ID CVE-2007-6755
Summary The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE. The list of products in the configuration is subject to change as more infomation becomes available. The Dual Elliptic Curve Random Bit Generator (Dual EC DRBG), as specified in NIST SP800-90A, depends on two parameters, P and Q, both elliptic curve points. The security of Dual EC DRBG relies on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm of Q base P. While computing discrete logarithms is a cryptographically hard problem, infeasible from an attack perspective, it would be possible for these parameters to be generated in such a way that this logarithm is known. This has raised concerns that the DRBG could conceal a trapdoor, allowing those who generated P and Q in this way to predict outputs from the DRBG after collecting a small number of sample outputs. It is important to note that Dual EC DRBG is only vulnerable to this attack if the parameters were generated in this way. If the parameters were both generated randomly and independently, this attack would not be feasible. However, because the provenance of the default values for P and Q are not known, security researchers are not able to verify the trustworthiness of this algorithm with the default parameters. For the purposes of scoring this vulnerability, it will be assumed that the relationship between P and Q described above is known to the attacker. SUPPLEMENTAL ITL BULLETIN FOR SEPTEMBER 2013: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/itlbul2013_09_supplemental.pdf
References
Vulnerable Configurations
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:3.0.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_psos:3.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_psos:3.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_psos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_psos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_vxworks:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-c_me_mfp_vxworks:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:5.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:rsa:bsafe_crypto-j_jsafe_and_jce:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
CVSS
Base: 5.8 (as of 28-11-2016 - 19:07)
Impact:
Exploitability:
CWE CWE-310
CAPEC
  • Signature Spoofing by Key Recreation
    An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by exploiting a cryptographic weakness in the signature algorithm or pseudorandom number generation and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
Access
VectorComplexityAuthentication
NETWORK MEDIUM NONE
Impact
ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
PARTIAL PARTIAL NONE
cvss-vector via4 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
refmap via4
bid 63657
misc
Last major update 28-11-2016 - 19:07
Published 11-10-2013 - 22:55
Last modified 28-11-2016 - 19:07
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