ID CVE-2016-10727
Summary camel/providers/imapx/camel-imapx-server.c in the IMAPx component in GNOME evolution-data-server before 3.21.2 proceeds with cleartext data containing a password if the client wishes to use STARTTLS but the server will not use STARTTLS, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network. The server code was intended to report an error and not proceed, but the code was written incorrectly.
Vulnerable Configurations
  • cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:14.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:16.04:*:*:*:lts:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.93:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.94:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.95:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.96:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.97:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.98:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:0.0.99:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.3.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.5.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.7.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.10.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.11.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.12.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.12.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:1.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.21.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.22.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.22.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.22.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.22.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.23.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.24.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.24.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.24.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.24.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.25.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.26.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.26.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.26.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.26.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.27.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.28.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.28.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.28.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.28.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.29.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.30.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.30.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.30.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.30.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.31.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.32.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.32.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.32.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.32.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:2.91.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.1.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.3.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.5.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.7.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.8.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:gnome:evolution:3.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Base: 5.0 (as of 18-09-2018 - 13:16)
  • Excavation
    An adversary actively probes the target in a manner that is designed to solicit information that could be leveraged for malicious purposes. This is achieved by exploring the target via ordinary interactions for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the target, or by sending data that is syntactically invalid or non-standard in an attempt to produce a response that contains the desired data. As a result of these interactions, the adversary is able to obtain information from the target that aids the attacker in making inferences about its security, configuration, or potential vulnerabilities. Examplar exchanges with the target may trigger unhandled exceptions or verbose error messages that reveal information like stack traces, configuration information, path information, or database design. This type of attack also includes the manipulation of query strings in a URI to produce invalid SQL queries, or by trying alternative path values in the hope that the server will return useful information.
  • Subverting Environment Variable Values
    The attacker directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The attacker's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the attacker.
  • Footprinting
    An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to identify constituents and properties of the target. Footprinting is a general term to describe a variety of information gathering techniques, often used by attackers in preparation for some attack. It consists of using tools to learn as much as possible about the composition, configuration, and security mechanisms of the targeted application, system or network. Information that might be collected during a footprinting effort could include open ports, applications and their versions, network topology, and similar information. While footprinting is not intended to be damaging (although certain activities, such as network scans, can sometimes cause disruptions to vulnerable applications inadvertently) it may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
  • Exploiting Trust in Client
    An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
  • Fingerprinting
    An adversary compares output from a target system to known indicators that uniquely identify specific details about the target. Fingerprinting by itself is not usually detrimental to the target. However, the information gathered through fingerprinting often enables an adversary to discover existing weaknesses in the target.
  • ICMP Echo Request Ping
    An adversary sends out an ICMP Type 8 Echo Request, commonly known as a 'Ping', in order to determine if a target system is responsive. If the request is not blocked by a firewall or ACL, the target host will respond with an ICMP Type 0 Echo Reply datagram. This type of exchange is usually referred to as a 'Ping' due to the Ping utility present in almost all operating systems. Ping, as commonly implemented, allows a user to test for alive hosts, measure round-trip time, and measure the percentage of packet loss. Performing this operation for a range of hosts on the network is known as a 'Ping Sweep'. While the Ping utility is useful for small-scale host discovery, it was not designed for rapid or efficient host discovery over large network blocks. Other scanning utilities have been created that make ICMP ping sweeps easier to perform. Most networks filter ingress ICMP Type 8 messages for security reasons. Various other methods of performing ping sweeps have developed as a result. It is important to recognize the key security goal of the adversary is to discover if an IP address is alive, or has a responsive host. To this end, virtually any type of ICMP message, as defined by RFC 792 is useful. An adversary can cycle through various types of ICMP messages to determine if holes exist in the firewall configuration. When ICMP ping sweeps fail to discover hosts, other protocols can be used for the same purpose, such as TCP SYN or ACK segments, UDP datagrams sent to closed ports, etc.
  • TCP SYN Scan
    An adversary uses a SYN scan to determine the status of ports on the remote target. SYN scanning is the most common type of port scanning that is used because of its enormous advantages and few drawbacks. As a result, novice attackers tend to overly rely on the SYN scan while performing system reconnaissance. As a scanning method, the primary advantages of SYN scanning are its universality and speed. RFC 793 defines the required behavior of any TCP/IP device in that an incoming connection request begins with a SYN packet, which in turn must be followed by a SYN/ACK packet from the receiving service. For this reason, like TCP Connect scanning, SYN scanning works against any TCP stack. Unlike TCP Connect scanning, it is possible to scan thousands of ports per second using this method. This type of scanning is usually referred to as 'half-open' scanning because it does not complete the three-way handshake. The scanning rate is extremely fast because no time is wasted completing the handshake or tearing down the connection. TCP SYN scanning can also immediately detect 3 of the 4 important types of port status: open, closed, and filtered. When a SYN is sent to an open port and unfiltered port, a SYN/ACK will be generated. This technique allows an attacker to scan through stateful firewalls due to the common configuration that TCP SYN segments for a new connection will be allowed for almost any port. When a SYN packet is sent to a closed port a RST is generated, indicating the port is closed. When SYN scanning to a particular port generates no response, or when the request triggers ICMP Type 3 unreachable errors, the port is filtered. A TCP Connect scan has the following characteristics:
  • Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records
    An adversary enumerates the MX records for a given via a DNS query. This type of information gathering returns the names of mail servers on the network. Mail servers are often not exposed to the Internet but are located within the DMZ of a network protected by a firewall. A side effect of this configuration is that enumerating the MX records for an organization my reveal the IP address of the firewall or possibly other internal systems. Attackers often resort to MX record enumeration when a DNS Zone Transfer is not possible.
  • DNS Zone Transfers
    An attacker exploits a DNS misconfiguration that permits a ZONE transfer. Some external DNS servers will return a list of IP address and valid hostnames. Under certain conditions, it may even be possible to obtain Zone data about the organization's internal network. When successful the attacker learns valuable information about the topology of the target organization, including information about particular servers, their role within the IT structure, and possibly information about the operating systems running upon the network. This is configuration dependent behavior so it may also be required to search out multiple DNS servers while attempting to find one with ZONE transfers allowed.
  • Host Discovery
    An adversary sends a probe to an IP address to determine if the host is alive. Host discovery is one of the earliest phases of network reconnaissance. The adversary usually starts with a range of IP addresses belonging to a target network and uses various methods to determine if a host is present at that IP address. Host discovery is usually referred to as 'Ping' scanning using a sonar analogy. The goal is to send a packet through to the IP address and solicit a response from the host. As such, a 'ping' can be virtually any crafted packet whatsoever, provided the adversary can identify a functional host based on its response. An attack of this nature is usually carried out with a 'ping sweep,' where a particular kind of ping is sent to a range of IP addresses.
  • Traceroute Route Enumeration
    An adversary uses a traceroute utility to map out the route which data flows through the network in route to a target destination. Tracerouting can allow the adversary to construct a working topology of systems and routers by listing the systems through which data passes through on their way to the targeted machine. This attack can return varied results depending upon the type of traceroute that is performed. Traceroute works by sending packets to a target while incrementing the Time-to-Live field in the packet header. As the packet traverses each hop along its way to the destination, its TTL expires generating an ICMP diagnostic message that identifies where the packet expired. Traditional techniques for tracerouting involved the use of ICMP and UDP, but as more firewalls began to filter ingress ICMP, methods of traceroute using TCP were developed.
  • ICMP Address Mask Request
    An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address. Many modern operating systems will not respond to ICMP type 17 messages for security reasons. Determining whether a system or router will respond to an ICMP Address Mask Request helps the adversary determine operating system or firmware version. Additionally, because these types of messages are rare, they are easily spotted by intrusion detection systems. Many ICMP scanning tools support IP spoofing to help conceal the origin of the actual request among a storm of similar ICMP messages. It is a common practice for border firewalls and gateways to be configured to block ingress ICMP type 17 and egress ICMP type 18 messages.
  • Timestamp Request
    This pattern of attack leverages standard requests to learn the exact time associated with a target system. An adversary may be able to use the timestamp returned from the target to attack time-based security algorithms, such as random number generators, or time-based authentication mechanisms.
  • ICMP Information Request
    An adversary sends an ICMP Information Request to a host to determine if it will respond to this deprecated mechanism. ICMP Information Requests are a deprecated message type. Information Requests were originally used for diskless machines to automatically obtain their network configuration, but this message type has been superseded by more robust protocol implementations like DHCP.
  • TCP ACK Ping
    An adversary sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag set to a remote host for the purpose of determining if the host is alive. This is one of several TCP 'ping' types. The RFC 793 expected behavior for a service is to respond with a RST 'reset' packet to any unsolicited ACK segment that is not part of an existing connection. So by sending an ACK segment to a port, the adversary can identify that the host is alive by looking for a RST packet. Typically, a remote server will respond with a RST regardless of whether a port is open or closed. In this way, TCP ACK pings cannot discover the state of a remote port because the behavior is the same in either case. The firewall will look up the ACK packet in its state-table and discard the segment because it does not correspond to any active connection. A TCP ACK Ping can be used to discover if a host is alive via RST response packets sent from the host.
  • UDP Ping
    An adversary sends a UDP datagram to the remote host to determine if the host is alive. If a UDP datagram is sent to an open UDP port there is very often no response, so a typical strategy for using a UDP ping is to send the datagram to a random high port on the target. The goal is to solicit an 'ICMP port unreachable' message from the target, indicating that the host is alive. UDP pings are useful because some firewalls are not configured to block UDP datagrams sent to strange or typically unused ports, like ports in the 65K range. Additionally, while some firewalls may filter incoming ICMP, weaknesses in firewall rule-sets may allow certain types of ICMP (host unreachable, port unreachable) which are useful for UDP ping attempts.
  • TCP SYN Ping
    An adversary uses TCP SYN packets as a means towards host discovery. Typical RFC 793 behavior specifies that when a TCP port is open, a host must respond to an incoming SYN "synchronize" packet by completing stage two of the 'three-way handshake' - by sending an SYN/ACK in response. When a port is closed, RFC 793 behavior is to respond with a RST "reset" packet. This behavior can be used to 'ping' a target to see if it is alive by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port and then looking for a RST or an ACK packet in response. Due to the different responses from open and closed ports, SYN packets can be used to determine the remote state of the port. A TCP SYN ping is also useful for discovering alive hosts protected by a stateful firewall. In cases where a specific firewall rule does not block access to a port, a SYN packet can pass through the firewall to the host and solicit a response from either an open or closed port. When a stateful firewall is present, SYN pings are preferable to ACK pings because a stateful firewall will typically drop all unsolicited ACK packets as they are not part of an existing or new connection. TCP SYN pings often fail when a stateless ACL or firewall is configured to blanket-filter incoming packets to a port. The firewall device will discard any SYN packets to a blocked port. Often, an adversary will alternate between SYN and ACK pings to discover if a host is alive.
  • Port Scanning
    An adversary uses a combination of techniques to determine the state of the ports on a remote target. Any service or application available for TCP or UDP networking will have a port open for communications over the network. Although common services have assigned port numbers, services and applications can run on arbitrary ports. Additionally, port scanning is complicated by the potential for any machine to have up to 65535 possible UDP or TCP services. The goal of port scanning is often broader than identifying open ports, but also give the adversary information concerning the firewall configuration. Depending upon the method of scanning that is used, the process can be stealthy or more obtrusive, the latter being more easily detectable due to the volume of packets involved, anomalous packet traits, or system logging. Typical port scanning activity involves sending probes to a range of ports and observing the responses. There are four types of port status that this type of attack aims to identify: 1) Open Port: The port is open and a firewall does not block access to the port, 2) Closed Port: The port is closed (i.e. no service resides there) and a firewall does not block access to the port, 3) Filtered Port: A firewall or ACL rule is blocking access to the port in some manner, although the presence of a listening service on the port cannot be verified, and 4) Unfiltered Port: A firewall or ACL rule is not blocking access to the port, although the presence of a listening service on the port cannot be verified. For strategic purposes it is useful for an adversary to distinguish between an open port that is protected by a filter vs. a closed port that is not protected by a filter. Making these fine grained distinctions is impossible with certain scan types. A TCP connect scan, for instance, cannot distinguish a blocked port with an active service from a closed port that is not firewalled. Other scan types can only detect closed ports, while others cannot detect port state at all, only the presence or absence of filters. Collecting this type of information tells the adversary which ports can be attacked directly, which must be attacked with filter evasion techniques like fragmentation, source port scans, and which ports are unprotected (i.e. not firewalled) but aren't hosting a network service. An adversary often combines various techniques in order to gain a more complete picture of the firewall filtering mechanisms in place for a host.
  • TCP Connect Scan
    An adversary uses full TCP connection attempts to determine if a port is open on the target system. The scanning process involves completing a 'three-way handshake' with a remote port, and reports the port as closed if the full handshake cannot be established. An advantage of TCP connect scanning is that it works against any TCP/IP stack. RFC 793 defines how TCP connections are established and torn down. TCP connect scanning commonly involves establishing a full connection, and then subsequently tearing it down, and therefore involves sending a significant number of packets to each port that is scanned. Compared to other types of scans, a TCP Connect scan is slow and methodical. This type of scanning causes considerable noise in system logs and can be spotted by IDS/IPS systems. TCP Connect scanning can detect when a port is open by completing the three-way handshake, but it cannot distinguish a port that is unfiltered with no service running on it from a port that is filtered by a firewall but contains an active service. Due to the significant volume of packets exchanged per port, TCP connect scanning can become very time consuming (performing a full TCP connect scan against a host can take multiple days). Generally, it is not used as a method for performing a comprehensive port scan, but is reserved for checking a short list of common ports.
  • TCP FIN Scan
    An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets. In addition to its relative speed in comparison with other types of scans, the major advantage a TCP FIN Scan is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. FIN packets, like out-of-state ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. Many operating systems, however, do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason FIN scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing an attacker from distinguishing between open and closed ports. FIN scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work. Additionally, because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, FIN scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. For these reasons, FIN scanning results must always be interpreted as part of a larger scanning strategy. FIN scanning is still relatively stealthy as the packets tend to blend in with the background noise on a network link. FIN scans are detected via heuristic (non-signature) based algorithms, much in the same way as other scan types are detected.
  • TCP Xmas Scan
    An adversary uses a TCP XMAS scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the all flags sent in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets. In addition to its relative speed when compared with other types of scans, its major advantage is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. XMAS packets, like out-of-state FIN or ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. Many operating systems, however, do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason FIN scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing the adversary from distinguishing between open and closed ports. XMAS scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work. Additionally, because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, XMAS scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. Because of their obvious rule-breaking nature, XMAS scans are flagged by almost all intrusion prevention or intrusion detection systems.
  • TCP Null Scan
    An adversary uses a TCP NULL scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with no flags in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets. In addition to being fast, the major advantage of this scan type is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. NULL packets, like out-of-state FIN or ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. Many operating systems, however, do not implement RFC 793 exactly and for this reason NULL scans do not work as expected against these devices. Some operating systems, like Microsoft Windows, send a RST packet in response to any out-of-sync (or malformed) TCP segments received by a listening socket (rather than dropping the packet via RFC 793), thus preventing an attacker from distinguishing between open and closed ports. NULL scans are limited by the range of platforms against which they work. Additionally, because open ports are inferred via no responses being generated, one cannot distinguish an open port from a filtered port without further analysis. For instance, NULL scanning a system protected by a stateful firewall may indicate all ports being open. Because of their obvious rule-breaking nature, NULL scans are flagged by almost all intrusion prevention or intrusion detection systems.
  • TCP ACK Scan
    An adversary uses TCP ACK segments to gather information about firewall or ACL configuration. The purpose of this type of scan is to discover information about filter configurations rather than port state. This type of scanning is rarely useful alone, but when combined with SYN scanning, gives a more complete picture of the type of firewall rules that are present. When a TCP ACK segment is sent to a closed port, or sent out-of-sync to a listening port, the RFC 793 expected behavior is for the device to respond with a RST. Getting RSTs back in response to a ACK scan gives the attacker useful information that can be used to infer the type of firewall present. Stateful firewalls will discard out-of-sync ACK packets, leading to no response. When this occurs the port is marked as filtered. When RSTs are received in response, the ports are marked as unfiltered, as the ACK packets solicited the expected behavior from a port. When combined with SYN techniques an attacker can gain a more complete picture of which types of packets get through to a host and thereby map out its firewall rule-set. ACK scanning, when combined with SYN scanning, also allows the adversary to analyze whether a firewall is stateful or non-stateful. If a SYN solicits a SYN/ACK or a RST and an ACK solicits a RST, the port is unfiltered by any firewall type. If a SYN solicits a SYN/ACK, but an ACK generates no response, the port is statefully filtered. When a SYN generates neither a SYN/ACK or a RST, but an ACK generates a RST, the port is statefully filtered. When neither SYN nor ACK generates any response, the port is blocked by a specific firewall rule, which can occur via any type of firewall. TCP ACK Scans are somewhat faster and more stealthy than other types of scans but often requires rather sophisticated analysis by an experienced person. A skilled adversary may use this method to map out firewall rules, but the results of ACK scanning will be less useful to a novice.
  • TCP Window Scan
    An adversary engages in TCP Window scanning to analyze port status and operating system type. TCP Window scanning uses the ACK scanning method but examine the TCP Window Size field of response RST packets to make certain inferences. While TCP Window Scans are fast and relatively stealthy, they work against fewer TCP stack implementations than any other type of scan. Some operating systems return a positive TCP window size when a RST packet is sent from an open port, and a negative value when the RST originates from a closed port. TCP Window scanning is one of the most complex scan types, and its results are difficult to interpret. Window scanning alone rarely yields useful information, but when combined with other types of scanning is more useful. It is a generally more reliable means of making inference about operating system versions than port status.
  • TCP RPC Scan
    An adversary scans for RPC services listing on a Unix/Linux host. This type of scan can be obtained via native operating system utilities or via port scanners like nmap. When performed by a scanner, an RPC datagram is sent to a list of UDP ports and the response is recorded. Particular types of responses can be indicative of well-known RPC services running on a UDP port. Direct RPC scans that bypass portmapper/sunrpc are typically slow compare to other scan types, are easily detected by IPS/IDS systems, and can only detect open ports when an RPC service responds. ICMP diagnostic message responses can help identify closed ports, however filtered and unfiltered ports cannot be identified through TCP RPC scans. There are two general approaches to RPC scanning: One is to use a native operating system utility, or script, to query the portmapper/rpcbind application running on port 111. Portmapper will return a list of registered RPC services. Alternately, one can use a port scanner or script to scan for RPC services directly. Discovering RPC services gives the attacker potential targets to attack, as some RPC services are insecure by default.
  • UDP Scan
    An adversary engages in UDP scanning to gather information about UDP port status on the target system. UDP scanning methods involve sending a UDP datagram to the target port and looking for evidence that the port is closed. Open UDP ports usually do not respond to UDP datagrams as there is no stateful mechanism within the protocol that requires building or establishing a session. Responses to UDP datagrams are therefore application specific and cannot be relied upon as a method of detecting an open port. UDP scanning relies heavily upon ICMP diagnostic messages in order to determine the status of a remote port. During a UDP scan, a datagram is sent to a target port. If an 'ICMP Type 3 Port unreachable' error message is returned then the port is considered closed. Different types of ICMP messages can indicate a filtered port. UDP scanning is slower than TCP scanning. The protocol characteristics of UDP make port scanning inherently more difficult than with TCP, as well as dependent upon ICMP for accurate scanning. Due to ambiguities that can arise between open ports and filtered ports, UDP scanning results often require a high degree of interpretation and further testing to refine. In general, UDP scanning results are less reliable or accurate than TCP-based scanning.
  • Network Topology Mapping
    An adversary engages in scanning activities to map network nodes, hosts, devices, and routes. Adversaries usually perform this type of network reconnaissance during the early stages of attack against an external network. Many types of scanning utilities are typically employed, including ICMP tools, network mappers, port scanners, and route testing utilities such as traceroute.
  • Scanning for Vulnerable Software
    An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.
  • Active OS Fingerprinting
    An adversary engages in activity to detect the operating system or firmware version of a remote target by interrogating a device, server, or platform with a probe designed to solicit behavior that will reveal information about the operating systems or firmware in the environment. Operating System detection is possible because implementations of common protocols (Such as IP or TCP) differ in distinct ways. While the implementation differences are not sufficient to 'break' compatibility with the protocol the differences are detectable because the target will respond in unique ways to specific probing activity that breaks the semantic or logical rules of packet construction for a protocol. Different operating systems will have a unique response to the anomalous input, providing the basis to fingerprint the OS behavior. This type of OS fingerprinting can distinguish between operating system types and versions.
  • Passive OS Fingerprinting
    An adversary engages in activity to detect the version or type of OS software in a an environment by passively monitoring communication between devices, nodes, or applications. Passive techniques for operating system detection send no actual probes to a target, but monitor network or client-server communication between nodes in order to identify operating systems based on observed behavior as compared to a database of known signatures or values. While passive OS fingerprinting is not usually as reliable as active methods, it is generally better able to evade detection.
  • IP ID Sequencing Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the IP 'ID' field sequence number generation algorithm of a remote host. Operating systems generate IP 'ID' numbers differently, allowing an attacker to identify the operating system of the host by examining how is assigns ID numbers when generating response packets. RFC 791 does not specify how ID numbers are chosen or their ranges, so ID sequence generation differs from implementation to implementation. There are two kinds of IP 'ID' sequence number analysis - IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the IP 'ID' sequence generation algorithm for one protocol used by a host and Shared IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the packet ordering via IP 'ID' values spanning multiple protocols, such as between ICMP and TCP.
  • IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'ID' value from the probe packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with an arbitrary IP 'ID' value to a closed port on the remote host to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. The identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within an ICMP error message.
  • IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'DF' (Don't Fragment) bit in a response packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with the DF bit set to a closed port on the remote host to observe whether the 'DF' bit is set in the response packet. Some operating systems will echo the bit in the ICMP error message while others will zero out the bit in the response packet.
  • TCP Timestamp Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe examines the remote server's implementation of TCP timestamps. Not all operating systems implement timestamps within the TCP header, but when timestamps are used then this provides the attacker with a means to guess the operating system of the target. The attacker begins by probing any active TCP service in order to get response which contains a TCP timestamp. Different Operating systems update the timestamp value using different intervals. This type of analysis is most accurate when multiple timestamp responses are received and then analyzed. TCP timestamps can be found in the TCP Options field of the TCP header.
  • TCP Sequence Number Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe tests the target system's assignment of TCP sequence numbers. One common way to test TCP Sequence Number generation is to send a probe packet to an open port on the target and then compare the how the Sequence Number generated by the target relates to the Acknowledgement Number in the probe packet. Different operating systems assign Sequence Numbers differently, so a fingerprint of the operating system can be obtained by categorizing the relationship between the acknowledgement number and sequence number as follows: 1) the Sequence Number generated by the target is Zero, 2) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the same as the acknowledgement number in the probe, 3) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the acknowledgement number plus one, or 4) the Sequence Number is any other non-zero number.
  • TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe sends a number of TCP SYN packets to an open port of a remote machine. The Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in each of the SYN/ACK response packets is analyzed to determine the smallest number that the target host uses when incrementing sequence numbers. This information can be useful for identifying an operating system because particular operating systems and versions increment sequence numbers using different values. The result of the analysis is then compared against a database of OS behaviors to determine the OS type and/or version.
  • TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe
    This OS detection probe measures the average rate of initial sequence number increments during a period of time. Sequence numbers are incremented using a time-based algorithm and are susceptible to a timing analysis that can determine the number of increments per unit time. The result of this analysis is then compared against a database of operating systems and versions to determine likely operation system matches.
  • TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe
    This type of operating system probe attempts to determine an estimate for how predictable the sequence number generation algorithm is for a remote host. Statistical techniques, such as standard deviation, can be used to determine how predictable the sequence number generation is for a system. This result can then be compared to a database of operating system behaviors to determine a likely match for operating system and version.
  • TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe checks to see if the remote host supports explicit congestion notification (ECN) messaging. ECN messaging was designed to allow routers to notify a remote host when signal congestion problems are occurring. Explicit Congestion Notification messaging is defined by RFC 3168. Different operating systems and versions may or may not implement ECN notifications, or may respond uniquely to particular ECN flag types.
  • TCP Initial Window Size Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe checks the initial TCP Window size. TCP stacks limit the range of sequence numbers allowable within a session to maintain the "connected" state within TCP protocol logic. The initial window size specifies a range of acceptable sequence numbers that will qualify as a response to an ACK packet within a session. Various operating systems use different Initial window sizes. The initial window size can be sampled by establishing an ordinary TCP connection.
  • TCP Options Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the type and order of any TCP header options present within a response segment. Most operating systems use unique ordering and different option sets when options are present. RFC 793 does not specify a required order when options are present, so different implementations use unique ways of ordering or structuring TCP options. TCP options can be generated by ordinary TCP traffic.
  • TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe
    This OS fingerprinting probe performs a checksum on any ASCII data contained within the data portion or a RST packet. Some operating systems will report a human-readable text message in the payload of a 'RST' (reset) packet when specific types of connection errors occur. RFC 1122 allows text payloads within reset packets but not all operating systems or routers implement this functionality.
  • ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe
    An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the amount of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the ICMP error message. For this purpose "Port Unreachable" error messages are often used, as generating them requires the attacker to send a UDP datagram to a closed port on the target. The goal of this analysis to make inferences about the type of operating system or firmware that sent the error message in reply. This is useful for identifying unique characteristics of operating systems because the RFC-1122 expected behavior reads: "Every ICMP error message includes the Internet header and at least the first 8 data octets of the datagram that triggered the error; more than 8 octets MAY be sent [...]." This contrasts with RFC-792 expected behavior, which limited the quoted text to 64 bits (8 octets). Given the latitude in the specification the resulting RFC-1122 stack implementations often respond with a high degree of variability in the amount of data quoted in the error message because "older" or "legacy" stacks may comply with the RFC-792 specification, while other stacks may choose a longer format in accordance with RFC-1122. As a general rule most operating systems or firmware will quote the first 8 bytes of the datagram triggering the error, but some IP stacks will quote more than the first 8 bytes of data.
  • ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe
    An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the integrity of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the error message. For this purpose "Port Unreachable" error messages are often used, as generating them requires the attacker to send a UDP datagram to a closed port on the target. When replying with an ICMP error message some IP/ICMP stack implementations change aspects of the IP header, change or reverse certain byte orders, reset certain field values to default values which differ between operating system and firmware implementations, and make other changes. Some IP/ICMP stacks are decidedly broken, indicating an idiosyncratic behavior that differs from the RFC specifications, such as the case when miscalculations affect a field value. A tremendous amount of information about the host operating system can be deduced from its 'echoing' characteristics. Notably, inspection of key protocol header fields, including the echoed header fields of the encapsulating protocol can yield a wealth of data about the host operating system or firmware version.
  • Browser Fingerprinting
    An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.
  • Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
    This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
  • Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
    This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
  • Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
    This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An attacker would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the attacker many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
  • File Discovery
    An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to determine if common key files exists. Such files often contain configuration and security parameters of the targeted application, system or network. Using this knowledge may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
  • Process Footprinting
    An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the currently running processes on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what processes are running on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior.
  • Services Footprinting
    An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the services on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what services are registered on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior. Depending on the operating system, commands that can obtain services information include "sc" and "tasklist/svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net.
  • Account Footprinting
    An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the domain accounts and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what accounts are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. Example Windows commands which can acquire this information are: "net user" and "dsquery".
  • Group Permission Footprinting
    An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about user groups and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what users/permissions are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command which can list local groups is "net localgroup".
  • Owner Footprinting
    An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the primary users on the target system to an authorized user. They may do this, for example, by reviewing logins or file modification times. By knowing what owners use the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command that may accomplish this is "dir /A ntuser.dat". Which will display the last modified time of a user's ntuser.dat file when run within the root folder of a user. This time is synonymous with the last time that user was logged in.
  • Establish Rogue Location
    An adversary provides a malicious version of a resource at a location that is similar to the expected location of a legitimate resource. After establishing the rogue location, the adversary waits for a victim to visit the location and access the malicious resource.
  • Identify Shared Files/Directories on System
    An adversary discovers connections between systems by exploiting the target system's standard practice of revealing them in searchable, common areas. Through the identification of shared folders/drives between systems, the adversary may further their goals of locating and collecting sensitive information/files, or map potential routes for lateral movement within the network.
  • Peripheral Footprinting
    Adversaries may attempt to obtain information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Examples may include discovering the presence of iOS devices by searching for backups, analyzing the Windows registry to determine what USB devices have been connected, or infecting a victim system with malware to report when a USB device has been connected. This may allow the adversary to gain additional insight about the system or network environment, which may be useful in constructing further attacks.
  • Eavesdropping
    An adversary intercepts a form of communication (e.g. text, audio, video) by way of software (e.g., microphone and audio recording application), hardware (e.g., recording equipment), or physical means (e.g., physical proximity). The goal of eavesdropping is typically to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. Eavesdropping is different from a sniffing attack as it does not take place on a network-based communication channel (e.g., IP traffic). Instead, it entails listening in on the raw audio source of a conversation between two or more parties.
cvss-vector via4 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
redhat via4
id 1367455
title No contacts are displayed until search is started
  • comment Red Hat Enterprise Linux must be installed
    oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20070304026
  • AND
    • comment Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 is installed
      oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20150364027
    • OR
      • AND
        • comment openchange is earlier than 0:2.3-2.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206001
        • comment openchange is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206002
      • AND
        • comment openchange-client is earlier than 0:2.3-2.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206003
        • comment openchange-client is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206004
      • AND
        • comment openchange-devel is earlier than 0:2.3-2.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206005
        • comment openchange-devel is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206006
      • AND
        • comment openchange-devel-docs is earlier than 0:2.3-2.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206007
        • comment openchange-devel-docs is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206008
      • AND
        • comment evolution-ews is earlier than 0:3.12.11-9.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206009
        • comment evolution-ews is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206010
      • AND
        • comment evolution-mapi is earlier than 0:3.12.10-5.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206011
        • comment evolution-mapi is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206012
      • AND
        • comment evolution-mapi-devel is earlier than 0:3.12.10-5.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206013
        • comment evolution-mapi-devel is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206014
      • AND
        • comment evolution-data-server is earlier than 0:3.12.11-37.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206015
        • comment evolution-data-server is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206016
      • AND
        • comment evolution-data-server-devel is earlier than 0:3.12.11-37.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206017
        • comment evolution-data-server-devel is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206018
      • AND
        • comment evolution-data-server-doc is earlier than 0:3.12.11-37.el7
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206019
        • comment evolution-data-server-doc is signed with Red Hat redhatrelease2 key
          oval oval:com.redhat.rhba:tst:20162206020
id RHBA-2016:2206
released 2016-11-03
severity Moderate
title RHBA-2016:2206: evolution-data-server bug fix update (Moderate)
  • evolution-data-server-0:3.12.11-37.el7
  • evolution-data-server-debuginfo-0:3.12.11-37.el7
  • evolution-data-server-devel-0:3.12.11-37.el7
  • evolution-data-server-doc-0:3.12.11-37.el7
  • evolution-ews-0:3.12.11-9.el7
  • evolution-ews-debuginfo-0:3.12.11-9.el7
  • evolution-mapi-0:3.12.10-5.el7
  • evolution-mapi-debuginfo-0:3.12.10-5.el7
  • evolution-mapi-devel-0:3.12.10-5.el7
  • openchange-0:2.3-2.el7
  • openchange-client-0:2.3-2.el7
  • openchange-debuginfo-0:2.3-2.el7
  • openchange-devel-0:2.3-2.el7
  • openchange-devel-docs-0:2.3-2.el7
refmap via4
ubuntu USN-3724-1
Last major update 18-09-2018 - 13:16
Published 20-07-2018 - 04:29
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