDriver -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match $byovd } | ForEach-Object {\n        $trTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Quelle=\"Treiber ($($_.State))\"; Name=$_.Name; Pfad=$_.PathName }\n    }\n    Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { [string]$_.ImagePath -match $byovd } | ForEach-Object {\n        $trTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Quelle='Dienst-Registry'; Name=$_.PSChildName; Pfad=[string]$_.ImagePath }\n    }\n    $tempOrte = @(\"$env:SystemRoot\\Temp\")\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $tempOrte += (Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData\\Local\\Temp') }\n    foreach ($to in $tempOrte) {\n        Get-ChildItem $to -Recurse -Depth 2 -Filter '*.sys' -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n            $trTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Quelle='Treiberdatei in TEMP'; Name=$_.Name; Pfad=(\"{0}  (erstellt {1})\" -f $_.FullName, $_.CreationTime) }\n        }\n    }\n    $trTreffer = @($trTreffer | Group-Object { \"$($_.Quelle)|$($_.Name)\" } | ForEach-Object { $_.Group[0] })\n    if ($trTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        $trTreffer | ForEach-Object {\n            $col = if ($_.Quelle -match 'TEMP' -or $_.Name -match '(?i)iqvw64e|capcom|mhyprot|dbutil') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0}: {1} -&gt; {2}\" -f $_.Quelle, $_.Name, $_.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  Hinweis: WinRing0/CPU-Z/HWiNFO/Process Explorer nutzen einige dieser Treiber legitim. .sys in TEMP ist es nie.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine bekannten verwundbaren Treiber und keine Treiberdateien in TEMP.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 21d: Side-Loading - signierte EXE + unsignierte System-DLL daneben\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 21d: Side-Loading (signierte EXE mit gefaelschter System-DLL im selben Ordner) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $sysDll = '(?i)^(version|winhttp|wininet|dbghelp|dbgcore|uxtheme|dwmapi|cryptbase|cryptsp|winmm|userenv|profapi|wtsapi32|iphlpapi|netapi32|mpr|secur32|sspicli|wldp|amsi|msimg32|oleacc|propsys|edputil|winsta|dsound|dxgi|d3d9|d3d10|d3d11|d3d12|dinput8|xinput1_3|xinput1_4|xinput9_1_0|opengl32|hid|setupapi|cfgmgr32|wer|dbgeng|srvcli|netutils|ntmarta|textshaping|mscms|winspool)\\.dll$'\n    $grafik = '(?i)^(dxgi|d3d9|d3d10|d3d11|d3d12|dinput8|opengl32|xinput1_3|xinput1_4|xinput9_1_0)\\.dll$'\n    $slOrte = @(\"$env:ProgramData\", 'C:\\Users\\Public')\n    Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {\n        $slOrte += @((Join-Path $_.FullName 'AppData'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'Downloads'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'Desktop'), (Join-Path $_.FullName 'Documents'))\n    }\n    $sl = 0\n    foreach ($o in $slOrte) {\n        if (-not (Test-Path $o)) { continue }\n        Get-ChildItem $o -Recurse -Depth 4 -Filter '*.dll' -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match $sysDll } | ForEach-Object {\n            $dll = $_\n            $si = &amp; $sigVon $dll.FullName\n            if ($si.Status -eq 'Valid') { return }\n            $exes = @(Get-ChildItem $dll.DirectoryName -Filter '*.exe' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            if ($exes.Count -eq 0) { return }\n            $signierteExe = @($exes | Where-Object { (&amp; $sigVon $_.FullName).Status -eq 'Valid' } | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Name)\n            $col = if ($dll.Name -match $grafik) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Red' }\n            $hin = if ($dll.Name -match $grafik) { ' (Grafik-DLL - auch ReShade/Overlays)' } else { '' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [!] {0}  [Sig: {1}, erstellt {2}]{3}\" -f $dll.FullName, $si.Status, $dll.CreationTime, $hin) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($signierteExe.Count -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"      Signierte EXE im selben Ordner: {0}\" -f (($signierteExe | Select-Object -First 4) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n            $sl++\n        }\n    }\n    if ($sl -eq 0) { Write-Host \"  Keine unsignierten System-DLL-Namen neben Programmen in Benutzerordnern.\" -ForegroundColor Green }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 21e: Hollows Hunter als Zweitmeinung (optional)\n    # ============================================================\n    if (-not $OhneFrage) {\n        $hh = Get-ChildItem \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\CTC_Tools\" -Recurse -Filter 'hollows_hunter*.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 1\n        if ($hh) {\n            $w = Read-Host \"`nHollows Hunter als Zweitmeinung laufen lassen? Scannt alle Prozesse, 1-5 Min [j/N]\"\n            if ($w -match '^[jJyY]') {\n                $out = Join-Path $env:TEMP (\"ctc_hh_\" + (Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMddHHmmss'))\n                New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $out -Force | Out-Null\n                Write-Host \"  Hollows Hunter laeuft...\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                &amp; $hh.FullName /dir $out 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-Null\n                $verd = @(Get-ChildItem $out -Recurse -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -match '^process_(\\d+)$' })\n                if ($verd.Count -gt 0) {\n                    Write-Host (\"  [!] Hollows Hunter meldet {0} auffaellige Prozesse:\" -f $verd.Count) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    foreach ($v in $verd) {\n                        $vpid = [int]($v.Name -replace '^process_','')\n                        $vp = Get-Process -Id $vpid -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                        Write-Host (\"      PID {0}  {1}  {2}\" -f $vpid, $(if ($vp) { $vp.Name } else { '(beendet)' }), $(if ($vp) { $vp.Path } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor Red\n                    }\n                    Write-Host \"  Berichte und Dumps: $out\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                    Write-Host \"  Hinweis: Hooks von Antivirus/Overlays (Malwarebytes, NVIDIA, Discord) loesen ebenfalls aus - mit 21a abgleichen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n                } else {\n                    Write-Host \"  Hollows Hunter: keine auffaelligen Prozesse.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                    Remove-Item $out -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n                }\n            }\n        } else {\n            Write-Host \"`n  (Hollows Hunter nicht gefunden - ueber Punkt 18, Eintrag 8, fuer eine Zweitmeinung laden.)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  21a findet den Cheat nur, solange er geladen ist - bei einem Dienst meist dauerhaft, also auch ohne laufendes Spiel.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  21b-21d finden den Einstieg auch rueckwirkend. Zeitstempel der Aenderung in Punkt 19 als Startzeit nutzen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Grenze: Ein Cheat ohne PE-Header in einem JIT-Prozess (Browser, Discord) ist per Speicherscan kaum zu trennen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  22 - DLL-Historie aus Prefetch (rueckwirkend, auch geloeschte DLLs)\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-DllHistory {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== DLL-Historie: welche DLLs haben Programme beim Start geladen (Prefetch) ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Windows speichert pro Programm die Dateien der ersten ~10 Sekunden - auch DLLs, die heute geloescht sind)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    Add-Type -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -TypeDefinition @\"\nusing System;\nusing System.IO;\nusing System.Text;\nusing System.Runtime.InteropServices;\npublic static class CtcPf {\n    [DllImport(\"ntdll.dll\")] static extern uint RtlGetCompressionWorkSpaceSize(ushort fmt, out uint bufWs, out uint fragWs);\n    [DllImport(\"ntdll.dll\")] static extern uint RtlDecompressBufferEx(ushort fmt, byte[] outBuf, int outSize, byte[] inBuf, int inSize, out int finalSize, byte[] work);\n\n    static byte[] Entpacke(byte[] d) {\n        if (d.Length &lt; 8) return null;\n        if (d[0] == 0x4D &amp;&amp; d[1] == 0x41 &amp;&amp; d[2] == 0x4D) {            // 'MAM' = komprimiert (Windows 10/11)\n            ushort fmt = (ushort)(d[3] &amp; 0x0F);\n            int start = ((d[3] &amp; 0x80) != 0) ? 12 : 8;                  // optionale CRC\n            int groesse = BitConverter.ToInt32(d, 4);\n            if (groesse &lt;= 0 || groesse &gt; 64 * 1024 * 1024) return null;\n            uint ws, fs;\n            if (RtlGetCompressionWorkSpaceSize(fmt, out ws, out fs) != 0) return null;\n            byte[] work = new byte[Math.Max(ws, fs)];\n            byte[] ein = new byte[d.Length - start];\n            Array.Copy(d, start, ein, 0, ein.Length);\n            byte[] aus = new byte[groesse];\n            int fertig;\n            if (RtlDecompressBufferEx(fmt, aus, groesse, ein, ein.Length, out fertig, work) != 0) return null;\n            return aus;\n        }\n        return d;                                                        // unkomprimiert (aeltere Windows)\n    }\n\n    public static string[] Dateien(string pfad) {\n        try {\n            byte[] d = Entpacke(File.ReadAllBytes(pfad));\n            if (d == null || d.Length &lt; 0x70) return new string[0];\n            if (d[4] != 0x53 || d[5] != 0x43 || d[6] != 0x43 || d[7] != 0x41) return new string[0];   // 'SCCA'\n            int off = BitConverter.ToInt32(d, 0x64);\n            int len = BitConverter.ToInt32(d, 0x68);\n            if (off &lt;= 0 || len &lt;= 0 || (long)off + len &gt; d.Length) return new string[0];\n            return Encoding.Unicode.GetString(d, off, len).Split(new[] { '\\0' }, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);\n        } catch { return new string[0]; }\n    }\n}\n\"@\n\n    $pfOrdner = \"$env:SystemRoot\\Prefetch\"\n    $pfs = @(Get-ChildItem \"$pfOrdner\\*.pf\" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n    if ($pfs.Count -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Prefetch-Dateien - Prefetch ist deaktiviert oder wurde geleert. Das ist selbst ein Befund (siehe Punkt 2).\" -ForegroundColor Red\n        return\n    }\n\n    $bekannteSigner = '(?i)Valve|NVIDIA|Discord|Spotify|Google|Razer|Logitech|Corsair|Elgato|Adobe|Malwarebytes|Epic Games|Riot|Electronic Arts|Ubisoft|Rockstar|Cfx|Intel|Advanced Micro|Realtek|Mozilla|Opera|Brave|Microsoft|Apple|Dropbox|Zoom|TeamSpeak|Overwolf|SteelSeries|Turtle Beach|Nahimic|ASUSTeK|Micro-Star|Gigabyte|Medal|OBS Project|TC-Helicon|Oracle|Python|Igor Pavlov|Notepad\\+\\+|WinRAR|win\\.rar'\n    $sysDllName     = '(?i)\\\\(version|winhttp|wininet|dbghelp|dbgcore|uxtheme|dwmapi|cryptbase|cryptsp|winmm|userenv|profapi|wtsapi32|iphlpapi|netapi32|mpr|secur32|sspicli|wldp|amsi|msimg32|oleacc|propsys|edputil|winsta|dsound|hid|setupapi|cfgmgr32|wer|dbgeng|srvcli|netutils|ntmarta|mscms|winspool)\\.dll$'\n    $phantom        = '(?i)\\\\WptsExtensions\\.dll$|\\\\wbem\\\\(WaaSMedicSvc|wlbsctrl)\\.dll$'\n    $benutzerOrt    = '(?i)\\\\(Temp|Downloads|Desktop)\\\\|\\\\AppData\\\\|\\\\ProgramData\\\\|\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\'\n\n    $sigCache = @{}\n    $sigVon = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        if ($sigCache.ContainsKey($pfad)) { return $sigCache[$pfad] }\n        $s  = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -LiteralPath $pfad -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\n        $sg = if ($s -and $s.SignerCertificate) { $s.SignerCertificate.Subject -replace '^(?:.*?,\\s*)?CN=(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|([^,]+)).*$','$1$2' } else { '-' }\n        $ok = $s -and $s.Status -eq 'Valid'\n        $r  = [PSCustomObject]@{ Status=$(if ($s) { [string]$s.Status } else { '?' }); Signierer=$sg; MS=($ok -and $sg -match '(?i)Microsoft'); Bekannt=($ok -and $sg -match $bekannteSigner) }\n        $sigCache[$pfad] = $r\n        $r\n    }\n    $versionWild = {\n        param([string]$pfad)\n        $w = $pfad -replace '(?i)\\\\([a-z_]+-)?\\d+(\\.\\d+)+\\\\', '\\*\\'\n        $w = $w    -replace '(?i)\\\\[^\\\\]*_amd64_[0-9a-f]{16}\\\\', '\\*\\'\n        $w -replace '(?i)\\\\[0-9a-f]{12,}\\\\', '\\*\\'\n    }\n\n    # \\VOLUME{...}\\PFAD -&gt; Laufwerksbuchstabe (Prefetch speichert Volumes, keine Buchstaben)\n    $laufwerke = @(Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Root -match '^[A-Z]:\\\\$' } | ForEach-Object { $_.Root.Substring(0,2) })\n    $aufgeloest = @{}\n    $aufloesen = {\n        param([string]$roh)\n        if ($aufgeloest.ContainsKey($roh)) { return $aufgeloest[$roh] }\n        $rest = $roh -replace '^\\\\VOLUME\\{[^}]*\\}','' -replace '(?i)^\\\\DEVICE\\\\HARDDISKVOLUME\\d+',''\n        $r = $null\n        foreach ($lw in $laufwerke) { if (Test-Path -LiteralPath ($lw + $rest)) { $r = [PSCustomObject]@{ Pfad=($lw + $rest); Da=$true }; break } }\n        if (-not $r) { $r = [PSCustomObject]@{ Pfad=('C:' + $rest); Da=$false } }\n        $aufgeloest[$roh] = $r\n        $r\n    }\n\n    # --- Sammeln ---\n    Write-Host (\"  Lese {0} Prefetch-Dateien...\" -f $pfs.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dll = @{}\n    $leer = 0; $n = 0\n    foreach ($pf in $pfs) {\n        $n++\n        if ($n % 40 -eq 0) { Write-Progress -Activity 'CTC Prefetch-Auswertung' -Status \"$n / $($pfs.Count)\" -PercentComplete ($n / $pfs.Count * 100) }\n        $wirt  = $pf.BaseName -replace '-[0-9A-F]{8}$',''\n        $liste = [CtcPf]::Dateien($pf.FullName)\n        if ($liste.Count -eq 0) { $leer++; continue }\n        $wirtPfad = $liste | Where-Object { $_ -like \"*\\$wirt\" } | Select-Object -First 1\n        $winWirt  = [string]$wirtPfad -match '(?i)\\\\WINDOWS\\\\'\n        foreach ($roh in $liste) {\n            if ($roh -notmatch '(?i)\\.dll$') { continue }\n            $a = &amp; $aufloesen $roh\n            $k = $a.Pfad.ToLower()\n            if (-not $dll.ContainsKey($k)) {\n                $dll[$k] = [PSCustomObject]@{ Pfad=$a.Pfad; Da=$a.Da; Wirte=@{}; WinWirt=$false; Erst=$pf.CreationTime; Letzt=$pf.LastWriteTime }\n            }\n            $o = $dll[$k]\n            $o.Wirte[$wirt] = $true\n            if ($winWirt) { $o.WinWirt = $true }\n            if ($pf.CreationTime  -lt $o.Erst)  { $o.Erst  = $pf.CreationTime }\n            if ($pf.LastWriteTime -gt $o.Letzt) { $o.Letzt = $pf.LastWriteTime }\n        }\n    }\n    Write-Progress -Activity 'CTC Prefetch-Auswertung' -Completed\n    Write-Host (\"  {0} verschiedene DLLs in den Ladelisten gefunden.\" -f $dll.Count) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # --- Bewerten ---\n    $funde = @(); $bekanntN = 0; $updateN = 0\n    $installerOrdner = '(?i)\\\\(ns[a-z0-9]+\\.tmp|7zs[0-9a-f]+\\.tmp|is-[a-z0-9]{5}\\.tmp|tlsfx[0-9a-f]+|ts3import|[^\\\\]+\\.tmp)\\\\|\\\\\\{[0-9a-f-]{36}\\}\\\\\\.ba\\\\'\n    $installerWirt   = '(?i)setup|install|_inst|redist|sfx|driver|dotnet-runtime|update|\\.tmp$'\n    $installerWirte  = @{}; $installerN = 0\n    $addTypeZeiten   = @()\n    foreach ($o in $dll.Values) {\n        $p = $o.Pfad\n        $stufe = $null; $grund = ''\n        $wirte = @($o.Wirte.Keys)\n        $cn = Get-CheatName (\"{0} {1}\" -f $p, ($wirte -join ' '))\n        if ($cn) { $funde += [PSCustomObject]@{ O=$o; Stufe='Rot'; Grund=\"BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" }; continue }\n\n        # PowerShell Add-Type: csc.exe kompiliert C#-Code nach TEMP\\xxxxxxxx\\xxxxxxxx.dll (macht auch CTC selbst)\n        if ($wirte -contains 'CSC.EXE' -and $p -match '(?i)\\\\Temp\\\\([a-z0-9]{8})\\\\\\1\\.dll$') { $addTypeZeiten += $o.Letzt; continue }\n        # Installer entpacken DLLs nach Temp, laden sie und loeschen sie wieder\n        $alleInstaller = @($wirte | Where-Object { $_ -notmatch $installerWirt }).Count -eq 0\n        if ($p -match '(?i)\\\\Temp\\\\' -and ($p -match $installerOrdner -or $alleInstaller)) {\n            $installerN++; foreach ($w in $wirte) { $installerWirte[$w] = $true }; continue\n        }\n\n        if ($p -match $phantom) {\n            $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = 'Phantom-DLL - gehoert nicht an diesen Ort (Hijacking)'\n        }\n        elseif ($p -match '(?i)^[A-Z]:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\') {\n            if ($p -match '(?i)\\\\(WinSxS|assembly|Microsoft\\.NET|SoftwareDistribution|servicing|System32\\\\DriverStore|SysWOW64\\\\DriverStore)\\\\') { continue }\n            if ($p -match '(?i)^[A-Z]:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\(System32|SysWOW64)\\\\[^\\\\]+\\.dll$') { continue }   # System32-Wurzel prueft Punkt 16\n            if ($p -match '(?i)\\\\WINDOWS\\\\Temp\\\\') { $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = 'aus C:\\Windows\\Temp geladen' }\n            elseif (-not $o.Da) {\n                if ((&amp; $versionWild $p) -ne $p -and (Test-Path (&amp; $versionWild $p))) { $updateN++; continue }\n                $stufe = 'Gelb'; $grund = 'im Windows-Ordner, heute GELOESCHT'\n            } else {\n                $si = &amp; $sigVon $p\n                if (-not $si.MS) {\n                    if ($si.Bekannt) { $bekanntN++; continue }\n                    $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = \"im Windows-Ordner, aber NICHT von Microsoft signiert ($($si.Status) / $($si.Signierer))\"\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        else {\n            if (-not $o.Da) {\n                $w = &amp; $versionWild $p\n                if ($w -ne $p -and (Test-Path $w)) { $updateN++; continue }\n                if ($p -match '(?i)\\\\(Temp|Downloads|Desktop)\\\\') { $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = 'aus Temp/Downloads/Desktop geladen, heute GELOESCHT' }\n                elseif ($o.WinWirt)                              { $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = 'von einem Windows-Prozess geladen, heute GELOESCHT' }\n                elseif ($p -match $sysDllName)                   { $stufe = 'Rot'; $grund = 'System-DLL-Name ausserhalb von Windows (Side-Loading), heute GELOESCHT' }\n            } else {\n                $pruefen = $o.WinWirt -or ($p -match $sysDllName) -or ($p -match '(?i)\\\\Temp\\\\')\n                if ($pruefen) {\n                    $si = &amp; $sigVon $p\n                    if ($si.MS -or $si.Bekannt) { $bekanntN++; continue }\n                    if ($p -match $sysDllName -and $si.Status -ne 'Valid') { $stufe = 'Rot';  $grund = \"System-DLL-Name ausserhalb von Windows, unsigniert (Side-Loading)\" }\n                    elseif ($si.Status -ne 'Valid')                        { $stufe = 'Rot';  $grund = \"unsigniert ($($si.Status)), geladen von Windows-Prozess oder aus Temp\" }\n                    elseif ($o.WinWirt)                                     { $stufe = 'Gelb'; $grund = \"Windows-Prozess laedt DLL eines unbekannten Herstellers ($($si.Signierer))\" }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        if ($stufe) { $funde += [PSCustomObject]@{ O=$o; Stufe=$stufe; Grund=$grund } }\n    }\n\n    # --- Ausgabe ---\n    if ($funde.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"`n  {0} auffaellige DLL-Ladevorgaenge:\" -f $funde.Count) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        foreach ($f in ($funde | Sort-Object { $_.Stufe -ne 'Rot' }, { $_.O.Letzt } -Descending | Select-Object -First 60)) {\n            $col = if ($f.Stufe -eq 'Rot') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"`n  [{0}] {1}\" -f $f.O.Letzt.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'), $f.O.Pfad) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"      {0}\" -f $f.Grund) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"      geladen von: {0}\" -f (($f.O.Wirte.Keys | Sort-Object | Select-Object -First 8) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        }\n        Write-Host \"`n  Zeit = letzter Start des ladenden Programms (Prefetch). Diesen Zeitpunkt in Punkt 19 als Startzeit nutzen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine auffaelligen DLL-Ladevorgaenge in den Prefetch-Ladelisten.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    if ($addTypeZeiten.Count -gt 0) {\n        $zeiten = @($addTypeZeiten | Sort-Object -Descending | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm') } | Select-Object -Unique -First 6)\n        Write-Host (\"`n  [!] PowerShell hat C#-Code kompiliert (Add-Type), {0} DLLs, zuletzt: {1}\" -f $addTypeZeiten.Count, ($zeiten -join ' | ')) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        Write-Host \"      CTC macht das selbst. Zeitpunkte AUSSERHALB eines CTC-Laufs = ein PowerShell-Skript hat C#-Code geladen (typisch fuer Loader).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($installerN -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  ({0} DLLs von Installern entpackt und wieder geloescht - Installer: {1})\" -f $installerN, (($installerWirte.Keys | Sort-Object | Select-Object -First 12) -join ', ')) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n        Write-Host \"   Unbekannter Installer-Name in dieser Liste = pruefen, was da installiert wurde.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    }\n    if ($bekanntN -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"  ({0} DLLs bekannter, signierter Hersteller ausgeblendet)\" -f $bekanntN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    if ($updateN  -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"  ({0} geloeschte DLLs alter Programmversionen ausgeblendet - neuere Version existiert)\" -f $updateN) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n    if ($leer -gt 0)     { Write-Host (\"  ({0} Prefetch-Dateien nicht lesbar)\" -f $leer) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Rot bei einem Windows-Prozess (svchost, WmiPrvSE, explorer ...) = eine fremde DLL wurde in einen signierten Prozess geladen.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Grenze: Prefetch erfasst nur die ersten ~10 Sekunden nach Programmstart und max. 1024 Programme.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Eine DLL, die spaeter per Injection nachgeladen wird, steht hier nicht - dafuer Punkt 21a (Speicher) und 19 (USN).\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  23 - Web: Cheat-Seiten, Download-Herkunft, DNS\n# ============================================================\nfunction Invoke-WebCheck {\n    Write-Host \"`n=== Web: Cheat-Seiten, Download-Herkunft, DNS ===\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"(Nur Treffer auf Cheat-Merkmale - kein vollstaendiger Verlauf, keine Passwoerter, Cookies oder Token)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # ---- Eigene Listen (vom Team pflegen) ----\n    # Begriffe in Domains, Adressen, Suchanfragen und Dateinamen\n    $cheatBegriffe = '(?i)cheat|hack|spoof|bypass|aimbot|wallhack|triggerbot|silent.?aim|undetect|injector|\\bloader\\b|hwid|\\bdma\\b|fuser|kmbox|makcu|pcileech|mod.?menu|executor|\\besp\\b'\n    $shopAuth  = '(?i)keyauth\\.|sellix\\.io|sell\\.app|shoppy\\.gg|sellpass\\.io|selly\\.(gg|io)|sellauth\\.'\n    $hoster    = '(?i)gofile\\.io|mediafire\\.com|mega\\.nz|pixeldrain\\.com|workupload\\.com|anonfiles|transfer\\.sh|filebin\\.net|send\\.cm'\n    $ausfDatei = '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|zip|rar|7z|bat|ps1|msi|scr|iso)(\\?|&amp;|$)'\n\n    # Datei kopieren (auch wenn der Browser laeuft) und alle URLs herausziehen\n    $urlsAus = {\n        param([string]$datei)\n        $tmp = Join-Path $env:TEMP (\"ctc_web_\" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))\n        try {\n            try { Copy-Item -LiteralPath $datei -Destination $tmp -ErrorAction Stop }\n            catch { &amp; esentutl.exe /y $datei /vss /d $tmp 2&gt;&amp;1 | Out-Null }\n            if (-not (Test-Path $tmp)) { return @() }\n            $raw = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($tmp, [Text.Encoding]::GetEncoding('ISO-8859-1'))\n            @([regex]::Matches($raw, 'https?://[\\x21-\\x7E]{4,400}') | ForEach-Object { $_.Value.TrimEnd('\"', \"'\", ')', ',', ';') })\n        } catch { @() } finally { Remove-Item $tmp -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }\n    }\n    $bewerte = {\n        param([string]$u)\n        $h = ''; if ($u -match '^https?://([^/:?#]+)') { $h = $matches[1] }\n        $dek = $u; try { $dek = [uri]::UnescapeDataString(($u -replace '\\+',' ')) } catch {}\n        $cn = Get-CheatName $dek\n        if ($cn)                                                     { return @('Rot',  \"BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\") }\n        if ($h -match $cheatBegriffe)                                { return @('Rot',  'Cheat-Begriff in der Domain') }\n        if ($h -match $shopAuth) {\n            $st = if ($u -match $cheatBegriffe) { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            return @($st, 'Shop-/Lizenzplattform, die Cheat-Verkaeufer nutzen')\n        }\n        if ($h -match $hoster) {\n            $st = if ($u -match $ausfDatei) { 'Rot' } else { 'Gelb' }\n            return @($st, 'Datei-Hoster')\n        }\n        if ($u -match '[?&amp;](q|query|search_query|p|text)=([^&amp;#]+)') {\n            $q = $matches[2]\n            try { $q = [uri]::UnescapeDataString(($q -replace '\\+',' ')) } catch {}\n            if ($q -match $cheatBegriffe) { return @('Gelb', \"Suche: $q\") }\n        }\n        if ($u -match $cheatBegriffe -and $h -notmatch '(?i)(^|\\.)(google|bing|youtube|reddit|duckduckgo|yahoo)\\.') { return @('Gelb', 'Cheat-Begriff in der Adresse') }\n        return $null\n    }\n    $ausgabe = {\n        param($treffer, [int]$max)\n        foreach ($x in ($treffer | Sort-Object { $_.Stufe -ne 'Rot' }, Url | Select-Object -First $max)) {\n            $col = if ($x.Stufe -eq 'Rot') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            $u = $x.Url; if ($u.Length -gt 160) { $u = $u.Substring(0,160) + ' [...]' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $x.Grund, $u) -ForegroundColor $col\n            if ($x.Quelle) { Write-Host (\"      Quelle: {0}\" -f $x.Quelle) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n    }\n\n    $benutzer = @(Get-ChildItem 'C:\\Users' -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Name -notmatch '^(Public|Default|Default User|All Users)$' })\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 23a: Browserverlauf\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 23a: Browserverlauf (nur Cheat-Merkmale) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $webTreffer = @{}\n    $gelesen = 0\n    foreach ($u in $benutzer) {\n        $loc = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Local'; $roam = Join-Path $u.FullName 'AppData\\Roaming'\n        $chromium = [ordered]@{\n            'Chrome'  = \"$loc\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\";  'Edge'    = \"$loc\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data\"\n            'Brave'   = \"$loc\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\User Data\"; 'Vivaldi' = \"$loc\\Vivaldi\\User Data\"\n            'Opera'   = \"$roam\\Opera Software\\Opera Stable\"; 'OperaGX' = \"$roam\\Opera Software\\Opera GX Stable\"\n        }\n        foreach ($b in $chromium.Keys) {\n            $root = $chromium[$b]\n            if (-not (Test-Path $root)) { continue }\n            $hist = @(Get-ChildItem $root -Recurse -Depth 2 -Filter 'History' -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n            foreach ($hf in $hist) {\n                $gelesen++\n                $profil = Split-Path (Split-Path $hf.FullName -Parent) -Leaf\n                foreach ($url in (&amp; $urlsAus $hf.FullName)) {\n                    if ($webTreffer.ContainsKey($url)) { continue }\n                    $bw = &amp; $bewerte $url\n                    if ($bw) { $webTreffer[$url] = [PSCustomObject]@{ Url=$url; Stufe=$bw[0]; Grund=$bw[1]; Quelle=\"$b/$profil ($($u.Name))\" } }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        $ff = Join-Path $roam 'Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles'\n        if (Test-Path $ff) {\n            foreach ($pl in @(Get-ChildItem $ff -Recurse -Depth 1 -Filter 'places.sqlite' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {\n                $gelesen++\n                foreach ($url in (&amp; $urlsAus $pl.FullName)) {\n                    if ($webTreffer.ContainsKey($url)) { continue }\n                    $bw = &amp; $bewerte $url\n                    if ($bw) { $webTreffer[$url] = [PSCustomObject]@{ Url=$url; Stufe=$bw[0]; Grund=$bw[1]; Quelle=\"Firefox ($($u.Name))\" } }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($gelesen -eq 0) {\n        Write-Host \"  Kein Browserverlauf gefunden (kein Browser, geloescht oder portable Browser).\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    } elseif ($webTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        Write-Host (\"  {0} Treffer in {1} Verlaufsdatei(en):\" -f $webTreffer.Count, $gelesen) -ForegroundColor Yellow\n        &amp; $ausgabe $webTreffer.Values 60\n    } else {\n        Write-Host (\"  Keine Cheat-Merkmale in {0} Verlaufsdatei(en).\" -f $gelesen) -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    Write-Host \"  (Verlauf enthaelt keine Uhrzeit in dieser Auswertung - Zeitbezug ueber 23c und Punkt 19)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 23c: Download-Herkunft (Zone.Identifier)\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 23c: Herkunft heruntergeladener Dateien (Zone.Identifier) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dlTreffer = @(); $dlSonst = 0\n    foreach ($u in $benutzer) {\n        foreach ($sub in @('Downloads','Desktop','Documents','AppData\\Local\\Temp')) {\n            $d = Join-Path $u.FullName $sub\n            if (-not (Test-Path $d)) { continue }\n            Get-ChildItem $d -Recurse -Depth 2 -File -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |\n                Where-Object { $_.Name -match '(?i)\\.(exe|dll|sys|zip|rar|7z|msi|bat|ps1|scr|iso)$' } | ForEach-Object {\n                    $zi = @(Get-Content -LiteralPath $_.FullName -Stream Zone.Identifier -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)\n                    if ($zi.Count -eq 0) { return }\n                    $hostUrl = ($zi | Where-Object { $_ -like 'HostUrl=*' }     | Select-Object -First 1) -replace '^HostUrl=',''\n                    $refUrl  = ($zi | Where-Object { $_ -like 'ReferrerUrl=*' } | Select-Object -First 1) -replace '^ReferrerUrl=',''\n                    $bw = $null\n                    $cn = Get-CheatName (\"{0} {1} {2}\" -f $_.Name, $hostUrl, $refUrl)\n                    if ($cn) { $bw = @('Rot', \"BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\") }\n                    if (-not $bw -and $hostUrl) { $bw = &amp; $bewerte $hostUrl }\n                    if (-not $bw -and $refUrl) { $bw = &amp; $bewerte $refUrl }\n                    if (-not $bw -and $_.Name -match $cheatBegriffe) { $bw = @('Rot','Cheat-Begriff im Dateinamen') }\n                    if ($bw) {\n                        $dlTreffer += [PSCustomObject]@{ Datei=$_.FullName; Zeit=$_.CreationTime; Von=$hostUrl; Ref=$refUrl; Stufe=$bw[0]; Grund=$bw[1] }\n                    } else { $dlSonst++ }\n                }\n        }\n    }\n    if ($dlTreffer.Count -gt 0) {\n        foreach ($x in ($dlTreffer | Sort-Object Zeit -Descending | Select-Object -First 40)) {\n            $col = if ($x.Stufe -eq 'Rot') { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"  [{0}] {1}\" -f $x.Zeit.ToString('dd.MM.yyyy HH:mm'), $x.Datei) -ForegroundColor $col\n            Write-Host (\"      {0} | von: {1}\" -f $x.Grund, $(if ($x.Von) { $x.Von } else { '-' })) -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            if ($x.Ref) { Write-Host (\"      Verweis-Seite: {0}\" -f $x.Ref) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n        }\n        Write-Host \"  Download-Zeit = Startzeit fuer Punkt 19.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine heruntergeladenen Dateien aus Cheat-Quellen gefunden.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n    if ($dlSonst -gt 0) { Write-Host (\"  ({0} weitere Downloads von unauffaelligen Quellen)\" -f $dlSonst) -ForegroundColor DarkGray }\n\n    # ============================================================\n    # 23d: DNS-Cache (seit dem letzten Neustart)\n    # ============================================================\n    Write-Host \"`n--- 23d: DNS-Cache (aufgerufene Domains seit dem letzten Neustart) ---\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    $dns = @(Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Entry -Unique | Where-Object {\n        $_ -match $cheatBegriffe -or $_ -match $shopAuth -or $_ -match $hoster -or [bool](Get-CheatName $_)\n    })\n    if ($dns.Count -gt 0) {\n        $dns | ForEach-Object {\n            $cn  = Get-CheatName $_\n            $col = if ($cn -or $_ -match $cheatBegriffe) { 'Red' } else { 'Yellow' }\n            Write-Host (\"  {0}{1}\" -f $_, $(if ($cn) { \"   &lt;-- BEKANNTER CHEAT-NAME: $cn\" } else { '' })) -ForegroundColor $col\n        }\n    } else {\n        Write-Host \"  Keine Cheat-, Shop- oder Hoster-Domains im DNS-Cache.\" -ForegroundColor Green\n    }\n\n    Write-Host \"`nAuswertung:\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Staerkste Spur: Downloads, deren Herkunft eine Cheat-Seite, ein Shop oder ein Datei-Hoster ist.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Shops/Hoster allein sind kein Beweis - viele legitime Verkaeufer nutzen sie. Immer im Zusammenhang werten.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Geloeschter Verlauf / Inkognito hinterlaesst hier nichts - dann bleiben DNS-Cache, Zone.Identifier und Punkt 19.\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n}\n\n# ============================================================\n#  Menue\n# ============================================================\nfunction Show-Menu {\n    Write-Host \"\"\n    Write-Host \"  ============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"    CTC by Dark - CatchTheCheat               \" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n    Write-Host \"  ============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [H] HARDWARE &amp; DMA\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"     3  PCI/PCIe-Geraete (VEN/DEV, Registry-Abgleich)\"\n    Write-Host \"     4  Entfernte Geraete (Zeitfenster)\"\n    Write-Host \"     6  USB-Historie + MAKCU/Arduino/ESP32\"\n    Write-Host \"    15  HVCI, Secure Boot, IOMMU/VT-d (DMA-Schutz), Testsigning\"\n    Write-Host \"    17  DMA Fuser / Zweiter PC / HDMI-Splitter\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [L] LOGS &amp; SPUREN\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"     1  PnP-Ereignisse (411 / 400 / 410 / 420)\"\n    Write-Host \"     2  Log-Integritaet / Amcache / USN / Prefetch\"\n    Write-Host \"     5  Datentraeger-Historie (Partition-Log)\"\n    Write-Host \"    10  PowerShell-History / ScriptBlock / EID 600\"\n    Write-Host \"    19  Session-Timeline: was lief nach der Fernwartung?\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [B] BYPASS &amp; INJECTION\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"     9  Unsignierte Treiber &amp; Prozesse\"\n    Write-Host \"    12  PE Binary Inspector (einzelne Datei)\"\n    Write-Host \"    13  DLL Hijacking (wbem, Phantom-DLLs)\"\n    Write-Host \"    14  Systemprozesse / AppInit / LSA / Winlogon\"\n    Write-Host \"    16  Signatur-Scan + Tiefenanalyse jeder DLL/EXE/SYS (mit HTML-Bericht)\"\n    Write-Host \"    21  Injection in signierte Prozesse (Speicher, IFEO, COM, Treiber)\"\n    Write-Host \"    22  DLL-Historie aus Prefetch (auch geloeschte DLLs)\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [R] REMOTE &amp; IDENTITAET\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"     7  Fernwartungssoftware (AnyDesk, RustDesk...)\"\n    Write-Host \"     8  Fernwartung: Sitzungen &amp; Uebertragungen\"\n    Write-Host \"    20  Handy-/Fernsteuerung: Ports, LAN, Firewall, SRUM\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [W] WEB\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"    23  Cheat-Seiten im Browserverlauf, Download-Herkunft, DNS\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  [T] WERKZEUGE\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n    Write-Host \"    18  Forensische Tools herunterladen\"\n\n    Write-Host \"`n  ----------------------------------------------\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  H / L / B / R / W = ganze Kategorie ausfuehren\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  A               = Alles (ohne 12, 16, 18, 19)\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  P               = Protokoll starten/stoppen\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  Q               = Beenden\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n    Write-Host \"  ============================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n}\n\n# ------------------------------------------------------------\nif (-not (Test-Admin)) {\n    Write-Host \"WARNUNG: Nicht als Administrator gestartet.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    Write-Host \"Das Kernel-PnP-Log ist so nicht lesbar.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n    Write-Host \"\"\n}\n\n$protokoll = $false\n\ndo {\n    Show-Menu\n    $wahl = (Read-Host \"Auswahl\").Trim().ToUpper()\n\n    switch ($wahl) {\n        '1' { Invoke-PnpEvents }\n        '2' { Invoke-LogIntegrity }\n        '3' { Invoke-PciDevices }\n        '4' {\n              $h = Read-Host \"Zeitfenster in Stunden (Enter = 1)\"\n              if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($h)) { $h = 1 }\n              Invoke-RemovedDevices -Stunden ([int]$h)\n            }\n        '5' { Invoke-DiskHistory }\n        '6' { Invoke-UsbHistory }\n        '7' { Invoke-RemoteTools }\n        '8' { Invoke-RemoteSessions }\n        '9' { Invoke-Unsigned }\n        '10' { Invoke-PSHistory }\n        '12' { Invoke-PEInspector }\n        '13' { Invoke-DLLHijackCheck }\n        '14' { Invoke-SystemProcessCheck }\n        '15' { Invoke-HVCICheck }\n        '16' { Invoke-System32Check }\n        '17' { Invoke-FuserCheck }\n        '18' { Invoke-ToolDownload }\n        '19' { Invoke-SessionTimeline }\n        '20' { Invoke-RemoteControlCheck }\n        '21' { Invoke-InjectionCheck }\n        '22' { Invoke-DllHistory }\n        '23' { Invoke-WebCheck }\n        'W'  {\n              Write-Host \"`n&gt;&gt;&gt; KATEGORIE: WEB &lt;&lt;&lt;\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              Invoke-WebCheck\n            }\n        'H' {\n              Write-Host \"`n&gt;&gt;&gt; KATEGORIE: HARDWARE &amp; DMA &lt;&lt;&lt;\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              Invoke-PciDevices\n              Invoke-RemovedDevices -Stunden 24\n              Invoke-UsbHistory\n              Invoke-HVCICheck\n              Invoke-FuserCheck\n            }\n        'L' {\n              Write-Host \"`n&gt;&gt;&gt; KATEGORIE: LOGS &amp; SPUREN &lt;&lt;&lt;\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              Invoke-LogIntegrity\n              Invoke-PnpEvents\n              Invoke-DiskHistory\n              Invoke-PSHistory\n            }\n        'B' {\n              Write-Host \"`n&gt;&gt;&gt; KATEGORIE: BYPASS &amp; INJECTION &lt;&lt;&lt;\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              Invoke-Unsigned\n              Invoke-DLLHijackCheck\n              Invoke-SystemProcessCheck\n              Invoke-InjectionCheck -OhneFrage\n              Invoke-DllHistory\n              Write-Host \"`n[12 und 16 sind Einzelchecks - manuell starten]\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        'R' {\n              Write-Host \"`n&gt;&gt;&gt; KATEGORIE: REMOTE &amp; IDENTITAET &lt;&lt;&lt;\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              Invoke-RemoteTools\n              Invoke-RemoteSessions\n              Invoke-RemoteControlCheck -OhneFrage\n            }\n        'A' {\n              Invoke-LogIntegrity\n              Invoke-PnpEvents\n              Invoke-PciDevices\n              Invoke-RemovedDevices -Stunden 24\n              Invoke-DiskHistory\n              Invoke-UsbHistory\n              Invoke-RemoteTools\n              Invoke-RemoteSessions\n              Invoke-Unsigned\n              Invoke-PSHistory\n              Invoke-DLLHijackCheck\n              Invoke-SystemProcessCheck\n              Invoke-HVCICheck\n              Invoke-FuserCheck\n              Invoke-RemoteControlCheck -OhneFrage\n              Invoke-InjectionCheck -OhneFrage\n              Invoke-DllHistory\n              Invoke-WebCheck\n              Write-Host \"`n[Uebersprungen: 12, 16, 18, 19 - Einzeldatei, Laufzeit bzw. Eingaben noetig - manuell starten]\" -ForegroundColor DarkGray\n            }\n        'P' {\n              if ($protokoll) {\n                  try { Stop-Transcript | Out-Null } catch {}\n                  $protokoll = $false\n                  Write-Host \"Protokoll gestoppt.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n              } else {\n                  $pfad = \"$env:USERPROFILE\\Desktop\\ctc_by_dark_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').txt\"\n                  try {\n                      Start-Transcript -Path $pfad | Out-Null\n                      $protokoll = $true\n                      Write-Host \"Protokoll laeuft: $pfad\" -ForegroundColor Green\n                  } catch {\n                      Write-Host \"Protokoll konnte nicht gestartet werden.\" -ForegroundColor Red\n                  }\n              }\n            }\n        'Q' { }\n        default { Write-Host \"Ungueltige Eingabe.\" -ForegroundColor Yellow }\n    }\n\n    if ($wahl -ne 'Q') {\n        Write-Host \"\"\n        Read-Host \"Enter fuer Menue\"\n        Clear-Host\n    }\n\n} while ($wahl -ne 'Q')\n\nif ($protokoll) { try { Stop-Transcript | Out-Null } catch {} }\nWrite-Host \"Beendet.\" -ForegroundColor Cyan", "url": "https://gist.github.com/analystdark/f70b483d398735a0a7a1e380bbf01e87"}], "metrics": {"as_of": "2026-11-16T05:38:49.744Z", "anchors": {"origin": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "discovery": null, "report": null, "acknowledgement": null, "disclosure": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "exploit_publication": {"timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922179Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "4748b214-38ce-4dff-8a62-3b5461d5d874", "content": "Detection  From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.  Driver whitelisting  Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even recommended by Microsoft themselves (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (Hypervisor-protected code integrity) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).  Kernel-memory integrity checks  Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.  As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent Kernel Data Protection (KDP) (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.  The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the ProviderEnableInfo, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Threat%20Intelligence) events generation.  User-mode detection  The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a LoadLibrary call, especially ntdll.dll.  In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.  Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for NtCreateProcess syscall, ObRegisterCallbacks for NtOpenProcess syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (kernel32.dll -&gt; ntdll.dll -&gt; syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. program.exe -&gt; direct syscall).  Acknowledgements      Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder      Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable  Micro-Star MSI Afterburner driver:  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/      Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider      Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz      Initial list of EDR drivers names:  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1      Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling Wdigest through LSASS memory  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/      Authors  Thomas DIOT (Qazeer) (https://github.com/Qazeer/)  Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks) (https://github.com/themaks)  Licence  CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, "exploitation": {"timestamp": "2022-10-06T17:35:04Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-10-06T17:35:04.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5fe9a99e-39f5-4c23-83d1-81cc30d2385f", "content": "BlackByte \u0432\u0437\u044f\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 Bring Your Own Driver (BYOVD).\n\n\u0412\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c 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null}, "vendor_response_time": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "time_to_exploit": {"available": true, "seconds": 96858888.0, "hours": 26905.246666666666, "days": 1121.0519444444444, "min_seconds": 96858888.0, "max_seconds": 96858888.0, "approximate": false, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2022-10-06T17:35:04Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-10-06T17:35:04.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5fe9a99e-39f5-4c23-83d1-81cc30d2385f", "content": "BlackByte \u0432\u0437\u044f\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 Bring Your Own Driver (BYOVD).\n\n\u0412\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438  \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 CVE-2019-16098 \u0432 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 MSI Afterburner 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\u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0442 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044e \u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043e\u0432 AV/EDR.\n\n\u041b\u044e\u0431\u044b\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0432\u043f\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u043d\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c \u044d\u0442\u0430\u043f\u0435, \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0438 \u043d\u0443\u043b\u044f\u043c\u0438 \u044d\u043b\u0435\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430, \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u044b\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u043f\u043e\u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 \u0430\u043d\u043d\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f.\n\nSophos \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e BlackByte \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u044d\u0442\u0438\u0445 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u043a \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0447\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0432 \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u0438\u0437 \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e.\n\n\u0412\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0430 BlackByte \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 DLL-\u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 Avast, Sandboxie, \u0431\u0438\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043e\u0442\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0439 Windows DbgHelp \u0438 Comodo Internet Security, \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0432 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f.\n\n\u0421\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0442 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 BlackByte, \u0434\u043e\u0431\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0432 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 MSI \u0432 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a.\n\n\u041a\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435 \u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e, \u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0436\u043d\u044b \u043e\u0442\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432\u0441\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u0431\u044b\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0447\u0430\u0449\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044f\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0445, \u0447\u0442\u043e\u0431\u044b \u043d\u0430\u0439\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e.", "url": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "metric_role": "exploitation", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}}, "disclosure_to_exploit": {"available": true, "seconds": 96858888.0, "hours": 26905.246666666666, "days": 1121.0519444444444, "min_seconds": 96858888.0, "max_seconds": 96858888.0, "approximate": false, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2022-10-06T17:35:04Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-10-06T17:35:04.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5fe9a99e-39f5-4c23-83d1-81cc30d2385f", "content": "BlackByte \u0432\u0437\u044f\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 Bring Your Own Driver (BYOVD).\n\n\u0412\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438  \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 CVE-2019-16098 \u0432 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 MSI Afterburner RTCore64.sys.\n\n\u0423\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u043b\u0430\u00a0BlackByte\u00a0\u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043f\u044f\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0435 EDR, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0441\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f.\n\nBYOVD \u044d\u0444\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0435\u043d, \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u0443 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0441 \u0432\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438.\n\n\u0410\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u043c \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 Lazarus, \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043b\u044f\u044f \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c Dell, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0438\u0433\u0440\u044b Genshin Impact.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u044f\u0441\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 MSI \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c-\u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c, \u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u044f\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0430\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0436\u0438\u043c\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 Microsoft \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u043a \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430.\n\n\u042d\u0442\u043e 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"disclosure_to_exploit_publication": {"available": true, "seconds": 220433996.922, "hours": 61231.665811666666, "days": 2551.3194088194446, "min_seconds": 220433996.922, "max_seconds": 220433996.922, "approximate": false, "ongoing": false, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922179Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "4748b214-38ce-4dff-8a62-3b5461d5d874", "content": "Detection  From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.  Driver whitelisting  Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even recommended by Microsoft themselves (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (Hypervisor-protected code integrity) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).  Kernel-memory integrity checks  Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.  As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent Kernel Data Protection (KDP) (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.  The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the ProviderEnableInfo, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Threat%20Intelligence) events generation.  User-mode detection  The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a LoadLibrary call, especially ntdll.dll.  In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.  Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for NtCreateProcess syscall, ObRegisterCallbacks for NtOpenProcess syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (kernel32.dll -&gt; ntdll.dll -&gt; syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. program.exe -&gt; direct syscall).  Acknowledgements      Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder      Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable  Micro-Star MSI Afterburner driver:  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/      Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider      Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz      Initial list of EDR drivers names:  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1      Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling Wdigest through LSASS memory  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/      Authors  Thomas DIOT (Qazeer) (https://github.com/Qazeer/)  Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks) (https://github.com/themaks)  Licence  CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}}, "time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "total_time_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["start", "end"]}, "disclosure_to_patch": {"available": false, "missing": ["end"]}, "time_unpatched": {"available": true, "seconds": 226588713.74433, "hours": 62941.309373425, "days": 2622.5545572260417, "min_seconds": 226588713.74433, "max_seconds": 226588713.74433, "approximate": false, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2019-09-11T16:20:16Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2019-09-11T16:20:16.000Z", "kind": "milestone", "label": "Published", "source": "cvelistv5", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "cveMetadata.datePublished", "metric_role": "disclosure", "metric_basis": "recorded_event"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-16T05:38:49.744Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}, "exploitation_to_patch": {"available": true, "seconds": 129729825.74433, "hours": 36036.062706758334, "days": 1501.5026127815972, "min_seconds": 129729825.74433, "max_seconds": 129729825.74433, "approximate": false, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2022-10-06T17:35:04Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2022-10-06T17:35:04.000000Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Exploited", "source": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "5fe9a99e-39f5-4c23-83d1-81cc30d2385f", "content": "BlackByte \u0432\u0437\u044f\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 Bring Your Own Driver (BYOVD).\n\n\u0412\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0441 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438  \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 CVE-2019-16098 \u0432 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 MSI Afterburner RTCore64.sys.\n\n\u0423\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u043b\u0430\u00a0BlackByte\u00a0\u043e\u0442\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b, \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043f\u044f\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0435 \u043d\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0435 EDR, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0441\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f.\n\nBYOVD \u044d\u0444\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0435\u043d, \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u0443 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e\u0434\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0441 \u0432\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438.\n\n\u0410\u043d\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043e\u043c \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 Lazarus, \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043b\u044f\u044f \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c Dell, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043d\u0435\u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0438\u0433\u0440\u044b Genshin Impact.\n\n\u0418\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u044f\u0441\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0433\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440 MSI \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u043e\u0434\u044b \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c-\u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c, \u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u044f\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0430\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0435\u0436\u0438\u043c\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 Microsoft \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u043a \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430.\n\n\u042d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c \u0447\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0442\u044c, \u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u044f\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434 \u0432 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0448\u0435\u043b\u043b-\u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430.\n\n\u041d\u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u043e\u043c \u044d\u0442\u0430\u043f\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 BlackByte \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044e \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043e\u0431\u044b \u0432\u044b\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0441\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0435 \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430. \u0417\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043c RTCore64.sys \u043f\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0449\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0432 \u00abAppData\\Roaming\u00bb \u0438 \u0441\u043e\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0443, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044f \u0436\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043a\u043e \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0438\u043c\u044f \u0438 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e 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\u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438.\n\n\u041f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u044b\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0430 \u0438 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0441\u043e \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c \u0438\u0437 1000 \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0442 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\u0430\u043d\u043d\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f.\n\nSophos \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442, \u0447\u0442\u043e BlackByte \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u044d\u0442\u0438\u0445 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u043f\u043e\u0438\u0441\u043a \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0447\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0432 \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u0438\u0437 \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e.\n\n\u0412\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0441\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0430 BlackByte \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 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\u0432\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0435 \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044e.", "url": "https://t.me/true_secator/3524", "metric_role": "exploitation", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-16T05:38:49.744Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}, "exploit_publication_to_patch": {"available": true, "seconds": 6154716.82233, "hours": 1709.6435617583334, "days": 71.23514840659722, "min_seconds": 6154716.82233, "max_seconds": 6154716.82233, "approximate": false, "ongoing": true, "order_known": true, "batch_listing": false, "end_before_start": false, "start": {"timestamp": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922Z", "date_only": false, "value": "2026-09-06T00:00:12.922179Z", "kind": "sighting", "label": "Published proof of concept", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "record": "CVE-2019-16098", "field": "creation_timestamp", "uuid": "4748b214-38ce-4dff-8a62-3b5461d5d874", "content": "Detection  From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.  Driver whitelisting  Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even recommended by Microsoft themselves (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (Hypervisor-protected code integrity) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).  Kernel-memory integrity checks  Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.  As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent Kernel Data Protection (KDP) (https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.  The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the ProviderEnableInfo, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence (https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Threat%20Intelligence) events generation.  User-mode detection  The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a LoadLibrary call, especially ntdll.dll.  In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.  Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for NtCreateProcess syscall, ObRegisterCallbacks for NtOpenProcess syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (kernel32.dll -&gt; ntdll.dll -&gt; syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. program.exe -&gt; direct syscall).  Acknowledgements      Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder      Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable  Micro-Star MSI Afterburner driver:  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/      Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider      Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz      Initial list of EDR drivers names:  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1      Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling Wdigest through LSASS memory  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/      Authors  Thomas DIOT (Qazeer) (https://github.com/Qazeer/)  Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks) (https://github.com/themaks)  Licence  CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/\n\n___________________________ \n@hacking_Attack\n@Hacking_Video", "url": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/50136", "metric_role": "exploit_publication", "metric_basis": "sighting_report"}, "end": {"timestamp": "2026-11-16T05:38:49.744Z", "date_only": false, "label": "As of", "source": "Calculation clock"}}}}
