| Name | Choosing a Message/Channel Identifier on a Public/Multicast Channel |
| Summary | Attackers aware that more data is being fed into a multicast or public information distribution means can 'select' information bound only for another client, even if the distribution means itself forces users to authenticate in order to connect initially.
Doing so allows the attacker to gain access to possibly privileged information, possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation.
If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could change its identifier from a less privileged to more so privileged channel or command. |
| Prerequisites | Information and client-sensitive (and client-specific) data must be present through a distribution channel available to all users.
Distribution means must code (through channel, message identifiers, or convention) message destination in a manner visible within the distribution means itself (such as a control channel) or in the messages themselves. |
| Solutions | The purpose is to architect the system in a way that associates proper authentication/authorization with each channel/message.
Re-architect system input/output channels as appropriate to distribute self-protecting data. That is, encrypt (or otherwise protect) channels/messages so that only authorized readers can see them. |
| Related Weaknesses |
| CWE ID | Description |
| CWE-201 | Information Exposure Through Sent Data |
| CWE-306 | Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
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