ID CVE-2016-7434
Summary The read_mru_list function in NTP before 4.2.8p9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted mrulist query.
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 10
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p10
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 100
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p100
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 101
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p101
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 102
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p102
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 103
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p103
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 104
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p104
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 105
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p105
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 106
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p106
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 107
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p107
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 108
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p108
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 109
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p109
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 110
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p110
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 111
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p111
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 112
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p112
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 113
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p113
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 114
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p114
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 115
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p115
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 116
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p116
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 117
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p117
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 118
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p118
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 119
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p119
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 12
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p12
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 120
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p120
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 121
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p121
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 122
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p122
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 123
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p123
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 124
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p124
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 125
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p125
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 126
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p126
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 127
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p127
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 128
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p128
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 129
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p129
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 13
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p13
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 130
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p130
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 131
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p131
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 132
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p132
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 133
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p133
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 134
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p134
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 135
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p135
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 136
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p136
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 137
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p137
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 138
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p138
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 139
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p139
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 14
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p14
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 140
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p140
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 141
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p141
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 142
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p142
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 143
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p143
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 144
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p144
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 145
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p145
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 146
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p146
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 147
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p147
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 148
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p148
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 149
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p149
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 15
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p15
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 150
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p150
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 151
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p151
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 152
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p152
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 153
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p153
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 154
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p154
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 155
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p155
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 156
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p156
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 157
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p157
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 158
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p158
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 159
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p159
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 16
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p16
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 160
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p160
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 161
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p161
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 162
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p162
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 163
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p163
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 164
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p164
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 165
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p165
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 166
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p166
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 17
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p17
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 170
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p170
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 171
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p171
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 172
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p172
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 173
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p173
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 174
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p174
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 175
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p175
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 176
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p176
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 177
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p177
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 178
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p178
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 179
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p179
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 18
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p18
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 180
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p180
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 181
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p181
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 182
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p182
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 183
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p183
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 184
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p184
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 185
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p185
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 186
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p186
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 187
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p187
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 188
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p188
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 189
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p189
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 190
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p190
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 191
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p191
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 192
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p192
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 193
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p193
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 194
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p194
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 195
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p195
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 196
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p196
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 197
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p197
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 198
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p198
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 199
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p199
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 200
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p200
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 201
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p201
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 202
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p202
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 203
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p203
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 204
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p204
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 205
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p205
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 206
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p206
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 207
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p207
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 208
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p208
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 209
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p209
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 21
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p21
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 210
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p210
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 211
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p211
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 212
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p212
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 213
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p213
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 214
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p214
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 215
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p215
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 216
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p216
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 217
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p217
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 218
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p218
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 219
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p219
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 220
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p220
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 221
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p221
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 222
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p222
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 223
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p223
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 224
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p224
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 225
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p225
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 226
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p226
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 227
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p227
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 228
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p228
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 229
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p229
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 23
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p23
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 230
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p230
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 231
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p231
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 232
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p232
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 233
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p233
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 234
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p234
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 235
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p235
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 236
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p236
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 237
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p237
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 238
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p238
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 239
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p239
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 24
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p24
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 240
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p240
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 241
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p241
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 242
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p242
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 243
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p243
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 244
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p244
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 245
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p245
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 246
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p246
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 247
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p247
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 248
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p248
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 249
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p249
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 250
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p250
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 251
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p251
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 252
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p252
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 253
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p253
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 254
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p254
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 255
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p255
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 256
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p256
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 257
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p257
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 258
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p258
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 259
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p259
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 26
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p26
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 260
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p260
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 261
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p261
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 262
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p262
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 263
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p263
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 264
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p264
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 265
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p265
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 266
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p266
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 267
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p267
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 268
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p268
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 269
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p269
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 27
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p27
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 270
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p270
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 271
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p271
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 272
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p272
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 273
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p273
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 274
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p274
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 275
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p275
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 276
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p276
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 277
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p277
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 278
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p278
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 279
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p279
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 28
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p28
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 280
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p280
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 281
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p281
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 282
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p282
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 283
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p283
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 284
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p284
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 285
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p285
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 286
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p286
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 287
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p287
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 288
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p288
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 289
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p289
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 29
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p29
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 290
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p290
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 291
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p291
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 292
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p292
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 293
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p293
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 294
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p294
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 295
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p295
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 296
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 3
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 32
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 35
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 36
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 369
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 37
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 38
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 39
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 4
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 40
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 41
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 44
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 448
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 449
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 45
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 450
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 451
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 452
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 453
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 454
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 455
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 456
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 458
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 459
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 46
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 460
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 461
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 462
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 463
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 464
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 465
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 466
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 467
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 468
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 469
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 47
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 470
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 471
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 472
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 473
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 474
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 475
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 476
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 477
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 478
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 479
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  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 48
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p48
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 480
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p480
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 481
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p481
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 482
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p482
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 483
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p483
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 484 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p484_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 485 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p485_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 486 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p486_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 49
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p49
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 50
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p50
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 51
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p51
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 52
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p52
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 53
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p53
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 54
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p54
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 55
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p55
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 56
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p56
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 57
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p57
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 58
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p58
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 59
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p59
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 60
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p60
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 61
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p61
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 62
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p62
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 63
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p63
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 64
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p64
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 65
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p65
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 66
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p66
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 67
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p67
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 68
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p68
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 69
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p69
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 70
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p70
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 71
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p71
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 72
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p72
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 73
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p73
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 74
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p74
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 75
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p75
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 76
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p76
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 77
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p77
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 78
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p78
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 79
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p79
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 80
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p80
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 81
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p81
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 82
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p82
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 83
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p83
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 84
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p84
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 85
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p85
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 86
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p86
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 87
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p87
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 88
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p88
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 89
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p89
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 90
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p90
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 91
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p91
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 92
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p92
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 93
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p93
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 94
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p94
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 95
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p95
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 96
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p96
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 97
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p97
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 98
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p98
  • NTP 4.2.7 Patch 99
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.7:p99
  • NTP NTP 4.2.8
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Beta 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_beta1
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Beta 2
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_beta2
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Beta 3
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_beta3
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Beta 4
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_beta4
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Beta5
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_beta5
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 1 Release Candidate 2
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p1_rc2
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 2
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p2
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 2 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p2_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 2 Release Candidate 2
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p2_rc2
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 2 Release Candidate 3
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p2_rc3
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 3
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p3
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 3 Release Candidate 1
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p3_rc1
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 3 Release Candidate 2
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p3_rc2
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 3 Release Candidate 3
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p3_rc3
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 4
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p4
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 5
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p5
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 6
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p6
  • NTP 4.2.8 Patch 7
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p7
  • cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p8
    cpe:2.3:a:ntp:ntp:4.2.8:p8
CVSS
Base: 5.0 (as of 16-01-2017 - 22:01)
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-20
CAPEC
  • Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables
    This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the attacker finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
  • Server Side Include (SSI) Injection
    An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.
  • Cross Zone Scripting
    An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security. In a zone-based model, pages belong to one of a set of zones corresponding to the level of privilege assigned to that page. Pages in an untrusted zone would have a lesser level of access to the system and/or be restricted in the types of executable content it was allowed to invoke. In a cross-zone scripting attack, a page that should be assigned to a less privileged zone is granted the privileges of a more trusted zone. This can be accomplished by exploiting bugs in the browser, exploiting incorrect configuration in the zone controls, through a cross-site scripting attack that causes the attackers' content to be treated as coming from a more trusted page, or by leveraging some piece of system functionality that is accessible from both the trusted and less trusted zone. This attack differs from "Restful Privilege Escalation" in that the latter correlates to the inadequate securing of RESTful access methods (such as HTTP DELETE) on the server, while cross-zone scripting attacks the concept of security zones as implemented by a browser.
  • Cross Site Scripting through Log Files
    An attacker may leverage a system weakness where logs are susceptible to log injection to insert scripts into the system's logs. If these logs are later viewed by an administrator through a thin administrative interface and the log data is not properly HTML encoded before being written to the page, the attackers' scripts stored in the log will be executed in the administrative interface with potentially serious consequences. This attack pattern is really a combination of two other attack patterns: log injection and stored cross site scripting.
  • Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
    An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
  • Object Relational Mapping Injection
    An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject his or her own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
  • SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
    An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
  • Subverting Environment Variable Values
    The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The attacker's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the attacker.
  • Format String Injection
    An attacker includes formatting characters in a string input field on the target application. Most applications assume that users will provide static text and may respond unpredictably to the presence of formatting character. For example, in certain functions of the C programming languages such as printf, the formatting character %s will print the contents of a memory location expecting this location to identify a string and the formatting character %n prints the number of DWORD written in the memory. An attacker can use this to read or write to memory locations or files, or simply to manipulate the value of the resulting text in unexpected ways. Reading or writing memory may result in program crashes and writing memory could result in the execution of arbitrary code if the attacker can write to the program stack.
  • LDAP Injection
    An attacker manipulates or crafts an LDAP query for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some applications use user input to create LDAP queries that are processed by an LDAP server. For example, a user might provide their username during authentication and the username might be inserted in an LDAP query during the authentication process. An attacker could use this input to inject additional commands into an LDAP query that could disclose sensitive information. For example, entering a * in the aforementioned query might return information about all users on the system. This attack is very similar to an SQL injection attack in that it manipulates a query to gather additional information or coerce a particular return value.
  • Relative Path Traversal
    An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation on the target by supplying a specially constructed path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to arbitrary files or resources. An attacker modifies a known path on the target in order to reach material that is not available through intended channels. These attacks normally involve adding additional path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.), or encodings thereof, in various combinations in order to reach parent directories or entirely separate trees of the target's directory structure.
  • Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
    This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service.
  • Variable Manipulation
    An attacker manipulates variables used by an application to perform a variety of possible attacks. This can either be performed through the manipulation of function call parameters or by manipulating external variables, such as environment variables, that are used by an application. Changing variable values is usually undertaken as part of another attack; for example, a path traversal (inserting relative path modifiers) or buffer overflow (enlarging a variable value beyond an application's ability to store it).
  • Embedding Scripts in Non-Script Elements
    This attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where malicious scripts are embedded in elements that are not expected to host scripts such as image tags (<img>), comments in XML documents (< !-CDATA->), etc. These tags may not be subject to the same input validation, output validation, and other content filtering and checking routines, so this can create an opportunity for an attacker to tunnel through the application's elements and launch a XSS attack through other elements. As with all remote attacks, it is important to differentiate the ability to launch an attack (such as probing an internal network for unpatched servers) and the ability of the remote attacker to collect and interpret the output of said attack.
  • Flash Injection
    An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.
  • Cross-Site Scripting Using Alternate Syntax
    The attacker uses alternate forms of keywords or commands that result in the same action as the primary form but which may not be caught by filters. For example, many keywords are processed in a case insensitive manner. If the site's web filtering algorithm does not convert all tags into a consistent case before the comparison with forbidden keywords it is possible to bypass filters (e.g., incomplete black lists) by using an alternate case structure. For example, the "script" tag using the alternate forms of "Script" or "ScRiPt" may bypass filters where "script" is the only form tested. Other variants using different syntax representations are also possible as well as using pollution meta-characters or entities that are eventually ignored by the rendering engine. The attack can result in the execution of otherwise prohibited functionality.
  • Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible)
    An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by placing themselves in the communication channel between client and server such that communication directly to the server is possible where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
  • XML Nested Payloads
    Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed. By nesting XML data and causing this data to be continuously self-referential, an attacker can cause the XML parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization. An attacker's goal is to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage. In most cases this type of an attack will result in a denial of service due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crash. However it may be possible to cause a crash resulting in arbitrary code execution, leading to a jump from the data plane to the control plane [R.230.1].
  • XML Oversized Payloads
    Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed. By supplying oversized payloads in input vectors that will be processed by the XML parser, an attacker can cause the XML parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization, and potentially cause execution of arbitrary code. An attacker's goal is to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a denial of service due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crash. However it is possible to cause a crash resulting in arbitrary code execution, leading to a jump from the data plane to the control plane [R.231.1].
  • Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow
    In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
  • Cross-Site Scripting via Encoded URI Schemes
    An attack of this type exploits the ability of most browsers to interpret "data", "javascript" or other URI schemes as client-side executable content placeholders. This attack consists of passing a malicious URI in an anchor tag HREF attribute or any other similar attributes in other HTML tags. Such malicious URI contains, for example, a base64 encoded HTML content with an embedded cross-site scripting payload. The attack is executed when the browser interprets the malicious content i.e., for example, when the victim clicks on the malicious link.
  • XML Injection
    An attacker utilizes crafted XML user-controllable input to probe, attack, and inject data into the XML database, using techniques similar to SQL injection. The user-controllable input can allow for unauthorized viewing of data, bypassing authentication or the front-end application for direct XML database access, and possibly altering database information.
  • Environment Variable Manipulation
    An attacker manipulates environment variables used by an application to perform a variety of possible attacks. Changing variable values is usually undertaken as part of another attack; for example, a path traversal (inserting relative path modifiers) or buffer overflow (enlarging a variable value beyond an application's ability to store it).
  • Global variable manipulation
    An attacker manipulates global variables used by an application to perform a variety of possible attacks. Changing variable values is usually undertaken as part of another attack; for example, a path traversal (inserting relative path modifiers) or buffer overflow (enlarging a variable value beyond an application's ability to store it).
  • Leverage Alternate Encoding
    This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult.
  • Fuzzing
    Fuzzing is a software testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input has occurred. Fuzzing treats the system as a black box and is totally free from any preconceptions or assumptions about the system. An attacker can leverage fuzzing to try to identify weaknesses in the system. For instance fuzzing can help an attacker discover certain assumptions made in the system about user input. Fuzzing gives an attacker a quick way of potentially uncovering some of these assumptions without really knowing anything about the internals of the system. These assumptions can then be turned against the system by specially crafting user input that may allow an attacker to achieve his goals.
  • Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters
    An attacker intentionally introduces leading characters that enable getting the input past the filters. The API that is being targeted, ignores the leading "ghost" characters, and therefore processes the attackers' input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API. Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. Perhaps these characters are considered redundant, and for this reason they are removed. Another possibility is the parser logic at the beginning of analysis is specialized in some way that causes some characters to be removed. The attacker can specify multiple types of alternative encodings at the beginning of a string as a set of probes. One commonly used possibility involves adding ghost characters--extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer. If the attacker has access to the API libraries being targeted, certain attack ideas can be tested directly in advance. Once alternative ghost encodings emerge through testing, the attacker can move from lab-based API testing to testing real-world service implementations.
  • Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
    This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form of this attack involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the attacker to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the attacker before it is sent back to the server. Here the attacker seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information.
  • Embedding Scripts in HTTP Query Strings
    A variant of cross-site scripting called "reflected" cross-site scripting, the HTTP Query Strings attack consists of passing a malicious script inside an otherwise valid HTTP request query string. This is of significant concern for sites that rely on dynamic, user-generated content such as bulletin boards, news sites, blogs, and web enabled administration GUIs. The malicious script may steal session data, browse history, probe files, or otherwise execute attacks on the client side. Once the attacker has prepared the malicious HTTP query it is sent to a victim user (perhaps by email, IM, or posted on an online forum), who clicks on a normal looking link that contains a poison query string. This technique can be made more effective through the use of services like http://tinyurl.com/, which makes very small URLs that will redirect to very large, complex ones. The victim will not know what he is really clicking on.
  • MIME Conversion
    An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
  • Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
    An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
  • Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
    This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An attacker can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
  • Overflow Variables and Tags
    This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The attacker crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.
  • Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion
    In this attack, the target software is given input that the attacker knows will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
  • Signature Spoof
    An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
  • XML Client-Side Attack
    Client applications such as web browsers that process HTML data often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed. These adverse effects may include the parser crashing, consuming too much of a resource, executing too slowly, executing code supplied by an attacker, allowing usage of unintended system functionality, etc. An attacker's goal is to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage. In some cases it may be possible to jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being passed to an XML parser. [R.484.1]
  • Embedding NULL Bytes
    An attacker embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
  • Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash
    If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an attacker to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.
  • Simple Script Injection
    An attacker embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
  • Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
    This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. An URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
  • SQL Injection
    This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input. When specially crafted user-controlled input consisting of SQL syntax is used without proper validation as part of SQL queries, it is possible to glean information from the database in ways not envisaged during application design. Depending upon the database and the design of the application, it may also be possible to leverage injection to have the database execute system-related commands of the attackers' choice. SQL Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the database, thus bypassing the application completely. Successful injection can cause information disclosure as well as ability to add or modify data in the database. In order to successfully inject SQL and retrieve information from a database, an attacker:
  • String Format Overflow in syslog()
    This attack targets the format string vulnerabilities in the syslog() function. An attacker would typically inject malicious input in the format string parameter of the syslog function. This is a common problem, and many public vulnerabilities and associated exploits have been posted.
  • Blind SQL Injection
    Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the attacker constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The attacker can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the attacker determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection. For example, an attacker may try entering something like "username' AND 1=1; --" in an input field. If the result is the same as when the attacker entered "username" in the field, then the attacker knows that the application is vulnerable to SQL Injection. The attacker can then ask yes/no questions from the database server to extract information from it. For example, the attacker can extract table names from a database using the following types of queries: If the above query executes properly, then the attacker knows that the first character in a table name in the database is a letter between m and z. If it doesn't, then the attacker knows that the character must be between a and l (assuming of course that table names only contain alphabetic characters). By performing a binary search on all character positions, the attacker can determine all table names in the database. Subsequently, the attacker may execute an actual attack and send something like:
  • Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
    An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
  • URL Encoding
    This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. An URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc. The attacker could also subvert the meaning of the URL string request by encoding the data being sent to the server through a GET request. For instance an attacker may subvert the meaning of parameters used in a SQL request and sent through the URL string (See Example section).
  • User-Controlled Filename
    An attack of this type involves an attacker inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
  • Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
    This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An attacker can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the attacker tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
  • Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
    This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
  • Buffer Overflow in an API Call
    This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An attacker who has access to an API may try to embed malicious code in the API function call and exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the function's implementation. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.
  • Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
    This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.
  • Web Logs Tampering
    Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.
  • XPath Injection
    An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean information that he normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection results from the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database. In order to successfully inject XML and retrieve information from a database, an attacker:
  • AJAX Fingerprinting
    This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. In many XSS attacks the attacker must get a "hole in one" and successfully exploit the vulnerability on the victim side the first time, once the client is redirected the attacker has many chances to engage in follow on probes, but there is only one first chance. In a widely used web application this is not a major problem because 1 in a 1,000 is good enough in a widely used application. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on.
  • Embedding Script (XSS) in HTTP Headers
    An attack of this type exploits web applications that generate web content, such as links in a HTML page, based on unvalidated or improperly validated data submitted by other actors. XSS in HTTP Headers attacks target the HTTP headers which are hidden from most users and may not be validated by web applications.
  • OS Command Injection
    In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.
  • Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
    This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An attacker can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to escalate privilege to root.
  • XSS in IMG Tags
    Image tags are an often overlooked, but convenient, means for a Cross Site Scripting attack. The attacker can inject script contents into an image (IMG) tag in order to steal information from a victim's browser and execute malicious scripts.
  • XML Parser Attack
    Applications often need to transform data in and out of the XML format by using an XML parser. It may be possible for an attacker to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the XML parser when it is being processed. These adverse effects may include the parser crashing, consuming too much of a resource, executing too slowly, executing code supplied by an attacker, allowing usage of unintended system functionality, etc. An attacker's goal is to leverage parser failure to his or her advantage. In some cases it may be possible to jump from the data plane to the control plane via bad data being passed to an XML parser. [R.99.1]
Access
VectorComplexityAuthentication
NETWORK LOW NONE
Impact
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
NONE NONE PARTIAL
exploit-db via4
description NTP 4.2.8p8 - Denial of Service. CVE-2016-7434. Dos exploit for Linux platform
file exploits/linux/dos/40806.py
id EDB-ID:40806
last seen 2016-11-21
modified 2016-11-21
platform linux
port
published 2016-11-21
reporter Exploit-DB
source https://www.exploit-db.com/download/40806/
title NTP 4.2.8p8 - Denial of Service
type dos
nessus via4
  • NASL family SuSE Local Security Checks
    NASL id SUSE_SU-2016-3196-1.NASL
    description This update for ntp fixes the following issues: ntp was updated to 4.2.8p9. Security issues fixed : - CVE-2016-9311, CVE-2016-9310, bsc#1011377: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. - CVE-2016-7427, bsc#1011390: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. - CVE-2016-7428, bsc#1011417: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. - CVE-2016-7431, bsc#1011395: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. - CVE-2016-7434, bsc#1011398: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). - CVE-2016-7429, bsc#1011404: Interface selection attack. - CVE-2016-7426, bsc#1011406: Client rate limiting and server responses. - CVE-2016-7433, bsc#1011411: Reboot sync calculation problem. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). Non-security issues fixed : - Fix a spurious error message. - Other bugfixes, see /usr/share/doc/packages/ntp/ChangeLog. - Fix a regression in 'trap' (bsc#981252). - Reduce the number of netlink groups to listen on for changes to the local network setup (bsc#992606). - Fix segfault in 'sntp -a' (bsc#1009434). - Silence an OpenSSL version warning (bsc#992038). - Make the resolver task change user and group IDs to the same values as the main task. (bsc#988028) - Simplify ntpd's search for its own executable to prevent AppArmor warnings (bsc#956365). Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-11-30
    plugin id 95988
    published 2016-12-21
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95988
    title SUSE SLES12 Security Update : ntp (SUSE-SU-2016:3196-1)
  • NASL family FreeBSD Local Security Checks
    NASL id FREEBSD_PKG_FCEDCDBBC86E11E6B1CF14DAE9D210B8.NASL
    description Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the NTP suite : CVE-2016-9311: Trap crash, Reported by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG. CVE-2016-9310: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. Reported by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG. CVE-2016-7427: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. Reported by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG. CVE-2016-7428: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. Reported by Matthew Van Gundy of Cisco ASIG. CVE-2016-7431: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. Reported by Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra of Boston University. CVE-2016-7434: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). Reported by Magnus Stubman. CVE-2016-7426: Client rate limiting and server responses. Reported by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat. CVE-2016-7433: Reboot sync calculation problem. Reported independently by Brian Utterback of Oracle, and by Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra of Boston University. Impact : A remote attacker who can send a specially crafted packet to cause a NULL pointer dereference that will crash ntpd, resulting in a Denial of Service. [CVE-2016-9311] An exploitable configuration modification vulnerability exists in the control mode (mode 6) functionality of ntpd. If, against long-standing BCP recommendations, 'restrict default noquery ...' is not specified, a specially crafted control mode packet can set ntpd traps, providing information disclosure and DDoS amplification, and unset ntpd traps, disabling legitimate monitoring by an attacker from remote. [CVE-2016-9310] An attacker with access to the NTP broadcast domain can periodically inject specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets into the broadcast domain which, while being logged by ntpd, can cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers. [CVE-2016-7427] An attacker with access to the NTP broadcast domain can send specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets to the broadcast domain which, while being logged by ntpd, will cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers. [CVE-2016-7428] Origin timestamp problems were fixed in ntp 4.2.8p6. However, subsequent timestamp validation checks introduced a regression in the handling of some Zero origin timestamp checks. [CVE-2016-7431] If ntpd is configured to allow mrulist query requests from a server that sends a crafted malicious packet, ntpd will crash on receipt of that crafted malicious mrulist query packet. [CVE-2016-7434] An attacker who knows the sources (e.g., from an IPv4 refid in server response) and knows the system is (mis)configured in this way can periodically send packets with spoofed source address to keep the rate limiting activated and prevent ntpd from accepting valid responses from its sources. [CVE-2016-7426] Ntp Bug 2085 described a condition where the root delay was included twice, causing the jitter value to be higher than expected. Due to a misinterpretation of a small-print variable in The Book, the fix for this problem was incorrect, resulting in a root distance that did not include the peer dispersion. The calculations and formulas have been reviewed and reconciled, and the code has been updated accordingly. [CVE-2016-7433]
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-11-10
    plugin id 96123
    published 2016-12-27
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=96123
    title FreeBSD : FreeBSD -- Multiple vulnerabilities of ntp (fcedcdbb-c86e-11e6-b1cf-14dae9d210b8)
  • NASL family Slackware Local Security Checks
    NASL id SLACKWARE_SSA_2016-326-01.NASL
    description New ntp packages are available for Slackware 13.0, 13.1, 13.37, 14.0, 14.1, 14.2, and -current to fix security issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2017-09-21
    plugin id 95028
    published 2016-11-22
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95028
    title Slackware 13.0 / 13.1 / 13.37 / 14.0 / 14.1 / 14.2 / current : ntp (SSA:2016-326-01)
  • NASL family PhotonOS Local Security Checks
    NASL id PHOTONOS_PHSA-2017-0003_NTP.NASL
    description An update of the ntp package has been released.
    last seen 2019-02-08
    modified 2019-02-07
    plugin id 121668
    published 2019-02-07
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=121668
    title Photon OS 1.0: Ntp PHSA-2017-0003
  • NASL family SuSE Local Security Checks
    NASL id SUSE_SU-2016-3193-1.NASL
    description This update for ntp fixes the following issues : - Simplify ntpd's search for its own executable to prevent AppArmor warnings (bsc#956365). Security issues fixed (update to 4.2.8p9) : - CVE-2016-9311, CVE-2016-9310, bsc#1011377: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. - CVE-2016-7427, bsc#1011390: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. - CVE-2016-7428, bsc#1011417: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. - CVE-2016-7431, bsc#1011395: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. - CVE-2016-7434, bsc#1011398: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). - CVE-2016-7429, bsc#1011404: Interface selection attack. - CVE-2016-7426, bsc#1011406: Client rate limiting and server responses. - CVE-2016-7433, bsc#1011411: Reboot sync calculation problem. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). - CVE-2015-8140: ntpq vulnerable to replay attacks. - CVE-2015-8139: Origin Leak: ntpq and ntpdc, disclose origin. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). Non-security issues fixed : - Fix a spurious error message. - Other bugfixes, see /usr/share/doc/packages/ntp/ChangeLog. - Fix a regression in 'trap' (bsc#981252). - Reduce the number of netlink groups to listen on for changes to the local network setup (bsc#992606). - Fix segfault in 'sntp -a' (bsc#1009434). - Silence an OpenSSL version warning (bsc#992038). - Make the resolver task change user and group IDs to the same values as the main task. (bsc#988028) Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-11-30
    plugin id 95986
    published 2016-12-21
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95986
    title SUSE SLES11 Security Update : ntp (SUSE-SU-2016:3193-1)
  • NASL family PhotonOS Local Security Checks
    NASL id PHOTONOS_PHSA-2017-0003_NTPSTAT.NASL
    description An update of the ntpstat package has been released.
    last seen 2019-02-08
    modified 2019-02-07
    plugin id 121669
    published 2019-02-07
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=121669
    title Photon OS 1.0: Ntpstat PHSA-2017-0003
  • NASL family Misc.
    NASL id NTP_CVE-2016-7434.NASL
    description The remote NTP server is affected by a denial of service vulnerability due to improper validation of mrulist queries. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, via a specially crafted NTP mrulist query packet, to terminate the ntpd process. Note that the NTP server is reportedly affected by additional vulnerabilities as well; however, Nessus has not tested for these.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-12-07
    plugin id 95389
    published 2016-11-29
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95389
    title Network Time Protocol Daemon (ntpd) read_mru_list() Remote DoS
  • NASL family SuSE Local Security Checks
    NASL id OPENSUSE-2016-1525.NASL
    description This update for ntp fixes the following issues : ntp was updated to 4.2.8p9. Security issues fixed : - CVE-2016-9311, CVE-2016-9310, bsc#1011377: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. - CVE-2016-7427, bsc#1011390: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. - CVE-2016-7428, bsc#1011417: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. - CVE-2016-7431, bsc#1011395: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. - CVE-2016-7434, bsc#1011398: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). - CVE-2016-7429, bsc#1011404: Interface selection attack. - CVE-2016-7426, bsc#1011406: Client rate limiting and server responses. - CVE-2016-7433, bsc#1011411: Reboot sync calculation problem. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). Non-security issues fixed : - Fix a spurious error message. - Other bugfixes, see /usr/share/doc/packages/ntp/ChangeLog. - Fix a regression in 'trap' (bsc#981252). - Reduce the number of netlink groups to listen on for changes to the local network setup (bsc#992606). - Fix segfault in 'sntp -a' (bsc#1009434). - Silence an OpenSSL version warning (bsc#992038). - Make the resolver task change user and group IDs to the same values as the main task. (bsc#988028) - Simplify ntpd's search for its own executable to prevent AppArmor warnings (bsc#956365). This update was imported from the SUSE:SLE-12-SP1:Update update project.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2017-04-17
    plugin id 96173
    published 2016-12-29
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=96173
    title openSUSE Security Update : ntp (openSUSE-2016-1525)
  • NASL family Misc.
    NASL id NTP_4_2_8P9.NASL
    description The version of the remote NTP server is 4.x prior to 4.2.8p9. It is, therefore, affected by the following vulnerabilities : - A denial of service vulnerability exists when rate limiting is configured for all associations, the limits also being applied to responses received from the configured sources. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, by periodically sending spoofed packets, to keep rate limiting active, resulting in valid responses not being accepted by ntpd from its sources. (CVE-2016-7426) - A denial of service vulnerability exists in the broadcast mode replay prevention functionality. An unauthenticated, adjacent attacker can exploit this, via specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets periodically injected into the broadcast domain, to cause ntpd to reject broadcast mode packets from legitimate NTP broadcast servers. (CVE-2016-7427) - A denial of service vulnerability exists in the broadcast mode poll interval functionality. An unauthenticated, adjacent attacker can exploit this, via specially crafted broadcast mode NTP packets, to cause ntpd to reject packets from a legitimate NTP broadcast server. (CVE-2016-7428) - A denial of service vulnerability exists when receiving server responses on sockets that correspond to different interfaces than what were used in the request. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, by sending repeated requests using specially crafted packets with spoofed source addresses, to cause ntpd to select the incorrect interface for the source, which prevents it from sending new requests until the interface list is refreshed. This eventually results in preventing ntpd from synchronizing with the source. (CVE-2016-7429) - A flaw exists that allows packets with an origin timestamp of zero to bypass security checks. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this to spoof arbitrary content. (CVE-2016-7431) - A flaw exists due to the root delay being included twice, which may result in the jitter value being higher than expected. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this to cause a denial of service condition. (CVE-2016-7433) - A denial of service vulnerability exists when handling specially crafted mrulist query packets that allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to crash ntpd. (CVE-2016-7434) - A flaw exists in the control mode (mode 6) functionality when handling specially crafted control mode packets. An unauthenticated, adjacent attacker can exploit this to set or disable ntpd traps, resulting in the disclosure of potentially sensitive information, disabling of legitimate monitoring, or DDoS amplification. (CVE-2016-9310) - A NULL pointer dereference flaw exists in the report_event() function within file ntpd/ntp_control.c when the trap service handles certain peer events. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, via a specially crafted packet, to cause a denial of service condition. (CVE-2016-9311) - A denial of service vulnerability exists when handling oversize UDP packets that allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to crash ntpd. Note that this vulnerability only affects Windows versions. (CVE-2016-9312)
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-09-17
    plugin id 95575
    published 2016-12-06
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95575
    title Network Time Protocol Daemon (ntpd) 4.x < 4.2.8p9 Multiple Vulnerabilities
  • NASL family FreeBSD Local Security Checks
    NASL id FREEBSD_PKG_8DB8D62AB08B11E68EBAD050996490D0.NASL
    description Network Time Foundation reports : NTF's NTP Project is releasing ntp-4.2.8p9, which addresses : - 1 HIGH severity vulnerability that only affects Windows - 2 MEDIUM severity vulnerabilities - 2 MEDIUM/LOW severity vulnerabilities - 5 LOW severity vulnerabilities - 28 other non-security fixes and improvements All of the security issues in this release are listed in VU#633847.
    last seen 2018-11-13
    modified 2018-11-10
    plugin id 95265
    published 2016-11-23
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95265
    title FreeBSD : ntp -- multiple vulnerabilities (8db8d62a-b08b-11e6-8eba-d050996490d0)
  • NASL family Ubuntu Local Security Checks
    NASL id UBUNTU_USN-3349-1.NASL
    description Yihan Lian discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain large request data values. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. (CVE-2016-2519) Miroslav Lichvar discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain spoofed addresses when performing rate limiting. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to perform a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7426) Matthew Van Gundy discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain crafted broadcast mode packets. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to perform a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7427, CVE-2016-7428) Miroslav Lichvar discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain responses. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to perform a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7429) Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra discovered that NTP incorrectly handled origin timestamps of zero. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to bypass the origin timestamp protection mechanism. This issue only affected Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7431) Brian Utterback, Sharon Goldberg and Aanchal Malhotra discovered that NTP incorrectly performed initial sync calculations. This issue only applied to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7433) Magnus Stubman discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain mrulist queries. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-7434) Matthew Van Gund discovered that NTP incorrectly handled origin timestamp checks. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to perform a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu Ubuntu 16.10, and Ubuntu 17.04. (CVE-2016-9042) Matthew Van Gundy discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain control mode packets. A remote attacker could use this issue to set or unset traps. This issue only applied to Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-9310) Matthew Van Gundy discovered that NTP incorrectly handled the trap service. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only applied to Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and Ubuntu 16.10. (CVE-2016-9311) It was discovered that NTP incorrectly handled memory when processing long variables. A remote authenticated user could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2017-6458) It was discovered that NTP incorrectly handled memory when processing long variables. A remote authenticated user could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only applied to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, Ubuntu 16.10 and Ubuntu 17.04. (CVE-2017-6460) It was discovered that the NTP legacy DPTS refclock driver incorrectly handled the /dev/datum device. A local attacker could possibly use this issue to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2017-6462) It was discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain invalid settings in a :config directive. A remote authenticated user could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2017-6463) It was discovered that NTP incorrectly handled certain invalid mode configuration directives. A remote authenticated user could possibly use this issue to cause NTP to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2017-6464). Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the Ubuntu security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-12-01
    plugin id 101263
    published 2017-07-06
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=101263
    title Ubuntu 14.04 LTS / 16.04 LTS / 16.10 / 17.04 : ntp vulnerabilities (USN-3349-1)
  • NASL family PhotonOS Local Security Checks
    NASL id PHOTONOS_PHSA-2017-0003.NASL
    description An update of [guile,ntp] packages for PhotonOS has been released.
    last seen 2019-02-08
    modified 2019-02-07
    plugin id 111852
    published 2018-08-17
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=111852
    title Photon OS 1.0: Guile / Ntp / Ntpstat PHSA-2017-0003 (deprecated)
  • NASL family SuSE Local Security Checks
    NASL id SUSE_SU-2016-3195-1.NASL
    description This update for ntp fixes the following issues: ntp was updated to 4.2.8p9. Security issues fixed : - CVE-2016-9311, CVE-2016-9310, bsc#1011377: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. - CVE-2016-7427, bsc#1011390: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. - CVE-2016-7428, bsc#1011417: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. - CVE-2016-7431, bsc#1011395: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. - CVE-2016-7434, bsc#1011398: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). - CVE-2016-7429, bsc#1011404: Interface selection attack. - CVE-2016-7426, bsc#1011406: Client rate limiting and server responses. - CVE-2016-7433, bsc#1011411: Reboot sync calculation problem. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). Non-security issues fixed : - Fix a spurious error message. - Other bugfixes, see /usr/share/doc/packages/ntp/ChangeLog. - Fix a regression in 'trap' (bsc#981252). - Reduce the number of netlink groups to listen on for changes to the local network setup (bsc#992606). - Fix segfault in 'sntp -a' (bsc#1009434). - Silence an OpenSSL version warning (bsc#992038). - Make the resolver task change user and group IDs to the same values as the main task. (bsc#988028) - Simplify ntpd's search for its own executable to prevent AppArmor warnings (bsc#956365). Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-11-30
    plugin id 95987
    published 2016-12-21
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=95987
    title SUSE SLED12 / SLES12 Security Update : ntp (SUSE-SU-2016:3195-1)
  • NASL family SuSE Local Security Checks
    NASL id SUSE_SU-2017-0255-1.NASL
    description This update for ntp fixes the following issues: ntp was updated to 4.2.8p9. Security issues fixed : - CVE-2016-9311, CVE-2016-9310, bsc#1011377: Mode 6 unauthenticated trap information disclosure and DDoS vector. - CVE-2016-7427, bsc#1011390: Broadcast Mode Replay Prevention DoS. - CVE-2016-7428, bsc#1011417: Broadcast Mode Poll Interval Enforcement DoS. - CVE-2016-7431, bsc#1011395: Regression: 010-origin: Zero Origin Timestamp Bypass. - CVE-2016-7434, bsc#1011398: NULL pointer dereference in _IO_str_init_static_internal(). - CVE-2016-7429, bsc#1011404: Interface selection attack. - CVE-2016-7426, bsc#1011406: Client rate limiting and server responses. - CVE-2016-7433, bsc#1011411: Reboot sync calculation problem. - CVE-2015-8140: ntpq vulnerable to replay attacks. - CVE-2015-8139: Origin Leak: ntpq and ntpdc, disclose origin. - CVE-2015-5219: An endless loop due to incorrect precision to double conversion (bsc#943216). Non-security issues fixed : - Fix a spurious error message. - Other bugfixes, see /usr/share/doc/packages/ntp/ChangeLog. - Fix a regression in 'trap' (bsc#981252). - Reduce the number of netlink groups to listen on for changes to the local network setup (bsc#992606). - Fix segfault in 'sntp -a' (bsc#1009434). - Silence an OpenSSL version warning (bsc#992038). - Make the resolver task change user and group IDs to the same values as the main task. (bsc#988028) - Simplify ntpd's search for its own executable to prevent AppArmor warnings (bsc#956365). Note that Tenable Network Security has extracted the preceding description block directly from the SUSE security advisory. Tenable has attempted to automatically clean and format it as much as possible without introducing additional issues.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-11-30
    plugin id 96715
    published 2017-01-24
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=96715
    title SUSE SLES11 Security Update : ntp (SUSE-SU-2017:0255-1)
  • NASL family Firewalls
    NASL id PFSENSE_SA-17_03.NASL
    description According to its self-reported version number, the remote pfSense install is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as stated in the referenced vendor advisories.
    last seen 2019-02-21
    modified 2018-12-07
    plugin id 106503
    published 2018-01-31
    reporter Tenable
    source https://www.tenable.com/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=106503
    title pfSense < 2.3.3 Multiple Vulnerabilities (SA-17_01 - SA-17_03)
packetstorm via4
data source https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/139856/ntp427p22-dos.txt
id PACKETSTORM:139856
last seen 2016-12-05
published 2016-11-22
reporter Magnus Klaaborg Stubman
source https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/139856/ntpd-4.2.7.p22-4.3.0-Denial-Of-Service.html
title ntpd 4.2.7.p22 / 4.3.0 Denial Of Service
refmap via4
bid 94448
cert-vn VU#633847
confirm
exploit-db 40806
freebsd FreeBSD-SA-16:39
sectrack 1037354
the hacker news via4
id THN:566AF977BB17FAE2C413BBE2311AB99D
last seen 2018-01-27
modified 2016-11-23
published 2016-11-22
reporter Mohit Kumar
source https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/ntp-server-vulnerability.html
title NTP DoS Exploit Released — Update Your Servers to Patch 10 Flaws
Last major update 09-05-2017 - 21:29
Published 13-01-2017 - 11:59
Last modified 20-11-2017 - 21:29
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