Name JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
Summary An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website. An attacker gets the victim to visit his or her malicious page that contains a script tag whose source points to the vulnerable system with a URL that requests a response from the server containing a JSON object with possibly confidential information. The malicious page also contains malicious code to capture the JSON object returned by the server before any other processing on it can take place, typically by overriding the JavaScript function used to create new objects. This hook allows the malicious code to get access to the creation of each object and transmit the possibly sensitive contents of the captured JSON object to the attackers' server. There is nothing in the browser's security model to prevent the attackers' malicious JavaScript code (originating from attacker's domain) to set up an environment (as described above) to intercept a JSON object response (coming from the vulnerable target system's domain), read its contents and transmit to the attackers' controlled site. The same origin policy protects the domain object model (DOM), but not the JSON.
Prerequisites JSON is used as a transport mechanism between the client and the server The target server cannot differentiate real requests from forged requests The JSON object returned from the server can be accessed by the attackers' malicious code via a script tag
Solutions Ensure that server side code can differentiate between legitimate requests and forged requests. The solution is similar to protection against Cross Site Request Forger (CSRF), which is to use a hard to guess random nonce (that is unique to the victim's session with the server) that the attacker has no way of knowing (at least in the absence of other weaknesses). Each request from the client to the server should contain this nonce and the server should reject all requests that do not contain the nonce. On the client side, the system's design could make it difficult to get access to the JSON object content via the script tag. Since the JSON object is never assigned locally to a variable, it cannot be readily modified by the attacker before being used by a script tag. For instance, if while(1) was added to the beginning of the JavaScript returned by the server, trying to access it with a script tag would result in an infinite loop. On the other hand, legitimate client side code can remove the while(1) statement after which the JavaScript can be evaluated. A similar result can be achieved by surrounding the returned JavaScript with comment tags, or using other similar techniques (e.g. wrapping the JavaScript with HTML tags). Make the URLs in the system used to retrieve JSON objects unpredictable and unique for each user session. Ensure that to the extent possible, no sensitive data is passed from the server to the client via JSON objects. JavaScript was never intended to play that role, hence the same origin policy does not adequate address this scenario.
Related Weaknesses
CWE ID Description
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CWE-346 Origin Validation Error
Back to Top