ID CVE-2019-1549
Summary OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1d (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1c).
Vulnerable Configurations
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre1
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre2
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre3
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre4
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre5
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre6
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre7
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre8
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1 Pre9
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1a
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1b
  • OpenSSL Project OpenSSL 1.1.1c
Base: 5.0
  • Brute Force
    In this attack, some asset (information, functionality, identity, etc.) is protected by a finite secret value. The attacker attempts to gain access to this asset by using trial-and-error to exhaustively explore all the possible secret values in the hope of finding the secret (or a value that is functionally equivalent) that will unlock the asset. Examples of secrets can include, but are not limited to, passwords, encryption keys, database lookup keys, and initial values to one-way functions. The key factor in this attack is the attackers' ability to explore the possible secret space rapidly. This, in turn, is a function of the size of the secret space and the computational power the attacker is able to bring to bear on the problem. If the attacker has modest resources and the secret space is large, the challenge facing the attacker is intractable. While the defender cannot control the resources available to an attacker, they can control the size of the secret space. Creating a large secret space involves selecting one's secret from as large a field of equally likely alternative secrets as possible and ensuring that an attacker is unable to reduce the size of this field using available clues or cryptanalysis. Doing this is more difficult than it sounds since elimination of patterns (which, in turn, would provide an attacker clues that would help them reduce the space of potential secrets) is difficult to do using deterministic machines, such as computers. Assuming a finite secret space, a brute force attack will eventually succeed. The defender must rely on making sure that the time and resources necessary to do so will exceed the value of the information. For example, a secret space that will likely take hundreds of years to explore is likely safe from raw-brute force attacks.
  • Signature Spoofing by Key Recreation
    An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by exploiting a cryptographic weakness in the signature algorithm or pseudorandom number generation and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
  • Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
    This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
Last major update 10-09-2019 - 13:35
Published 10-09-2019 - 13:15
Last modified 12-09-2019 - 11:03
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